The relationship between nature and normativity in Aristotle’s practical philosophy is problematic. On the one hand, Aristotle insists that ethical virtue arises through the habitual repetition of ethically good actions, and thus no one is good or virtuous by nature. Phusikê aretê or “natural virtue” is more like cleverness (demotes) than prudence (phronêsis) and it can result in wrong actions. Yet on the other hand, at times Aristotle appears to use nature to justify normative claims. Thus the problem with Aristotle’s (...) use of the notion of nature in his practical philosophy is that in some instances what is natural seems to be ethically neutral, but in other instances it seems to set the standard for human perfection. Modern Aristotle exegetes have sometimes argued that Aristotle must, consciously or not, be using the term “nature” in at least two different senses here. To use the language of Julia Annas, when Aristotle talks about “natural virtue” in the sense of the talents or abilities which one possesses from birth, he has in mind the notion of “mere nature,” but when he discusses the perfections which a virtuous individual enjoys by his or her nature, Aristotle has in mind the notion of nature as an “ethical ideal.” I would like to suggest an alternative solution to the problem of reconciling Aristotle’s different senses of nature in his Ethics. In Nicomachean Ethics V.7, Aristotle claims that political justice {to dikaion politikon) possesses a “natural” {phusikon) part and a “conventional” {nomikori) part. Aristotle claims that both nature and convention admit of variation, and his language suggests that the two are ultimately parts which need to be interwoven or combined. Scholars who have struggled with Aristotle’s apparently disparate senses of the idea of nature have assumed that nature is an ethical ideal which can be separated from and serve as a guide for that which is merely conventional. I argue that when Aristotle invokes what is “natural” as a norm, he does so under the assumption that the natural component of a norm is ultimately separable from its conventional part only in abstraction. Just like the syllable “BA” is not reducible to the letters “b” and “a,” but instead is a whole greater than its two parts, political justice is a composite unity of nature and convention which, in unifying the two parts, transforms them. (shrink)

In this original study, noted scholar and theologian David Hartman discusses the relation between Maimonides' halakhic writings and The Guide of the Perplexed- ...

The canon, this full Christian-Torah story, is the paradigm God has given us so that we too can conjugate the verbs of his activity today and know his participation in our lives now.

Discusses the respects in which religiously grounded considerations can have an appropriate---even important--role in the public and political discourse of a liberal polity. Examines the role tradition can have in enabling people to attain a reasoned justification for moral ideas and ideals, i.e., tradition is not always an impediment to universally valid or objective considerations. Also, discusses respects in which modern liberalism owes an important debt to religious ideas.

Every speech has a long ancestry, even if it was composed for a novel occasion. It may help to clarify my purposes in today’s speech if I say a few words about its genealogy and its genesis. Its lone ancestor was my undergraduate teacher, Simon Kaplan, a learned and a pious man. I recall vividly the day he admonished me in a thick Russian accent which I can’t mimic, “Mr. Lachterman, you spend all your time with the Greeks and none (...) of your time with the Jews.” Although he prepared a reading list of traditional Jewish texts for me, it was many years before I undertook to read the books on that list. I was, however, able to repay a small portion of the extravagant debt that I owed him both as a teacher and as a friend, by helping him with the English translation of Hermann Cohen’s Religion of Reason, a book about which I shall have more to say later. (shrink)

The physis and nomos controversy first emerged in ancient Greek thought. This article explores Castoriadis' reactivation of the issues concerned; in particular, his radicalization of Aristotle's conception of physis and nomos. It suggests that nomos appears as multifaceted in his work. However, three key variations may be identified: empirical nomos, normative nomos and generic nomos. Empirical nomos signifies the human creation of laws. It challenges the notion, long held in western philosophy, that Being (...) = being determined. Although all laws are by humans created and thus in one sense autonomous, Castoriadis further distinguishes normatively between those societies which embrace their self-creating and self-transformative capacity and those which obscure it. Normative nomos, then, refers to the autonomous or heteronomous institution of society. The third sense of nomos refers to the creation of form. In this generic sense, it is argued that the debate shifts from the human to the non-human realm; that nomos also manifests itself in the realm of physis. (shrink)

This commentary response presents two concepts that may address legal-political issues arising in the civics pillar of digital civics: the history of data and nomos. It suggests that we can draw from the history of data to supplement our understanding of datafication and formulate responses to surveillance capitalism. It then forwards the utility of the ancient concept of nomos as a means of approaching cultural and jurisdictional challenges arising in the infosphere.

This volume of studies in honor of Arthur Hyman contains various investigations in philosophy, Halakha, and Kabbala. While several focus upon ethico-legal issues pertinent to rabbinic law, such as economic public policy in the Torah and Sabbath laws in the writings of Philo, four concentrate on Maimonides' understanding of metaphysics and knowledge of God.

The paper challenges the traditional assumption that the fragments of ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ are best understood and interpreted against the intellectual and cultural background of the so-called ‘sophistic movement’. I begin by suggesting that we can distinguish, in the fragments, between two separate ‘discourses’ concerning nomos and its role in human life: an abstract ‘sophistic’ discourse, centered around the defense of nomos against the antinomian champions of natural pleonexia, and another, less abstract and more polemical discourse on nomos, (...) which is aimed at the author’s contemporary Athens. I argue that the author’s engagement with well-known sophistic ideas is best understood as instrumental to his polemical agenda: it provides him with a powerful intellectual framework in which to articulate his criticism of democratic society, especially with regard to traditional notions of social ‘benefaction’ and the relation between rich and poor. (shrink)

Abstract Proceeding from Jewish philosophy's origins in the convergence and divergence of Greek and Jewish thought and the resulting possibilities of construing Judaism and philosophy as heterogeneous or homogeneous, and ranging across the three major “ages“ or linguistic matrices of Jewish philosophizing (Hellenistic, Judeo-Arabic, and Germanic), the essay describes Jewish philosophy as an unresolvable entanglement in a dialectic of heteronomy and autonomy.

This publishes the Taubman Lectures for September 2013. The aim of the book is to trace the reception of the Torah from the Babylonian...

A concise introduction to the Christian theology of salvation in light of the contributions of Thomas Aquinas. In the study, Matthew Levering identifies six important aspects of soteriology, each of which corresponds to an individual chapter in the book. Levering focuses on: human history understood in light of the divine law and covenants; Jesus the Incarnate Son of God and Messiah of Israel; Jesus' cross; transformation in the image of God; the Mystical Body of Christ into which all human beings (...) are called; and eternal life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Torah and Law in “Paradise Lost,”Gordon TeskeyTorah and Law in “Paradise Lost,” by Jason P. Rosenblatt; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, $39.50.The epic project that includes the poems Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained marks the last occasion in Europe when the most ambitious literary form sought stability in theology rather than in philosophy. The philosophical poem, a minor form before the Enlightenment, became after Milton the general (...) idea of what a great long poem should be. One thinks of Faust, naturally enough, where the triumph of philosophy over theology is enacted, of Coleridge’s youthful plans for a philosophical epic, and of Wordsworth’s qualified achievement of it in The Prelude. Hegel said that art, having been supplanted by philosophy as the discourse of truth, must be for us a thing of the past. A less striking but perhaps more accurate statement would be that the art that once sought stability in the knowledge of God now seeks it in the impersonal knowledge of truth. The Milton who, before Paradise Lost, composed for his own use a theological treatise in which every point made is anchored in scripture, belongs to an earlier age. Yet there are in him clear indications of what is to come. No poet before Milton is so preoccupied with metaphysical questions, with the ultimate nature of being and the causative principles governing creation.It is the theological Milton with which Jason P. Rosenblatt is concerned in this fine study of Paradise Lost, a study that is more controversial than is suggested by its title or by its eirenic scholarly tone. The book is an attack on what its author regards as the Pauline bias of Milton studies in the tradition of A. S. P. Woodhouse and Arthur Barker. It is a bias, persisting even in Miltonists who are unconcerned with theological questions, against Hebraism in general and the “Old Law” in particular, the system of law referred to as Torah. Expressed in positive terms, Rosenblatt’s aim is to show how Milton’s prose tracts of 1643–1645 (the tracts on divorce) are “the principal doctrinal matrix of the middle books of Paradise Lost” (p. ix), that is, of the books in which human beings are shown in the state of innocence, giving us a utopian model [End Page 546] of what we should strive for in our own lives. But the Hebraic ethos of Eden gives way in the later books of the epic, after the Fall, to a Pauline perspective where the Law is an evil that stands in the way of our freedom. Whereas Pauline theology condemns the Hebrew Law as a law of bondage, Torah, like the Tao, is a means to live freely in accord with the law of one’s nature. Such law is felt not as a restraint but as a path. Rosenblatt suggests that Paradise Lost is not the unified, orthodox Christian vision Woodhouse claimed it to be but a work that undergoes radical ideological change after the Fall, reenacting the historical change brought about by Christianity itself.In the 1640s Milton embarked on an arduous program of Hebraic studies, spurred on by his desire to recuperate the one Mosaic law Christ explicitly overturned: that permitting divorce for causes other than fornication, a word that, as Milton’s Satan says of another, bears no single sense. After the exaggerated assessments, earlier this century, of Milton’s Hebrew erudition an over-correction set in, asserting that because Milton resorted to secondary sources, reference works, and translations his Hebrew learning was shallow. But Milton never pretended to be a Hebrew or an Aramaic scholar. He knew the languages and used them to learn more, as he used and acknowledged the work of great scholars like Selden; and for an amateur his attainments were truly remarkable. Miltonists will value this book for its balanced, expert reassessment of the poet’s Hebrew learning. And it will be especially appreciated by Miltonists for the new insight it brings to the importance of the divorce tracts of the 1640s for the representation of human innocence in Paradise Lost.For most readers the book will be of interest as... (shrink)

This research outlines the concept of resurrection from the ancient Hebrew Torah to Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity according to authoritative and linguistically accurate scriptures accompanied by English translations. Although some contemporary scholars are of the opinion that resurrection is vaguely portrayed in the Hebrew Torah, our research into the ancient texts offers quotes and provides proofs to the contrary. With the passing time, the concept of the resurrection grew even stronger and became one of the most important doctrines (...) of Judaism, enjoined as one of the thirteen articles of faith by Maimonides in the Mishnah. Imitative of the Jewish concept of God reaching out to save Israelites from gehenna, Jesus’ crucifixion and death for the sins of the world, resurrection on the third day, descend into the hells and subsequent rise into heavens became the essential foundation of Christianity, with Christ's resurrection as the impetus for the resurrection of those who believe in him. According to this Pauline theology, Christian faith is based upon the resurrection of Jesus and the hope for a life after death. (shrink)

In this short article, I argue that (a) the distinction between what counts as natural and moral evil is not fixed; that (b) science and technology can transform natural evil into moral evil; that (c) two main philosophical anthropologies explain moral evil as due to ignorance (Socrates) or wickedness (Hobbes); and hence that (d) a society that seeks to counter evil should rely on science and technology to transform natural evil into moral evil and then on education (Paideia) and regulations (...) (Nomos) to minimise or even eliminate moral evil. (shrink)

An interesting question arises in the context of the typically medieval description of the universe presented at the beginning of Maimonides' great law code, the Mishneh Torah. What was Maimonides' own attitude towards that account? Was it meant only as a statement of the best description of nature available at the time matters which make up the bulk of the Mishneh Torah) or was it meant to be a description of the true nature of the universe as it (...) really is, not subject to revision in the light of new paradigms or new models ? Answering this question will lead us to a better understanding of Maimonides' understanding of the nature of science and of what I shall call, for lack of a better term, scientific progress. Maimonides will be shown to hold that while sublunar science can reach perfection and completion such is not possible for superlunar science and that to the extent that the scientific matters in the Mishneh Torah deal with the latter they could not have been presented as the final description of the universe as it truly is. (shrink)

-- 3. Hilchot ta'aniot = The laws of fasts and Hilchot Megillah vaChanukah = The laws of (reading) the Megillah and of Chanukah -- 5. Sefer kedushah = The book of holiness -- 6. Sefer hafla'ah = The book of utterances -- 7. Sefer zeraim = The book of agricultural ordinances -- 8. Sefer ha'avodah = The book of (temple) service -- 11. Sefer nezikin = The book of damages -- 12. Sefer kinyan = The book of acquisition -- 14. (...) Sefer shoftim = The book of judges. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt's notion of nomos is commonly regarded as the international equivalent to the national sovereign's decision on the exception. But can concrete spatial order alone turn a constellation of forces into an international order? This article looks at Schmitt's work The Nomos of the Earth and proposes that it is the process of bracketing war called Hegung which takes the place of the sovereign in the international order Schmitt describes. Beginning from an analysis of nomos, the (...) ordering function of the presocratic concept moira is explored. It is argued that the process of Hegung, like moira, does not just achieve the containment of war, but constitutes the condition of possibility for plural order. (shrink)

This essay explores the treatment of the relation between nature (phusis) and norm or convention (nomos) in Democritus and in certain Platonic dialogues. In his physical theory Democritus draws a sharp contrast between the real nature of things and their representation via human conventions, but in his political and ethical theory he maintains that moral conventions are grounded in the reality of human nature. Plato builds on that insight in the account of the nature of morality in the myth (...) in the Protagoras. That provides material for a defense of morality against the attacks by Callicles in the Gorgias and Thrasymachus and Glaucon in the Republic, all of whom seek to use the nature-convention contrast to devalue morality. (shrink)

Appealing to the original meaning of the Greek term nomos, Hannah Arendt claims that a bounded legal space is constitutive for political community. Can this seemingly anachronistic claim be substantiated in the conceptually strong sense that every polity - the Greek city-state as much as a hypothetical world state - must constitute itself as a nomos? It is argued that whereas Arendt falls short of justifying this claim, a reflexive reading of nomos can do the trick: the (...) space of political community is necessarily bounded because no polity is imaginable that does not raise a claim to an inside as the community’s own space. A world state, were it ever to be founded, would globalize nomos, not suppress it. Whence the political problem: how does a polity deal with its outside? This problem is particularly pressing because Carl Schmitt’s defense of nomos radically challenges Arendt’s position. A reinterpretation of her analyses of the foundation of a political community suggests how the representational structure of a politics of boundaries parries Schmitt’s challenge. (shrink)

In Aristotle and Law, George Duke argues that Aristotle's seemingly dispersed statements on law and legislation are unified by a commitment to law's status as an achievement of practical reason. This book provides a systematic exposition of the significance and coherence of Aristotle's account of law, and also indicates the relevance of this account to contemporary legal theory. It will be of great interest to scholars and students in jurisprudence, philosophy, political science and classics.

Superficially, citizenship appears relatively simple: a legal status denoting political membership. However, critical citizenship studies scholars suggest that citizenship is first and foremost a political practice. When non-citizens, such as irregularised migrants, constitute themselves as citizens through their actions, irrespective of legal status, these practices of citizenship have transformational potential because they are extra-legal. Yet, there is an ambivalence here: rights-claiming migrants tend to frame their key demands within the terms of the law often by calling for the regularisation of (...) their status. This article addresses this ambivalence by adopting a ‘deconstructive method’ to investigate the legal dimensions of citizenship as sites of theoretical and political intervention. It is argued that practices of rights-claiming by irregularised migrants are important to grasp because they mobilise the paradoxes inherent to the fact that universal rights are enshrined in the constitutional texts of modern citizenship in order to generate new legal meanings and horizons of justice. This hypothesis is explored through a series of illustrative examples of rights-claiming taking place within and beyond the formal confines of legal orders. In so doing, the article sets out a novel conceptual framework for analysing how migrants’ claims to justice strategically negotiate citizenship in its legal form. (shrink)