The tendency to attribute foundationalist ambitions to the Vienna Circle has long obscured our view of its attempted revolution in philosophy. The present paper makes the case for a consistently epistemologically anti-foundationalist interpretation of all three of the Circle's main protagonists: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. Corresponding to the intellectual fault lines within the Circle, two ways of going about the radical reorientation of the pursuit of philosophy will then be distinguished and the contemporary potential of Carnap's and Neurath's project (...) explored. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts the epistemologies of Rawls and Dworkin, both usually presented as either Kantian or pragmatist. It considers in particular the main pragmatist theses underlying their work, namely anti-metaphysics, anti-skepticism, fallibilism and objectivity as conditioned by practice, as well as their account of truth. It then examines an approach which takes Rawls’ epistemology as “anti-foundationalist” and argues that, to the extent that this qualification is connected to deliberative democracy, it should not be accepted without (...) reservation as an adequate account of the views of either philosopher. (shrink)

The chapter explores comparatively the attention to the practical dimension that—each in his own way—Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the classic pragmatist thinker William James pay when confronted with the challenge of providing a non-skeptical response to the relativist stance on truth that arose in the post-Kantian age. Particular focus will be given to the extent to which these three authors conceived of the practical framework as the only one that allows us to meaningfully address and determine truth.

Social ontology studies the nature and properties of social reality while social metaontology examines the relationship between ontology and the social sciences, which is often treated as a normative question. However, social sciences themselves contain ontological theses, raising the descriptive question of how these internal ontologies relate to the rest of the social sciences. This paper argues that important parts of sociology have an anti-foundationalist metaontology. This descriptive claim is used to build a normative argument against foundationalism and (...) is supported by examining the works of Durkheim and Weber and how their metaontological beliefs continue to influence many sociologists. (shrink)

The Euclidean ideal of mathematics as well as all the foundational schools in the philosophy of mathematics have been contested by the new approach, called the “maverick” trend in the philosophy of mathematics. Several points made by its main representatives are mentioned – from the revisability of actual proofs to the stress on real mathematical practice as opposed to its idealized reconstruction. Main features of real proofs are then mentioned; for example, whether they are convincing, understandable, and/or explanatory. Therefore, the (...) new approach questions Hilbert’s Thesis, according to which a correct mathematical proof is in principle reducible to a formal proof, based on explicit axioms and logic. (shrink)

The editor's introduction to the volume explores the thesis of a convergence between analytic and hermeneutic philosophy on the absence of grounds for knowledge and practice. The nature of philosophy without foundations is discussed, along with the conservative tendencies and utopian tensions of "anti-foundationalism.".

ln a number of recent essays, Hendrik Hart has elaborated an account of the nature and function of religious belief that, he believes, is post-modern in inspiration and anti-foundationalist in character. ln this paper, I reconstruct what I take to be Hart’s central claims. While Hart does remind us of some important aspects of the nature of religious belief---aspects often overlooked by many critics---l suggest that there are several problems in the account he provides, that there are tensions between (...) his view of religious belief and his claims about how it can function, and that it is not clear that he ultimately avoids adopting a variant of the foundationalism he explicitly rejects. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate a class of theories that attempt to justify democracy and human rights on the basis of a specific political anthropology. These theories belong to what could be called contemporary French liberalism, as exemplified by Claude Lefort, Marcel Gauchet, and Pierre Rosanvallon. These thinkers share the important intuition that human coexistence is rooted in a fundamental “political” and “historical” condition. Although this condition can be illustrated by meansof empirical examples, I will argue that their argument should (...) be taken to mean that societies are necessarily caught up in this condition. In a second step I will consider the normative consequences of this thesis. The key idea is that ignoring this fundamental condition inevitably leads to pathological consequences, as can be illustrated in reference to both predemocratic societies (e.g. non-Western premodern societies) and postdemocratic societies (e.g. totalitarian regimes). It is only democracies, so they contend, that are able to deal with this condition in a “correct” way, for here this condition is not overlooked or repressed but is openlyrecognized and even institutionally protected. In the final part of my paper I will argue that this line of reasoning offers a promising alternative for the many strands of foundationalism that dominate contemporary political theory, even if it remains beset by a number of weaknesses. (shrink)

In recent years methodological debates in the social sciences have increasingly focused on issues relating to epistemology. Realism and Sociology makes an original contribution to the debate, charting a middle ground between postmodernism and positivism.

Uebel has recently claimed that, contrary to popular opinion, none of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists were proponents of epistemological foundationalism. According to the considerations of the current discussion, however, Uebel's conclusion is erroneous, especially with respect to the work of Moritz Schlick. The chief reason Uebel offers to support his conclusion is that current attempts to portray Schlick's epistemology as foundationalist fail to overcome its ‘ultimate incoherence’. In contrast, it is argued that current interpretations, (...) based on the unpublished as well as the published record, provide understandings of Schlick's foundationalist epistemology as not only coherent, but plausible. In closing, Uebel's own treatment of Schlick's work, which purports to show that the most feasible candidates for foundational statements are ‘meaning-theoretic’ clarifications of the content of expressions, itself fails to accurately represent Schlick's own characterizations, and pictures Schlick's epistemology as a confused mix of epistemic and semantic insights. (shrink)

The paper is a critical examination of Rorty’s argument against foundationalism, on which depends his view of the social irrelevance of traditional philosophy. I try to demonstrate the incoherence and speciousness of his reasoning against foundationalism and in the process refute his view that traditional philosophy is a tool which can and should be cast off from the public, and even from the private, sphere of human life and that its universal concepts can therefore be circumvented. This demonstration (...) is accomplished in twocomplementary stages. First, I provide a general justification of my “argumentative” style in engaging Rorty’s position against his objection to this approach, while showing that what he calls his strategy of “re-description” is really nothing but a form of logical argumentation. Second, I attempt to show how, in order to substantiate his rejection of traditional philosophy’s claim of social relevance, Rorty’s “re-description” of the motivation underlying traditional philosophy is no different from the strategy of unmasking that he has called into question as an instance of a radical or foundationalist critique. I show that, despite his protestations to the contrary, “unmasking” is precisely what—at least on a number of occasions—Rorty quite inconsistently does in demonstrating that the claim of social relevance arises from a form of self-deception engaged in by the traditional philosopher. I further show that theanti-foundationalist stance that defines his characteristic manner of extricating himself from such self-reference problems is based on faulty reasoning and lands him in a deeper incoherence. Since his depoliticization of traditional philosophy depends on the cogency ofthis anti-foundationalist view, I conclude that this depoliticizing project fails. (shrink)

Empirical philosophy of religion is usually appraised in light of its theological uses, rather than in terms of its relation to philosophical forms of empiricism. The present paper examines the empirical theism of Henry Nelson Wieman by relating it to Carl Hempel's critique of functionalism, Karl Popper's use of falsifiability, and the growth of post–empiricist anti–foundationalism in epis–temology. It is concluded that Wieman's argument commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent; that his theistic perspective nevertheless offers an important (...) heuristic device in line with fal–libilism, and that his radical empiricism anticipates recent anti–foundationalist trends. (shrink)

In 'No Experience Necessary: Foundationalism and the Retreat from Culture in Environmental Ethics'. Ben A. Minteer forgivably misconstrues my critique of moral pluralism. Contrary to Minteer’s representation: I do not accuse moral pluralists of ‘moral promiscuity’: nor do I posit a ‘master principle’ to govern all human action respecting the environment: and although I offer conceptual foundations for environmental ethics, I do not claim that they rest on certain, a priori, and non-empirical intuitions. Rather, the conceptual foundations I offer (...) for environmental ethics are largely scientific. Contrary to Minteer’s representation: I do consider a multiplicity of contexts in which ethical actions are situated: and I do respectfully attend to and creatively engage a variety of cultural points of view, both western and nonwestern. in constructing environmental ethics. Anti-foundationalists, such as Minteer and Bryan G. Norton, ironically pose an insidious threat to democratic discussion and debate of environmental values, because they themselves posit, but do not frankly acknowledge, foundational beliefs. (shrink)

To be intelligible, the finite order of human experience, for Hegel, requires infinite absolute spirit. Flay and Kolb overlook this infinite in Hegel's thought. Notwithstanding their contextualist hints in interpreting Hegel they regard Hegel as even more of a foundationalist than the epistemological foundationalists. But the notion of ground in Hegel's Logic refutes this. Hegel's systemic holism is grounded in the prospective completed infinity of spirit beyond either Foundationalism or Anti-Foundationalism. In the absence of infinite spirit we (...) are consigned to an unnecessarily attenuated human finitude. The mutual career of the Hegelian finite and infinite however frees us from this prospect. (shrink)

This paper calls into question Richard Rorty's recasting of the traditional justifications of liberal political philosophy in an anti-foundationalist ironic mould. Rorty suggests not only that his irony is compatible with the liberal commitments to human flourishing but also that it can clear up many of the conceptual difficulties that liberal reformers face today. Two objections are raised against the Rortian approach to politics, one conceptual, the other practical. Conceptually, because Rorty does not wish to burden political irony and (...) imagination with a constraining political theory, his proposal increases the likelihood that two liberal commitments that he judges essential, the separation of the public and the private, and the aversion of wilful cruelty, will clash with one another. Practically, the success of his anti-foundationalist irony among sophisticated liberal reformers is jeopardized by its potentially negative impact upon the non-ironic, metaphysically minded political actors who most need to be brought into the liberal debate. Key Words: irony • liberal imagination • political theory • pragmatism • social change • Third World. (shrink)

I concentrate on difficulties met by Putnam's "internal" or "scientific" realism. They concern his attempt to reconcile pragmatism and realism. My line of argument is the following. A) By exploiting Putnam's argument against the "God's-eye view" and the Brains-in-a-Vat argument , it can be shown that the realism he is defending is either a too strong metaphysical realism or a too weak "residual" position. B) If it is a metaphysical position, then it contradicts Putnam's own views on GEV. C) If (...) it is a "residual" position, then in the context of a Theory of meaning for formal and natural languages, it is not more explicative than some forms of functionalism. The paper ends with an attempt to reconcile Putnam's pragmatism with a functionalist approach to epistemic features of "meaning," for the sake of a reconciliation between pragmatism and realism. (shrink)

Brandom’s reading of Hegel’s metaphysics offers an excitingly rich interpretation within the context of contemporary modal metaphysics. Brandom reads Hegel’s determinate negation in the way that the concepts of material incompatibility and material consequence relations operate. Brandom recognizes incompatibility as a modal concept and places it as a primitive in the foundation of Hegel’s metaphysics. This paper examines of Brandom’s modal foundationalist claim in comparison to how Hegel conceives of modality in his Logic. Upon this examination, the paper suggests that (...) Brandom’s interpretation remains problematically indifferent to the anti-foundationalist aspect of Hegel’s Logic and Hegel’s understanding of modality. (shrink)

I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of the paper, I defend this (...) version of foundationalism against Sellars's famous anti-foundationalist dilemma, according to which sense-experiential states can't be justifiers ifthey lack propositional content, and can't terminate the justificatory regress if they have propositional content. I argue that the latter of these two claims is false. A-states can play the role of justifiers because they have propositional content, and they can terminate the justificatory regress because they themselves are capable of neither being true or false, nor being justified or unjustified. (shrink)

The idea that there is such a thing as Wittgensteinian foundationalism is a provocative one for two reasons. For one thing, Wittgenstein is widely regarded as an anti-foundationalist. For another, the very word `foundationalism' sounds like the name of a theory, and Wittgenstein famously opposed the advancing of theories and theses in philosophy. Nonetheless, in his book Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Avrum Stroll has argued that Wittgenstein does indeed develop a foundationalist view in his final work, (...) On Certainty. On this basis, Stroll goes on to argue against a number of contemporary views, including forms of relativism and scientism. In what follows I will examine what Stroll calls Wittgenstein's foundationalism (in Section 1) and argue that Stroll's reading of Wittgenstein, though original and interesting, is misguided in important ways and so cannot be used against the views he opposes (in Section 2). Finally, in Section 3, I offer a brief summary of the reading of Wittgenstein that I recommend. (shrink)

The article discusses current philosophical issues in foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as well as their ramifications for theological epistemology. Thestrengths and weaknesses of the anti-foundationalist theological current are also assessed.

Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a foundationalist was the standard view in early Husserl scholarship, things have changed considerably as prominent commentators like Christian Beyer, John Drummond, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Dan Zahavi have challenged this foundationalist interpretation. These anti-foundationalist interpretations have again been challenged, for instance, by Walter Hopp and Christian Erhard. One might (...) suspect that inconsistencies in Husserl’s writings are the simple reason for this disagreement. I shall argue, however, that the real question is not so much how to read Husserl, but how to define foundationalism and that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Husserl championed the most tenable version of foundationalism: a moderate foundationalism that allows for incorporating coherentist elements. (shrink)

This paper argues that some defenses of global antirealism that critique both epistemic foundationalism and ontological priority foundationalism (e.g., Westerhoff 2020) turn on a false dilemma that ignores non-representational approaches to consciousness and cognition. Arguments against the existence of an external world and against introspective certainty, typically draw on a range of empirical findings (mainly about the brain-based mechanisms that realize cognition) and that are said to lend support to irrealism. Theories that incorporate these findings, such as the (...) interface theory of perception and predictive processing, not only retain the notion of the veil of perception, but have continued to assign to it an important theoretical role. While the mathematical frameworks these theories employ do make them viable candidates, neither theory is moving in a direction that would suggest global anti-realism is the more plausible attitude. Rather, I argue that the new paradigm of 4E cognitive science (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) bolsters epistemological and metaphysical realism. (shrink)

This is a critique of Peirce, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Buchler, Derrida, and Rorty as anti-realists, showing that each of these philosophers affirms some form of self-undermining relativism that cannot account for itself.

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

This chapter considers four areas in the differences between Vygotsky's concept of reason and ‘Enlightenment rationality’ in its familiar characterisation. These areas cover: (1) foundationalism and anti‐foundationalism, (2) the conception of science, (3) the conception of development and (4) idealism and materialism. The last is developed more by Ilyenkov, although, given its Hegelian and Spinozist provenance, it can be reasonably interpreted as part of the general direction of Vygotsky's work. Two indications of the importance of Hegel for (...) understanding Vygotsky are: first, the absence of an unbridgeable epistemological chasm between thought and world, and second, the conception of development as a non‐linear process embedded in historical resources. Marx's and Hegel's ideas of history and development influenced every aspect of Vygotsky's thinking on concepts. Vygotsky's work provides no blueprint for teachers and educational administrators, but it does provide a frame of ideas within which questions concerning education can fruitfully be pursued. (shrink)

Two strikingly similar critiques of epistemological foundationalism are examined: J. L. Austin's critique of A. J. Ayer in the former's "Sense and Sensibilia," and part of Candrakīrti's critique of Dignāga in the first chapter of the "Prasannapadā." With respect to Austin, it is argued that his writings on epistemology in fact relate quite closely to his better-known philosophy of speech acts, and that the appeal to ordinary language is part of a transcendental argument against the possibility of radical skepticism. (...) It is then argued that Candrakīrti makes some very similar moves, and that his argument against Dignāga makes still clearer the sense in which both Austin and Candrakīrti can be characterized as making transcendental arguments. In particular, if a condition of the possibility of meaningful discourse is the making of certain kinds of assents, then the epistemologist's demand for the justification of those assents is unreasonable. (shrink)

This study elucidates and defends philosophical realism. The version I propose includes a realist understanding of the nature of reality, and a twofold realist view of truth. I hold that reality is cognition-independent. This means that the conceptual scheme of inquiry into a given subject matter does not constitute its nature. Using a different set of concepts to investigate a certain phenomenon will not change what it is. This is realism about reality: Reality is not contingent upon the concepts we (...) use in our attempts to understand it. ;I embrace, as well, a realist conception of truth, according to which, truth consists in agreement with reality. In addition, truth is not characterized as any sort of justification. What we say is true if, and only if, what we are talking about is as we claim it to be. Furthermore, the conditions under which a statement is true are not to be identified with the conditions which would make anyone justified in believing the statement: Truth conditions and justification conditions of statements are not identical. ;There are two major ways in which I defend realism. First, I specify exactly what the doctrine should be. This involves so characterizing realism that it is not committed to a number of undesirable theses; for example, foundationalism, physicalism, scientism, skepticism, and moral relativism. The realism I embrace allows for ontological and epistemological pluralism, according to which there are many kinds of things in the world, and many ways to describe them. Secondly, I respond to two of the most important recent attacks on realism, those of Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. I examine their alternatives to realism, and find them lacking in merit. I formulate their strongest arguments against realism, and then respond on the realist's behalf. Realism emerges as a plausible, interrelated conception of the nature of knowledge, truth, and reality which stands up well against the attacks of its most prominent contemporary critics. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p99 This paper presents a possible but controversial characterization of two periods in Rudolf Carnap’s work: foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. I will argue that even with the identification of two periods, it is possible to argue in favor of the unity of Carnap’s work concerning the unity of science and the principle of linguistic tolerance. To do so, I will count on the analysis of some revisionist views advocated by Friedman and Uebel. Therefore I intend to contribute to (...) a discussion that, since the second half of the twentieth century, seemed to have been overcome, but that, at the end of that century is resumed due to the importance of issues such as the unity of science, observability and interpretation of the scientific language for the philosophy of science. (shrink)

According to Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophers, everything depends for its existence on something else. But what would a world devoid of fundamentalia look like? In this paper, I argue that the anti-foundationalist “neither-one-nor-many argument” of the Indian Mādhyamika Śrīgupta commits him to a position I call “metaphysical indefinitism.” I demonstrate how this view follows from Śrīgupta’s rejection of mereological simples and ontologically independent being, when understood in light of his account of conventional reality. Contra recent claims in the secondary literature, (...) I clarify how the Madhyamaka metaphysical dependence structure is not a straightforward infinitism since it does not honor strict asymmetry or transitivity. Instead, its dependence relations are irreflexive and extendable, admitting of dependence chains of indefinite (though not actually infinite) length and dependence loops of non-zero length. Yet, the flexible ontology of Śrīgupta's Madhyamaka can accommodate a contextualist account of asymmetry and support a revisable theory of conventional truth, delivering significant payoffs for the view, including the capacity to accommodate developments in scientific explanation. (shrink)

Summary John Stuart Mill's classic tale of disillusionment from a ‘narrow creed’, an overt as much as a covert theme of his Autobiography (London, 1873), has for many years served as a guide to the search for the causes and sources of his ‘enlargement-of-the-utilitarian-creed’ project. As a result, in analyses of Mill's mature views, Samuel Taylor Coleridge—and friends—commonly take centre stage in terms of influence, whereas John's father—James Mill—is reduced either to a supernumerary or a villain in the last act (...) of John's intellectual development. However, students of Mill's works should not take at face value the story presented in Autobiography. Mill's own emphasis on the role of his ‘new influences’ has led scholars to disregard the role of his ‘old influences’ in his attempt to create a broader theory of living—one which takes into account both the intellectual and the emotional capacities of individuals. A close look at key aspects of John Stuart Mill's ‘enlargement project’ suggests that James Mill may have played a more positive role than is usually acknowledged. A way into the intellectual affinity of the two Mills is the person they both kept returning to for guidance and inspiration throughout their lives: Plato. (shrink)

It seems that eudaimonistic reconstructions of John Stuart Mill's conception of happiness have fallen prey to what they thought Mill should have done with regard to the role of pleasure in his notion of happiness. Insisting that utility and eudaimonia make conflicting claims, something which mirrors Mill's ‘conflicting loyalties’, they downgrade pleasure to just one of the ingredients of happiness. However, a closer look at Mill's intellectual development suggests otherwise. By focusing on Mill's radical background, this paper argues that pleasure (...) retains a central role in his conception of happiness – even from a eudaimonistic point of view. (shrink)

The article views the development of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school from the analysis of texts to the study of spatial entities (semiosphere being most well known of them). It comes to light that ‘culture’ and ‘space’ have been such notions in Tartu–Moscow School to which, for instance, the ‘semiosphere’ does not add much. There are studied possibilities to join Uexküll’s and Lotman’s basic concepts (as certain grounds of Estonian semiotics) with Tartu–Moscow School’s treatment of culture and space through the notion (...) of ‘semiotic subject’. Such an approach allows to see transdisciplinarity, which has come to issue only during the last decade, already in the first conceptions of Tartu–Moscow School where transdisciplinarity revealed itself in the symbiotic use of ‘culture’ and ‘space’. (shrink)