_Vygotsky Philosophy and Education_ reassesses the works of Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky work by arguing that his central ideas about the nature of rationality and knowledge were informed by the philosophic tradition of Spinoza and Hegel. Presents a reassessment of the works of Lev Vygotsky in light of the tradition of Spinoza and Hegel informing his work Reveals Vygotsky’s connection with the work of contemporary philosophers such as Brandom and McDowell Draws on discussions in contemporary philosophy to revise prominent readings (...) of Vygotskian psychology and revisits educational debates where Vygotsky’s ideas were central Reveals the limitations of appropriations of Vygotsky which fail to recognize the Hegelian provenance of his work Shows the relevance of Brandom’s inferentialism for contemporary educational theory and practice. (shrink)

This article argues that Robert Brandom's work can be used to develop ideas in the area of social epistemology. It suggests that this work, precisely because it was influenced by Hegel, can make a significant contribution with philosophical anthropology at its centre. The argument is developed using illustrations from education: the first, from the now classic replication of Piaget's ‘three mountains task’ by Margaret Donaldson and her colleagues; the second, from contemporary debates about the questions of knowledge and epistemic access. (...) This leads to a series of questions concerning the relation of concepts to each other and to objects of knowledge and to the social dimension of epistemology as it is involved in the development of human capacities. (shrink)

rationality has increasingly been a target of attack in contemporary educational research and practice and in its place practical reason and situated thinking have become a focus of interest. The argument here is that something is lost in this. In illustrating how we might think about the issue, this paper makes a response to the charge that as a result of his commitment to the ‘Enlightenment project’ Vygotsky holds abstract rationality as the pinnacle of thought. Against this it is argued (...) that Vygotsky had a far more sophisticated appreciation of reason and of its remit. The paper proceeds first by examining the picture of Vygotsky that is presented in the work of James Wertsch, and especially his claim that Vygotsky was an ambivalent rationalist, goes on to provide an account of Vygotsky that corrects this picture, and develops this in the light of the work of Robert Brandom, who shares Vygotsky’s inheritance of Hegel. The conclusion towards which this piece points is that the philosophical underpinnings of Vygotsky’s work provide a radically different idea of rationality and epistemology from that characterised as abstract rationality and that this has significance for education studies. (shrink)

The issues that Paul Standish alerts us to are significant since they situate McDowell's argument in reference to works lying outside the mainstream tradition o.

This chapter considers four areas in the differences between Vygotsky's concept of reason and ‘Enlightenment rationality’ in its familiar characterisation. These areas cover: (1) foundationalism and anti‐foundationalism, (2) the conception of science, (3) the conception of development and (4) idealism and materialism. The last is developed more by Ilyenkov, although, given its Hegelian and Spinozist provenance, it can be reasonably interpreted as part of the general direction of Vygotsky's work. Two indications of the importance of Hegel for understanding Vygotsky are: (...) first, the absence of an unbridgeable epistemological chasm between thought and world, and second, the conception of development as a non‐linear process embedded in historical resources. Marx's and Hegel's ideas of history and development influenced every aspect of Vygotsky's thinking on concepts. Vygotsky's work provides no blueprint for teachers and educational administrators, but it does provide a frame of ideas within which questions concerning education can fruitfully be pursued. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This chapter argues that Robert Brandom's work can be used to develop ideas in the area of social epistemology. It suggests that this work, precisely because it was influenced by Hegel, can make a significant contribution with philosophical anthropology at its centre. The argument is developed using illustrations from education: the first, from the now classic replication of Piaget's ‘three mountains task’ by Margaret Donaldson and her colleagues; the second, from contemporary debates about the questions of knowledge and epistemic access. (...) This leads to a series of questions concerning the relation of concepts to each other and to objects of knowledge and to the social dimension of epistemology as it is involved in the development of human capacities. (shrink)

This chapter presents an argument about constructivism, schooling and reason. A central argument of the chapter is that the representationalist paradigm referred to by Brandom underpins much of the discussion of Vygotsky, with consequences for the way in which sociogenesis is theorised. It plays a decisive if undeclared role in the conceptualisation of pedagogy in contemporary schooling and has decisive consequences for the way that constructivist positions are taken in relation to the active participation of learners, both in their learning (...) and also more radically in the constitution of knowledge. This is considered in the latter part of the chapter. The chapter talks about Robert Brandom whose work is especially relevant to the distinction between causes and reasons. Constructivism is influential in the appropriation of Vygotsky, yet at the same time a tension arises as a result of the importance Vygotsky attached to instruction. (shrink)

This introductory chapter of Vygotsky Philosophy and Education aims to show that Vygotsky was influenced by a different tradition of philosophy from that which has influenced post‐Vygotskian research. The book also aims to demonstrate that this difference is significant and has implications for educational practice. A recurring theme of the book is Vygotsky's conception of the nature of abstract reason. The book is a response to the claim that Vygotsky holds abstract rationality as the pinnacle of thought. The claim is (...) based on the belief that Vygotsky subscribed to what is referred to as the ‘Enlightenment project’. The book concludes by illustrating how the philosophical tradition that inspired Vygotsky has significant implications for these debates. (shrink)

This chapter develops three themes involving the issue of free will necessary to an understanding of Vygotsky's work. They are: (1) his distinctive idea of freedom understood as self‐determination; (2) the distinction between this idea of freedom and a common‐sense concept of free will; and (3) arising from these, the issue of determinism and determinist readings of Marx. For Spinoza, truth is necessary to freedom and the two are inextricably linked. The chapter discusses the elements of Spinoza's philosophy relevant to (...) Vygotsky's approach. It addresses the issue of determinism in relation to attempts to provide a causal account of mind and will. To be free for Spinoza is to be a cause of oneself. Freedom is found in necessity but in a necessity that human beings mediate as their own rather than one that remains uncompromisingly external. (shrink)

The interpretation of Vygotsky raises issues at the heart of contemporary debates in educational theory and practice, and nowhere is this more true than in connection with situated cognition and constructivism. This chapter considers the division of opinion concerning situated cognition, contextualism and constructivism. To grasp the nature of the issues involved it is necessary to consider the following: decontextualisation, theorising the institutional, historical background, situated cognition, the transfer problem and the question of determination. The specific concern of the chapter (...) is to consider the charge of decontextualised rationality levelled against Vygotsky. The chapter also considers the question of abstract rationality. Once the idea of a free‐floating abstract reason – that is, of one decontextualised from the practices that generate it – has been rejected, the question arises as to by what means does reasoning develop. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the human dimension of technology-enhanced learning; many suppositions are made about this but the amount of attention it has been given relative to that paid to technology is quite limited. It is argued that an aspect of the question that deserves more attention than it has received in the work on the application of technologies to education is epistemology on the grounds that the nature of knowledge and the general character of mind are critically important. (...) As regards epistemology this paper draws on recent developments in philosophy by John McDowell and Robert Brandom that deal with the relation of mind to world and the nature of experience. From McDowell it draws on the idea of second nature and particularly the argument that human beings acquire their cognitive capacities by initiation into language and tradition. From Brandom it draws on the idea that humans stand apart from animals and machines in that they respond to reasons as well as to causes. It is argued that the implication of these ideas for education differ radically from the pedagogic models that underpin much work on technology-enhanced learning where the suppositions about experience are quite different. Indeed the nature of knowledge is usually presumed rather than examined and often what is taken for granted is awareness as a conceptually unmediated response to the world. These questions are raised in the context of so far disappointing results of the use of technologies to enhance learning. (shrink)

This chapter concentrates on the philosophic tradition informing Vygotsky's work. Its aim is to make explicit in Vygotsky's work what many commentaries leave unsaid: namely, that it has a definite philosophic provenance that conditions and shapes its arguments. Comparisons of Vygotsky and Piaget are commonly made from the point of view of psychology, but attention in the chapter is directed to the less well‐aired, but no less important, philosophic differences between them. The chapter puts these differences in context by considering (...) parts of the philosophy of Hegel and Spinoza that are relevant for Vygotsky's conception of mind and world and its differences from that of Piaget. It underlines how Vygotsky's criticism of Piaget brings to light the differences of philosophic approach employed. (shrink)

The chapter provides illustrations of the link between Hegel's work and Vygotsky's and shows how the argument that Vygotsky employed an abstract decontextualised form of reason, is groundless. Kant sets out to resolve the dualism of world and mind by positing the categories of understanding. Although Kant's later work moved towards overcoming the rigid separation of concept and intuition and of spontaneity from receptivity, dualism remained. Hegel dealt with dualism from a radically different standpoint, and this transformed the terms in (...) which it can be posed. In contrast to Kant, he rejected the categorical separation of subject and object, thereby opening a philosophical space within which the antinomies of dualism could be transcended. Most reactions to Hegel after Marx were intermingled with reactions to Marx. Misinterpretation of Hegel is communicated to readings of Vygotsky, where the influence of Hegel is read as evidence of hierarchical conceptions of abstract reason. (shrink)