This Handbook offers a broad yet unified treatment of many philosophical issues connected with climate change, ranging from foundational puzzles to detailed applications. It extends to many branches of philosophy that are relevant to the understanding of the premises and implications of the impacts of climate change on human and nonhuman life on Earth. More specifically, the handbook examines the scientific accounts of climate change as well as its causes. It explores the tools offered by social sciences and humanities to (...) study the societal premises and impacts of climate change as well as delving deeper into the ethical and political issues connected with and resulting from climate change. By doing so, it puts it all in an ecological and historical context. In addition, the book offers solutions to some important philosophical puzzles and problems, and indicates paths of interaction between philosophy and other disciplines. The discussion about climate change and the mitigation/adaptation policies spans many areas and levels – from abstract science and philosophy to current on-the-ground politics. However, climate change is also a great a philosophical puzzle. Indeed, its existential and practical relevance can be thought to largely derive from the philosophical complications it engenders. Climate change is applied philosophy par excellence. Preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change needs very good philosophy applied to concrete and specific practical issues. Climate change is an area where scholars from very different provenances should cooperate on equal terms, having in view a common, and really important, purpose – contribute to preventing great burdens and even the extinction of humankind and the destruction of hospitable and valuable non-human nature. (shrink)

This Handbook offers a broad yet unified treatment of all the philosophical issues connected with climate change, ranging from foundational puzzles to detailed applications. It addresses the philosophical foundations of the discussion on the ethical, social, political and legal impacts of climate change. It covers all branches of philosophy that are relevant to the understanding of the premises and implications of the impacts on human, animal and natural life on Earth. More specifically, the Handbook examines the scientific accounts of climate (...) change as well as its causes. It explores the tools offered by social sciences and humanities to study the societal impact of climate change. It studies the ethical and political issues connected with and resulting from climate change, and puts it all in an environmental and historical context. In addition, the book offers solutions to the main philosophical puzzles and problems, and provides paths of interaction between philosophy and other disciplines. The discussion about climate change and the mitigation/adaptation policies spans many areas and levels – from abstract science and philosophy to current on-the-ground politics. However, climate change is also a great a philosophical puzzle. Indeed, its existential and practical relevance can be thought to largely derive from the philosophical complications it engenders. Climate change is applied philosophy par excellence. Preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change needs very good philosophy applied to concrete and specific practical issues. Climate change is an area where scholars from very different provenances should cooperate on equal terms, having in view a common, and really important, purpose – contribute to preventing great burdens and even the extinction of humankind and the destruction of hospitable and valuable non-human nature. (shrink)

This essay places the debate between Jerome and Helvidius in the theological context of the Rome of Pope Damasus. It presents the different theological positions of Helvidius and Jerome, highlighting that the literary clash was in the first place centered on asceticism and only later on the question of the perpetual virginity of Mary. The controversy, before being dogmatic, was exegetical in nature and this could explain the absence of an official intervention by Pope Damasus. Referring mainly to the testimony (...) of Ambrosiaster, it is proved in this study that the thought of Helvidius differed from the tradition of the Church in Rome, and that even Jerome innovates with his exegetical solution to the issue of the «brethren of the Lord». (shrink)

Solving complex socio-technical problems, this paper claims, involves diverse knowledges (cognitive diversity), competing interests (social diversity), and pragmatism. To explain this view, this paper first explores two different cases: Canadian pulp and paper mill pollution and siting nuclear reactors in seismically sensitive areas of California. Solving such socio-technically complex problems involves cognitive diversity as well as social diversity and pragmatism. Cognitive diversity requires one to not only recognize relevant knowledges but also to assess their validity. Finally, it is suggested, integrating (...) the resultant set of diverse relevant and valid knowledges determines the parameters of the solution space for the problem. (shrink)

The λ-continuum of inductive methods was derived from an assumption, called λ-condition, which says that the probability of finding an individual having property $x_{j}$ depends only on the number of observed individuals having property $x_{j}$ and on the total number of observed individuals. So, according to that assumption, all individuals with properties which are different from $x_{j}$ have equal weight with respect to that probability and, in particular, it does not matter whether any individual was observed having some property similar (...) to $x_{j}$ (the most complete proof of this result is presented in Carnap, 1980). The problem thus remained open to find some general condition, weaker than the λ-condition, which would allow for the derivation of probability functions which might be sensitive to similarity. Carnap himself suggested a weakening of the λ-condition which might allow for similarity sensitive probability functions (Carnap, 1980, p. 45) but he did not find the family of probability functions derivable from that principle. The aim of this paper is to present the family of probability functions derivable from Carnap's suggestion and to show how it is derived. In Section 1 the general problem of analogy by similarity in inductive logic is presented, Section 2 outlines the notation and the conceptual background involved in the proof, Section 3 gives the proof, Section 4 discusses Carnap's principle and the result, Section 5 is a brief review of the solutions which have previously been proposed. (shrink)

What does Kant mean when he claims that a moral conflict is only possible as a conflict between obligating reasons (rationes obligandi)? How does this differ from a conflict of duties? And how does Kant’s idea relate to the understandings of moral conflict prevalent in his time? This paper distinguishes three influential traditional models (as represented by Wolff, Baumgarten, and Jesuit casuistry) for a comparison with Kant’s own conception of moral conflict. Before investigating these issues more deeply, the paper discusses (...) a preliminary point regarding the liminal localization of the moral conflict between the domains of theory and practice. As a result, its solution depends both on the consistency of the moral theory and on the agent’s conscientiousness in the practice of moral judgment. (shrink)

The relationship between music and language is one of the main axes of Western philosophy of music. In particular, the link between music and literature has fostered an intense debate that resulted in a plurality of different solutions. The present issue of "Itinera” aims at analyzing some of the fundamental questions that emerge from Azio Corghi's use of literary sources in composition. The complexity of the themes that characterize Corghi's work, across musicology, aesthetics and literature, leads the reader to deal (...) with fundamental categories such as postmodernity and avant-garde, in music and beyond. (shrink)

Intellectual humility plays a crucial role among intellectual virtues. It has attracted considerable attention from virtue epistemologists, who have offered a fair number of treatments. In this essay, I argue that, regardless of the difference among these treatments, they are beset by two problems: they fall into a circular argument; they fall into a self-referential contradiction. I then argue that a recent proposal by D. Pritchard allows us to avoid, but not. However, by combining this proposal with another reflection (...) advanced by the same author while he discusses the Wittgensteinian notion of hinge commitments, it is possible to avoid. The thesis that emerges is that only a partial application of intellectual humility solves. Finally, I reinforce this thesis by rejecting an alternative solution to. (shrink)

This Handbook offers a broad yet unified treatment of all the philosophical issues connected with climate change, ranging from foundational puzzles to detailed applications. It addresses the philosophical foundations of the discussion on the ethical, social, political and legal impacts of climate change. It covers all branches of philosophy that are relevant to the understanding of the premises and implications of the impacts on human, animal and natural life on Earth. More specifically, the Handbook examines the scientific accounts of climate (...) change as well as its causes. It explores the tools offered by social sciences and humanities to study the societal impact of climate change. It studies the ethical and political issues connected with and resulting from climate change, and puts it all in an environmental and historical context. In addition, the book offers solutions to the main philosophical puzzles and problems, and provides paths of interaction between philosophy and other disciplines. The discussion about climate change and the mitigation/adaptation policies spans many areas and levels – from abstract science and philosophy to current on-the-ground politics. However, climate change is also a great a philosophical puzzle. Indeed, its existential and practical relevance can be thought to largely derive from the philosophical complications it engenders. Climate change is applied philosophy par excellence. Preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change needs very good philosophy applied to concrete and specific practical issues. Climate change is an area where scholars from very different provenances should cooperate on equal terms, having in view a common, and really important, purpose – contribute to preventing great burdens and even the extinction of humankind and the destruction of hospitable and valuable non-human nature. (shrink)

Over the last few years the diplomatic language of UN resolutions has repeatedly been questioned for the excessive presence of vagueness. The use of vague terms could be connected to the genre of diplomatic texts, as resolutions should be applicable to every international contingency and used to mitigate tensions between different legal cultures. However, excessive vagueness could also lead to biased or even strategically-motivated interpretations of resolutions, undermining their legal impact and triggering conflicts instead of diplomatic solutions. This study aims (...) at investigating intentional vagueness in Security Council resolutions, by focussing on the analysis of the resolutions relating to the second Gulf war. Using the qualitative Discourse-Historical approach (Wodak in Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism, Taylor & Francis Ltd., London [2000]) and quantitative analysis tools (Antconc and Sketch Engine), special attention is given to the historical/political consequences of the vagueness and indeterminacy used in that framework and to the study of vague ‘weasel words’ (Mellinkoff in The language of the law, Little, Brown & Company, Boston [1963]), modals, and adjectives contained in the corpus. The hypothesis of intentional vagueness is further reinforced through an analysis of the US legislation related to the outbreak of the war, to reveal how the US has legally interpreted UN legislation and to understand the purposes and consequences of vague language contained in it. The findings indicate that vagueness in resolutions has triggered the Iraqi conflict instead of diplomatic solutions with the overall legislative intent of using intentional vagueness as a political strategy. (shrink)

To address the need for a valid and reliable scale of youth leadership potential based on the development theory of leadership, the current study developed the Youth Leadership Potential Scale (YLPS) and investigated its factor structure and psychometric properties in a sample of 696 students (grades 7-9) in China. Exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM) identified a five-factor solution comprising leadership information, leadership attitude, communication skills, decision-making skills, and stress management skills. ESEM within confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated an adequate fit (...) for this structure. The scale showed good composite reliability and measurement invariance across different gender and grade/age groups. The scale also showed sufficient concurrent validity with the Coping Self-Efficacy Scale, the Chinese Roets Rating Scale for Leadership, and the Leadership Skills Inventory. Furthermore, criterion-related validity was supported by the relationship between YLPS scores and the length of student leadership positions. The results suggest that the YLPS is a valid and pragmatic measure for assessing youth leadership potential. The current study is the first to develop a youth leadership potential scale based on the development theory of leadership. (shrink)

Insight is a construct carried out into different theoretical orientations with increasing application out of the boundaries of clinical psychology. Recent studies have investigated insight also as a promising variable for organizational outcomes. Given the relevance of Insight in promoting change, this paper aimed at describing the psychometric analysis of one of the shortest, most agile, and most versatile tool for measuring some of the characteristics of insight, the Insight Orientation Scale, using Item Response Theory. To achieve this goal, we (...) applied a Mixed Rash Model to the IOS. Data from 1,445 individuals were analyzed by the means of WIN-MIRA and Multilog. Based on the likelihood statistics we assumed a three-class solution for the IOS. Results also indicated that the greater part of items had good discrimination and threshold parameters. These findings confirmed psychometric stability of the IOS highlighting its measurement precision, supporting its utility in both research and practice. (shrink)

”The last remnant of physical objectivity of space-time” is disclosed in the case of a continuous family of spatially non-compact models of general relativity. The physical individuation of point-events is furnished by the autonomous degrees of freedom of the gravitational field, which represent -as it were -the ontic part of the metric field. The physical role of the epistemic part is likewise clarified as embodying the unavoidable non-inertial aspects of GR. At the end the philosophical import of the Hole Argument (...) is substantially weakened and in fact the Argument itself dis-solved, while a specific four-dimensional holistic and structuralist view of space-time emerges, including elements common to the tradition of both substantivalism and relationism. The observables of our models undergo real temporal change: this gives new evidence to the fact that statements like the frozen-time character of evolution, as other ontological claims about GR, are model dependent. (shrink)

The so-called ‘‘species problem’’ has plagued evolution- ary biology since before Darwin’s publication of the aptly titled Origin of Species. Many biologists think the problem is just a matter of semantics; others complain that it will not be solved until we have more empirical data. Yet, we don’t seem to be able to escape discussing it and teaching seminars about it. In this paper, I briefly examine the main themes of the biological and philosophical liter- atures on the species problem, (...) focusing on identifying common threads as well as relevant differences. I then argue two fundamental points. First, the species problem is not primarily an empirical one, but it is rather fraught with philosophical questions that require—but cannot be settled by—empirical evidence. Second, the (dis-)solution lies in explicitly adopting Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘‘family resemblance’’ or cluster concepts, and to consider spe- cies as an example of such concepts. This solution has several attractive features, including bringing together apparently diverging themes of discussion among bio- logists and philosophers. The current proposal is con- ceptually independent (though not incompatible) with the pluralist approach to the species problem advocated by Mishler, Donoghue, Kitcher and Dupre ́, which implies that distinct aspects of the species question need to be emphasized depending on the goals of the researcher. From the biological literature, the concept of species that most closely matches the philosophical discussion pre- sented here is Templeton’s cohesion idea. (shrink)

In this paper I shall present three solutions to the Knower Paradox which, despite important points in common, differ in several respects. The first solution, proposed by C. A. Anderson [1] is a hierarchical solution, developed in the framework of first-order arithmetic. However I will try toshow that this solution is based on an incorrect argument. The second solution, inspired by a book of R.M. Smullyan [14], is developed in the framework of modal logic and it (...) is based on the idea of interpreting one of the basic systems of the modal logic of provability in an epistemic way. Ishall give arguments in support of this solution. The third solution, proposed by P. Egrèé [8] attempts to connect the first and the second solutions. I will show that this attempt fails for philosophical and formal reasons. (shrink)

When Wittgenstein claims that "the expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged" (Wittgenstein 1953: 196), he expresses a paradox that Gombrich (Gombrich 1960) modifies in this way: (a 1) the observer x perceives a picture P under a new aspect; (b 1) if x perceives P under a new aspect then x's perception of P has changed; (c 1) but x's perception of P has (...) not actually changed. I argue that the Gombrich's version of the paradox has become the core of the problem of the pictorial representation. As I will explain, different approaches to depiction solve the paradox by denying one among (a 1)-(c 1). Gombrich rejects (c 1). Wollheim rejects (a 1). The so-called psychological theories of depiction also reject (a 1). Every theory of depiction should face what I call the Fictional Issue (FI) and the Representational Issue (RI). Attempting to solve FI and RI, I shall explore an alternative, Wittgensteinian solution, which implies to reject (b 1). To do this, we have to interpret the seeing-as as made of two kinds of perception: a simple perception and a representational perception. (shrink)

The most pressing issues of the twenty-first century—climate change and persistent hunger in a world of food surpluses, to name only two—are not problems that can be solved from within individual disciplines, nation-states, or cultural perspectives. They are predicaments that can only be resolved by generating sustained and globally robust coordination across value systems. The scale of the problems and necessity for coordinated global solutions signal a world historical transit as momentous as the Industrial Revolution: a transition from the predominance (...) of technical knowledge to that of ethical deliberation. This volume brings together leading thinkers from around the world to deliberate on how best to correlate worth (value) with what is worthwhile (values), pairing human prosperity with personal, environmental, and spiritual flourishing in a world of differing visions of what constitutes a moral life. Especially in the aftermath of what is now being called the Great Recession, awareness has mounted of the imperative to question the modern divorce of economics from ethics. While the domains of economics and ethics were from antiquity through at least the eighteenth century understood in many cultures to be coterminous and mutually entailing, the modern assumption has been that the goal of maximizing human prosperity and the aim of justly enhancing our lives as persons and as communities were functionally and practically distinct. Working from a wide array of perspectives, the contributors to this volume offer a set of challenges to the assumed independence of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of human and planetary well-being. Reflecting on the complex interrelationship among economics, justice, and equity, the book resists "one size fits all" approaches and struggles to revitalize the marriage of economics and ethics by activating cultural differences as the basis of mutual contribution to shared human flourishing. The publication of this important collection will stimulate or extend critical debates among scholars and students working in a number of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, including philosophy, history, environmental studies, economics, and law. Contributors: Roger T. Ames, James Behuniak Jr., Steve Bein, Nalini Bhushan, Purushottama Bilimoria, Steven Burik, Amita Chatterjee, Baoyan Cheng, Gordon Davis, Jay L. Garfield, Steven F. Geisz, Peter D. Hershock, Larry A. Hickman, Kathleen M. Higgins, Heidi M. Hurd, Thomas P. Kasulis, Workineh Kelbessa, Lori Keleher, Oliver Leaman, James McRae, Jin Y. Park, James Peterman, Naoko Saito, May Sim, Robert Smid, Paul Standish, Kenneth W. Stikkers, Karsten J. Struhl, Meera Sushila Viswanathan, Wu Shiu- Ching, Xu Di, T. Yamauchi, Yang Liuxin. (shrink)

The binding problem is to explain how information processed by different sensory systems is brought together to unify perception. The problem has two sides. First, we want to explain phenomenal binding: the fact that we experience a single world rather than separate perceptual fields for each sensory modality. Second, we must solve a functional problem: to explain how a neural net like the brain links instances to types. I argue that phenomenal binding and functional binding require very different treatments. The (...) puzzle of phenomenal binding rests on a confusion and so can be dissolved. So only functional binding deserves explanation. The general solution to that problem is that information to be bound is arrayed along different dimensions. So sensory coding into separate topographic maps facilitates functional binding and there is no need based on the unity of perception for special mechanisms that bring "back together" information in different maps. (shrink)

Se e in che modo il piacere abbia a che fare con il modello di vita preferibile è argomento centrale, sia nella cultura greca, sia nel dibattito filosofico antico. Questo articolo confronta le differenti soluzioni che Platone e Aristotele hanno dato alla questione del piacere, rispettivamente nel Filebo e nell’Etica Nicomachea, registrando una significativa divergenza nel metodo e nella concezione antropologica.Whether and in what way pleasure has to do with a desirable lifestyle is a main topic both in Greek culture (...) and in ancient philosophical debate. This article compares the different solutions that Plato and Aristotle gave to the question of pleasure, in Philebus and in Nicomachean Ethics respectively, pointing out an important divergence in method and anthropological conception. (shrink)

One of Heidegger’s main targets of criticism in History of the Concept of Time is Husserl’s theory of intentionality. This criticism, however, has roots in Heidegger’s earliest thinking over the course of his student years and pertains to what Ernst Tugendhat called the problem of encounter as such. In this article I present how the critical appropriation of Rickert’s and Lask’s ideas shaped a unique interpretation of the subject’s existence in the early stages of Heidegger’s career, contributing to the (dis) (...) class='Hi'>solution of the encounter problem and anticipating an independent version of phenomenology more than a decade before the publication of Being and Time. These alternative sources of influence illuminate Heidegger’s own path, which is significantly different from Husserl’s from the very start. In particular, I show in the article how Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Neo-Kantian sources allows him already during the 1910s to see the derivative status of the theoretical subject-object dichotomy and to realize the need to investigate living subjectivity in its embeddedness in the world. (shrink)

Recently, Richard Healey and Simon Friederich have each advocated a pragmatist interpretation of quantum mechanics as a way to dissolve its foundational problems. The idea is that if we concentrate on the way quantum claims are used, the foundational problems of quantum mechanics cannot be formulated, and so do not require solution. Their central contention is that the content of quantum claims differs from the content of non-quantum claims, in that the former is prescriptive whereas the latter is descriptive. (...) Healey also argues that claims about non-decoherent systems are largely devoid of content. I consider various objections to these claims, noting in particular the ways in which the application of pragmatism to quantum mechanics differs from previous examples of pragmatist therapy. I conclude that a pragmatist dissolution of the foundational difficulties of quantum mechanics is promising, but requires fairly radical changes to our understanding of the content of propositions and the extent of physical explanation. (shrink)

: For many, Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex has only historic significance. The aim of this article is to show on the contrary that Beauvoir's philosophy already contains all the elements of contemporary feminism—so much so that it can be taken as its paradigm. Beauvoir's ideas about the self are extremely relevant today. Feminist themes such as the logic of "equality and difference" and identity are interwoven in her thinking in ways that can offer solutions to what seem (...) to be insurmountable di-lemmas in modern feminism. The attack on all kinds of essentialism can be recon-ciled with feminist identity-politics when the latter presents itself as "arts of living.". (shrink)

In this paper I compare Philoponus’s account of the laws of conversion for categorical and modal propositions with Alexander’s exposition of the same topic. I argue that Philoponus’s main source was Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics and that Philoponus had no access to independent sources to reconstruct Theophrastus’s proof for the conversion of universal negative propositions. I suggest that the different solutions that Alexander and Philoponus offer to the puzzles of the doctrine of the laws of conversion depend on (...) the two commentators’ different exegetical strategies. Alexander tries to solve the puzzles by means of doctrines, which Aristotle expounded elsewhere. Philoponus instead interprets Aristotle’s passage as implying a hierarchy among propositions - a doctrine which is not explicitly present in Aristotle’s text. (shrink)

The article argues in favour of replacing Dewey’s notion of 'experience' in today's cognitive sciences with Mead’s notion of 'act.' Although Dewey's approach to cognition is an essential contribution to the pragmatist turn of cognitive science and his theory of organic relation is particularly useful for future developments in this field, his notion of 'experience' risks proving to be the weak link in the program of empirical implementation of such a turn. In a perspective that shows a clear empirical intent (...) such as that of the 4E programme, the concept of experience, as intentionally vague and smoky, with its strong metaphysical significance, does not seem to offer a useful operational criterion to exclude from evaluation aspects that should not be considered constitutive of the mental. Moreover, in its openness to the overall determination of the relationship between organism and environment, this notion does not contribute to the definition of the phases that characterize the relational dynamics itself. The essay proposes as a solution to these difficulties to turn the attention to Mead's notion of 'act.' Although Mead's act and Dewey's experience are undoubtedly similar concepts, as the result of elaborations often carried out jointly by the two authors, the act seems more suitable to describe in its different characteristics the ideo-sensori-motor process that characterizes the integrated approach in which perception and action are indissolubly linked. Mead's theory of the act is an epistemological tool particularly useful to the empirical program of the 4E, also offering an interesting contribution to the debate between radical representationalists and enactivists. (shrink)

The editor's introduction discusses Clarence I. Lewis's conceptual pragmatism when compared with post-empiricist epistemology and argues that several Cartesian assumptions play a major role in the work, not unlike those of Logical Positivism. The suggestion is made that the Cartesian legacy still hidden in Logical Positivism turns out to be a rather heavy ballast for Lewis’s project of restructuring epistemology in a pragmatist key. More in detail, the sore point is the nature of inter-subjectivity. For Lewis, no less than for (...) the Logical Positivists at the time of the Protocols Controversy and Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations, this is a problem without a solution. The reason is that all these philosophers are apparently unable to realize that the existence of a plurality of knowing subjects cannot be treated at once both as a speculative problem and a methodological one. Lewis, thanks to his pragmatist approach both comes closer to the right answer and offers an even more naïve unsatisfactory solution to the pseudo-problem under discussion. The fact that he has clear in mind that inter-subjectivity means not only a plurality of linguistic utterances but also a co-existence of different kinds of practical behaviour. Eventually, the very idea of mind, the key-idea in the book, suffers from the above mentioned tension. In fact, if inter-subjective communication and action is considered at a methodological level, the very idea of mind would not need an analysis, and no kind of ‘reflexive’ analysis. Methodology might be limited to a ‘naïve’ level where the existence of the world and a plurality of subjects be taken as a bedrock of uncritically accepted evidence. Philosophical reflection on ultimate evidence, instead, would take a different approach, maybe the one Wittgenstein was putting into practice in the same years when Mind and the world order was written, namely it would be bound to question the very meaning of the idea of ‘mind’ as an undue fiction – the same carried out by Descartes – when he assumed the Cogito to be at once a body of self-evident truths and a thing or substance, the familiar Platonic idea of psyche or soul. (shrink)

Responsible conduct of research and research integrity has become a key concern in both research policy and public media resulting in a number of soft law documents, such as codes of conduct at national and supranational levels. This article zooms in on the institutions that are supposed to translate these overall policies and guidelines into workable and recognizable structures for researchers, that is, the mediating layer between the policy articulations and the individual researchers and research groups; a perspective which has (...) been notably lacking in the literature on research integrity. Document analysis demonstrated how research organizations translated and integrated demands for research integrity measures differently, and interviews explored how department heads made sense of these organizational efforts. Results show that department heads did not seem to use organizational policies in their sensemaking around research integrity. To a much larger degree, they used disciplinary norms, systemic pressures and other cues to construct the meaning of integrity. The heads of department articulated integrity as a “non-problem” in their own local context, rather, it was other departments and other countries that experienced lack of research integrity. This meant that the origin of the problem of integrity is located in the system, but to a large extent the department heads describe the solution of the problem to be in the culture of research. The implications of this dis-location and externalizing of integrity are discussed. (shrink)

This article proposes a solution to the ‘paradox of normalcy’, a problem raised by the early Frankfurt Sehool in its questioning of basic concepts of psychoanalysis. After reviewing the different definitions of normalcy put forward by Freud, the paradoxical character of the concept of normalcy, as perceived by the various members of the Frankfurt School, will be made explicit. The solution to the paradox will take the form ofa practical ‘dis-solution’, and will bring to the fore a (...) fundamental principle of Critical Theory identified as the ’banning of graven images’, which will be shown to operate even in the contemporary work of Habermas.Cet artiele propose une solution au ‘paradoxe de la normalité’ qui émergea lors des analyses psychanalytiques de I’École de Francfort de première heure. Suite à une revue des différentes définitions de la normalité avancées par Freud, le caraetère paradoxaI du concept de normalité, tel que perçu par divers membres de l’École de Francfort, sera explieité. La solution au paradoxe prendra la forme d’une ‘dis-solution’ pratique et mettra en relief un prineipe fondamental de la Théorie Critique identifié comme ‘interdiction des idoles’, laquelle opère encore - comme iI sera démontré - dans I’oeuvre contemporaine de Habermas. (shrink)

Feminist philosophical writing on sexuality is both concentrated in specific areas and dispersed throughout feminist philosophy. This is because feminist philosophers usually incorporate in their writing some notion of what sexuality is and its relevance to women's social oppression and liberatory projects. Feminist thinking on sexuality can also be found in many writings on sexual violence, reproductive and erotic rights, sexual ethics, sexual politics, sexual law, sexual harassment, sexual deviance, sexual practices, sexual commerce, sexual identity, and sexual pleasure. Additionally, feminist (...) thinking on sexuality appears in the critical rethinking of biological and social sciences and in a variety of new discourses seeking their interdisciplinary homes in women's studies, gender studies, queer theory, and cultural studies. To carve out from all of this a domain of feminist philosophical work on sexuality seems difficult if not perilous. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show that the current incineration techniques of corpses are directly related to the Holocaust itself and its purposes. It is the same technique which, in the inhuman years of Nazi atrocities, was developed to be applied massively against the Jewish people and the other groups, because as a method it served and expressed both politically and ideologically the plan of a “final solution:” the final “dis-solution,” the disappearance of the human body (...) even as a residue, because the human body, even as a corpse, still retains identity and value. The findings of this study suggest a different analysis of the Nazis’ choice to eliminate the corpses of the Jews, while, at the same time, exploring the original approach offered here helps to understand better the value that the human corpse retains. Many social and religious groups that currently refuse to accept this way of managing human corpses become more understandable in their choice not to accept what nature itself denies but modern technique imposes, namely perfect oblivion, extinction of the corpse. Initially, it is presented in historical and intercultural terms in which ways human societies mainly behave towards the human corpse along with the most prevalent funeral burial customs. Subsequently, the semiology of the human corpse is evaluated in terms of philosophical aesthetics and is included in the corresponding aesthetic categories. Finally, this work airs and analyzes new bioethical issues which arise considering this ever-increasing tendency towards the practice of those responsible for the Holocaust, namely the disappearance of the human corpse. (shrink)

Albert the Great’s theological and exegetical-biblical works often reshape naturalphilosophical doctrines derived from his earlier Aristotelian paraphrases. Accordingly, Albert’s caveats, distinguishing the treatment of topics in physicis and in theologicis, are not abstract disciplinary borderlines but point out to his Dominican students that he will return to crucial matters of the peripatetic paraphrases, recontextualizing them in later works. This article illustrates such interdisciplinary dynamics by analyzing Albert’s commentary on Gen., 1, 20-23, the fifth day of creation, as discussed in STh., (...) II, xi, 60. Albert questions the seeming asymmetry arising from a single element, water, giving rise to two different outcomes: birds for the sublunar sky and reptiles for the earth. The arguments put forth by opponents and Albert’s solution draw upon earlier natural-philosophical works of his, namely De animalibus, De vegetabilibus, and De sensu et sensatu. Notably, Albert reuses his doctrine of humiditates in living bodies and generative processes (such as humidum seminale, humidum vaporativum, humidum spirans, humidum manens). Additionally, Albert analyzes the processes of subtiliatio and digestio, which transform siccum terreum into the matter required for the formation of animate bodies. (shrink)

The theory of ‘objective thought’ can be characterized as an essential core of the Hegelian philosophy and, at the same time, as one of its most indigestible kernels. This theory, at the intersection of foundational and epistemological problems, on the one hand, provides Hegel’s solution to the problem of the relation between being and thought. On the other hand, this theory is the result of a powerful conceptual torsion carried out by Hegel on the notion of thought. This torsion (...) consists, in a first approximation, of a strong enlargement of the scope of such a notion, articulated principally in two steps. In the first step, we have an enlargement within the finite subject, inside the mental realm. Thought (conceived of as Denken) becomes, from a mental faculty or activity separated from the other mental activities, an active element working in an unconscious and instinctual way in the whole of the mental. This step, naturally, requires a redefinition of thought as a faculty or activity, i.e. a redefinition of conscious and reflective thought (conceived of as Nachdenken). In the second step, the scope of the notion of thought is enlarged in order to encompass reality in all of its different spheres, natural and spiritual. Here, thought is conceived as the logicrational structure of reality. With this further step, thought evades the mental sphere in which it would be enclosed on a merely psychological account. In this paper, I will move from the assumption that the first step, providing a first sense in which objectivity can be attributed to thought, is a necessary, though insufficient, condition for the second step, and then for the further sense of this attribution. Thus, I will attempt to provide a conceptual map of the fundamental distinctions within the notion of thought, particularly regarding the first step of this conceptual torsion. (shrink)

What happens to a person in a case of fission? Does it survive? Does it go out of existence? Or is the outcome indeterminate? Since each description of fission based on the persistence conditions associated with our ordinary concept of a person seems to clash with one or more platitudes of common sense about the spatiotemporal profile of macroscopic objects, fission threatens the common-sense conception of persons with inconsistency. Standard responses to this paradox agree that the common-sense conception of persons (...) is unstable, differing over which part of the conception requires revision. I will show that this entrenched view of fission is not compulsory. I will develop a solution to the paradox that maintains the consistency of the common-sense conception of persons on the basis of an ontology of persons and other ordinary objects as double-layered compounds. Each of various descriptions of the outcome of personal fission is compatible with principles about the spatiotemporal profile of persons, because the descriptions and the principles manifest different perspectives on persons and are made true or false by different ontological components of the latter. What holds for the fission of persons, holds for the fission of other kinds of objects. (shrink)

The article uses Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno’s fundamental paradox, as a thought-model for the mind-body problem. With the help of this model, the distinction contained between mental and physical phenomena can be formulated as sharply as possible. I formulate Zeno’s fundamental paradox and give a sketch of four different solutions to it. Then I construct a mind-body paradox corresponding to the fundamental paradox. Through that, it becomes possible to copy the solutions to the fundamental paradox on the (...) mind-body paradox. Three of them fail. But one of them – the Aristotelian one – gives us an interesting hint. Finally, this hint is pursued somewhat further and through comparison with Zeno’s fundamental paradox, the impossibility of a solution to the mind-body problem is shown again. The main new point of this article is the comparison of the mind-body problem with Zeno’s fundamental paradox. The article is a revised english version of an article published in: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 23, 1998, p. 61-75. (shrink)

: This paper focuses on cases of epistemically transformative experiences, as Paul calls them, cases where we have radically different experiences that teach us something we would not have learned otherwise. Paul raises the new and rather intriguing question of whether epistemic transformative experiences pose a general problem for the very possibility of rational decision-making. It is argued that there is an important grain of truth in Paul’s set up and solution when it is applied to a certain narrowly (...) defined set of cases – choices to have a new taste experience in a safe environment, where no important objective values are at stake. But the way she generalizes this approach to large-scale life choices, such as the choice to become a parent, is less convincing. Furthermore, given a proper understanding of revelatory value, there is no need to reconfigure the agent’s choice situation in order to enable rational decision-making. Keywords: Transformative Experience; Rational Decision-Making; Revelatory Value; Subjective Value La riconfigurazione dei problemi decisionali nell’ottica di Transformative Experiences di L.A. Paul Riassunto: Questo lavoro si concentra sui casi di esperienze epistemicamente trasformative, come le definisce Paul, casi in cui abbiamo esperienze radicalmente differenti che ci insegnano qualcosa che non avremmo appreso diversamente. Paul solleva una questione nuova e alquanto intrigante, ossia se le esperienze epistemicamente trasformative pongano un problema generale per l’effettiva possibilità della decisione razionale. Si sosterrà come vi sia un importante elemento di verità nella posizione e nella soluzione di Paul, se riferite a un ristretto numero di casi – la scelta di provare una nuova esperienza in un ambiente sicuro, dove non sono in gioco valori oggettivamente importanti. E, tuttavia, il modo in cui Paul generalizza questo approccio investendo un vasto ambito di scelte di vita, quali la scelta di diventare genitore, è meno convincente. Inoltre, data un’adeguata comprensione di valori rivelativi, non c’è bisogno di riconfigurare il contesto di scelta dell’agente per attivare un processo decisionale razionale. Parole chiave: Esperienza trasformativa; Decisione razionale; Valore rivelativo; Valore soggettivo. (shrink)

This paper begins by pointing to an obvious difficulty in Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy: undoing the decisive separation between linguistic connotation and the denotated, undoing the decisive separation between linguistic meaning and the sensible world. This difficulty demands that we understand how the sensible and the symbolic have a sort of spontaneous relation. How can this be? The history of this problem is then traced back to Husserl, and in particular to his The Origin of Geometry. For Husserl, ‘abstract geometry’ is (...) understood to be a self-constituting field that cuts itself off from a ‘pre-geometry.’ The latter sort of geometry has to do with a symbolic and phantasy consciousness that makes differences in an otherwise uniform sensible plenum. Merleau-Ponty is at odds with the idea of an abstract geometry that constitutes its own field. His phenomenology would have this abstract geometry reduced to pre-geometry, and this pre-geometry further reduced to the sensible, which is then not uniform at all. The problem becomes more precisely how the separations of the sensible and the differences between things are already symbolic.The paper suggests that a way to think through Merleau-Ponty’s problem can be found in a January 1960 Working Note to The Visible and the Invisible called “The Invisible, the negative, vertical Being.” This note, with its references to “joints and members” and “disjunction and dis-membering” is very likely a reference to, and correction of, Heidegger’s 1943 essay on Heraclitus. The point for Merleau-Ponty seems to be a radicalization of the Heraclitean coinstantiation of opposites. His reading allows him to resist understanding the sensible as a self-identity and replace it instead with disarticulation, disintegration, or even perhaps disruption. To show this very disruption is, the paper finally argues, to show the sensible with its phantasmagorical character. Finally, by way of conclusion, the paper takes a turn to sculpture precisely to discuss how we might grasp a sensible that is not uniform but always being shaped and differentiated; and how the symbolic is exactly in, enjambed with, this spacing apart. Ce texte commence par signaler une difficulté évidente dans l’oeuvre tardive de Merleau-Ponty : défaire la séparation décisive entre la connotation linguistique et la dénotation, défaire la séparation décisive entre la signification linguistique et le monde sensible. Cette difficulté requiert de comprendre comment le sensible et le symbolique se trouvent dans une sorte de relation spontanée. Comment cela se fait-il? L’histoire de ce problème remonte à Husserl et à son Origine de la géométrie. Pour Husserl, la « géométrie abstraite » est comprise comme un champ qui se constitue lui-même et qui se détache d’une « pré-géométrie ». Cette dernière sorte de géométrie est liée à une conscience symbolique et imaginative qui fait des différences dans un espace sensible autrement uniforme. Merleau-Ponty n’est pas favorable à l’idée d’une géométrie abstraite qui constitue son propre champ. Sa phénoménologie vise à réduire la géométrie abstraite à la pré-géométrie, et cette dernière au sensible, qui dès lors n’est plus du tout uniforme. Le problème consiste alors à montrer comment les séparations du sensible et les différences entre les choses sont toujours déjà symboliques.La contribution ici suggère qu’une solution peut être trouvée dans la note de travail du Visible et l’invisible de janvier 1960, intitulée « L’Invisible, le négatif, l’Être vertical ». Cette note, qui parle de « jointure et membrure » et de « dis-jonction et dé-membrement », est sans doute une référence à, et une correction l’essai de Heidegger de 1943 sur Héraclite. Le propos de Merleau-Ponty semble être une radicalisation de la co-instantiation héraclitéenne des opposés. Son interprétation lui permet de résister à la conception du sensible comme identité à soi et de la remplacer par la désarticulation, la désintégration ou même peut-être le bouleversement (disruption). Le fait de montrer ce bouleversement consiste précisément à montrer le sensible avec son caractère fantasmatique. Finalement, en guise de conclusion, le texte se tourne vers la sculpture pour discuter une notion du sensible comme étant non uniforme mais toujours déjà formé et différencié, et une notion de symbolique comme étant exactement dans cet espacement. Questo testo inizia portando l’attenzione su un evidente problema nella filosofia dell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty: annullare la separazione decisiva tra connotazione linguistica e ciò che viene denotato, annullare la separazione decisiva tra significato linguistico e mondo sensibile. Questo problema richiede una comprensione della relazione spontanea tra sensibile e simbolico. Come ciò è possibile? La storia di questo problema risale fino ad Husserl, ed in particolare al suo L’origine della geometria. Per Husserl, la ‘geometria astratta’ è da concepire come un campo che si costituisce da sé, distaccandosi da una ‘pre-geometria’. L’ultima tipologia di geometria ha a che fare con una coscienza simbolica e immaginativa, che crea delle differenze in un altrimenti uniforme plenum sensibile. Merleau-Ponty non concorda con l’idea di una geometria astratta che costituisca il proprio campo. La sua fenomenologia intende piuttosto riportare la geometria astratta alla pre-geometria, e quest’ultima al sensibile, che quindi è tutto fuorché uniforme. Il problema diventa allora, più precisamente, come mostrare che le separazioni del sensibile e delle differenze tra le cose siano già simboliche. Questo testo suggerisce che una soluzione per pensare questo problema in Merleau-Ponty possa essere trovata in una nota di lavoro al Visibile e l’invisibile del gennaio 1960, intitolata “L’invisibile, il negativo, l’essere verticale”. Questa nota, con i suoi riferimenti a “spazio topologico e il tempo di congiunzione e di membratura”, e ancora “di dis-giunzione e dis-membramento”, è molto probabilmente un riferimento, ed insieme una correzione, al saggio di Heidegger su Eraclito del 1943. Il punto, per Merleau-Ponty, sembra essere una radicalizzazione del concetto eracliteo di compresenza degli opposti. La sua lettura gli permette di resistere alla comprensione del sensibile come un’auto-identità, per rimpiazzarla invece con una disarticolazione, disintegrazione, o perfino interruzione. Mostrare quest’interruzione è, come argomentiamo in questo testo, mostrare il sensibile con il suo carattere fantasmagorico. Infine, tirando le conclusioni, questo testo si rivolge alla scultura, per discutere come sia possibile afferrare un sensibile che non sia uniforme, ma sempre in-formato e in differenziazione, e come la simbolica sia sempre in – e intrecciata con – questa spaziatura, questa distanziazione. (shrink)

CELL AND PSYCHE THE BIOLOGY OF PURPOSE By EDMUND W. SINNOTT. PREFACE TO THE TORCHBOOK EDITION: SINCE the publication of this little book, as the McNair Lectures at the University of North Carolina, the author has written two others, as well as a number of papers, on the same gen eral theme. Though these elaborate the argument a little further, the essence of it is in Cell and Psyche. This is admittedly a specula tion, but one based solidly on biological (...) fact. It has been regarded as rather visionary and metaphysical by some people, but others have been attracted to it by the suggestion it offers for a better understanding of the ancient problem of how mind and body are related to each other. This problem is of such paramount impor tance, not only for a knowledge of what man really is but for the construction of a satisfying life philosophy, that any light thrown on it should be welcome. The suggestion that man's physical life grows out of the basic goal-seeking and purposiveness found in all organic behavior and that this, in turn, is an aspect of the more general self - regulating and normative character evident in the development and activities of living organisms, is at least worth serious consideration. If we are to avoid a dualistic idea of man's nature and to construct a true monism that does not require the sacrifice of the significance of either mind or body, some such conception as this seems a rea sonable means of doing so. It is to be hoped that the wider distri bution now made possible for the present book may result in a more general consideration of this particular relationship between biol ogy and philosophy* E. W. S. CONTENTS: Introduction. i I. Organization, the Distinctive Character of All Life 15 II. Biological Organization and Psychological Activity 43 IIL Some Implications for Philosophy 75 Suggested Readings. 112 Index. 117. INTRODUCTION: IN THE CLAMOR and confusion of our times one fact grows ever clearer beliefs are important. One of the major problems with which men now are faced per haps, indeed, the most important one is the wide dis agreement which still exists in their fundamental philos ophies. What course a man will follow, or a nation, is set in no small measure by his basic creed, by what he really thinks about the true nature of a human being his personality, his freedom, his destiny, his relations to others and to the rest of the universe; by the judgments lie makes as to what qualities and courses of action are admirable and should command his allegiance. These are not academic questions merely. They arc ancient mys teries which long have troubled human hearts and seem today almost as far as ever from solution. The answer a ny* n gives to them is the most significant thing that one can know about him. We may be tempted to under estimate the importance of these inner directives and turn instead to outer influences, to economic and social factors, as more decisive for our actions. But when we look at what the philosophy of Marx has done to set one half the world against the other, at the basic divergence between the thinking of East and West, and at so many other differences in political and religious beliefs which now divide mankind, we can hardly doubt the profound practical import of men's philosophies. It is still true today that as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he. In the minds of men are the most fateful battles fought. Against those ideologies we condemn, force in the end will fail. If our opponents cannot be convinced, or their ideas reconci. (shrink)

« Sous les masques, il n’y a pas de visages, l’homme historique n’a jamais été homme, et pourtant nul homme n’est seul » : notre article s’interroge sur le sens et les enjeux éthiques de cette affirmation merleau-pontyenne énoncée dans la préface de Signes. Partant du caractère énigmatique et très inquiétant de cette thèse et constatant sa résonance avec l’affirmations deleuzienne, dans Différence et répétition, « Les masques ne recouvrent rien, sauf d’autres masques », nous avons voulu explorer la possibilité (...) de prendre pleinement au sérieux la formule merleau-pontyenne et de lui donner l’envergure d’une théorie des simulacres rendue éthiquement féconde. Le contexte, un dialogue avec Sartre et Nizan entre désenchantement, découragement et nouvelles perspectives éthiques et politiques, nous projette d’emblée dans un pensée de l’adversité et des apories indissociables de la rencontre d’autrui. Il permet également d’entrer avec Merleau-Ponty dans la quête d’une théorie éthique et politique de la communauté non exclusive de l’altérité radicale. A partir d’une analyse de la notion de masques et de ses occurrences dans les travaux de Merleau-Ponty, nous montrons que toute image est essentiellement un masque ontologiquement premier, c’est-à-dire qui ne copie ni ne recouvre une réalité plus authentique. La formulation de Signes qui nous intéresse fait d’emblée apparaître la dimension éthiquement dramatique de cette ontologie. Ce qui est en cause est une hyper-crise, une pensée de l’abîme et des ruptures de sens. Comment agir quand tout être est évasif et autre que soi? Nous aimerions montrer que surgit, dans l’oeuvre merleau-pontyenne, une tension entre une première solution pratique centrée sur la foi et une seconde voie « centrée », si l’on peut dire, sur la temporalité tourbillonnaire de l’institution. Ces deux issues pratiques, qui ne sont pas si nettement circonscrites explicitement par Merleau-Ponty, mais se déploient plutôt de texte en texte sous des formes parfois entremêlées, parfois incompatibles, doivent être, selon nous, soigneusement distinguées. La première, la solution de la foi, fait trop peu de cas du caractère trompeur de l’Urdoxa et des dangers d’une action qui ne s’inquiète pas de la mystification et des biais sur lesquels, peut-être, elle repose. La seconde, la voie de l’institution ne prétend plus surmonter le vertige, mais parvient à en faire un atout. Les masques, compris comme essentiellement instituants – en même temps qu’ils éclairent sur le sens de la notion merleau-pontyenne d’institution – peuvent retrouver un rôle éthique : passer de masque en masque sans jamais trouver de visage, autrement dit répondre à côté, c’est répondre tout de même et cela peut même être la meilleure réponse et compréhension possibles puisque les masques euxmêmes, comme institutions, sont des « visées à côté » qui réclament indéfiniment de nouvelles reprises et ont le pouvoir de relier entre elles, dans une structure de dialogue sans fin, des réinstitutions pourtant minées par une opacité à soi et aux autres. Les simulacres peuvent ainsi devenir en tant que tels notre plus grande chance : véhicules d’altérité radicale et de communication pourtant ininterrompue. Cette théorie élaborée à partir des thèses et analyses merleau-pontyennes fait place aux expériences commotionnantes, mais a, en même temps et sans contradiction, le mérite d’insister davantage, sans attendrissement, sur l’heureuse nature de l’être au lieu de déboucher sur la misosophie que développera Deleuze.“Under the masks, there are no faces: historical man has never been man, and yet, no man is alone.” This article questions the meaning and the ethical stakes of this Merleau-Pontian affirmation articulated in the preface of Signs. Beginning with the enigmatic and very worrisome character of this thesis, and while noticing its resonance with Deleuzian affirmations in Difference and Repetition—“masks recover nothing apart from other masks”—we wanted to explore the possibility of taking seriously the Merleau-Pontian formula and to give it meaning as a theory of ethically productive simulacra. The context, a dialogue between Sartre and Nizan regarding disenchantment, despondency and new ethical as well as political perspectives, immediately projects us toward the thought of adversity and the inseparable aporias in the encounter with the Other. Equally, it permits us to enter with Merleau-Ponty into a search for a political and ethical theory of the community that is not exclusive to radical alterity. Starting from an analysis of the concept of masks and its occurrences in the works of Merleau-Ponty, we show that all image is essentially first an ontological mask; that is to say, one that does not copy nor recovers a more authentic reality. The formulation in Signs which interests us immediately reveals the dramatic ethical dimension of this ontology. That which is a cause is a hyper-crisis, a thought of the damage and the rupture of meaning. How does one act when all being is evasive and other than oneself? We would like to show that what surfaces in Merleau-Ponty’s work is a tension between a primary practical solution centered on faith and a second path “centered,” if we can say this, on the turbulent temporality of the institution. These two practical issues, which are not so explicitly circumscribed by Merleau-Ponty, but which rather reveal themselves from text to text in somewhat intermingled and sometimes incompatible forms must be carefully distinguished. The first, the solution of faith, makes too little of the falsifying character of the Urdoxa and the dangers of an action that is not concerned with the mystification and biases on which, perhaps, it rests. The second, the path of the institution, does not attempt to surmount the vertigo, but nevertheless manages to hold the advantage. The masks, understood essentially as “instituted,” which at the same time clarify the meaning of the Merleau-Pontian notion of the institution, are able to rediscover an ethical role: passing from mask to mask without ever uncovering a face or, stated otherwise, responding side by side, is nevertheless a response. Moreover, this might provide an even better response and possible understanding since the masks themselves, as institutions, are proximate viewfinders which indefinitely reclaim new recoveries and which have the ability to link up with each other in a never-ending structure of dialogue regarding “reinstitutions” despite being undermined by the opacity of self and other. The simulacra can also become as they are in themselves a greatest chance: vehicles of radical alterity and communication, but uninterrupted. This theory, elaborated from the theses and analyses of Merleau-Ponty, gives way to experiences of shock, but, at the same time and without contradiction, to the right to insist further, without tenderness, on the happy nature of being instead of opening itself up to the misosophie that Deleuze will develop.“Dietro le maschere non ci sono volti, l’uomo storico non è mai stato uomo, e tuttavia nessun uomo è solo”: il nostro articolo si interroga sul senso e sulla posta in gioco etica di questa affermazione merleau-pontyana che troviamo nella Prefazione a Segni. Partendo dal tratto enigmatico e inquietante di questa tesi, e dalla constatazione della sua risonanza con l’affermazione deleuziana secondo cui “le maschere non ricoprono nulla, se non altre maschere”, abbiamo voluto esplorare la possibilità di prendere sul serio la formula merleau-pontyana ricavandone una teoria dei simulacri eticamente feconda. Il contesto, quello di un dialogo con Sartre e Nizan intorno ai temi del disincanto e delle nuove prospettive etiche e politiche, ci proietta direttamente nello spazio di un pensiero dell’avversità e delle aporie indissociabili dall’incontro con l’altro, e consente parimenti di farci strada con Merleau-Ponty in direzione di un’etica e di una politica della comunità non esclusiva della dimensione dell’alterità radicale. A partire da un’analisi della nozione di maschera e delle sue occorrenze nei testi merleau-pontyani mostriamo che ogni immagine è una maschera ontologicamente prima, che non copia e non ricopre affatto una realtà più autentica. La formulazione richiamata da Segni introduce immediatamente alla dimensione eticamente drammatica di tale ontologia. La sua posta in gioco è quella di un ipercriticismo, di un pensiero dell’abisso e dell’interruzione del senso. Come agire quando ogni essere è evasivo ed è altro rispetto a se stesso? Vorremmo mostrare che a quest’altezza si fa strada nell’opera merleau-pontyana una tensione tra una prima soluzione pratica, affidata alla dimensione della fede, e una seconda via d’uscita “incentrata”, se così si può dire, sulla temporalità spiraliforme dell’istituzione. Questi due esiti pratici, che in Merleau-Ponty non risultano nettamente ed esplicitamente circoscritti, ma si dispiegano di testo in testo dando luogo a sovrapposizioni e al limite a contraddizioni, vanno invece, a nostro avviso, accuratamente distinte. La prima, la soluzione della fede, fa troppo poco spazio al carattere ingannevole dell’Urdoxa e ai pericoli di un’azione che non si preoccupa di farsi carico delle mistificazioni e delle deformazioni su cui essa forse si fonda. La seconda, la soluzione dell’istituzione, non pretende più di oltrepassare la vertigine ma arriva a farne una risorsa. Le maschere, intese come essenzialmente istitutive, facendo luce sulla nozione merleau-pontyana di istituzione vengono a giocare un ruolo etico: passare di maschera in maschera senza mai trovare volti, in altri termini rispondere “a lato”, significa rispondere comunque e forse rispondere nel modo migliore, secondo la migliore comprensione possibile. Poiché le maschere stesse in quanto istituzioni sono delle “visées à côté” che chiamano indefinitiamente a nuove riprese e hanno il potere di legare tra loro in un dialogo senza fine una serie di re-istituzioni inevitabilmente opache a sé e agli altri. I simulacri possono così diventare, proprio in quanto simulacri, la nostra più grande chance: veicoli di alterità radicale e di comunicazione ininterrotta. Questa teoria, elaborata a partire dalle tesi e dalle analisi merleau-pontyane, consente di fare spazio a esperienze di grande momento emotivo, e allo stesso tempo, senza contraddizione, di insistere senza sentimentalismi sulla felice natura dell’essere, evitando infine la “misosophia” a cui approda Deleuze. (shrink)

In his recent book, Professor J. S. Morrison has brought to a happy conclusion a quarter of a century and more of inspired research into the problem of how the oars of a classical trireme were arranged. The essence of his solution of this perennial problem is that the fifth-century Athenian trireme had her oars and benches alike disposed at three different levels, each rower having his own oar, and each oar its separate thole set at a distance of (...) feet, not inches, from its neighbours. The evidence is marshalled with such mastery that it may be thought unlikely that there will ever be any general recrudescence of the di scaloccio and a zenzile theories that were as fashionable once as they are seen now to have been unhistorical. In his inquiry, however, Professor Morrison has wisely confined himself to the ancient sources, and no more than touched upon the analogy of the Byzantine dromon, the direct descendant of the classical trireme and to some extent the parent of the a zenzile galley. Other protagonists, and notably Tarn, have been far from sharing his discretion, and there is still room perhaps for a brief note calling attention to the possibility that the dromon of the Middle Ages may shed indirect light upon the trireme of fifteen hundred years earlier. (shrink)

In his recent book, Professor J. S. Morrison has brought to a happy conclusion a quarter of a century and more of inspired research into the problem of how the oars of a classical trireme were arranged. The essence of his solution of this perennial problem is that the fifth-century Athenian trireme had her oars and benches alike disposed at three different levels, each rower having his own oar, and each oar its separate thole set at a distance of (...) feet, not inches, from its neighbours. The evidence is marshalled with such mastery that it may be thought unlikely that there will ever be any general recrudescence of the di scaloccio and a zenzile theories that were as fashionable once as they are seen now to have been unhistorical. In his inquiry, however, Professor Morrison has wisely confined himself to the ancient sources, and no more than touched upon the analogy of the Byzantine dromon, the direct descendant of the classical trireme and to some extent the parent of the a zenzile galley. Other protagonists, and notably Tarn, have been far from sharing his discretion, and there is still room perhaps for a brief note calling attention to the possibility that the dromon of the Middle Ages may shed indirect light upon the trireme of fifteen hundred years earlier. (shrink)

One of the currently most discussed themes in the philosophy of action is whether there is some kind of collective intention that explains what groups do independent of what the indi-viduals who make up the group intend and do. One of the main obstacles to solve this prob-lem is that on the one hand collective intentionality is no simple summation, aggregate, or dis-tributive pattern of individual intentionality (the Irreducibility Claim), while on the other hand collective intentionality is in the heads (...) of the participating individuals, so to speak, and so it is owned by each of the separate individuals who make up the group (the Individual Ownership Claim). The claims are contradictory and until now no satisfactory solution how to reconcile them has been found. In this article I argue that the constitution view, like the one developed by Lynne R. Baker, can provide a way to sidestep the contradiction. Just as a statue as such is constituted by the marble it is made of but has characteristics that are different from the mar-ble (a statue has a head and legs, while the marble hasn’t; while the marble is stony and the statue as such isn’t), I argue that a group is constituted by its members and that a group on the one hand and its members on the other hand have different characteristics. This is possible be-cause group and members are on different levels. Then there is no longer a contradiction be-tween the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership Claim, for the former claim con-cerns the group level and the latter claim concerns the level of the group members. This ex-plains that a group can have intentions that are no simple summation, aggregate, or distributive patterns of the intentions of its members and that group intentions can be different from if not contradictory to what the individual members taken together intend. (shrink)

ABSTRACT (ENG) One of the concerns of Greek philosophy centred on the question of how a manifold and ordered universe arose out of the primitive state of things. From the mythical accounts dating around the seventh century B.C. to the cosmologies of the Classical period in Ancient Greece, many theories have been proposed in order to answer to this question. How these theories differ in positing a “something” that pre-existed the ordered cosmos has been widely discussed. However, scholars have rarely (...) made explicit how they differ in style of thought. In the span of four centuries the first deductive arguments of the Eleatic philosophers culminated in the emergence of logical proof and a form of explanation of natural phenomena, which consisted of searching for the simplest and fewest premises and deducting implications. In this paper it will be discussed how, at distinct stages of its development, the deductive thinking informed the solutions proposed to solve the chaos-order problem, that of how an ordered universe has been possible. -/- ABSTRACT (ITA) Una delle più importanti questioni della filosofia greca è stata quella di comprendere come sia stato possibile un universo ordinato a partire da uno stato primordiale. Dalle teogonie del VII secolo a.C. fino alle cosmologie dei filosofi dell’età classica, sono state proposte diverse teorie per dare risposta a questa domanda. Come esse differiscano nel postulare l’esistenza di un “qualcosa” di primordiale che preesisteva all’ordine del cosmo è stato molto discusso. Pochi studiosi, però, le hanno esaminate sullo sfondo della lenta evoluzione del pensiero deduttivo, culminata nella dimostrazione in geometria e in una forma di spiegazione dei fenomeni che consisteva nel cercare semplici premesse e inferire conclusioni. In questo articolo si mostrerà come il lento affermarsi della spiegazione razionale prima, dell’argomento deduttivo e della dimostrazione in geometria poi, abbiano dato forma alle diverse risposte al problema caos-ordine, e in particolare alla domanda su come sia sorto un universo ordinato. (shrink)

Università degli Studi di Milano.I propose to consider the paradox of temporal becoming using conceptual instruments derived from Lewis’ definition of intrinsic change. I will show that there are two possible solutions to this paradox, that the two solutions are conceptually incompatible and that they both solve the paradox at the cost of doing without temporal becoming. The problem I want to raise is: how should we consider temporal becoming? I suppose that, given these premises, the most obvious answer is (...) that temporal becoming is unreal: the paradox of temporal becoming is a demonstration of the impossibility of temporal becoming; there are, of course, two different and competing models of the nature of time , but they both exclude the reality of temporal change. I propose a different answer: temporal becoming is conceptually inaccessible, the paradox concerns our conceptual abilities, not reality in itself and the two possible solutions to the paradox of time reveal two possible conceptual attitudes towards a conceptually unattainable reality. (shrink)

_:_ Habermas believes that the foundation of democracy is to be found in the discourse principle. Also, some cognitive and experimental studies have suggested that democratic procedures can promote a debate between different opinions and ideas, thus improving the decision-making performance of public authorities. However, Habermas believes that, while, on the one hand, the democratic community is based on the premise that participants in the discourse collectively strive to find the best solutions, on the other, the democratic process allows citizens (...) to irrationally misuse their political rights. If, therefore, reasoned decision and dialogue have an important role in the justification of democracy, but it is a limited role, we propose the idea of an imperfect dialogic democracy. _Keywords:_ Jürgen Habermas; Collective Reasoning; Cognitive and Experimental Studies; Democracy; Decision Making _____La democrazia dialogica imperfetta: il principio discorsivo di Habermas e gli studi sperimentali sul ragionamento collettivo___ _Riassunto:_ Secondo Habermas il fondamento della democrazia risiede nel principio del discorso. Alcuni studi cognitivi e sperimentali suggeriscono che le procedure tipiche delle democrazia siano in grado di promuovere un dibattito fra opinioni e idee diverse, capace di migliorare le performances decisionali delle autorità pubbliche. Tuttavia, da un lato Habermas ritiene che la comunità democratica sia basata sulla presupposto che chi partecipa a un pubblico discorso si impegni a trovare la migliore soluzione, dall’altro le procedure democratiche non impediscono che i cittadini utilizzino in maniera irrazionale i loro diritti politici. Se le decisioni ragionate e il dialogo hanno un ruolo importante nella legittimazione della demcocrazia, un ruolo che tuttavia resta limitato, allora suggeriamo l’idea di una democrazia dialogica imperfetta. _Parole chiave:_ Jürgen Habermas; Ragionamento collettivo; Studi cognitivi e sperimentali; Democrazia; Processi decisionali. (shrink)

La fenomenologia possiede un implicito potenziale pedagogico estremamente promettente e tuttavia ancora largamente inesplorato. Il presente articolo suggerisce che l’orientamento fenomenologico-esistenziale nella didattica e nell’educazione rappresenti una possibile soluzione per: 1) riportare tutti i differenti aspetti metodologici del processo formativo ad una unità tematica; 2) sviluppare negli studenti che si preparano ad esercitare una professione di cura l’attitudine a svolgere il loro servizio in modo autentico, sostenendo la motivazione, rendendo possibile il coinvolgimento emotivo senza il quale il gesto di cura (...) non potrebbe nascere, favorendo la realizzazione di significati e di valori e prevenendo il rischio sempre presente di burnout. Viene qui esplorato il significato dei termini fenomenologia ed esistenzialismo, intendendo con il primo una particolare postura metodologica dinanzi alla realtà, e con l’altro un ambito di ricerca concernente il senso dell’esistenza umana. In tal modo, la formazione del professionista, ancorché scientificamente fondata, non perde di vista i due riferimenti ineludibili che sostengono le professioni d’aiuto: il contatto con la soggettività e la coltivazione dell’umanità quale imprescindibile risorsa professionale . Poiché l’approccio fenomenologico-esistenziale abitua ad un sapere contestualizzato,individualizzato e “sapienziale”, i professionisti del lavoro cura che sono stati formati secondo una sensibilità fenomenologico-esistenziale saranno meglio equipaggiati per fronteggiare e gestire le sfide che quotidianamente coloro che svolgono un lavoro di cura devono affrontare, nonché più preparati a cogliere in modo profondo i bisogni della popolazione e a rispondervi in modo creativo ed efficace. È una questione di sguardo: l’atteggiamento fenomenologico forma nei professionisti la capacità di “vedere” ciò che altrimenti resterebbe implicito, latente, imbrigliato nelle maglie dell’ovvietà e della routine. In questo senso si parla qui di una sorta di “oftalmologia” pedagogica: perché lo scopo della formazione non consiste tanto nel trasmettere una nozione della realtà , quanto nell’affinare la capacità di coglierne l’essenza e il significato più profondo. L’articolo offre alcune suggestioni rispetto al modo in cui i formatori possono trasferire queste nozioni nella costruzione di un ambiente di apprendimento aperto all’esperienza viva e aderente al mondo della vita.This paper poses the suggestion that existential phenomenology provides an ideal solution for 1) integrating all of the different methodological aspects of the educational process into a thematic unity for the student and 2) empowering students entering the caring professions to best serve their intended populations authentically, while avoiding the ever-present peril of burnout. The meanings of both phenomenology and existentialism are clarified, with phenomenology indicating a particular methodological stance toward phenomena, and existentialism indicating research content concerned with domains of human meaning. It is anticipated that students preparing to enter the caring professions who have training in existential phenomenology will be better equipped to manage challenges commonly faced by those in the caring vocations, as well as to prepare them to assist the populations they serve with meaning-oriented crises and needs. A few suggestions on how educators might bring these notions into the classroom environmentensue. (shrink)

Abstract: Il testo viene pubblicato per gentile concessione della casa editrice ESI ed e’ tratto dal libro di Stefano Ulliana “Il concetto creativo e dialettico dello Spirito nei Dialoghi Italiani di Giordano Bruno. Il confronto con la tradizione neoplatonico-aristotelica: il testo bruniano De l’Infinito, Universo e mondi”, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli, 2003. -/- Le argomentazioni presentate ne Il concetto creativo e dialettico dello Spirito nei Dialoghi Italiani di Giordano Bruno (Il confronto con la tradizione neoplatonico-aristotelica: il testo bruniano De l’Infinito, (...) Universo e mondi) costituiscono le conclusioni ultime e definitive di un lavoro di ricerca che ha investito l’insieme dei Dialoghi Italiani, riuscendo a reperire ed a far emergere quello che pare il nucleo più profondo ed importante—il vero e proprio elevato fondamento—della speculazione bruniana: la presenza attiva di un concetto triadico teologico-politico—il Padre, il Figlio e lo Spirito della tradizione trinitaria cristiana—però riformulato attraverso il capovolgimento rivoluzionario di questa stessa tradizione, attuato attraverso il concetto creativo e dialettico dell’infinito. In questo modo la stessa tradizione platonica pare subire una trasformazione essenziale, abbandonando qualunque forma di alienazione e negazione, per riaprirsi invece verso soluzioni che paiono riprendere moniti ed osservazioni suscitati dalle prime, grandi e maestose, speculazioni dei filosofi presocratici. Parmenide, Eraclito ed Empedocle sembrano rivivere nei testi bruniani, riproponendo una soluzione ben diversa a quei nodi e problemi teoretico-pratici—fondamentale il rapporto Uno-molti e tutto ciò che da esso consegue, sia sul piano naturale che politico—apparentemente risolti e codificati dal pensiero postsocratico, prima platonico e poi aristotelico. L’inscindibilità del principio di libertà (la figura teologica del Padre) ed eguaglianza (il Figlio), attraverso il richiamo alla fonte amorosa infinita ed universale (lo Spirito), consente alla riflessione bruniana di presentare per la prima volta nel panorama filosofico mondiale di tutti i tempi la possibilità di salvaguardare sia l’aspetto creativo naturale, che la diversità politica, presentando nel contempo un concetto di ragione capace di esprimere un movimento infinito sempre aperto ed attento alla molteplicità. In questa liberazione della potenza e della volontà dalle strettoie ordinate e gerarchiche della tradizione il pensiero e la riflessione di Giordano Bruno danno inizio alla modernità, ripresentandosi quale mirabile soluzione ogni qual volta potere e violenza paiono assestarsi e reciprocamente incrementarsi, in un circolo apparentemente indistruttibile. -/- Allora i capitoli di questo libro—attraverso l’analisi di concetti importanti nella filosofia bruniana, quali quelli del desiderio e dell’immaginazione, della materia e della ragione—riattraversano la storia della definizione filosofica delle entità reali più importanti—Dio, Natura, Ragione, Uno—per mostrare un’opposizione fondamentale: l’opposizione fra la fusione speculativa apportata dal pensiero neoplatonico-aristotelico (antico, moderno e contemporaneo), attenta alla difesa della necessità ordinata di un mondo unico, e la liberazione speculativo-pratica bruniana, attenta a far rivivere la coscienza dell’infinito, in noi e fuori di noi. -/- English Abstract: The arguments that have been presented in this essay, which are part of the book ‘The creative and dialectical concept of the Spirit in the Italian Dialogues of Jordanus Brunus. The comparison with the neoplatonic-Aristotelian tradition: the brunian text De l’Infinito, Universo e mondi’, constitute the ultimate and definitive conclusions of a body of research that has mainly focused on Bruno’s work “Dialoghi Italiani”. This research has managed to rise the deepest and most important core of the true foundation of Giordano Bruno’s speculative thinking—the active presence of a triadic theological-political concept of the Father, the Son and the Spirit of Christian tradition. However, this triad has also been reformulated through the revolutionary overturning of this tradition and realized through a creative and dialectical concept of the infinite. In this way the same Platonic tradition seems to undergo an essential transformation by abandoning any form of alienation and negation and indeed to open itself to recover those warnings and observations that the first great speculative thoughts of the Presocratics philosophers brought about. Parmenides, Heraclitus and Empedocles seem to come to life again in Bruno’s essays by proposing a different solution to those theoretical and practical problems such as the fundamental relation between One-many and what it can represent either at the natural level or at the political level which have been apparently solved and codified in the Platonic and Aristotelian thought. -/- The indissolubility of the freedom principle (the theological character of the Father) and equality (the Son), through the use of the loving, infinite and universal source (the Spirit), allows Bruno’s reflection to present for the first time in the entire philosophical tradition the possibility of safeguarding the creative aspect as well as the political diversity. He achieves this by showing a concept of reason which is able to express the infinite movement that it is always open and measured (careful) towards the multiplicity. In this release of power and will from the ordered and hierarchical paths of the philosophy tradition, Bruno’s thought gave birth to Modernity. (shrink)

Il contributo intende discutere alcune questioni legate alla diversa visione del profeta dell'Islam in una prospettiva interculturale. In particolare si tentano di evidenziare le radici del problema concentrandosi sullo contesto storico in cui la questione ha preso forma. Emerge una critica alla maggior parte degli studiosi arabi che, storicamente, hanno evitato di affrontare lo studio di fonti non musulmane che potessero proporre visioni contrastanti rispetto alle credenze religiose condivise. Il contributo ha affrontato quindi il problema della traduzione di opere letterarie (...) occidentali in arabo, in particolare le opere in cui è implicata l’immagine del profeta dell'Islam: emerge una censura piuttosto diffusa che tende a omettere le parti considerate "offensive" per la sensibilità religiosa dei musulmani. La Divina Commedia di Dante Alighieri rappresenta il caso esemplare di questo atteggiamento. Obbiettivo del contributo è affrontare il concetto di diversità in modo costruttivo in modo da non nascondere i fatti attraverso la censura o la non conoscenza ma invocando un nuovo modo di confrontarsi nel contesto multiculturale.This paper discusses the frequent intercultural problems related to the different cross-cultural vision of the prophet of Islam. In particular, the paper highlights the roots of the problem; in fact, focusing on the historical background of the problem is extremely important. Moreover, the paper delivered criticism to the majority of Arab scholars who, historically, seemed to lack the willingness to study non Muslim sources that have a contradicting vision to their believes. The paper tackled the issue of the translation of western literary works into Arabic, especially those that tackles the image of the prophet of Islam, where the Arabic translation usually skip any “offensive” part related to the image of the prophet. For example, The divine comedy of Dante Alighieri. The paper tries to face the concept of diversity in constructive way, by never hiding the facts, as this can never be considered a solution, but a way to transform it into a very complex problem. (shrink)

Hampshire addresses the problem of pluralism, i.e. conflicts, characteristic of modern societies, which arise from the presence of conflicting moral interests and duties. The solution is a procedural notion of justice, seen as the precondition for respect for the different positive conceptions of the good. A salient feature of the book is the combination of a form of a 'weak' Aristotelianism, similar to that of Bernard Williams and far away from that of MacIntyre, with the theme of the relationship (...) between universalism and particularism. Another is the idea that deliberation is the primary procedure in ethics. This theme was the centre of American ethical and political thought since the confrontation between Rawls and his communitarian critics. (shrink)

Since last year, major initiatives have been undertaken by the chair of theoretical philosophy at the University of Tübingen in order to enhance the reception of analytic metaphysics in the European landscape. Here we review the 2013 summer workshop, intended to be the first of an annual series, on “Existence, Truth and Fundamentality”, the invited speakers being Graham Priest (Melbourne), Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow), Dan López de Sa (Barcelona), Francesco Berto (Aberdeen), Friederike Moltmann (Paris – Pantheon Sorbonne) and Jason Turner (Leeds). (...) The workshop’s scope is fairly large, focusing on three different aspects of contemporary research in metaphysics. However, the underlying idea of organizers Thomas Sattig and Alessandro Torza consisted in exploring their interconnections and even new areas which possibly share the same problem spectrum. Also, they thought of bringing together both young and senior protagonists of the contemporary debate. In this sense, the main thread followed by the speakers consisted in enquiring the ideas of fundamentality, dependence and grounding with respect to ontology (Berto, López de Sa, Turner) and the truthmaking debate (Priest, Moltmann, Leuenberger), thus pretty much in line with some latest tendencies in metaphysics, such as, prima inter paria, the works of Kit Fine. When we say that something is more fundamental than something else, we move into a non-conventional (for the standards of 20 th century philosophy) metodological framework, hardly focusing on the question about what there is, and rather tackling the issue of how fundamentally there is what there is, or how the existence of something is required as a ground for the existence of other things. Here is how Jonathan Schaffer explains the methodological transition in his influential “On What Grounds What” (2009): -/- Among the many assumptions Quine and Carnap share is that metaphysical questions are existence questions, such as whether numbers exist. They only disagree on the further issue of whether such questions are meaningful (at least as the metaphysician might pose them). But why think that metaphysical questions are existence question of this sort? Return to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. There are virtually no existence question posed. The whole discussion is about substances (fundamental units of being). At one point Aristotle pauses to ask if numbers exist, and his answer is a brief and dismissive yes. [. . . ] For Aristotle, the question about numbers is whether they are transcendent substances or grounded in concreta. The question is not whether numbers exist, but how. (Schaffer, 2009, p. 347) -/- The conference opened with Graham Priest’s intriguing and peculiar review of Buddhist cornerstone “The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way” (Mūlamadhyakamakārikā) by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-ca. 250 AD), seen as a unrecognized forerunner of multi-valued semantics and dialetheism. Priest shows that Nagarjuna’s thought indeed has valuable analytic grip (contrary to the traditional mystical dismiss of his works altogether) and is even in accord to some formal schemas rejecting both the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction. Dan López de Sa was interested in the topic of grounding, raising concerns about how to explain the kind of “reality” exemplified by what is not fundamental, but rather derivative on something else. He proposes a conceptual and non-primitive analysis of grounding as linked to fundamentality and derivation, and argues that the view can be advocated along with the acceptance that at least something is not fundamental. Subsequently, he illustrates an impressive range of applications linked to contemporary debates in meta-ontology, truthmaking and philosophy of time. Stephan Leuenberger discussed a semantics for “total logic”, a variant of first order logic which is claimed to have several applications with respect to the issue of excluding negative existentials from the scope of theories accounting for a given ’totality’ of facts. For example, materialism is the claim that everything there is can be traced back to physical facts or to truth implied by those facts. What about the claim that “There are no angels”? According to Leuenberger, ordinary logic falls prey of modal arguments (if it is possible that there are angels, by modus tollens, that it is not metaphysically necessary that everything there is is physical). So, there is space for the introduction of a new operator, the totality operator, claiming of what enters its scope that “that’s the whole truth”. Consequently, total logic’s semantics tackles David Chalmers’ well-known conceivability-based argument in favour of zombie’s (subjects producing behaviour but experiencing no qualia) possible existence. Friederike Moltmann presented a massive array of natural language-based examples on the role played by case-constructions, such as “it is the case that Caesar crossed the Rubicon”, “the case of the stolen statue”, “the case in which it might rain”, and so forth. She suggests that we should take surface phenomena of our language very seriously with regard to the determination of ontological categories and truth-makers. Cases are provided by many natural languages with their own existence predicates (“to occur” and “to present itself ”), and these do not apply to other kind of entities, such as objects and events. Trying to derive a substantive thesis on their nature, she claims that they are filtered entities, a structure taking into account some features of the corresponding objects and events and preserving their relational pattern. Jason Turner discussed meta-ontological concerns against the claim that ontological debates are defective. Analysed the structure of a metaphysical theory and identified two different forms of defectiveness that can occur in ontological questions, the defection from without and the defection from within, the author provided an original solution in order to avoid such difficulties. He argued thus in favor of a logical constancy, a translation principle thanks to it would be possible reconceive an ontological defection. Lastly, Francesco Berto’s talk closed the workshop with a sagacious discussion of meinongian quantification. He substains that Meinongians and Quineans experience no conceptual equivocation. Even if the former claims that “There are things that do not exist”, something that the latter contrasts with the interpretation of existential quantifiers as all-including, they still rely upon the same concept of “existence” and they understand each other when they are outside the ontology room, so that it cannot be that they lack competence. Subsequently, Berto deals with the objection that Meinongians commit analytic falsehood in separating the meaning of “to be” from that of “exists”. The Quinean has no independent evidence for analytic equivalence aside from her emphatic stress on the “is” in “there is”. Meinongians, however, can retort to linguistic considerations and claim that existence predicates display fairly different functions. -/- As for what regards our internal division of the “philosophical labor”, Fabio Ceravolo reviewed Moltmann and Berto’s talks; whereas Mattia Cozzi took care of Priest’s and Leuenberger’s, and Mattia Sorgon of those given by López de Sa and Turner. Conclusively, we would like to thank Thomas Sattig and Alessandro Torza for all of their organizational efforts and the kind welcome they reserved to us. We hope we will have further opportunities to collaborate with Tübingen in supporting similarly innovative and valiant european initiatives. (shrink)

Realist ontologies about history stress that entities such as documents, their sources, and events whom they are talking about are objectively given in the ontological reality of social history, beyond our skills to recognize them. Thus, how is it possible to understand the extension of the ontological independence of historical findings and where does our (mis)interpretations of those findings begin? As every realist ontological commitment must provide us with a suitable tool to solve the age-old problem of findings’ reliability, in (...) this paper we analyze how such realist views, like Searle’s Collective Intentionality, cannot be a solution, meanwhile, on the other hand, other realist purposes could represent valid alternatives. In fact, Searle’s theory surely accounts for the constitution of such social objects as false historical acts, but its definition of function of status (FS) as “X count as Y in C” permits, even only in principle, that the same entity X, which has counted as Y, in the far-off times historical context C0, could “re-count” as Y  Y in a more recent context Ct  C0, after an involuntary forgery too. Being by definition iterative, FS could iterate clamorous twists, also ad libitum, making future historians’ shared intentionality lose the contact with the reality of original status’ functions. On the contrary, Ferraris’ Documentality satisfies this historical reliability test, because its definition of a social object as inscription of an act distinguishes between what a fact/event/object X of the past has been, and what characteristics this same X must possess to become a document, discerning, this way, voluntary from unintentional effects of the creation of an object/event/fact, to instantiate a social fact, or to cause an historical event, and their different taxa of historicity. (shrink)

The TV series American Gods (2017-2021) features a war between the Old Gods, a syncretic pantheon of deities of the natural powers drawn from all mythological and religious traditions, and the New Gods, the deities of history and the artificial realm of man-made technics. Gods of both fences are shown as beings whose morals beyond good and evil is entirely focused on fulfilling their will to power in terms of immortality. Humans are trapped within this conflict; their only option is (...) seemingly limited to choose which side they stand. While the series sumptuously renders Heidegger’s claim that metaphysics and technics are the same, it also employs a different and positive meaning of the latter: by showing the old gods, the new ones, and humans as different options about existence – namely the logic of sacrifice, the logic of hedonism, and the economic logic of human reason – and eventually rejecting all of them as viable solutions, it favours an idea of existence as full open-ness and experimentality. In the end, technics is one with man’s self-creativity, embodied in his very biology, providing him an escape route from the vicious circles constantly ambushing him on his path towards authenticity – namely, all deities, religious as well as secular. (shrink)