Husserl’s phenomenology entails the absolute thesis that there could not be a world without a subject. My intention in this paper is to show that the consistent development of a phenomenological approach can establish that such a transcendental subject must be defined as a fundamental open intersubjectivity and more radically as interanimality. I intend to demonstrate that anthropomorphism cannot be a serious threat and that Einfühlung [empathy] is a valid method for studying animality. In this regard, I will contrast a (...) Husserlian-inspired and a Merleau-Pontian approach with Heidegger’s reflections on animals. This method will allow me to study the intertwinement between humans and other animals. On the one hand I will show that we necessarily find animality within us, in the latent multiplicity of a body which is built through introjections and projections. On the other hand I will wonder if it is possible to decenter ourselves into other living beings so as to sense what they think and to build a world with them. It will then appear, through a reflection on Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible as well as on recent ethological studies, that openness to the other and to indeterminacy is an essential characteristic of animals in general. (shrink)

Cet essai aborde la question phénoménologique fondamentale de la donation de l’apparaître. L’auteur commence par noter que la distinction husserlienne entre l’apparaître comme vécu (Erscheinen als Erleben) et ce qui apparaît (das Erscheinende) ou phénomène a été critiquée à partir de deux perspectives différentes dont Patočka et Henry sont, respectivement, deux représentants importants. Quoique tous deux critiquent la même distinction husserlienne, l’auteur montre cependant que leurs critiques prennent en réalité des directions opposées. Patočka entend développer une phénoménologie asubjective dans laquelle (...) la donation fondamentale de toute apparence se trouve dans le « se-montrer-soi-même » (Sich-selbst-zeigen) des êtres. Plutôt que dans le domaine de l’auto-donation du vécu de l’expérience (Erleben), cette phénoménologie fonde l’apparence dans la sphère phénoménologique globale du monde. Henry, quant à lui, ne rejette pas le domaine subjectif mais renforce bien plutôt son importance en radicalisant la distinction husserlienne entre l’expérience et le phénomène et en la remplaçant par la différence qu’il établit entre révélation et manifestation. La manifestation suppose toujours la distance et l’intentionnalité. La révélation, en revanche, peut être comprise comme une radicalisation de l’expérience husserlienne, puisqu’elle est un mode d’apparaître qui n’implique pas une forme de pensée (meinen) et d’intentionnalité. Elle est, en tant que telle, exempte de la distance que Henry exclut du domaine d’intériorité où se produit la révélation. L’auteur discute alors ce contraste entre Patočka et Henry et montre à quel point l’accent mis sur le monde dans l’explication de la donation donnée par le premier diffère de la relation à soi subjective qui est au cœur de l’explication de la donation offerte par le second. (shrink)

The common opposition between the imaginary and the real prevents us from genuinely understanding either one. Indeed, the imaginary embodies a certain intuitive presence of the thing and not an empty signitive intention. Moreover it is able to compete with perception and even to offer an increased presence, a sur-real display, of the things, as shown by Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of art in Eye and Mind. As a result, we have to overcome the conception according to which the imaginary field is (...) a mere figment of my imagination, a mental entity that I could still possess in the very absence of its object. On the other hand, the presence of reality is never complete or solid: “The transcendence of the far-off encroaches upon my present and brings a hint of unreality even into the experiences with which I believe myself to coincide.” Therefore, first, the imaginary has to be redefined as a special hovering modality of the presence of the beings themselves. Second and furthermore: is not the imaginary always intertwined with perception? Merleau-Ponty advocates the puzzling thesis that there is an “imaginary texture of the real.” What is the meaning of this assertion? To what extent will it be able to blur the classical categories without arousing confusion? Can we avoid reducing reality to illusion? Lastly, consistently followed, this reflection leads as far as to discover, in the imaginary mode of being, an ontological model, the canon enabling Merleau-Ponty to think Being, an “Oneiric Being.” Thus we will venture the apparently paradoxical contention that the imaginary is the fundamental dimension of the real. The notion of “fundament” becomes indeed problematic and receives an ironical connotation, however this is precisely what is at stake in a non-positivist ontology. Existence “lies” in a ghost-like, sketchy and unsubstantial ground, in a restlessly creative being that is open to creative interpretations. And there it finds the principle of the ever-recurring crisis that both tears it apart and makes it rich in future promise. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology entails the absolute thesis that there could not be a world without a subject. My intention in this paper is to show that the consistent development of a phenomenological approach can establish that such a transcendental subject must be defined as a fundamental open intersubjectivity and more radically as interanimality. I intend to demonstrate that anthropomorphism cannot be a serious threat and that Einfühlung [empathy] is a valid method for studying animality. In this regard, I will contrast a (...) Husserlian-inspired and a Merleau-Pontian approach with Heidegger’s reflections on animals. This method will allow me to study the intertwinement between humans and other animals. On the one hand I will show that we necessarily find animality within us, in the latent multiplicity of a body which is built through introjections and projections. On the other hand I will wonder if it is possible to decenter ourselves into other living beings so as to sense what they think and to build a world with them. It will then appear, through a reflection on Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible as well as on recent ethological studies, that openness to the other and to indeterminacy is an essential characteristic of animals in general. (shrink)

_Est-ce réel?_ collects exciting new perspectives on the crucial role of the imaginary in contemporary phenomenology. Redrawing the boundaries of real and imaginary, this collection renews investigation into a range of ontological issues and their many practical and ethical implications.

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v57-dufourcq.

This article shows that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is traversed by a tension between an interpretation of history and existence in terms of crisis and the recognition of an insurmountable vertigo, the Heraclitean model of an eternal return of the singular and the partial, without possible synthesis. Our thesis is that the model of the crisis is marked by a classical positivism which makes it the secret ally of a conservative and anti-democratic politics. It is also an impasse in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy since (...) it supposes a reference to an overlooking point of view that the whole of Merleau-Pontian reflection has shown to be impossible. The phenomenology of perception and ontology of the perceived world show that we have access only to a mystified consciousness and that even the world itself is undecided. The Heraclitean path must win against the interpretation in terms of crisis, but the persistence of the second path in Merleau-Ponty’swork is also explained by the extremely difficult character of the first path. The theory of chronic vertigo takes us closer to nihilism, and this is an aspect of Merleau-Pontian philosophy whose radical and highly problematic – perhaps even aporetic – character must not be underestimated. How to decide on practice and politics without absolute reference, without being able to guarantee anything? The use Merleau-Ponty makes of crucial references to Machiavelli and Marx at the heart of his political philosophy is very revealing this regard: in the first movement, this is a matter of “disarming” these philosophies, making them instruments for the disruption of action. But Merleau-Ponty’s final goal is not to return to the philosophy of contemplation, abstract ontology, but to build a new practical model: that of symbolic action, which integrates vertigo rather than surpassing it and constitutes a praxis inseparable from the enterprise of knowledge and artistic creation. We could say that it is saved by its openness to sense, but this means that it cannot rely on any positive established meaning and must find its wellspring in a ‘wild’ ability to be unceasingly decentered, to take nothing for granted, to approach our values and beliefs as foreign. This raises the question of the possibilityof the incarnation of such a model in an effective political institution. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Merleau-PontyDepth of Images and the Thought of the Eternal ReturnHere, we analyze the reasons for which it is possible to establish a connection between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty – a connection claimed by Merleau-Ponty – based on a “metaphysics” of the Dionysian and the Apollonian. All existence rests upon a cruel and violent depth; and the surface of the “real,” individualities and distinct ideas, is in fact solely constituted by Apollonian images. We show how Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty surmount the (...) nihilism necessarily induced by this fi rst thesis by affirming the richness of images and their power of inspiration as well as the eternal recurrence of the world of appearances. In a world of images, salvation belongs to those who will know how to recognize images as such in any being and in any idea. No preexisting meaning confines us; each instant must be creative and the maximum amount of meaning will be exalted at the heart of a vivified imagination. But how can we, simultaneously, produce simple images, love and desire their subsequent destruction as well as be a creative genius, instituting and teaching? What is exactly our relationship to the Dionysian depth and to past images? Nietzsche’s position on this matter is ambiguous and, to a certain extent, double. Two tendencies coexist in his thought. On the one hand, we have an exhortation for rupture, for absolutely free creation as well as a condemnation of modern culture which has been invaded and ossified by the bric-a-brac of historical meaning. On the other hand, we have the claim for a heritage, the reference to the models of monumental history and the invocation of an inspiration drawn from nature and the elements. Merleau-Ponty’s solution to escape nihilism avoids such a duality and endeavors to reconcile our status of inheritors and our responsibility as creators. In Nietzsche’s steps, but by founding a renewed doctrine of eternal recurrence, Merleau-Ponty shows us how to become, by one and the same movement, superficial and profound.Nietzsche e Merleau-PontyProfondità delle immagini e pensieri dell’eterno ritornoSi analizzano qui le ragioni per le quali è possibile stabilire un avvicinamento tra Nietzsche e Merleau-Ponty, avvicinamento rivendicato da Merleau-Ponty stesso, a partire dall’idea di una «metafi sica» del dionisiaco e dell’apollineo. Ogni esistenza riposa su un fondo crudele e violento, mentre la superfi cie del «reale», delle individualità e delle idee chiare e distinte è costituita unicamente di immagini apollinee. Mostraremo come Nietzsche e Merleau-Ponty sormontino il nichilismo inevitabilmente connesso a questa prima posizione, affermando la ricchezza e molteplicità di spunti racchiusi in immagini come quella dell’eterno ritorno del mondo delle apparenze. In un mondo di immagini, la salvezza appartiene a coloro che sapranno riconoscere le immagini in quanto tali, in ogni essere e in ogni idea. Nessun senso preesistente ci rinchiude, ogni istante deve essere creatore, e il massimo di senso sarà celebrato in seno a un’immaginazione vivifi cata. Ma come si può al tempo stesso produrre semplici immagini, amare e desiderare la loro distruzione ormai prossima, e proporsi di essere un genio creatore, istituire ed insegnare? Qual è il nostro rapporto con il fondo dionisiaco e con le immagini passate? La posizione di Nietzsche su questo punto è ambigua e, in una certa misura, doppia. Coesistono nel suo pensiero due tendenze: da una parte un’esortazione alla rottura, alla creazione assolutamente libera, e una condanna della cultura moderna, invasa e sclerotizzata dalle anticaglie del senso storico; dall’altra parte la rivendicazione di un’eredità, il riferimento ai modelli della storia monumentale e l’invocazione di un’ispirazione attinta alla natura e agli elementi. La soluzione che Merleau-Ponty elabora, come via di fuga dal nichilismo, evita una tale dualità e si sforza di conciliare il nostro statuto di eredi con la nostra responsabilità di creatori. Seguendo Nietzsche, ma fondando una rinnovata dottrina dell’eterno ritorno, Merleau-Ponty ci mostra come divenire, attraverso un unico movimento, superficiali e profondial tempo stesso. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Merleau-PontyDepth of Images and the Thought of the Eternal ReturnHere, we analyze the reasons for which it is possible to establish a connection between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty – a connection claimed by Merleau-Ponty – based on a “metaphysics” of the Dionysian and the Apollonian. All existence rests upon a cruel and violent depth; and the surface of the “real,” individualities and distinct ideas, is in fact solely constituted by Apollonian images. We show how Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty surmount the (...) nihilism necessarily induced by this fi rst thesis by affirming the richness of images and their power of inspiration as well as the eternal recurrence of the world of appearances. In a world of images, salvation belongs to those who will know how to recognize images as such in any being and in any idea. No preexisting meaning confines us; each instant must be creative and the maximum amount of meaning will be exalted at the heart of a vivified imagination. But how can we, simultaneously, produce simple images, love and desire their subsequent destruction as well as be a creative genius, instituting and teaching? What is exactly our relationship to the Dionysian depth and to past images? Nietzsche’s position on this matter is ambiguous and, to a certain extent, double. Two tendencies coexist in his thought. On the one hand, we have an exhortation for rupture, for absolutely free creation as well as a condemnation of modern culture which has been invaded and ossified by the bric-a-brac of historical meaning. On the other hand, we have the claim for a heritage, the reference to the models of monumental history and the invocation of an inspiration drawn from nature and the elements. Merleau-Ponty’s solution to escape nihilism avoids such a duality and endeavors to reconcile our status of inheritors and our responsibility as creators. In Nietzsche’s steps, but by founding a renewed doctrine of eternal recurrence, Merleau-Ponty shows us how to become, by one and the same movement, superficial and profound.Nietzsche e Merleau-PontyProfondità delle immagini e pensieri dell’eterno ritornoSi analizzano qui le ragioni per le quali è possibile stabilire un avvicinamento tra Nietzsche e Merleau-Ponty, avvicinamento rivendicato da Merleau-Ponty stesso, a partire dall’idea di una «metafi sica» del dionisiaco e dell’apollineo. Ogni esistenza riposa su un fondo crudele e violento, mentre la superfi cie del «reale», delle individualità e delle idee chiare e distinte è costituita unicamente di immagini apollinee. Mostraremo come Nietzsche e Merleau-Ponty sormontino il nichilismo inevitabilmente connesso a questa prima posizione, affermando la ricchezza e molteplicità di spunti racchiusi in immagini come quella dell’eterno ritorno del mondo delle apparenze. In un mondo di immagini, la salvezza appartiene a coloro che sapranno riconoscere le immagini in quanto tali, in ogni essere e in ogni idea. Nessun senso preesistente ci rinchiude, ogni istante deve essere creatore, e il massimo di senso sarà celebrato in seno a un’immaginazione vivifi cata. Ma come si può al tempo stesso produrre semplici immagini, amare e desiderare la loro distruzione ormai prossima, e proporsi di essere un genio creatore, istituire ed insegnare? Qual è il nostro rapporto con il fondo dionisiaco e con le immagini passate? La posizione di Nietzsche su questo punto è ambigua e, in una certa misura, doppia. Coesistono nel suo pensiero due tendenze: da una parte un’esortazione alla rottura, alla creazione assolutamente libera, e una condanna della cultura moderna, invasa e sclerotizzata dalle anticaglie del senso storico; dall’altra parte la rivendicazione di un’eredità, il riferimento ai modelli della storia monumentale e l’invocazione di un’ispirazione attinta alla natura e agli elementi. La soluzione che Merleau-Ponty elabora, come via di fuga dal nichilismo, evita una tale dualità e si sforza di conciliare il nostro statuto di eredi con la nostra responsabilità di creatori. Seguendo Nietzsche, ma fondando una rinnovata dottrina dell’eterno ritorno, Merleau-Ponty ci mostra come divenire, attraverso un unico movimento, superficiali e profondial tempo stesso. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Merleau-PontyDepth of Images and the Thought of the Eternal ReturnHere, we analyze the reasons for which it is possible to establish a connection between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty – a connection claimed by Merleau-Ponty – based on a “metaphysics” of the Dionysian and the Apollonian. All existence rests upon a cruel and violent depth; and the surface of the “real,” individualities and distinct ideas, is in fact solely constituted by Apollonian images. We show how Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty surmount the (...) nihilism necessarily induced by this fi rst thesis by affirming the richness of images and their power of inspiration as well as the eternal recurrence of the world of appearances. In a world of images, salvation belongs to those who will know how to recognize images as such in any being and in any idea. No preexisting meaning confines us; each instant must be creative and the maximum amount of meaning will be exalted at the heart of a vivified imagination. But how can we, simultaneously, produce simple images, love and desire their subsequent destruction as well as be a creative genius, instituting and teaching? What is exactly our relationship to the Dionysian depth and to past images? Nietzsche’s position on this matter is ambiguous and, to a certain extent, double. Two tendencies coexist in his thought. On the one hand, we have an exhortation for rupture, for absolutely free creation as well as a condemnation of modern culture which has been invaded and ossified by the bric-a-brac of historical meaning. On the other hand, we have the claim for a heritage, the reference to the models of monumental history and the invocation of an inspiration drawn from nature and the elements. Merleau-Ponty’s solution to escape nihilism avoids such a duality and endeavors to reconcile our status of inheritors and our responsibility as creators. In Nietzsche’s steps, but by founding a renewed doctrine of eternal recurrence, Merleau-Ponty shows us how to become, by one and the same movement, superficial and profound.Nietzsche e Merleau-PontyProfondità delle immagini e pensieri dell’eterno ritornoSi analizzano qui le ragioni per le quali è possibile stabilire un avvicinamento tra Nietzsche e Merleau-Ponty, avvicinamento rivendicato da Merleau-Ponty stesso, a partire dall’idea di una «metafi sica» del dionisiaco e dell’apollineo. Ogni esistenza riposa su un fondo crudele e violento, mentre la superfi cie del «reale», delle individualità e delle idee chiare e distinte è costituita unicamente di immagini apollinee. Mostraremo come Nietzsche e Merleau-Ponty sormontino il nichilismo inevitabilmente connesso a questa prima posizione, affermando la ricchezza e molteplicità di spunti racchiusi in immagini come quella dell’eterno ritorno del mondo delle apparenze. In un mondo di immagini, la salvezza appartiene a coloro che sapranno riconoscere le immagini in quanto tali, in ogni essere e in ogni idea. Nessun senso preesistente ci rinchiude, ogni istante deve essere creatore, e il massimo di senso sarà celebrato in seno a un’immaginazione vivifi cata. Ma come si può al tempo stesso produrre semplici immagini, amare e desiderare la loro distruzione ormai prossima, e proporsi di essere un genio creatore, istituire ed insegnare? Qual è il nostro rapporto con il fondo dionisiaco e con le immagini passate? La posizione di Nietzsche su questo punto è ambigua e, in una certa misura, doppia. Coesistono nel suo pensiero due tendenze: da una parte un’esortazione alla rottura, alla creazione assolutamente libera, e una condanna della cultura moderna, invasa e sclerotizzata dalle anticaglie del senso storico; dall’altra parte la rivendicazione di un’eredità, il riferimento ai modelli della storia monumentale e l’invocazione di un’ispirazione attinta alla natura e agli elementi. La soluzione che Merleau-Ponty elabora, come via di fuga dal nichilismo, evita una tale dualità e si sforza di conciliare il nostro statuto di eredi con la nostra responsabilità di creatori. Seguendo Nietzsche, ma fondando una rinnovata dottrina dell’eterno ritorno, Merleau-Ponty ci mostra come divenire, attraverso un unico movimento, superficiali e profondial tempo stesso. (shrink)

En Métaphysique du sentiment, Renaud Barbaras contrapone una teoría del amor y de la superabundancia del ser –que se fenomenaliza sin agotarse nunca– a una tendencia acósmica del existencialismo –según la cual la fenomenalización comienza cuando el ser humano es arrebatado de la absorción a lo que simplemente es–. Por otro lado, Barbaras desarrolla una teoría del exilio humano, esta vez utilizando todos los códigos del mito de la separación. Este artículo analiza la fuerte tensión que existe en Métaphysique du (...) sentiment entre una línea plotiniana y otra opuesta, gnóstica. Muestra que esta tensión es una nueva expresión de un patrón fundamental y recurrente en la filosofía moderna y contemporánea, para el que he acuñado el nombre de complejo de Chandos. Este complejo se manifiesta en el intento de mantener unidas, de forma inevitablemente escenificada y engañosa, la narrativa de una supuesta continuidad dichosa entre lo humano y la naturaleza, y la del patético desarraigo que separa a los sujetos de la naturaleza. También encontramos este complejo en cierta ambigüedad de la teoría de la carne de Merleau-Ponty. En el Seminario de Buenos Aires, sin embargo, Barbaras esboza una vía alternativa, que será el eje de L’appartenance, y que nos permitirá superar esta moderna narrativa chandossiana. Para lograr tal superación, este trabajo propone definir el ser como una proliferación de diversos y ya poéticos procesos de individuación. (shrink)

« Sous les masques, il n’y a pas de visages, l’homme historique n’a jamais été homme, et pourtant nul homme n’est seul » : notre article s’interroge sur le sens et les enjeux éthiques de cette affirmation merleau-pontyenne énoncée dans la préface de Signes. Partant du caractère énigmatique et très inquiétant de cette thèse et constatant sa résonance avec l’affirmations deleuzienne, dans Différence et répétition, « Les masques ne recouvrent rien, sauf d’autres masques », nous avons voulu explorer la possibilité (...) de prendre pleinement au sérieux la formule merleau-pontyenne et de lui donner l’envergure d’une théorie des simulacres rendue éthiquement féconde. Le contexte, un dialogue avec Sartre et Nizan entre désenchantement, découragement et nouvelles perspectives éthiques et politiques, nous projette d’emblée dans un pensée de l’adversité et des apories indissociables de la rencontre d’autrui. Il permet également d’entrer avec Merleau-Ponty dans la quête d’une théorie éthique et politique de la communauté non exclusive de l’altérité radicale. A partir d’une analyse de la notion de masques et de ses occurrences dans les travaux de Merleau-Ponty, nous montrons que toute image est essentiellement un masque ontologiquement premier, c’est-à-dire qui ne copie ni ne recouvre une réalité plus authentique. La formulation de Signes qui nous intéresse fait d’emblée apparaître la dimension éthiquement dramatique de cette ontologie. Ce qui est en cause est une hyper-crise, une pensée de l’abîme et des ruptures de sens. Comment agir quand tout être est évasif et autre que soi? Nous aimerions montrer que surgit, dans l’oeuvre merleau-pontyenne, une tension entre une première solution pratique centrée sur la foi et une seconde voie « centrée », si l’on peut dire, sur la temporalité tourbillonnaire de l’institution. Ces deux issues pratiques, qui ne sont pas si nettement circonscrites explicitement par Merleau-Ponty, mais se déploient plutôt de texte en texte sous des formes parfois entremêlées, parfois incompatibles, doivent être, selon nous, soigneusement distinguées. La première, la solution de la foi, fait trop peu de cas du caractère trompeur de l’Urdoxa et des dangers d’une action qui ne s’inquiète pas de la mystification et des biais sur lesquels, peut-être, elle repose. La seconde, la voie de l’institution ne prétend plus surmonter le vertige, mais parvient à en faire un atout. Les masques, compris comme essentiellement instituants – en même temps qu’ils éclairent sur le sens de la notion merleau-pontyenne d’institution – peuvent retrouver un rôle éthique : passer de masque en masque sans jamais trouver de visage, autrement dit répondre à côté, c’est répondre tout de même et cela peut même être la meilleure réponse et compréhension possibles puisque les masques euxmêmes, comme institutions, sont des « visées à côté » qui réclament indéfiniment de nouvelles reprises et ont le pouvoir de relier entre elles, dans une structure de dialogue sans fin, des réinstitutions pourtant minées par une opacité à soi et aux autres. Les simulacres peuvent ainsi devenir en tant que tels notre plus grande chance : véhicules d’altérité radicale et de communication pourtant ininterrompue. Cette théorie élaborée à partir des thèses et analyses merleau-pontyennes fait place aux expériences commotionnantes, mais a, en même temps et sans contradiction, le mérite d’insister davantage, sans attendrissement, sur l’heureuse nature de l’être au lieu de déboucher sur la misosophie que développera Deleuze.“Under the masks, there are no faces: historical man has never been man, and yet, no man is alone.” This article questions the meaning and the ethical stakes of this Merleau-Pontian affirmation articulated in the preface of Signs. Beginning with the enigmatic and very worrisome character of this thesis, and while noticing its resonance with Deleuzian affirmations in Difference and Repetition—“masks recover nothing apart from other masks”—we wanted to explore the possibility of taking seriously the Merleau-Pontian formula and to give it meaning as a theory of ethically productive simulacra. The context, a dialogue between Sartre and Nizan regarding disenchantment, despondency and new ethical as well as political perspectives, immediately projects us toward the thought of adversity and the inseparable aporias in the encounter with the Other. Equally, it permits us to enter with Merleau-Ponty into a search for a political and ethical theory of the community that is not exclusive to radical alterity. Starting from an analysis of the concept of masks and its occurrences in the works of Merleau-Ponty, we show that all image is essentially first an ontological mask; that is to say, one that does not copy nor recovers a more authentic reality. The formulation in Signs which interests us immediately reveals the dramatic ethical dimension of this ontology. That which is a cause is a hyper-crisis, a thought of the damage and the rupture of meaning. How does one act when all being is evasive and other than oneself? We would like to show that what surfaces in Merleau-Ponty’s work is a tension between a primary practical solution centered on faith and a second path “centered,” if we can say this, on the turbulent temporality of the institution. These two practical issues, which are not so explicitly circumscribed by Merleau-Ponty, but which rather reveal themselves from text to text in somewhat intermingled and sometimes incompatible forms must be carefully distinguished. The first, the solution of faith, makes too little of the falsifying character of the Urdoxa and the dangers of an action that is not concerned with the mystification and biases on which, perhaps, it rests. The second, the path of the institution, does not attempt to surmount the vertigo, but nevertheless manages to hold the advantage. The masks, understood essentially as “instituted,” which at the same time clarify the meaning of the Merleau-Pontian notion of the institution, are able to rediscover an ethical role: passing from mask to mask without ever uncovering a face or, stated otherwise, responding side by side, is nevertheless a response. Moreover, this might provide an even better response and possible understanding since the masks themselves, as institutions, are proximate viewfinders which indefinitely reclaim new recoveries and which have the ability to link up with each other in a never-ending structure of dialogue regarding “reinstitutions” despite being undermined by the opacity of self and other. The simulacra can also become as they are in themselves a greatest chance: vehicles of radical alterity and communication, but uninterrupted. This theory, elaborated from the theses and analyses of Merleau-Ponty, gives way to experiences of shock, but, at the same time and without contradiction, to the right to insist further, without tenderness, on the happy nature of being instead of opening itself up to the misosophie that Deleuze will develop.“Dietro le maschere non ci sono volti, l’uomo storico non è mai stato uomo, e tuttavia nessun uomo è solo”: il nostro articolo si interroga sul senso e sulla posta in gioco etica di questa affermazione merleau-pontyana che troviamo nella Prefazione a Segni. Partendo dal tratto enigmatico e inquietante di questa tesi, e dalla constatazione della sua risonanza con l’affermazione deleuziana secondo cui “le maschere non ricoprono nulla, se non altre maschere”, abbiamo voluto esplorare la possibilità di prendere sul serio la formula merleau-pontyana ricavandone una teoria dei simulacri eticamente feconda. Il contesto, quello di un dialogo con Sartre e Nizan intorno ai temi del disincanto e delle nuove prospettive etiche e politiche, ci proietta direttamente nello spazio di un pensiero dell’avversità e delle aporie indissociabili dall’incontro con l’altro, e consente parimenti di farci strada con Merleau-Ponty in direzione di un’etica e di una politica della comunità non esclusiva della dimensione dell’alterità radicale. A partire da un’analisi della nozione di maschera e delle sue occorrenze nei testi merleau-pontyani mostriamo che ogni immagine è una maschera ontologicamente prima, che non copia e non ricopre affatto una realtà più autentica. La formulazione richiamata da Segni introduce immediatamente alla dimensione eticamente drammatica di tale ontologia. La sua posta in gioco è quella di un ipercriticismo, di un pensiero dell’abisso e dell’interruzione del senso. Come agire quando ogni essere è evasivo ed è altro rispetto a se stesso? Vorremmo mostrare che a quest’altezza si fa strada nell’opera merleau-pontyana una tensione tra una prima soluzione pratica, affidata alla dimensione della fede, e una seconda via d’uscita “incentrata”, se così si può dire, sulla temporalità spiraliforme dell’istituzione. Questi due esiti pratici, che in Merleau-Ponty non risultano nettamente ed esplicitamente circoscritti, ma si dispiegano di testo in testo dando luogo a sovrapposizioni e al limite a contraddizioni, vanno invece, a nostro avviso, accuratamente distinte. La prima, la soluzione della fede, fa troppo poco spazio al carattere ingannevole dell’Urdoxa e ai pericoli di un’azione che non si preoccupa di farsi carico delle mistificazioni e delle deformazioni su cui essa forse si fonda. La seconda, la soluzione dell’istituzione, non pretende più di oltrepassare la vertigine ma arriva a farne una risorsa. Le maschere, intese come essenzialmente istitutive, facendo luce sulla nozione merleau-pontyana di istituzione vengono a giocare un ruolo etico: passare di maschera in maschera senza mai trovare volti, in altri termini rispondere “a lato”, significa rispondere comunque e forse rispondere nel modo migliore, secondo la migliore comprensione possibile. Poiché le maschere stesse in quanto istituzioni sono delle “visées à côté” che chiamano indefinitiamente a nuove riprese e hanno il potere di legare tra loro in un dialogo senza fine una serie di re-istituzioni inevitabilmente opache a sé e agli altri. I simulacri possono così diventare, proprio in quanto simulacri, la nostra più grande chance: veicoli di alterità radicale e di comunicazione ininterrotta. Questa teoria, elaborata a partire dalle tesi e dalle analisi merleau-pontyane, consente di fare spazio a esperienze di grande momento emotivo, e allo stesso tempo, senza contraddizione, di insistere senza sentimentalismi sulla felice natura dell’essere, evitando infine la “misosophia” a cui approda Deleuze. (shrink)

The deconstruction of stupidity [in French bêtise] plays a crucial role in Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign. Through the concept of stupidity/bêtise the violence of our relationship with others, as inseparable from our relation to animality comes into view. “Stupidity” is deeply political, but also directly connected to the trace and, thus, cannot be simply overcome. While Sartre claimed that there are no fools, but just wicked men, Derrida embraces an uncanny version of stupidity. In this paper, guided by (...) Derrida’s reflections, we will examine the many paradoxes that undermine the pseudo-concept of stupidity, as well as several key moments of its history in Schelling’s, Nietzsche’s, Sartre’s, and Deleuze’s philosophies. Eventually our purpose will be to display the ethical statements which can be extrapolated from Derrida’s perspective: when the world is gone, how can we carry stupidity? (shrink)

A dimensão de violência e radicalidade no pensamento de Merleau-Ponty, com suas implicações desestabilizadoras, é frequentemente perdida. A "carne", em Merleau-Ponty, não é pacífica. É um Ser explosivo e aberto, a partir do qual "consciência de si", "real" e "verdade", no sentido clássico, são impossíveis. O artigo pretende demonstrar que Merleau-Ponty cinde a distinção clássica entre real e irreal, engendrando uma profunda reorganização do campo do conhecimento e da ética, e tornando possível, de certo modo, uma fusão entre eles. Se (...) o Ser é incompleto e aberto a interpretações, logo, não há verdades a serem conhecidas, temos apenas imagens do mundo e, correlativamente, imagens funcionam melhor para revelar a direção a que aponta o sentido em que se forma o mundo do que o assim chamando conhecimento absoluto. Assim, aceitar a dimensão criativa da interpretação tal como requerida pelo próprio mundo permite entender que não se pode entender o mundo sem agir e agir é ajustar o equilíbrio entre, por um lado, a atenção paciente devida ao sentido nascente nas situações e, por outro lado, à forma rigorosa dos elementos dados do sentido que são "neles mesmos" sempre dispersos e ambíguos.Real. Irreal. Imaginário. Verdade. Etica. Política.The dimension of violence and the radically destabilizing implications of Merleau-Ponty’s thought are sometimes, too often, overlooked. The merleau-pontian flesh is not first and foremost peaceful, it is an explosive and open being, within which self-coincidence, rest and truth in a classical sense are impossible. This article intends to demonstrate that MP makes the classical distinction between the real and the unreal collapse, entailing a deep reorganization of the fields of knowledge and ethics and, somehow, a fusion between them. If the very being is unfinished and open to interpretations, then there is no truth to be known, we only have “images” of the world and, correlatively, images are more revealing of the on-going meaning in which the world consists than any so-called absolute knowledge. Moreover, to accept the creative dimension of interpretation as requested by the world itself permits to realize that one cannot understand the world without acting and that to act is to set up a balance between, on the one hand, the patient attention paid to the nascent meaning in situations and, on the other hand, a bold shaping of the given elements of meaning that are always “in-themselves” scattered and ambiguous.Real. Unreal. Imaginary. Truth. Ethics. Politics. (shrink)