Husserl: Philosophy of Mathematics

From the general history of culture, with a particular attention turned towards the personal and intellectual relationships between Hermann Weyl and Edmund Husserl, it will be possible to identify certain historical-critical moments from which a philosophical reflection concerning aspects of the ontology of mathematics may be carried out. In particular, a notable epistemological relevance of group theory methods will stand out.

I argue against the interpretation of propositions as intentions and proof-objects as fulfillments proposed by Heyting and defended by Tieszen and van Atten. The idea is already a frequent target of criticisms regarding the incompatibility of Brouwer’s and Husserl’s positions, mainly by Rosado Haddock and Hill. I raise a stronger objection in this paper. My claim is that even if we grant that the incompatibility can be properly dealt with, as van Atten believes it can, two fundamental issues indicate that (...) the interpretation is unsustainable regardless: (1) it is hard to determine, without appealing to propositional intentions on pain of circularity, what intention a proof-object should be understood as a fulfillment of; (2) due to a difficult fulfillment dilemma, it is unclear, at best, what the object of an intention corresponding to a proposition is. (shrink)

This paper argues that the shared intersubjective accessibility of mathematical objects has its roots in a stratum of experience prior to language or any other form of concrete social interaction. On the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology, I demonstrate that intersubjectivity is an essential stratum of the objects of mathematical experience, i.e., an integral part of the peculiar sense of a mathematical object is its common accessibility to any consciousness whatsoever. For Husserl, any experience of an objective nature has as its (...) correlate a “we,” which he terms the “community of monads”. Thus, even before mathematical objects gain expression, formalization, and axiomatization through natural and scientific language, from a phenomenological viewpoint their objectivity has its roots in raw pre-linguistic though intersubjective experience. Accordingly, I demonstrate the different senses in which the experience of mathematical objects is permeated by intersubjectivity, suggesting a picture of mathematical intersubjectivity as pre-linguistic common experience based on Husserl’s idea of a “community of monads”. (shrink)

One is occasionally reminded of Foucault's proclamation in a 1970 interview that "perhaps, one day this century will be known as Deleuzian." Less often is one compelled to update and restart with a supplementary counter-proclamation of the mathematician, David Lindley: "the twenty-first century would be a Bayesian era..." The verb tenses of both are conspicuous. // To critically attend to what is today often feared and demonized, but also revered, deployed, and commonly referred to as algorithm(s), one cannot avoid the (...) mathematical and philosophical legacies of probability. // But attending to these probabilistic or Bayesian legacies must include an undeniable theological legacy in which they remain entangled. // We are not, today, discovering quirky theological metaphors in contemporary technics. It's the other way around. The technologies are mere metaphors of past theologies. (shrink)

Husserl and Mathematics explains the development of Husserl's phenomenological method in the context of his engagement in modern mathematics and its foundations. Drawing on his correspondence and other written sources, Mirja Hartimo details Husserl's knowledge of a wide range of perspectives on the foundations of mathematics, including those of Hilbert, Brouwer and Weyl, as well as his awareness of the new developments in the subject during the 1930s. Hartimo examines how Husserl's philosophical views responded to these changes, and offers a (...) pluralistic and open-ended picture of Husserl's phenomenology of mathematics. Her study shows Husserl's phenomenology to be a method capable of both shedding light on and internally criticizing scientific practices and concepts. (shrink)

Husserl's two notions of "definiteness" enabled him to clarify the problem of imaginary numbers. The exact meaning of these notions is a topic of much controversy. A "definite" axiom system has been interpreted as a syntactically complete theory, and also as a categorical one. I discuss whether and how far these readings manage to capture Husserl's goal of elucidating the problem of imaginary numbers, raising objections to both positions. Then, I suggest an interpretation of "absolute definiteness" as semantic completeness and (...) argue that this notion does not suffice to explain Husserl's solution to the problem of imaginary numbers. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: what does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as (...) Hermann Weyl and Kurt Gödel, the overall objective is systematic in nature: to offer a plausible approach towards mathematics. (shrink)

The article reconstructs Jean Cavaillès’s polemical engagement with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy of mathematics. I argue that Cavaillès’s encounter with Husserl clarifies the scope and ambition of Cavaillès’s philosophy of the concept by identifying three interrelated epistemological problems in Husserl’s phenomenological method: (1) Cavaillès claims that Husserl denies a proper content to mathematics by reducing mathematics to logic. (2) This reduction obliges Husserl, in turn, to mischaracterize the significance of the history of mathematics for the philosophy of mathematics. (3) Finally, (...) Husserl’s phenomenology distorts the nature of mathematical experience. Accordingly, Cavaillès’s philosophy of mathematics is premised on a threefold affirmation designed to overcome these inadequacies. Cavaillès claims that mathematics is an autonomous field of conceptual production that cannot be reduced to logical, psychological, or phenomenological descriptions of conceptual genesis. Two important corollaries follow: the history of mathematics must guide the philosophy of mathematics, and mathematical experience itself must be described according to the mechanisms of a novel theory of mathematical abstraction. In what follows, I demonstrate that Cavaillès’s encounter with Husserl does not merely describe a polemical engagement with a rival philosophical position; it allows us to reconstruct Cavaillès’s own highly original contributions to the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. Social science, liberal arts, history, and philosophy are meant first of all. That kind of theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be accepted rather (...) a metamathematical axiom about the relation of mathematics and reality. The main statement is formulated as follows: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to some mathematical structure in a way constructive. Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. The sketch of the proof is organized in five steps: a generalization of epoché; involving transfinite induction in the transition between Peano arithmetic and set theory; discussing the finiteness of Peano arithmetic; applying transfinite induction to Peano arithmetic; discussing an arithmetical model of reality. Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an independent axiom. The present paper follows a pathway grounded on Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve the generalized arithmetic necessary for the principle to be founded in alternative ontology, in which there is no reality external to mathematics: reality is included within mathematics. That latter mathematics is able to self-found itself and can be called Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert’s program for self-founding mathematics on the base of arithmetic. The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent to Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the problem which mathematics refers to our being; and vice versa: the choice between them for different reasons would confirm or refuse the principle as to the being. An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. The Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics is involved to illustrate that ontology. Thus the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to our being is discussed again in a new way A few directions for future work can be: a rigorous formal proof of the principle as an independent axiom; the further development of information ontology consistent to both kinds of mathematics, but much more natural for Hilbert mathematics; the development of the information interpretation of quantum mechanics as a mathematical one for information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics; the description of consciousness in terms of information ontology. (shrink)

A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. That theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be accepted rather a metamathematical axiom about the relation of mathematics and reality. Its investigation needs philosophical (...) means. Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. A comparison to Mach’s doctrine is used to be revealed the fundamental and philosophical reductionism of Husserl’s phenomenology leading to a kind of Pythagoreanism in the final analysis. Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an independent axiom. An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. Thus the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to our being is discussed. An information interpretation of the Schrödinger equation is involved to illustrate the above problem. (shrink)

According to Kant, the axioms of intuition, i.e. space and time, must provide an organization of the sensory experience. However, this first orderliness of empirical sensations seems to depend on a kind of faculty pertaining to subjectivity, rather than to the encounter of these same intuitions with the real properties of phenomena. Starting from an analysis of some very significant developments in mathematical and theoretical physics in the last decades, in which intuition played an important role, we argue that nevertheless (...) intuition comes into play in a fundamentally different way to that which Kant had foreseen: in the form of a formal or “categorical” yet not sensible intuition. We show further that the statement that our space is mathematically three-dimensional and locally Euclidean by no means follows from a supposed a priori nature of the sensible or subjective space as Kant claimed. In fact, the three-dimensional space can bear many different geometrical and topological structures, as particularly the mathematical results of Milnor, Smale, Thurston and Donaldson demonstrated. On the other hand, it has been stressed that even the phenomenological or perceptual space, and especially the visual system, carries a very rich geometrical organization whose structure is essentially non-Euclidean. Finally, we argue that in order to grasp the meaning of abstract geometric objects, as n-dimensional spaces, connections on a manifold, fiber spaces, module spaces, knotted spaces and so forth, where sensible intuition is essentially lacking and where therefore another type of mathematical idealization intervenes, we need to develop a new form of intuition. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to phenomenological ideas in conceptions of modern philosophy of mathematics. Views of Husserl, Weyl, Becker andGödel will be discussed and analysed. The aim of the paper is to show the influence of phenomenological ideas on the philosophical conceptions concerning mathematics. We shall start by indicating the attachment of Edmund Husserl to mathematics and by presenting the main points of his philosophy of mathematics. Next, works of two philosophers who attempted to apply Husserl’s phenomenological ideas to the (...) philosophy of mathematics, namely Hermann Weyl and Oskar Becker, will be briefly discussed. Lastly, the connections between Husserl’s ideas and the philosophy of mathematics of Kurt Gödel will be studied. (shrink)

I argue that Brouwer’s notion of the construction of purely mathematical objects and Husserl’s notion of their constitution by the transcendental subject coincide. Various objections to Brouwer’s intuitionism that have been raised in recent phenomenological literature are addressed. Then I present objections to Gödel’s project of founding classical mathematics on transcendental phenomenology. The problem for that project lies not so much in Husserl’s insistence on the spontaneous character of the constitution of mathematical objects, or in his refusal to allow an (...) appeal to higher minds, as in the combination of these two attitudes. (shrink)

Moving from the reformulation of the meaning of geometry, achieved in the first half of the Nineteenth Century, which also implied a new definition of the relationship between formal and empirical understanding of the space, Husserl starts, since the Philosophy of arithmetic, a deep reflection on the definition of space, which would have led to a new philosophical theory of Euclidean geometry. Husserl took the view that the clarification of scientific concepts must be made back to the intuitive ground from (...) whence they sprang. In what the author himself called the Raumbuch, the book of the space, Husserl makes a clear distinction between space and intuitive geometric space, believing that this was a conceptual construct, of which there is not an intuitive representation. In fact, peculiar to geometrical concepts is ideation. For this reason the setting of Husserlian problem differs markedly from that of Kant: for Kant, «the representation of space behind the geometry is an intuition, not a concept». Despite this “freedom” of the products of idealization, geometry, for Husserl, is deep-rooted in intuition, because in his opinion, and following Gauss, there is a clear difference between arithmetic and geometry. Or within the experience they are structured all the possibilities of various geometric multiplicity. From the idea, here implied, that Euclidean geometry should be assumed, Husserl take distances as early as the Logical Investigations. But despite the changes of perspective, the reference to the intuition remains constant along the entire Husserlian research. The clarification of the relationship between geometry and intuitive space presupposes a long preparatory work related to the supply of light in space structures intuitive, because the processes of idealization not happen—this is the specificity of reflection Husserl—upon the intuitive world, but are prepared in it. In this context Husserl will confront for a long time with contemporary research about the psychology of the space, and in particular with those of Stumpf. For Stumpf, the space is an absolute content that inheres essentially to the quality of sensations, for example to color. From this setting Husserl definitely takes the distances, because its base is the confusion between field of view and representation of the surface. The central point is therefore that «the visual field is not some sort of objective surface in space». In the constitution of three-dimensional thingness and of the deep space play also an essential role the kinesthetic sensations. There is in fact a definite correlation between the visual field and kinesthetic course, since even in the changing of the contents of the field of view, we can show. from the perspective of phenomenological-transcendental, a stable association between sensation kinesthetic and visual content. The manifold of places is never given without a kinaesthetic sensation, and neither is a kinaesthetic sensation given without the total manifold of places, which is merely fulfilled in a changing manner. All this is not yet sufficient to constitute three-dimensional space, as «the Objects here are still not things». And this marks the end of the most problematic attempt to Husserl: to follow the strata in the constitution of the thing and the constitution of a «visual space for Euclidean space» and, therefore, of a Riemannian manifold. (shrink)

This monograph offers a fresh perspective on the applicability of mathematics in science. It explores what mathematics must be so that its applications to the empirical world do not constitute a mystery. In the process, readers are presented with a new version of mathematical structuralism. The author details a philosophy of mathematics in which the problem of its applicability, particularly in physics, in all its forms can be explained and justified. Chapters cover: mathematics as a formal science, mathematical ontology: what (...) does it mean to exist, mathematical structures: what are they and how do we know them, how different layers of mathematical structuring relate to each other and to perceptual structures, and how to use mathematics to find out how the world is. The book simultaneously develops along two lines, both inspired and enlightened by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. One line leads to the establishment of a particular version of mathematical structuralism, free of “naturalist” and empiricist bias. The other leads to a logical-epistemological explanation and justification of the applicability of mathematics carried out within a unique structuralist perspective. This second line points to the “unreasonable” effectiveness of mathematics in physics as a means of representation, a tool, and a source of not always logically justified but useful and effective heuristic strategies. (shrink)

This monograph offers a fresh perspective on the applicability of mathematics in science. It explores what mathematics must be so that its applications to the empirical world do not constitute a mystery. In the process, readers are presented with a new version of mathematical structuralism. The author details a philosophy of mathematics in which the problem of its applicability, particularly in physics, in all its forms can be explained and justified. Chapters cover: mathematics as a formal science, mathematical ontology: what (...) does it mean to exist, mathematical structures: what are they and how do we know them, how different layers of mathematical structuring relate to each other and to perceptual structures, and how to use mathematics to find out how the world is. The book simultaneously develops along two lines, both inspired and enlightened by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. One line leads to the establishment of a particular version of mathematical structuralism, free of “naturalist” and empiricist bias. The other leads to a logical-epistemological explanation and justification of the applicability of mathematics carried out within a unique structuralist perspective. This second line points to the “unreasonable” effectiveness of mathematics in physics as a means of representation, a tool, and a source of not always logically justified but useful and effective heuristic strategies. (shrink)

The paper examines Husserl’s phenomenology and Hilbert’s view of the foundations of mathematics against the backdrop of their lifelong friendship. After a brief account of the complementary nature of their early approaches, the paper focuses on Husserl’s Formale und transzendentale Logik viewed as a response to Hilbert’s “new foundations” developed in the 1920s. While both Husserl and Hilbert share a “mathematics first,” nonrevisionist approach toward mathematics, they disagree about the way in which the access to it should be construed: Hilbert (...) wanted to reach it and show it consistent by his formalism on the basis of sensuous signs, Husserl held that there should be a reduction to elementary judgements about individuals. Husserl’s reduction does not establish the consistency of mathematics but he claims it is important for the considerations of truth. (shrink)

The article explores the relationship between the philosopher and historian of mathematics Jacob Klein’s account of the transformation of the concept of number coincident with the invention of algebra and Husserl’s early investigations of the origin of the concept of number and his late account of the Galilean impulse to mathematize nature. Klein’s research is shown to present the historical context for Husserl’s twin failures in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, to provide a psychological foundation for the proper concept of number (...) and to show how this concept of number functions as the mathematical foundation of universal arithmetic. The argument is advanced that one significant result of bringing together Klein’s and Husserl’s thought on these issues is the need to fine-tune Husserl’s Crisis project of desedimenting the mathematization of nature. Specifically, Klein’s research shows that “a ‘sedimented’ understanding of numbers” “is superposed upon the first stratum of ‘sedimented’ geometrical ‘evidences’” uncovered by Husserl’s fragmentary analyses of geometry in the Crisis. In addition, then, to the task of “the intentional-historical reactivation of the origin of geometry” recognized by Husserl as intrinsic to the reactivation of the origin of mathematical physics, Klein discloses a second task, that of “the reactivation” of the “complicated network of sedimented significances” that “underlies the ‘arithmetical’ understanding of geometry.”. (shrink)

A common analysis of Edmund Husserl’s early works on the philosophy of logic and mathematics presents these writings as the result of a combination of two distinct strands of influence: on the one hand a mathematical influence due to his teachers is Berlin, such as Karl Weierstrass, and on the other hand a philosophical influence due to his later studies in Vienna with Franz Brentano. However, the formative influences on Husserl’s early philosophy cannot be so cleanly separated into a philosophical (...) and a mathematical pathway. Growing evidence indicates that a Brentanist philosophy of mathematics was already in place before Husserl. Rather than an original combination at the confluence of two different streams, his early writings represent an elaboration of topics and problems that were already being discussed in the School of Brentano within a pre-existing framework. The traditional account understandably neglects Brentano’s own work on the philosophy of mathematics and logic, which can be found mostly in his unpublished manuscripts and lectures, and various works by Brentano’s students on the philosophy of mathematics which have only recently emerged from obscurity. Husserl’s early works must be correctly placed in this preceding context in order to be fully understood and correctly assessed. (shrink)

We aim at clarifying to what extent the work of the English mathematician George Boole on the algebra of logic is taken into consideration and discussed in the work of early Husserl, focusing in particular on Husserl’s lecture “Über die neueren Forschungen zur deduktiven Logik” of 1895, in which an entire section is devoted to Boole. We confront Husserl’s representation of the problem-solving processes with the analysis of “symbolic reasoning” proposed by George Boole in the Laws of Thought and try (...) to show how and why Husserl, while praising Boole’s calculus, strongly criticizes his attempt at a philosophical clarification and justification of it. (shrink)

In this paper, I carry out a comparative study of the philosophical views of Edmund Husserl and Hermann Weyl on issues such as mathematical existence and mathematical intuition, the validity of classical logic, the concept of logical definiteness, the nature of symbolic mathematics, the role of mathematics in empirical science, the relation of scientific theories with perception, space representation and the philosophy of geometry, and intentional constitution in general. My main goal is not simply to assess the extent of Husserl’s (...) influence on Weyl, although this is an ever present concern, but to clarify the views of one by contrasting them with those of the other. (shrink)

Husserl’s lifelong interest in Kant eventually becomes a preoccupation in his later years when he finds his phenomenology in competition with Neokantianism for the title of transcendental philosophy. Some issues that Husserl is concerned with in Kant are bound up with the works of Lambert. Kant believed that the role played by principles of sensibility in metaphysics should be determined by a “general phenomenology” on which Lambert had written. Kant initially believed that man is capable only of symbolic cognition, not (...) intellectual intuition. Lambert saw an increasing need in mathematics for symbolic cognition as exemplified in his proofs of the irrationality of π and e. Kant takes from Leibniz and Lambert an unrestricted notion of construction, allowing him to view mathematics as constructing its concepts in intuition, while Lambert’s proofs convince him that all mathematical problems are eventually solvable. Husserl criticizes Kant’s intuitionism for its inadequate accommodation of meaning to intuition, which he redresses with his theory of categorial intuition. This may improve on Kant’s intuition of the axiom of parallels but not so clearly on his spatial intuition. Husserl opposes Kant’s view of space as the form of outer intuition with his own view of it as the form of things. Husserl’s exploration of the geometry of visual space, which involves his earliest uses of epoché and reduction, converges however with Hilbert’s logical analysis of Kantian spatial intuition in leading to Euclidean spatial judgments. Hilbert’s analysis leads him to affirm the solvability of all well posed mathematical problems, a thesis complicated by the outbreak of logical paradoxes. Untroubled by such paradoxes, Husserl develops a supramathematics of all possible deductive systems whose completeness implicitly would also provide solutions of all such problems. Husserl’s full transcendental turn coincides with his realization that in effecting his Copernican turn, Kant was really the first to detect the “secret longing” of modern philosophy for a phenomenological clarification of being. Husserl now finds that Kant’s transcendental deductions presuppose a pure ego not adequately analyzed by Kant that survives the phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s idealism leads him to develop his own intuitionism, which adds to Kant’s, a “method of clarification” of mathematical concepts intended to clarify difficult impossibility proofs, but neither Husserl nor Kant base arithmetic on time. Husserl’s critique of the room left in Kant’s idealism, for things in themselves, leads to his own monadological solution of the problem of intersubjectivity. Husserl’s final judgment on Kant is that his form of transcendental idealism did not enable him to achieve absolute subjectivity through a genuine transcendental reduction. (shrink)

Husserl’s first work formulated what proved to be an algorithmically complete arithmetic, lending mathematical clarity to Kronecker’s reduction of analysis to finite calculations with integers. Husserl’s critique of his nominalism led him to seek a philosophical justification of successful applications of symbolic arithmetic to nature, providing insight into the “wonderful affinity” between our mathematical thoughts and things without invoking a pre-established harmony. For this, Husserl develops a purely descriptive phenomenology for which he found inspiration in Mach’s proposal of a “universal (...) physical phenomenology.” To account for applications to any domain, Husserl envisages a theory of all possible deductive systems, which he develops extensively in his Göttingen lectures wherein he engages with Hilbert’s work on deductive systems for geometry, real arithmetic, and physics. This leads Husserl to formulate claims of decidability and proofs of completeness for various arithmetics that result from his analysis of Kronecker’s general arithmetic. Careful attention to these proofs seem to show that Husserl was not oblivious to problems that underlie our incompleteness theorems, namely that of showing that some inversions of his algorithmic arithmetic are undefined. His growing preoccupation with the issue of a pre-established harmony between mathematical thought and reality motivate his pursuit of a “supramathematics” of all possible complete theory forms to demystify such harmony, by having such a form on hand for describing any empirical domain. He soon decides that a transcendental idealism of nature will reveal the wonderful affinity of thoughts and things comprising such harmony, to be a wonderful “parallelism of objective unities and constituted manifolds of consciousness.” But the paradoxes of logic and set theory cloud the clarity of mathematics, which Weyl would restore with Brouwer’s intuitionism and Hilbert with his metamathematics. Husserl informed Weyl that his student Becker had formulated a phenomenological foundation not only for Weyl’s generalization of relativity theory but also for the Brouwer-Weyl continuum. But Weyl eventually rejected much of Becker’s work, especially when it became clear that his phenomenological intuitionism could not account for the success of Hilbert’s transfinite mathematics in quantum physics. Becker responded to this “crisis of phenomenological method” with his mantic phenomenology celebrating the magic of mathematical mysticism, which Husserl finally rejects in favor of a pluralistic phenomenology of mathematics and nature. (shrink)

In the first year of the twentieth century, in Gottingen, Husserl delivered two talks dealing with a problem that proved central in his philosophical development, that of imaginary elements in mathematics. In order to solve this problem Husserl introduced a logical notion, called “definiteness”, and variants of it, that are somehow related, he claimed, to Hilbert’s notions of completeness. Many different interpretations of what precisely Husserl meant by this notion, and its relations with Hilbert’s ones, have been proposed, but no (...) consensus has been reached. In this paper I approach this question afresh and thoroughly, taking into consideration not only the relevant texts and context, as others have also done before, but, more importantly, Husserl’s philosophy, his intuition-based epistemology in particular. Based on a system of clearly defined concepts that I here present, I reinforce an interpretation—definiteness as a form of syntactic completeness—that has, I believe, some advantages vis-à-vis alternative interpretations. It is in conformity with the available texts; it makes clear that Husserl’s notion of definiteness is indeed close to Hilbert’s notions of completeness; it solves the important problem of imaginaries for which it was created; and last, but not least, it fits naturally into Husserl’s system of concepts and ideas. (shrink)

The article explores the relationship between the philosopher and historian of mathematics Jacob Klein’s account of the transformation of the concept of number coincident with the invention of algebra, together with Husserl’s early investigations of the origin of the concept of number and his late account of the Galilean impulse to mathematize nature. Klein’s research is shown to present the historical context for Husserl’s twin failures in the Philosophy of Arithmetic: to provide a psychological foundation for the proper concept of (...) number, and to show how this concept of number functions as the mathematical foundation of universal arithmetic. This context establishes that Husserl’s failures are ultimately rooted in the historical transformation of number documented in Klein’s research, from its premodern meaning as the unity of a multitude of determinate objects to its modern meaning as a symbolic representation with no immediate relation to a concrete multiplicity. The argum... (shrink)

Edmund Husserl’s engagement with Bertrand Russell’s paradox stands in a continuum of reciprocal reception and discussions about impossible objects in the School of Brentano. Against this broader context, we will focus on Husserl’s discussion of Russell’s paradox in his manuscript A I 35α from 1912. This highly interesting and revealing manuscript has unfortunately remained unpublished, which probably explains the scant attention it has received. I will examine Husserl’s approach in A I 35α by relating it to earlier discussions of relevant (...) topics in his manuscripts and the broader historical context of the School of Brentano and early phenomenology. (shrink)

This paper begins by pointing to an obvious difficulty in Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy: undoing the decisive separation between linguistic connotation and the denotated, undoing the decisive separation between linguistic meaning and the sensible world. This difficulty demands that we understand how the sensible and the symbolic have a sort of spontaneous relation. How can this be? The history of this problem is then traced back to Husserl, and in particular to his The Origin of Geometry. For Husserl, ‘abstract geometry’ is (...) understood to be a self-constituting field that cuts itself off from a ‘pre-geometry.’ The latter sort of geometry has to do with a symbolic and phantasy consciousness that makes differences in an otherwise uniform sensible plenum. Merleau-Ponty is at odds with the idea of an abstract geometry that constitutes its own field. His phenomenology would have this abstract geometry reduced to pre-geometry, and this pre-geometry further reduced to the sensible, which is then not uniform at all. The problem becomes more precisely how the separations of the sensible and the differences between things are already symbolic.The paper suggests that a way to think through Merleau-Ponty’s problem can be found in a January 1960 Working Note to The Visible and the Invisible called “The Invisible, the negative, vertical Being.” This note, with its references to “joints and members” and “disjunction and dis-membering” is very likely a reference to, and correction of, Heidegger’s 1943 essay on Heraclitus. The point for Merleau-Ponty seems to be a radicalization of the Heraclitean coinstantiation of opposites. His reading allows him to resist understanding the sensible as a self-identity and replace it instead with disarticulation, disintegration, or even perhaps disruption. To show this very disruption is, the paper finally argues, to show the sensible with its phantasmagorical character. Finally, by way of conclusion, the paper takes a turn to sculpture precisely to discuss how we might grasp a sensible that is not uniform but always being shaped and differentiated; and how the symbolic is exactly in, enjambed with, this spacing apart. Ce texte commence par signaler une difficulté évidente dans l’oeuvre tardive de Merleau-Ponty : défaire la séparation décisive entre la connotation linguistique et la dénotation, défaire la séparation décisive entre la signification linguistique et le monde sensible. Cette difficulté requiert de comprendre comment le sensible et le symbolique se trouvent dans une sorte de relation spontanée. Comment cela se fait-il? L’histoire de ce problème remonte à Husserl et à son Origine de la géométrie. Pour Husserl, la « géométrie abstraite » est comprise comme un champ qui se constitue lui-même et qui se détache d’une « pré-géométrie ». Cette dernière sorte de géométrie est liée à une conscience symbolique et imaginative qui fait des différences dans un espace sensible autrement uniforme. Merleau-Ponty n’est pas favorable à l’idée d’une géométrie abstraite qui constitue son propre champ. Sa phénoménologie vise à réduire la géométrie abstraite à la pré-géométrie, et cette dernière au sensible, qui dès lors n’est plus du tout uniforme. Le problème consiste alors à montrer comment les séparations du sensible et les différences entre les choses sont toujours déjà symboliques.La contribution ici suggère qu’une solution peut être trouvée dans la note de travail du Visible et l’invisible de janvier 1960, intitulée « L’Invisible, le négatif, l’Être vertical ». Cette note, qui parle de « jointure et membrure » et de « dis-jonction et dé-membrement », est sans doute une référence à, et une correction l’essai de Heidegger de 1943 sur Héraclite. Le propos de Merleau-Ponty semble être une radicalisation de la co-instantiation héraclitéenne des opposés. Son interprétation lui permet de résister à la conception du sensible comme identité à soi et de la remplacer par la désarticulation, la désintégration ou même peut-être le bouleversement. Le fait de montrer ce bouleversement consiste précisément à montrer le sensible avec son caractère fantasmatique. Finalement, en guise de conclusion, le texte se tourne vers la sculpture pour discuter une notion du sensible comme étant non uniforme mais toujours déjà formé et différencié, et une notion de symbolique comme étant exactement dans cet espacement. Questo testo inizia portando l’attenzione su un evidente problema nella filosofia dell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty: annullare la separazione decisiva tra connotazione linguistica e ciò che viene denotato, annullare la separazione decisiva tra significato linguistico e mondo sensibile. Questo problema richiede una comprensione della relazione spontanea tra sensibile e simbolico. Come ciò è possibile? La storia di questo problema risale fino ad Husserl, ed in particolare al suo L’origine della geometria. Per Husserl, la ‘geometria astratta’ è da concepire come un campo che si costituisce da sé, distaccandosi da una ‘pre-geometria’. L’ultima tipologia di geometria ha a che fare con una coscienza simbolica e immaginativa, che crea delle differenze in un altrimenti uniforme plenum sensibile. Merleau-Ponty non concorda con l’idea di una geometria astratta che costituisca il proprio campo. La sua fenomenologia intende piuttosto riportare la geometria astratta alla pre-geometria, e quest’ultima al sensibile, che quindi è tutto fuorché uniforme. Il problema diventa allora, più precisamente, come mostrare che le separazioni del sensibile e delle differenze tra le cose siano già simboliche. Questo testo suggerisce che una soluzione per pensare questo problema in Merleau-Ponty possa essere trovata in una nota di lavoro al Visibile e l’invisibile del gennaio 1960, intitolata “L’invisibile, il negativo, l’essere verticale”. Questa nota, con i suoi riferimenti a “spazio topologico e il tempo di congiunzione e di membratura”, e ancora “di dis-giunzione e dis-membramento”, è molto probabilmente un riferimento, ed insieme una correzione, al saggio di Heidegger su Eraclito del 1943. Il punto, per Merleau-Ponty, sembra essere una radicalizzazione del concetto eracliteo di compresenza degli opposti. La sua lettura gli permette di resistere alla comprensione del sensibile come un’auto-identità, per rimpiazzarla invece con una disarticolazione, disintegrazione, o perfino interruzione. Mostrare quest’interruzione è, come argomentiamo in questo testo, mostrare il sensibile con il suo carattere fantasmagorico. Infine, tirando le conclusioni, questo testo si rivolge alla scultura, per discutere come sia possibile afferrare un sensibile che non sia uniforme, ma sempre in-formato e in differenziazione, e come la simbolica sia sempre in – e intrecciata con – questa spaziatura, questa distanziazione. (shrink)

The following pages contain a partial edition of Husserl’s manuscript A I 35, pages 1a-28b. The first few pages are dated on May 1927 and are included mostly for completeness’ sake. The bulk of the manuscript convolute, however, is from 1912. Four pages of the convolute, 31a-34b, have been published as Beilage XII (210, 2–216, 2) in Hua XXXII. The manuscript was excluded from the text selection of Husserliana XXI3 based on its much later date of composition. A I 35/24a (...) is mentioned in Husserliana XXII (p. xxi, n. 4) as confirmation for Zermelo’s 1902 “oral report” to Husserl of his own independent discovery of the paradox. The text presented here for the first time has already been the target of at least three extensive commentaries, while still unpublished, by Claire Ortiz Hill and Guillermo Rosado Haddock. These present a good survey in english of the central issues on the text and contain many translated quotations. (shrink)

In this paper, I have attempted to make the role of mathematical thinking clear in Husserl’s theory of sciences. Husserl believed that phenomenology could afford to provide a safe foundation for individual sciences. Hence, the first task of the project was reorganizing the system of sciences and to show the possibility of apodictic knowledge regarding the world. Husserl was inspired by the progress of mathematics at that time because mathematics is the most logical discipline and deals with abstract objects. It (...) was the most suitable model for Husserl’s project. In fact, we can find structural similarities between his project and F. Klein’s Erlangen Program; further, the procedure of the essence intuition can be explained by a mathematical induction. Mathematics is certainly a new path for understanding Husserl’s phenomenology. In order to clarify the relation between Husserl’s theory of sciences and mathematics, this study focused on the problem of classification. Lastly, another implication of Husserl’s phenomenology as a theory of sciences is that his work is still meaningful for today’s dynamic reality of sciences. (shrink)

The view that mathematics deals with ideal objects to which we have epistemic access by a kind of perception has troubled many thinkers. Using ideas from Husserl’s phenomenology, I will take a different look at these matters. The upshot of this approach is that there are non-material objects and that they can be recognized in a process very closely related to sense perception. In fact, the perception of physical objects may be regarded as a special case of this more universal (...) way of recognizing objects of any kind. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel wrote (1964, p. 272), after he had read Husserl, that the notion of objectivity raises a question: “the question of the objective existence of the objects of mathematical intuition (which, incidentally, is an exact replica of the question of the objective existence of the outer world)”. This “exact replica” brings to mind the close analogy Husserl saw between our intuition of essences in Wesensschau and of physical objects in perception. What is it like to experience a mathematical proving (...) process? What is the ontological status of a mathematical proof? Can computer assisted provers output a proof? Taking a naturalized world account, I will assess the relationship between mathematics, the physical world and consciousness by introducing a significant conceptual distinction between proving and proof. I will propose that proving is a phenomenological conscious experience. This experience involves a combination of what Kurt Gödel called intuition, and what Husserl called intentionality. In contrast, proof is a function of that process — the mathematical phenomenon — that objectively self-presents a property in the world, and that results from a spatiotemporal unity being subject to the exact laws of nature. In this essay, I apply phenomenology to mathematical proving as a performance of consciousness, that is, a lived experience expressed and formalized in language, in which there is the possibility of formulating intersubjectively shareable meanings. (shrink)

Au terme des Prolégomènes, Husserl formule son idée de la logique pure en la structurant sur deux niveaux: l'un, supérieur, de la logique formelle fondé transcendantalement et d'un point de vue épistémologique par l'autre, inférieur, d'une morphologie des catégories. Seul le second de ces deux niveaux est traité dans les Recherches logiques, tandis que les travaux théoriques en logique formelle menés par Husserl à la même époque en paraissent plutôt indépendants. Cet article est consacré à ces travaux tels que recueillis (...) dans les appendices VI-X du volume 12 des Husserliana. Mettant en évidence la théorie de la signification qui les sous-tend par le biais d'une analyse de la question dite de l'extension des systèmes d'axiomes et de sa résolution au moyen d'une notion de complétude, son objectif est d'expliciter les modalités de l'intégration de la logique formelle dans l'idée husserlienne de la logique pure au tournant du xx siècle.When formulating his idea of pure logic in the Prole.. (shrink)

Husserl credited Riemann for bringing the modern idea of “mathesis universalis‘ to its realization. Going beyond the logical ideal of a theory of all possible forms of theories, this paper explores the phenomenological sense of intrinsically physical geometry. Starting from Kant, how can we follow the thread of transcendental idealism in the search for the hidden presuppositions of this kind of geometry? This is achieved by reflecting on the paradigmatic experience of the earth at rest in our primary lifeworld.

One major difficulty confronting attempts to clarify the epistemological and ontological status of abstract objects is determining the sense, if any, in which such entities may be characterised as mind and language independent. Our contention is that the tolerant reductionist position of Michael Dummett can be strengthened by drawing on Husserl's mature account of the constitution of ideal objects and mathematical objectivity. According to the Husserlian position we advocate, abstract singular terms pick out weakly mind-independent sedimented meaning-contents. These meaning-contents serve (...) as the ‘thin’ referents of abstract singular terms, but are ultimately founded in prior acts of meaning-constitution. (shrink)

This present collection of (translations of) reviews is intended to help obtain a more balanced picture of the reception and impact of Edmund Husserl’s first book, the 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic. One of the insights to be gained from this non-exhaustive collection of reviews is that the Philosophy of Arithmetic had a much more widespread reception than hitherto assumed: in the present collection alone there already are fourteen, all published between 1891 and 1895. Three of the reviews appeared in mathematical (...) journals (Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der Mathematik, Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik, and Zeitschrift für mathema- tischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht), three were published in English journals (The Philosophical Review, The Monist, Mind), two were written by other members of the School of Brentano (Franz Hillebrand and Alois Höfler). Some of the reviews and notices appear to be very superficial, consisting merely of para- phrases (often without references) and lists of topics taken from the table of con- tents, presenting barely acceptable summaries. Others, among which Höfler might be the most significant, engage much more deeply with the topics and problems that Husserl addresses, analyzing his approach in the context of the mathematics of his time and the School of Brentano. (shrink)

For different reasons, Husserl's original, thought-provoking ideas on the philosophy of logic and mathematics have been ignored, misunderstood, even despised, by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike, who have been content to barricade themselves behind walls of ideological prejudices. Yet, for several decades, Husserl was almost continuously in close professional and personal contact with those who created, reshaped and revolutionized 20th century philosophy of mathematics, logic, science and language in both the analytic and phenomenological schools, people whom those other makers of (...) 20th century philosophy, Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein and their followers, rarely, if ever, met. Independently of them, Husserl offered alternatives to the well-trodden paths of logicism, nominalism, formalism and intuitionism. He presented a well-articulated, thoroughly argued case for logic as an objective science, but was not philosophically naive to the point of not seeing the role of subjectivity in shaping the sense of the reality facing objective science. Given the preeminent role that philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics have played in transforming the way philosophy has been done since Husserl's time, and given the depth of his insights and his obvious expertise in those fields, his ideas need to be integrated into present-day, mainstream philosophy. Here, philosopher Claire Ortiz Hill and mathematician-philosopher Jairo da Silva offer a wealth of interesting insights intended to subvert the many mistaken idees recues about the development of Husserl's thought and reestablish broken ties between it and philosophy now. (shrink)

In this paper our purpose is to explane and discuss the essential objections Cavaillès raised to Husserlian phenomenology in his last text “On Logic and Theory of Science”. In this text Cavaillès questioned the foundational status of cogito and the capacity of consciousness to produce new ideal objects.; and he replaced this capacity with an anonymous generating necessity that would be dialectical and would take place intin the ideal domains of objects. We have to determine if such objections question every (...) philosophy philosophy of consciousness in general, or if they only question a particular interpretation of Husserlian transcendental subject; and if they necessarily lead us toward a Spinozist or Hegelian position in philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The article discusses research work of Heinrich Hofmann, who has completed doctoral studies in mathematics under Karl Weierstrass in Berlin. His first book "Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations With Supplementary Texts From 1887-1901" contains his thesis "In the Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses" completed in the guidance of Weierstrass.

In the year 1894, Husserl had not been already contaminated by Bolzano’s realism. It was then that he conceived a theory of assumptions in order to “save an existence” for mathematical objects. Here we would like to explore this theory and show in what way it represented a convincing alternative to realistic ontology and its counterpart: the correspondence theory of truth. However, as soon as he designed it, Husserl shoved away all the implications for his theory of assumptions, and merely (...) abandoned it. We would also like to consider the wrong reasons for this renouncement, which undoubtedly have to do with the dichotomy between signification and perception in his elaboration of phenomenology. (shrink)

Husserl left many unpublished drafts explaining (or trying to) his views on spatial representation and geometry, such as, particularly, those collected in the second part of Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie (Hua XXI), but no completely articulate work on the subject. In this paper, I put forward an interpretation of what those views might have been. Husserl, I claim, distinguished among different conceptions of space, the space of perception (constituted from sensorial data by intentionally motivated psychic functions), that of physical (...) geometry (or idealized perceptual space), the space of the mathematical science of physical nature (in which science, not only raw perception has a word) and the abstract spaces of mathematics (free creations of the mathematical mind), each of them with its peculiar geometrical structure. Perceptual space is proto-Euclidean and the space of physical geometry Euclidean, but mathematical physics, Husserl allowed, may find it convenient to represent physical space with a non-Euclidean structure. Mathematical spaces, on their turn, can be endowed, he thinks, with any geometry mathematicians may find interesting. Many other related questions are addressed here, in particular those concerning the a priori or a posteriori character of the many geometric features of perceptual space (bearing in mind that there are at least two different notions of a priori in Husserl, which we may call the conceptual and the transcendental a priori). I conclude with an overview of Weyl’s ideas on the matter, since his philosophical conceptions are often traceable back to his former master, Husserl. (shrink)

The concept of a Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl has been given various interpretations, due to its shifting role in his works. Many authors have been misled by this term, placing it in the context of Husserl’s early period in Halle, while writing the Philosophy of Arithmetic, as a friend and colleague of Georg Cantor.Yet at the time, Husserl distanced himself explicitly from Cantor’s definition and rather took Bernhard Riemann as example, having studied and lectured extensively on Riemann’s theories of space. Husserl’s (...) Mannigfaltigkeitslehre would then not be a Cantorian set-theory, but come rather closer to topology. Then, in the Prolegomena, Husserl introduces the idea of a pure Mannigfaltigkeitslehre as a meta-theoretical enterprise which studies the relations among theories, e.g. how to derive or found one upon another. When Husserl announces that in fact the best example of such a pure theory of manifolds is what is actually practiced in mathematics, this sounds slightly misleading. The pure theory of theories cannot simply be the mathematics underlying topology, but should rather be considered as a mathesis universalis. Indeed, while this might not have been fully clear yet in 1900/1901, Husserl will explicitly tie together the notions of pure theory of manifolds and mathesis universalis. The mathesis universalis in this sense is formal, a priori and analytic, as theory of theory in general. It is an analysis of the highest categories of meaning and their correlative categories of objects. In my paper I try to understand the development of the notion of Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl’s thought from its mathematical beginnings to its later central philosophical role, taking into account the mathematical background and context of Husserl’s own development. (shrink)

The concept of a Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl has been given various interpretations, due to its shifting role in his works. Many authors have been misled by this term, placing it in the context of Husserl’s early period in Halle, while writing the Philosophy of Arithmetic, as a friend and colleague of Georg Cantor.Yet at the time, Husserl distanced himself explicitly from Cantor’s definition and rather took Bernhard Riemann as example, having studied and lectured extensively on Riemann’s theories of space. Husserl’s (...) Mannigfaltigkeitslehre would then not be a Cantorian set-theory, but come rather closer to topology. Then, in the Prolegomena, Husserl introduces the idea of a pure Mannigfaltigkeitslehre as a meta-theoretical enterprise which studies the relations among theories, e.g. how to derive or found one upon another. When Husserl announces that in fact the best example of such a pure theory of manifolds is what is actually practiced in mathematics, this sounds slightly misleading. The pure theory of theories cannot simply be the mathematics underlying topology, but should rather be considered as a mathesis universalis. Indeed, while this might not have been fully clear yet in 1900/1901, Husserl will explicitly tie together the notions of pure theory of manifolds and mathesis universalis. The mathesis universalis in this sense is formal, a priori and analytic, as theory of theory in general. It is an analysis of the highest categories of meaning and their correlative categories of objects. In my paper I try to understand the development of the notion of Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl’s thought from its mathematical beginnings to its later central philosophical role, taking into account the mathematical background and context of Husserl’s own development. (shrink)

In 1913, in a draft for a new Preface for the second edition of the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl reveals to his readers that "The source of all my studies and the first source of my epistemological difficul­ties lies in my first works on the philosophy of arithmetic and mathematics in general", i.e. his Habilitationsschrift and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: "I carefully studied the consciousness constituting the amount, first the collec­tive consciousness (consciousness of quantity, of multiplicity) in its simplest and (...) higher levels (consciousness of sums, sums of sums etc.). I immediately separated proper (intuitive) and symbolic consciousness, in the characteriza­tion of the former I hit the radical difference of categorial consciousness [...] and sensuous consciousness of unity." Later on, in the Third Investigation, Husserl makes some very specific claims, that are of considerable importance to assess the development of his early works and their relation to his later phenomenology: "This first work of mine (an elaboration of my Habilitationsschrift, [...], 1887) should be compared with all assertions of the present work on compounds, moments of unity, complexes, wholes and objects of higher order. I am sorry that in many recent treatments of the doctrine of "Gestalt-qualities", this work has mostly been ignored, though quite a lot of the thought-content of later treatments by Cornelius, Meinong etc., of questions of analysis, apprehension of plurality and complexion is already to be found, differently expressed, in my Philosophy of Arithmetic. I think it would still be of use today to consult this work on the phenomenological and ontological issues in question, especially since it is the first work that attached importance to acts and objects of higher order and investigated them thoroughly." Hence, at the time of the Ideas, Husserl retrospectively considers his first works4 as being still relevant for phenomenological issues. Not only does Husserl advance a very interesting priority claim with respect to Von Ehrenfels’ development of the notion of Gestalt and Meinong’s development of Gegenstandstheorie, but also a strong affirmation of continuity and coherence of his position from 1887 all the way up to 1913, encompassing the alleged “revolution” in his position from psychologism to anti-psycho­logism in the 1890s. Indeed, according to much of the recent secondary literature, in 1894, right in the middle of the ten “incubation” years between the Philosophy of Arithmetic and the Logical Investigations, Frege’s destruc­tive review would have converted Husserl to antipsychologism practically overnight. This gives us two conflicting interpretations: on the one hand, Husserl himself in 1913 still seems to approve of the Philosophy of Arithmetic and even considers it to contain valuable phenomenological material, on the other, it is routinely dismissed by much of the secondary literature as hope­lessly psychologistic. So which one is it: do we have a phenomenological arithmetic or a psychologistic arithmetic in Husserl’s first book? On balance, I think that Husserl in his Philosophy of Arithmetic developed a position that does not fall prey to the exaggerated and poorly aimed critiques of Frege, while at the same time, as a descriptive psychology of the genesis and constitution of number, it can certainly be considered as providing phenome­nologically meaningful analyses, though of course not made from within an explicitly transcendental phenomenological framework. (shrink)

In the following, I argue that L. E. J. Brouwer's notion of the construction of purely mathematical objects and Edmund Husserl's notion of their constitution coincide.

Eine vollständige Darstellung von Edmund Husserls Verhältnis zu Gottlob Frege steht noch aus, so dass es nicht verwundert, einige Missverständnisse, dieses Verhältnis betreffend, im Umlauf zu finden. Selbst scheinbar längst überwundene systematische Dogmen tauchen wieder auf, so z.B. die Auffassung, dass Husserl nicht nur entscheidend von Gottlob Frege beeinflusst wurde, sondern darüber hinaus auch seine schärfste Frege-Kritik 1891 zurückgenommen habe. Mein Beitrag enthält eine überwiegend historisch vorgehende Entgegnung auf solche fälschlich vertretenen Ansichten wie sie sich auch in dem neu erschienenen (...) und mit vielen dokumentarischen Belegen versehenen Frege-Kommentarbuch von W. Künne finden. Die wichtigsten Argumente, die in diesem Buch gegen Husserl gerichtet werden, stützen sich auf Stellen in Husserls Frühwerk, die zwar sehr aufschlussreich für die Beurteilung des philosophischen und menschlichen Habitus Husserls in den 1890er Jahre sind, nicht aber Künnes Thesen stützen oder gar beweisen können. Die als zurückgenommene Frege-Kritik verstandene Selbstkritik Husserls betrifft jedoch nach meinen Darlegungen gerade nicht die Kritik, die er an Freges Buch Grundlagen der Arithmetik geübt hatte, sondern seine eigene systematische Stellungnahme hinsichtlich der Begründung der Arithmetik. Ausgehend von dieser Einsicht werde ich auf ein wichtiges Spezifikum von Husserls Erstlingswerk (Philosophie der Arithmetik) aufmerksam machen, das voreiligen Interpretationen einen Riegel vorschiebt: Dieses Buch ist ein Mosaik aus Einsichten verschiedener Arbeits- und Denkperioden des Verfassers, die sich vor allem auch in dem zweifachen Begriff der Äquivalenz zeigen. Dies knüpft an einen langen geschichtlichen Entwicklungsprozess an, der in eine von Bolzano, Lotze, Brentano und Carl Stumpf geprägte Tradition zurückführt und das Problem der Unterscheidung zwischen Sinn und Gegenstand eines Aktes betrifft. (shrink)

Two hundred years ago Bernard Bolzano published a booklet on the philosophy of mathematics that is the first major step forward in this area since Pascal’s De l’esprit géométrique. Following Aristotelian lines Bolzano distinguishes in his opusculum two kinds of proofs, those that simply show that something is the case, and those that explain why something is the case. In his Wissenschaftslehre this contrast reappears as that between derivability and consecutivity . Husserl takes up some of Bolzano’s key concepts in (...) his Prolegomena to Pure Logic. In this paper I discuss, among other things, the question whether consecutivity can be regarded as a special case of derivability, as Husserl seems to think, and I contrast Bolzano’s rejection of any appeal to self-evidence with Husserl’s reliance on this notion.Genau vor zweihundert Jahren erschienen Bernard Bolzano Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik. Dieses Büchlein ist der erste Meilenstein in der Geschichte der Philosophie der Mathematik seit Pascals De l’esprit géométrique. Im Anschluss an Aristoteles unterscheidet Bolzano in seinem Opusculum zwei Arten von Beweisen: solche, die nur dartun, dass etwas der Fall ist, und solche, die erklären warum etwas der Fall ist. Im seiner Wissenschaftslehre erscheint dieser Kontrast als der zwischen Ableitbarkeit und Abfolge. Husserl übernimmt einige von Bolzanos Grundbegriffen in seinen Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. In diesem Aufsatz diskutiere ich u.a. die Frage, ob Abfolge ein Spezialfall von Ableitbarkeit ist, wie Husserl anzunehmen scheint, und ich kontrastiere Bolzanos Ablehnung jeder Berufung auf Evidenz mit Husserls Einstellung. (shrink)

The article introduces and discusses an unpublished manuscript by Edmund Husserl, conserved at the Husserl-Archives Leuven with signature K I 26, pp. 73a–73b. The article is followed by the text of the manuscript in German and in an English translation. The manuscript, titled “The Transition through the Impossible” ( Der Durchgang durch das Unmögliche ), was part of the material Husserl used for his 1901 Doppelvortrag in Göttingen. In the manuscript, the impossible is characterized as the “sphere of objectlessness” ( (...) Sphäre der Gegenstandslosigkeit ) and Husserl addresses the question whether and when it is warranted to perform a transition through the impossible to obtain valid results for the sphere of objectivity. (shrink)

The article seeks to challenge the standard accounts of how to view the difference between Husserl and Frege on the nature of ideal objects and meanings. It does so partly by using Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Husserl to open up a critical space where the two approaches can be confronted in a new way. Frege’s criticism of Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics (that it was essentially psychologistic) was partly overcome by the program of transcendental phenomenology. But the original challenge to the (...) prospect of a fulfilled intuition of idealities remained and was in fact encountered again from within the transcendental analysis by Husserl himself in his last writings on geometry and language. According to the two standard and conflicting accounts, Husserl either changed his earlier psychologistic program as a result of Frege’s criticism, or he was in fact never challenged by it in the first place. The article shows instead how Husserl continued to struggle with the problem of the constitution of ideal objects, and how his quest led him to a point where his analyses anticipate a more dialectical and deconstructive conclusion, eventually made explicit by Derrida. It also shows not only how this development constitutes a philosophical continuity from the original dispute with Frege, but also how Frege’s critique in a certain respect could be read as an anticipation of Derrida’s deconstructive elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenology. (shrink)