Marxism is a materialist theory that centers economic life in its analysis of the human social world. This materialist orientation manifests in explanations that take economic class to play a fundamental causal role in determining the emergence, character, and development of race-and sex-based oppression—indeed, of all forms of identity-based oppression within class societies. To say that labor is mediated by class in a class-based society is to say that, in such societies, the class-based division of that activity which produces and (...) reproduces the human species is the definite form in which labor appears, and that the human life which is the product of that self-making activity bears its stamp. Marxism’s emphasis on economic factors as central in the constitution and development of human life has been seized upon as evidence of its alleged “class reductionism”—its supposed tendency to think of all aspects of human life as direct and simple expressions of a class relation. No such thing follows; quite the opposite, a correct understanding of the relationships among capitalism, racism, and sexism only further highlights how central the struggle against each is to the struggles against any of the others. (shrink)

Unethical pro-organizational behaviors are unethical, but prosocially-motivated, acts intended to benefit one’s organization. This study examines the extent to which employees are willing to perform UPB to benefit a liked leader. Based on social exchange theory, we hypothesized that LMX would mediate the association of interpersonal justice with UPB willingness. Moral identity and positive reciprocity beliefs were examined as moderators. Higher LMX was significantly and positively related to UPB willingness, and the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on UPB via LMX (...) was significant and positive. These findings suggest that LMX and interpersonal justice could have a previously-unexplored dark side. Moral identity had a negative direct relationship with UPB, but it did not moderate the relationship of LMX with UPB. Thus, LMX facilitates UPB willingness even when employees are high in moral identity. LMX is associated with many positive outcomes, but our results show that high LMX may also increase willingness to perform unethical behaviors to benefit one’s leader. These results contribute to the literature by identifying a potential negative outcome associated with high LMX. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Chinese government implemented a lockdown to contain the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic during the Chinese Lunar New Year when people have the tradition to visit families and friends. Previous research suggested that heuristic processing increased risky behavioral willingness and that people’s tendency to use heuristic processing varied across different adulthood stages. This study thus investigated the relationships among age, heuristic processing of COVID-19-related information, and the willingness to have social gatherings during the lockdown.MethodsA sample of 1,651 participants was recruited (...) from an online crowdsourcing platform between January 31 and February 04 in 2020, with a mean age of 30.69, 47.9% being women. Participants completed an online questionnaire about heuristic processing of COVID-19-related information, willingness to engage in social gatherings during the lockdown, age, and other demographic information.ResultsAge was found to have a U-shaped curvilinear relationship with heuristic processing, and heuristic processing was positively correlated with the willingness to have social gatherings. Further analyses showed that heuristic processing curvilinearly mediated the relationship between age and the willingness to have social gatherings.ConclusionCompared with young adults, emerging and older adults are more likely to engage in heuristic processing, which in turn, increases the willingness to have social gatherings. Heuristic processing serves as an underlying mechanism to explain the relationship between age and risky behavioral willingness. (shrink)

Scholars have suggested that leaders’ ethical failures at the beginning of the twenty-first century have raised awareness about the importance of ethical leadership (EL). Yet, there has been no systematic effort to evaluate whether this awareness indeed led to changes in EL or how followers react to this leadership style over time. To address this gap, we examine the evolution in EL means, variability, and its associations with follower outcomes between 2004 and 2019. Our cross-temporal meta-analysis included 359 independent samples (...) from 314 studies published between 2005 and 2020 and focused on followers’ ratings of their leaders using the Ethical Leadership Scale (ELS; Brown et al., in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97(2), 117–134, 2005). Using cubic spline meta-regressions, our results indicated no global changes in EL mean levels and variability across the 15-year period. Nevertheless, country-level comparisons revealed different EL-trends in China (i.e. decrease) versus the United States (i.e. stable), and further moderation analyses highlighted the role of cultural value dimensions and national corruption rates. Finally, we also found that the relationship between EL and desirable follower outcomes (e.g. organizational citizenship behavior) became gradually stronger over time on a global level. These results provide a solid empirical basis to evaluate cross-temporal trends in EL and its (changing) impact on follower outcomes across the globe. (shrink)

To Will & To Do presents one of the most significant theological contributions of the dynamic twentieth-century thinker Jacques Ellul. Benefiting from recent scholarship on Ellul and a discovery of a lost manuscript, this new edition renders the full text available in English for the first time, combining a fresh translation of Volume I with a first English translation of Volume II. Together, the two volumes constitute the introductory first part of Ellul's planned four-part treatment of Christian ethics. Volume I (...) examines the origin of the problem of Good and Evil, outlines the contemporary morality of Western society, and provocatively sketches the paradox of an impossible and yet necessary Christian ethics. Volume II carries this discussion forward, outlining the characteristics and conditions of Christian ethics. It then treats the relationship between ethics and the legal texts of the Bible, the relationship between ethics and dogmatic theology, and concludes by reimagining the theological use of the ""analogy of faith"" for scriptural interpretation. In constant dialogue with Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Ricoeur, and many other theologians and philosophers, To Will & To Do constitutes a major intervention in twentieth-century theological ethics. (shrink)

To Will & To Do presents one of the most significant theological contributions of the dynamic twentieth-century thinker Jacques Ellul. Benefiting from recent scholarship on Ellul and a discovery of a lost manuscript, this new edition renders the full text available in English for the first time, combining a fresh translation of Volume I with a first English translation of Volume II. Together, the two volumes constitute the introductory first part of Ellul's planned four-part treatment of Christian ethics. Volume I (...) examines the origin of the problem of Good and Evil, outlines the contemporary morality of Western society, and provocatively sketches the paradox of an impossible and yet necessary Christian ethics. Volume II carries this discussion forward, outlining the characteristics and conditions of Christian ethics. It then treats the relationship between ethics and the legal texts of the Bible, the relationship between ethics and dogmatic theology, and concludes by reimagining the theological use of the "analogy of faith" for scriptural interpretation. In constant dialogue with Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Ricoeur, and many other theologians and philosophers, To Will & To Do constitutes a major intervention in twentieth-century theological ethics. -- back cover. (shrink)

Four studies measured or manipulated beliefs in free will to illuminate how such beliefs are linked to other aspects of personality. Study 1 showed that stronger belief in free will was correlated with more gratitude, greater life satisfaction, lower levels of perceived life stress, a greater sense of self-efficacy, greater perceived meaning in life, higher commitment in relationships, and more willingness to forgive relationship partners. Study 2 showed that the belief in free will was a stronger predictor of life (...) satisfaction, meaning in life, gratitude, and self-efficacy than either locus of control or implicit person theory. Study 3 showed that experimentally manipulating disbelief in free will caused a reduction in the perceived meaningfulness of life. Study 4 found that inducing a stronger belief in free will caused people to set more meaningful goals for themselves. The possible concern that believers in free will simply claim all manner of positive traits was contradicted by predicted null finding.. (shrink)

Discussions of life extension ethics have focused mainly on whether an extended life would be desirable to have, and on the social consequences of widely available life extension. I want to explore a different range of issues: four ways in which the advent of life extension will change our relationship with death, not only for those who live extended lives, but also for those who cannot or choose not to. Although I believe that, on balance, the reasons in favor (...) of developing life extension outweigh the reasons against doing so, most of these changes probably count as reasons against doing so. First, the advent of life extension will alter the human condition for those who live extended lives, and not merely by postponing death. Second, it will make death worse for those who lack access to life extension, even if those people live just as long as they do now. Third, for those who have access to life extension but prefer to live a normal lifespan because they think that has advantages, the advent of life extension will somewhat reduce some of those advantages, even if they never use life extension. Fourth, refusing life extension turns out to be a form of suicide, and this will force those who have access to life extension but turn it down to choose between an extended life they don't want and a form of suicide they may consider immoral. (shrink)

푸코가 ‘지식의 의지’ 개념을 주조해내는 과정은 푸코의 니체 독서의 고유한 면을 보여준다. 필자는 이 글에서 한편으로 ‘충실한’ 니체주의자로서 푸코가 자신의 과제 수행을 위해 어떻게 니체의 특정 통찰을 채택·활용하는가를 보여주고, 다른 한편으로 필자의 관점에서 중요한, 하지만 푸코의 사상 형성에서는 누락된 또 다른 통찰이 니체의 사상 전개 과정에서 어떻게 중요한 역할을 하는지 보여주고자 한다. 이를 위해 필자는 우선 푸코가 고고학으로부터 계보학으로 이행하는 과정에서 어떻게 니체의 계보학적 통찰을 프랑스 인식론의 전통으로부터 주조해낸 ‘지식’의 개념과 결합하여 ‘지식의 의지’라는 개념을 만들어내었는가를 살펴볼 것이다(2∼4절). 그 다음으로 필자는 (...) 이 과정에서 니체의 계보학적 통찰이 비중 있게 채택되는 반면 그의 인간학적 통찰은 채택의 문턱을 넘지 못함을 밝히고, 니체가 인간학적 통찰을 출발점으로 삼아 어떻게 서양 형이상학의 자기지양의 논리 속에서 자신의 길을 찾는지를 제시하고자 한다(5∼6절). 마지막으로, 인간학적인 사유를 극복하는, 니체와 푸코 각자의 방식을 종합적으로 검토함으로써 이 글을 끝맺을 것이다(7절). (shrink)

Female empowerment has long been a prominent social concern in Western culture. With the rise of social media, the quest for female empowerment has become embodied in self-presentational practices, occurring conspicuously throughout the Instagram fitness subculture: ‘fitspiration’. Here, female empowerment is merged with the body-centrality inherent to fitness, and the self-sexualization that has become characteristic of both photo-based social media in general, and fitspiration in particular. Meanwhile, an extensive body of research highlights numerous detrimental effects of self-sexualization on women. Evidently, (...) something seems awry with the implied proposition ‘sexualization as empowerment’. Drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of power and its relationship to human flourishing, this article aims to critically examine the conception of female empowerment expressed in fitspiration and to conceptualize a philosophically compelling reformulation of universal human empowerment. I argue that what is commonly conceived of as female empowerment in trends like fitspiration—delineated in its explicit relationship to sexualization—may be seriously flawed. Rejecting this understanding in favor of a Nietzschean universal alternative may prove beneficial to individuals both within and without the contemporary fitness culture. (shrink)

The author examines the relation between Michel Foucault's corpus and Freudian psychoanalysis. He argues that Foucault had a complex and changing relationship to psychoanalysis for two primary reasons: his own psychopathology, personal experience, and expressed desire, and due to an ineluctable contradiction at the heart of psychoanalysis itself. The author examines the history of Foucault's personal and scholarly interest in psychology and psychiatry, tracing the emergence, development, and shift in his thought and work. He then argues that Foucault's critique (...) of psychoanalysis can be extended to the constitution of the Western educated subject, and that Foucault ultimately resolved his personal dilemma in relation to psychoanalysis by rejecting the ‘will to knowledge’ and refusing the notion of a stable and fixed identity. (shrink)

I will argue here a) that we have a right to have opportunities to meaningful relationships, b) that such a right is distinct from a right focusing only on protecting access to more basic social interactions, and c) that to the extent that we have rights to both kinds of social interactions, the one focused on more meaningful relationships should have priority because it secures an interest of greater importance for us.

It is a commonplace amongst communitarians, socialists and feminists alike that liberalism is to be rejected for its excessive ‘individualism’ or ‘atomism,’ for ignoring the manifest ways in which we are ‘embedded’ or ‘situated’ in various social roles and communal relationships. The effect of these theoretical flaws is that liberalism, in a misguided attempt to protect and promote the dignity and autonomy of the individual, has undermined the associations and communities which alone can nurture human flourishing.My plan is to examine (...) the resources available to liberalism to meet these objections. My primary concern is with what liberals can say in response, not with what particular liberals actually have said in the past. Still, as a way of acknowledging intellectual debts, if nothing else, I hope to show how my arguments are related to the political morality of modem liberals from J.S. Mill through to Rawls and Dworkin. The term ‘liberal’ has been applied to many different theories in many different fields, but I’m using it in this fairly restricted sense. First, I’m dealing with a political morality, a set of moral arguments about the justification of political action and political institutions. Second, my concern is with this modem liberalism, not seventeenth-century liberalism, and I want to leave entirely open what the relationship is between the two. It might be that the developments initiated by the ‘new liberals’ are really an abandonment of what was definitive of classical liberalism. G.A. Cohen, for example, says that since they rejected the principle of ‘self-ownership’ which was definitive of classical liberalism, these new liberals should instead be called ‘social democrats.’My concern is to defend their political morality, whatever the proper label. (shrink)

The cell is not only the structural, physiological, and developmental unit of life, but also the reproductive one. So far, however, this aspect of the cell has received little attention from historians and philosophers of biology. I will argue that cell theory had far-reaching consequences for how biologists conceptualized the reproductive relationships between germs and adult organisms. Cell theory, as formulated by Theodor Schwann in 1839, implied that this relationship was a specific and lawful one, that is, that germs (...) of a certain kind, all else being equal, would produce adult organisms of the same kind, and vice versa. Questions of preformation and epigenesis took on a new meaning under this presupposition. The question then became one of whether cells could be considered as autonomous agents producing adult organisms of a given species, or whether they were the product of external, organizing forces and thus only a stage in the development of the whole organism. This question became an important issue for nineteenth-century biology. As I will demonstrate, it was the view of cells as autonomous agents which helped both Charles Darwin and Gregor Mendel to think of inheritance as a lawful process. (shrink)

The paper argues for a normative rather than psychological interpretation of Nietzsche's conceptions of power and will - and hence will to power. It does so with a view to rethinking the questions of Nietzsche's relationship to Enlightenment thought. Jürgen Habermas's view of Nietzsche's philosophy of power as epitomizing a counter-Enlightenment instrumentalism is contrasted with Maudmarie Clark's attempt to divest it of its power aspect in order to place him within the tradition of Enlightenment. Both approaches, it is argued, (...) ignore the irreducibly normative basis of Nietzsche's conception of will to power. This normative basis suggests that Nietzsche's thought can in fact contribute to the reconfiguration of our concept of rationality recently urged by Habermas.In der Abhandlung wird in Abgrenzung zur psychologischen ein normative Interpretation von Nietzsches Auffassung von Macht und Willen, und folglich seiner Idee vom Willen zur Macht, vorgestellt, mit der zugleich Nietzsches Beziehung zum Denken der Aufklärung revidiert werden soll. Dazu wird zunächst Jürgen Habermas' verkürzte Deutung von Nietzsches Philosophie der Macht als eines Instruments der Gegenaufklärung mit Maudmarie Clarks Versuch konfrontiert, Nietzsches Philosophie ihres Machtaspektes zu berauben und ihn so in die Tradition der Aufklärung zu stellen. Es wird gezeigt, das beide Interpretationsversuch die nicht reduzierbar normative Basis von Nietzsches Begriff des Willens zur Macht ignorieren. Dagegen legt die normative Deutung nahe, dass Nietzsches Denken tatsächlich zur Rekonfiguration unseres Vernunftkonzeptes beitragen kann, wie sie jüngst von Habermas gefordet wurde. (shrink)

For many people "animal rights" suggests campaigns against factory farms, vivisection or other aspects of our woeful treatment of animals. Zoopolis moves beyond this familiar terrain, focusing not on what we must stop doing to animals, but on how we can establish positive and just relationships with different types of animals.

The orthodox monadic determination thesis holds that we represent colour relations by virtue of representing colours. Against this orthodoxy, I argue that it is possible to represent colour relations without representing any colours. I present a model of iconic perceptual content that allows for such primitive relational colour representation, and provide four empirical arguments in its support. I close by surveying alternative views of the relationship between monadic and relational colour representation.

While philosophers and scientists sometimes suggest (or take for granted) that consciousness is an essential condition for free will and moral responsibility, there is surprisingly little discussion of why consciousness (and what sorts of conscious experience) is important. We discuss some of the proposals that have been offered. We then discuss our studies using descriptions of humanoid robots to explore people’s attributions of free will and responsibility, of various kinds of conscious sensations and emotions, and of reasoning capacities, and examine (...) the relationships between these attributions. Our initial results suggest that people’s attributions of free will are strongly influenced by their attributions of conscious emotions, such as happiness and disappointment, including Strawsonian emotions, such as pride and regret. These results provide some support for an intriguing proposal: Free will requires the capacity to make decisions that really matter to the agent, and for anything to really matter to the agent, she must be able to consciously experience the good and bad effects of the decisions she makes—to suffer and regret, or to enjoy and feel proud of, their outcomes. (shrink)

This paper resolves a paradox concerning colour constancy. On the one hand, our intuitive, pre-theoretical concept holds that colour constancy involves invariance in the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in illumination. On the other, there is a robust scientific consensus that colour constancy can persist in cerebral achromatopsia, a profound impairment in the ability to perceive colours. The first stage of the solution advocates pluralism about our colour constancy capacities. The second details the close relationship between colour constancy (...) and contrast. The third argues that achromatopsics retain a basic type of colour constancy associated with invariants in contrast processing. The fourth suggests that one person-level, conscious upshot of such processing is the visual awareness of chromatic contrasts ‘at’ the edges of surfaces, implicating the ‘colour for form’ perceptual function. This primitive type of constancy sheds new light on our most basic perceptual capacities, which mark the lower borders of representational mind. (shrink)

This article critically evaluates current developments in marketing fair trade labelled products and "no sweat" manufactured goods, and argues that both the fair trade and ethical trade movements increasingly rely on strategies for bottom-up change, converting consumers "one cup at a time". This individualistic approach, which we call "shopping for a better world", must, we argue, be augmented by more collectivist approaches to affect transformative change. Specifically, we look at the concept of mission-driven organizations pursuing leadership roles in developing affinity (...) relationships to promote fair and ethical trade and developing ethical spaces. Increasingly, a range of organizations are restructuring their operations, so that their mission is reflected in ethical practices throughout their operations, including product sourcing and product sales. First, ethical purchasing policies operated by non-profits and public agencies represent markets through which fair/ethical products reach end consumers. The efforts discussed to create ethical spaces through direct democracy and electoral mandate build on a broad-based affinity with the principles of fair and ethical trade. Second, we explore the potential for "mission-driven" non-profit organiza- tions, such as zoos and aquaria for merging their mission of conservation education with their marketing activities through the operation of their shops and cafes. Interesting initiatives to link the conservation message to food choices is being undertaken by a number of zoos and aquaria, while there is scope for increased linkages in the giftware sold in their shops. (shrink)

The cell is not only the structural, physiological, and developmental unit of life, but also the reproductive one. So far, however, this aspect of the cell has received little attention from historians and philosophers of biology. I will argue that cell theory had far-reaching consequences for how biologists conceptualized the reproductive relationships between germs and adult organisms. Cell theory, as formulated by Theodor Schwann in 1839, implied that this relationship was a specific and lawful one, that is, that germs (...) of a certain kind, all else being equal, would produce adult organisms of the same kind, and vice versa. Questions of preformation and epigenesis took on a new meaning under this presupposition. The question then became one of whether cells could be considered as autonomous agents producing adult organisms of a given species, or whether they were the product of external, organizing forces and thus only a stage in the development of the whole organism. This question became an important issue for nineteenth-century biology. As I will demonstrate, it was the view of cells as autonomous agents which helped both Charles Darwin and Gregor Mendel to think of inheritance as a lawful process. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article reviews the current literature on the relationship of the Kyoto School philosopher Keiji Nishitani to Nietzsche's writings. In particular, I respond to Bret Davis's treatment of the relationship between the two thinkers in his 2011 article: “Nishitani after Nietzsche: From the Death of God to the Great Death of the Will.” Through recourse to Nishitani's treatment of Nietzsche in The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism as well as his later work Religion and Nothingness, I dispute the claim (...) that Nishitani's eventual dissatisfaction with Nietzsche's philosophy is based on a negative assessment of will to power. I then show that it is primarily on the issue of time rather than that of will that Nishitani ultimately takes issue with Nietzsche's mature philosophical standpoint. Finally, I outline a possible response to Nishitani's criticisms from the perspective of Nietzsche's thought. (shrink)

Many anthropological explanations of magical practices are based on the assumption that the immediate cause of performing an act of magic is the belief that the magic will work as claimed. Such explanations typically attempt to show why people come to believe that magical acts work as claimed when such acts do not identifiably have such effects. We suggest an alternative approach to the explanation of magic that views magic as a form of religious behavior, a form of communication that (...) promotes or protects cooperative social relationships. We suggest that all forms of religious behavior involve persons communicating acceptance of a supernatural claim and that this act communicates a willingness to accept nonskeptically the influence of the person making such a claim. Thus, religious behavior communicates a willingness to cooperate with the claim maker and others who accept his or her influence. We suggest that magic, which can be distinguished by the communicated acceptance of the claim that certain techniques have supernatural effects, also promotes cooperation. Different types of magic, including sorcery, love magic, and curing magic, can be shown to communicate different types of messages, such as a threat to use violence to punish unsocial behavior, sexual desire, or concern for a person's well-being. Ethnographic examples are used to support this hypothesis. This approach requires no assumptions about whether the practitioners of magic do or do not believe that the magical acts work as claimed. It attempts only to account for the identifiable talk and behavior that constitute magical acts by examining the identifiable, and often important, effects of these acts on the behavior of others. (shrink)

Noah Rosenberg et al.'s 2002 article “Genetic Structure of Human Populations” reported that multivariate genomic analysis of a large cell line panel yielded reproducible groupings (clusters) suggestive of individuals' geographical origins. The paper has been repeatedly cited as evidence that traditional notions of race have a biological basis, a claim its authors do not make. Critics of this misinterpretation have often suggested that it follows from interpreters' personal biases skewing the reception of an objective piece of scientific writing. I contend, (...) however, that the article itself to some degree facilitates this misrepresentation. I analyze in detail several verbal and visual features of the original article that may predispose aspects of its racial interpretation; and, tracing the arguments of one philosopher and one popular science writer, I show how these features are absorbed, transformed into arguments for a biological basis of race, and re-attributed to the original. The essay demonstrates how even slight ambiguities can enable the misappropriation of scientific writing, unintentionally undermining the authors' stated circumspection on the relationship between cluster and race. (shrink)

Several quantitative surveys have been conducted internationally to gather empirical information about physicians’ general attitudes towards health care rationing. Are physicians ready to accept and implement rationing, or are they rather reluctant? Do they prefer implicit bedside rationing that allows the physician–patient relationship broad leeway in individual decisions? Or do physicians prefer strategies that apply explicit criteria and rules?

The concept of free will is fraught with controversy, as readers of this volume likely know. Philosophers disagree about what free will is, whether we have it, what mitigates or destroys it, and what it's good for. Indeed, philosophers even disagree about how to fix the referent of the term 'free will' for purposes of describing and exploring these disagreements. What one person considers a reasonably neutral working definition of 'free will' is often considered question-begging or otherwise misguided by another. (...) Such disputes make it difficult to summarize the problem of free will, roughly the debate over the nature and existence of free will, in a clear and uncontentious way. In generic terms, however, the two basic solutions to the problem of free will are free-willism, the view that we have free will, and free-will denialism, i.e. the view that we do not have free will. As stated here, neither denialism nor free-willism constitutes a complete solution to the problem of free will; to be complete, a proposed solution must also tell us a convincing story about what free will is and that, as it turns out, is a very difficult task indeed. One historically popular way of approaching the problem of free will is to ask about the relationship between free will and determinism: "Does free will stand in relation R to determinism: yes or no?" This is just a template for a question, of course. To transform this template-question into a substantive question with a clear meaning, we need to flesh out the template's free-will relatum, its determinism relatum, and give a precise value to relation R. There is, however, no uncontroversial way to do this. In addition to the standard difficulties raised by fixing the referent of 'free will', philosophers hold radically different views about what is-or should be-meant by 'determinism', Shabo ), and they identify relations which are as substantively different as correlation and causation when characterizing relation R. In practical terms, then, it may be best to think of the problem of determinism as a loose collection of disagreements about how to best spell out and answer the template-question, and how asking and answering such questions would help us to solve the problem of free will. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with everyday data practices, considering how people record data produced through self-monitoring. The analysis unpacks the relationships between taking a measure, and making and reviewing records. The paper is based on an interview study with people who monitor their blood pressure and/or body mass index/weight. Animated by discussions of ‘data power’ which are, in part, predicated on the flow and aggregation of data, we aim to extend important work concerning the everyday constitution of digital data. In (...) the paper, we adopt and develop the idea of curation as a theory of attention. We introduce the idea of discerning work to characterise the skilful judgements people make about which readings they record, how readings are presented, and about the records they retain and those they discard. We suggest self-monitoring produces partial data, both in the sense that it embodies these judgements, and also because monitoring might be conducted intermittently. We also extend previous analyses by exploring the broad set of materials, digital and analogue, networked and not networked, involved in record keeping to consider the different ways these contributed to regulating attention to self-monitoring. By paying attention to which data is recorded and the occasions when data is not recorded, as well as the ways data is recorded, the research provides specificity to the different ways in which self-monitoring data may or may not flow or contribute to big data sets. We argue that ultimately our analysis contributes to nuancing our understanding of ‘data power’. (shrink)

I have on my desk an artifact of wonderful contrivance. Though its outer skin is of flimsy cardboard standing over half a foot high, it is squarely based, making it nearly untippable on shelves. It is a deodorant product called ban—a box containing a bottle containing a liquid. But this simple division of the artifact into three components gives no idea of the complex relationships sustained between part and part, or within each part taken separately.Study, first, the bottle. It emerges (...) from the box a tall and shapely miracle of ballast. It emerges from the box a tall and shapely miracle of ballast. Its most prominent feature, the revolving-ball applicator on top, is airy enough not to destabilize the three-and-one-half ounces of liquid in the bottle’s pyramidal base. It looks like one of those skirted Egyptian statues with no waist to speak of—bulbous of headdress or hairstyle above, firm-footed below, pinched in the middle.The box, despite artfully cutout windows, gives little suggestion of the Nefertiti-like interior. On the contrary: the box suggests that the bottle is bulkier than, unclothed, it turns out to be. Still, one could argue that the box is almost suicidally candid. It not only confesses but proclaims how much of the interior is taken up by the applicator . The upper window space on the bottle is intruded on by a semicircle of cardboard—the lower half of a full yellow circle boldly marked off from the green and white product colors that reign everywhere else. Inside the circle, wide letters boast: WIDE BALL. The circle is, in fact, exactly the size of the wide ball as seen in section, giving us what seems an almost geometrical regard for truth in advertising. The circle is repeated, at full size, on both ends of the box; but there it is white, with WIDE BALL printed in green. Why this emphasis on an empty ball, on the fact that one is being sold a great content of air? The ball is shrouded by a huge plastic cover, a screw-on cowl that gives the Egyptian figure its impressive headdress. Garry Wills, adjunct professor of history at Northwestern University, is the author of Reagan’s America . His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry was “Washington’s Citizen Virtue: Greenough and Houdon”. (shrink)

This paper responds to the debate between John Burbidge, Edward Halper, and William Maker about the nature of Hegel’s idealism, and in particular of the relationship between Hegel’s logic and Realphilosophie. I argue that Maker’s position is the one most consistent with both what Hegel says about philosophy and Hegel’s own philosophical practice. I begin by highlighting the essential differences that separate the three interpretations and then turn to Hegel’s texts, to identify the passages that pose difficulties for the (...) readings of Burbidge and Halper. I conclude by considering, and ultimately rejecting, the objections that Burbidge and Halper raise to Maker’s interpretation. (shrink)

Despite devoting their time to another person’s needs, many carers paradoxically experience guilt during their caregiving tenure concerning whether they are providing enough care. When discussing the “enough” of anything, what is at stake is that thing’s quantification. Given that there are seemingly no quantifiable units of care by which to measure the role, concerns regarding whether enough care is being provided often focus on what constitutes enough time as a carer. In exploring this aspect of the carer’s experience, two (...) key parameters emerge; guilt, and, quantified time. The guilt that carers report regarding whether they devote “enough time” to their caring responsibilities can be examined through Henri Bergson’s philosophical conception of quantification. By integrating contemporary analyses of carers’ guilt from the social sciences, most significantly via the sociology of Rebecca Olson, the relationship between quantified time and guilt becomes apparent. A quantified conception of time frames the assumption that spending more time on caregiving will reduce the amount of guilt felt by a carer. However, whilst care is structured according to quantified, clocked and calendared time, there are not comparable, quantifiable parameters for guilt. This means that suppositions of an inverse relationship between how much time one spends giving care, and how much guilt they will feel in terms of their caregiving, are problematic. These insights become relevant to health care policies via a coherence with calls to make the role of unpaid, caregiving, labour time more visible, and by explaining how understanding quantified time can help policies guide how caregivers negotiate guilt. (shrink)

The interview focuses on Kymlicka's major area of research, i.e., the issue of minority rights. Kymlicka explains why the rights of national minorities have been traditionally neglected in the Western political tradition. He argues that these rights promote individual freedom, and so should be seen as promoting liberal democratic principles. The interview covers many issues including the relationship between ethno‐cultural groups and other forms of “identity politics”; how to individuate cultural groups with legitimate claims to minority rights; whether something (...) like a “cosmopolitan view” can seriously challenge the need for minority rights; what are the dangers of building transnational political institutions such as the EU for democratic citizenship; what are the bases of social unity in multination states and what are the limits of toleration of illiberal minorities. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to understand if and how interactions with Sexual Robots will modify users’ relational abilities in human-human relations. We first underline that, in today’s scholar discussion on the ‘symbolic argument’, there is no theoretical framework explaining the process of symbolic shift between human-robot interactions (HRI) and human-human interactions (HHI). To clarify the symbolic shift mechanism, we propose the concept of objectual mediation. Moreover, under the lens of Winnicott’s object-relation theory, we argue that HRI can structurally (...) modify users relationality, degrading intersubjective abilities: Sexual Robots may blurry the limit between the ‘internal object’ and the external one. We conclude that, under certain conditions, interactions with Sexual Robots may bring the user back to an infantile object-relation setting, worsening the user ability to manage relational frustration. This will negatively impact on human-human interactions and social values in general. -/- . (shrink)

This paper depicts a case study of an organizational strategy for the promotion of ethical practice when introducing a new, high-risk, ethically-charged medical practice like Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD). We describe the development of an interprofessional program that enables the delivery of high-quality, whole-person MAiD care that is values-based and sustainable. A “care ecology” strategy recognizes the interconnected web of relationships and structures necessary to support a quality experience of MAiD for patients, families, and clinicians. This program exemplifies a (...) care ecology approach that addresses common barriers to entry to MAiD practice, and also meets the needs of a variety of stakeholders through the creation of patient and family resources, team supports, standards of practice, professional development opportunities, organizational infrastructure, and community partnerships. We also describe how a thriving care ecology evolves to remain resilient, and to enable integration as the needs of the organization, team and program change over time. The design and development of this program may be adapted to other jurisdictions and organizations where MAiD is introduced, or where new patient populations become eligible for MAiD. This care ecology model may also be applicable to the creation of sustainable programs that provide other morally controversial or novel clinical services. (shrink)

The ethics of belief involves an inquiry into what beliefs are legitimate to hold, including religious beliefs. Whatever the criteria determined in such an investigation, adopting a belief that does not meet this criterion is seen as illegitimate and it is considered an ethical violation. English mathematician W. K. Clifford (d. 1879) defines “sufficient evidence” as a criterion in his famous essay, “The Ethics of Belief”. Clifford’s evidence-centered argument becomes one of the most frequent references in the evidentialist objection against (...) theism. It turns out that this argument is not functional in the face of the diversity of beliefs. In this context, different suggestions are presented about what the ethics of belief could be. American philosopher William James (d. 1810), one of the founding names of pragmatism, offers a new proposal. In his classic work, “The Will to Believe”, James claims that Clifford is wrong in seeking the requirement of evidence for all beliefs. Because it is not possible to prove beliefs from the passionate nature of human beings, especially religious beliefs. Following this distinction, James proposes a new criterion for religious beliefs: a religious belief can be vivid or dead, forced or avoidable; and momentous or trivial. If a religious belief is vivid, forced, and momentous, it is necessary to have the courage to believe in it instead of suspending it. James' proposal is often valued as a strong counter-challenge or defense of religious beliefs. However, this argument also has aspects that are open to criticism. One of them is that the will to believe argument concurrently accepts conflicting religious beliefs or, in other words, confronts the issue of religious diversity. According to J. Hick, for example, this argument inevitably results in religious pluralism, even though James does not want to. Contrary to Hick, S. F. Aikin claims that the will to believe does not result in religious pluralism. According to Aikin, who draws attention to the relationship of argument with pragmatism, James obscures religious beliefs and removes them from being claims about truth. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the classical sense. So, which of the objections is valid? Does the will-to-believe argument result in religious pluralism by legitimizing more than one religious belief at the same time, or does it make a purely pragmatic proposition by devaluing religious beliefs? Which religion do I have the right to believe in according to the will to believe? The aim of this article is to provide an answer to the mentioned question. In the article, unlike the current evaluations, it is argued that the argument is closely related to James's theory of knowledge, radical empiricism, not pragmatism as it is usually made. For this purpose, after showing the relationship between the arguments of Clifford and James, the argument will be re-examined in this context and it will be revealed that James has two steps regarding religious beliefs: to make religious beliefs independent from factual beliefs; leaving theism to accept a monistic vision of God and basing religion on mystical experience, which is an emotional experience. As details emerge, it will become clear that James defends a natural religion that excludes traditional religions in his philosophical system and that he defends the beliefs of a humanized religion. With an individual definition of religion based on emotion, James on the one hand ensures the commonality of religious feeling, on the other hand, he makes religion independent from the field of facts. Therefore, with this study, it will be seen that the argument of the will to believe does not aim to legitimize believing in traditional religions, and diversity is not a fundamental problem. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to contribute towards a fuller critical understanding of gender relations/politics in mid-19th-century Spanish America. Its aim is to provide an account of the relationship Mexican President General Antonio López de Santa Anna established with his two wives. This study is particularly concerned with the representative value of Santa Anna's case in terms of 19th-century gender relations and the macho stereotype of the caudillo. Do Santa Anna's marital and extra-marital relationships confirm or question traditional (...) views on the position of women in Spanish America following the achievement of Independence? Do they conform with the ‘rock-star’ lifestyle generally attributed to the early 19th-century caudillo? A key aim of this study is to test the extent to which the relatively recent claim that women were more independent and influential than had been previously noted is borne out by case-studies of the women who shared their lives with the promiscuous six-times president Santa Anna. (shrink)

One lingering, unresolved dimension of intermediality theory is the status of mediality itself. Typically, the concept of intermediality is offered as a challenge to the idea that media exist as “isolated monads” ; the task of the analyst then becomes that of thinking through the variety of relationships between them. The risk is that this conception of intermediality may work to hypostatize media as particular kinds of objects. In this hypostatization, work on intermediality has sometimes diverged in important ways from (...) the ongoing development of ideas about mediality itself. Mediality is best seen, I would argue, not as a permanent and definitive property of objects or forms but as the occasional.. (shrink)

English summary: Sigmund Freud's atheism was a model for various movements critical of religion in the 20th century. This book places his claim of absoluteness under scrutiny. While in that time, religious-critical struggles led to decisive advances, while we live in a time of greater reflectiveness. The author presents a historical line of conflict, which is developed between faith and faithlessness, atheism and church, secular and religious thought. The author shows how Freud was enmeshed in his life and thought in (...) a very human way, and he describes how differently the sociologist Max Weber and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein shaped their relationships to religion and secularity in order to engage the reader to reflect on their own experiences and convictions in the conflict between modern rationality and enchanting religiosity. German description: Sigmund Freuds Atheismus wurde zum Vorbild vieler religionskritischer Bewegungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Dieses Buch stellt seinen Absolutheitsanspruch infrage. Wahrend seinerzeit religionskritische Kampfe zu entscheidenden Fortschritten gefuhrt haben, leben wir heute in einer Zeit grosserer Nachdenklichkeit. Der Autor stellt eine historische Konfliktlinie vor, die sich zwischen Glaube und Unglaube, Atheismus und Kirche, sakularem Denken und Religion entfaltet hat. Er zeigt, wie Freud in seinem Leben und Denken auf sehr menschliche Weise darin verstrickt ist, und schildert, wie andersartig der Soziologe Max Weber und der Philosoph Ludwig Wittgenstein ihr Verhaltnis zu Religion und Sakularitat gestalten. Er mochte die Leser anregen, ihre eigenen Erfahrungen und Uberzeugungen im Konfliktfeld zwischen moderner Rationalitat und verzaubernder Religiositat zu reflektieren. (shrink)

A central thinker on the question of the animal in continental thought, Élisabeth de Fontenay moves in this volume from Jacques Derrida’s uneasily intimate writing on animals to a passionate frontal engagement with political and ethical theory as it has been applied to animals—along with a stinging critique of the work of Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri as well as with other “utilitarian” philosophers of animal–human relations. Humans and animals are different from one another. To conflate them is to be (...) intellectually sentimental. And yet, from our position of dominance, do we not owe them more than we often acknowledge? In the searching first chapter on Derrida, she sets out “three levels of deconstruction” that are “testimony to the radicalization and shift of that philosopher’s argument: a strategy _through_ the animal, exposition to an animal or to this animal, and compassion _toward_ animals.” For Fontenay, Derrida’s writing is particularly far-reaching when it comes to thinking about animals, and she suggests many other possible philosophical resources including Adorno, Leibniz, and Merleau-Ponty. Fontenay is at her most compelling in describing philosophy’s ongoing indifference to animal life—shading into savagery, underpinned by denial—and how attempts to exclude the animal from ethical systems have in fact demeaned humanity. But Fontenay’s essays carry more than philosophical significance. _Without Offending Humans_ reveals a careful and emotionally sensitive thinker who explores the unfolding of humans’ assessments of their relationship to animals—and the consequences of these assessments for how we define ourselves. (shrink)

Mainstream educational theory and practice tend to favour what Freire, in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, has called ‘banking education’, in which students are seen as depositories of knowledge. But seeing pedagogy as a matter of simply communicating knowledge misses the epistemological complexities of our relationship with the world. By means of a reading of the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi, in this paper I intend to explore how the communication of not-knowing may be of central value in teaching (...) and learning. Arguing that our lives are characterised by an ‘epistemological chaos’ in which the distinctions between knowing and not-knowing can never be firmly established, I suggest that the Daoist texts may allow teachers and students to rethink the purpose of education as a matter of yang sheng, or ‘nourishing life, by means of developing skill in dealing with the epistemological chaos in which we are immersed. [China Media Research. 2014; 10: 10-19]. (shrink)

The telling of tales is always a troubling business, and the way in which we tell stories about ourselves and about others always involves a degree of ethical risk. Levinas, Storytelling and Anti-Storytelling explores the troubling nature of storytelling through a reading of the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas is a thinker who has a complex relationship with literature and with storytelling. At times, Levinas is a teller of powerful tales about ethics; at other times, on ethical grounds, he (...) disavows storytelling altogether. Levinas, Storytelling and Anti-Storytelling explores the tensions between philosophy and storytelling that run throughout Levinas's work. By asking about how Levinas tells and untells his stories, and by risking the telling of tales that Levinas himself does not dare to tell, this book opens up new ways of thinking about Levinas's ethics of responsibility. It may be, as Levinas often insists, that storytelling presents us with ethical dangers; but Levinas, Storytelling and Anti-Storytelling makes the case that an ethics of responsibility may demand that, whilst mindful of these dangers, we nevertheless continually seek out new stories to tell about ourselves, about others and about the world. (shrink)

Once we get past moral outrage, Aristotle’s notorious discussion of slavery has several ever more disquieting challenges to modern thinking. Not only are slaves in a certain sense “natural,” but so is the master/slave relationship and so is mastery. While he thinks that living the right kind of state and having the right kind of character is a permanent solution to problems of slavishness, problems of mastery, of the despotic cast of mind, are permanent political problems, since the desire (...) to dominate others has the same psychic source as the desire for friendship and for political reciprocity. (shrink)

An essay about hypochondria, past and present. Beginning with the observation that for centuries hypochondria has been blamed upon various forms of reading, I attempt to take seriously this venerable relationship between hypochondria and literature. By bracketing the medical and moral concerns that encumber most treatments of hypochondria, I instead seek to understand the condition as a method of reading, a close textual engagement that is at once anxious and oddly clear-sighted about its own limits, and which bears some (...) similarities to other, more familiar hermeneutic methods such as paranoid reading and ‘too-close reading’. In the second half of the essay, I draw upon the lives and writings of Maurice Blanchot and Franz Kafka, two writers who were themselves plagued by mysterious and unexplained symptoms, and attempt to show how the imperatives of literature as understood by each writer could meaningfully be described as hypochondriacal. Above all, then, this essay looks more closely at a figure whom it is difficult to take seriously, and asks whether, viewed from a certain angle, the hypochondriac might in fact be said to be endowed with a perspicuous if discomfiting form of insight. (shrink)

Phenomenologists have always been concerned with the relationships between their methods and the life that sustains and instructs them, and which are, in turn, instructed by it. In its most general form, it is a question of relationships between philosophy and non-philosophy. Maurice Merleau-Ponty conceives of these connections in terms of a reversible inside-outside dynamic from at least Phenomenology of Perception to his unpublished manuscripts. No philosopher better illustrates this dialectic of life and ideas than Michel de Montaigne, whose life (...) and work are the subject of “Reading Montaigne” in Signs. This paper consists of a critical analysis of that essay, and thus forms a meta-inside/outside relationship in reading Merleau-Ponty reading his predecessor. The essay examines, among other things, how Montaigne’s writing provides an instructive example of the intertwining of life and ideas as Merleau-Ponty understood it as well as a puzzle about why he did not connect “Reading Montaigne” with the two chapters of Signs that concern language. (shrink)

As unstintingly irreligious as he was, Karl Marx was not an atheist. He was a staunch opponent of supernatural belief, yet neither did he embrace agnosticism as the position of claiming no answer to the question whether or not God exists. Rather, Marx argued that it was incoherent and pointless even to pose that very question. His irreligion is best understood not primarily as an ontological stance on the existence or nonexistence of God, but rather as part and parcel of (...) a philosophical worldview radically committed to sweeping such questions aside, to centering the human perspective ontologically and epistemologically, to overthrowing “all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being,” and to taking as its core principle that “man is the highest being for man.” A “religious worldview” for Marx includes not only the plainly divine, but any perspective that subordinates the value of human beings to a superior entity, operating externally to human beings and imperviously to their influence. I begin by explaining the relationship between Marx's historical materialism and his position on the existence of God. It may seem obvious how irreligion would follow from a philosophical materialist stance. I show that Marx's historical materialist irreligion, however, warrants a closer and more nuanced assessment than we might at first realize. I go on to discuss why Marx's historical materialism leads him to regard questions about the existence of God as fundamentally misguided. I then unpack the meanings of Marx's infamous statement that religion is “the opium of the people.” I conclude with a discussion of Marx's pronouncement that “the criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man,” a teaching that separates mere atheism from radical irreligion. (shrink)

I examine Nietzsche's concept of a nihilism of strength\nand the relationship in which it stands to the kind of\nvital self-assertion that he admired in archaic\naristocracies. What is new in Nietzsche's nihilism of\nstrength is a self-awareness that was lacking in the past\nand that would enable a fully autonomous human being to\nrecognize the "being" he imposes on "becoming" as the\nexpression of his own will to power. I show that this idea\nleads to serious incoherencies in Nietzsche's account of\nthis new kind of strength (...) and undermines any possible\nauthority that such volitional enactments might have for\nother people. (shrink)

Jason Wirth aims to resurrect interest in Schelling's philosophy in order to effect a transformation of our relationship to nature. Wirth believes that we do violence to nature because we mistakenly understand it mechanistically. He would thus like to overcome the mechanistic conception of nature in the hopes that this will transform our instrumental violence into a love of all beings. His book is intended to contribute to this revolution by offering "eight meditations on different ways of entering into (...) the thinking of Schelling". (shrink)

The Routledge Companion to Performance Philosophy is a volume of especially commissioned critical essays, conversations, collaborative, creative and performative writing mapping the key contexts, debates, methods, discourses and practices in this developing field. Firstly, the collection offers new insights on the fundamental question of how thinking happens: where, when, how and by whom philosophy is performed. Secondly, it provides a plurality of new accounts of performance and performativity as the production of ideas, bodies and knowledges in the arts and beyond. (...) Comprising texts written by international artists, philosophers and scholars from multiple disciplines, the essays engage with questions of how performance thinks and how thought is performed in a wide range of philosophies and performances, from the ancient to the contemporary. Concepts and practices from diverse geographical regions and cultural traditions are analysed to draw conclusions about how performance operates across art, philosophy and everyday life. The collection both contributes to and critiques the philosophy of music, dance, theatre and performance, exploring the idea of a philosophy from the arts. It is crucial reading material for those interested in the hierarchy of the relationship between philosophy and the arts, advancing debates on philosophical method, and the relation between Performance and Philosophy more broadly. (shrink)

Accountability means accepting responsibility for your actions and repairing any harm you have done. This workbook can be used by anyone who is ready to do the work to change toxic behaviors and patterns, from quitting smoking to atoning for abuse or crimes. At its heart, accountability is understanding that your actions do not always have the impact that you intend. Sometimes this is as simple as getting to know yourself and apologizing. Sometimes it's a years-long process to recognize the (...) motivations and behaviors that you see inside yourself and feel like you have no control over. Ultimately, accountability is something we each must choose for ourselves; nobody else can do it for us. The results can be unexpected and transformative, and improve your friendships, relationships, work, and community; most of all it's about coming to peace with yourself. The authors share tough lessons learned through many years of personal and professional experience. This workbook will walk you through your own head to understand your own patterns and behaviors, untangle them, and live the kind of life you want. (shrink)

A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, I will (...) explore the link between mental disorder and free will. I examine two domains in which a connection between mental disorder and free will is present: the philosophy of free will and forensic psychiatry. As it turns out, philosophers of free will frequently refer to mental disorders as conditions that compromise free will and reduce moral responsibility. In addition, in forensic psychiatry, the rationale for the assessment of criminal responsibility is often explained by referring to the fact that mental disorders can compromise free will. Yet, in both domains, it remains unclear in what way free will is compromised by mental disorders. Based on the philosophical debate, I discuss three senses of free will and explore their relevance to mental disorders. I conclude that in order to further clarify the relationship between free will and mental disorder, the accounts of people who have actually experienced the impact of a mental disorder should be included in future research. (shrink)

Considering the enormous diversity of living organisms, representing mostly untapped resources for studying ecological, ontogenetic and phylogenetic patterns and processes, why should evolutionary biologists concern themselves with the remains of animals and plants that died out tens or even hundreds of millions of years ago? The reason is that important new insights into some of the most vexing evolutionary questions are being revealed at the interfaces of palaeontology, developmental biology and molecular biology. Attempts to synthesise information from these disciplines, however, (...) often encounter their greatest hurdles in considerations of the radiation of the Metazoa. Ongoing challenges relate to the origins of body plans, the relationships of the metazoan phyla and the timing of major evolutionary radiations. Palaeontology not only has its own unique contributions to the study of evolutionary processes, but provides a lynchpin for many of the emerging techniques. BioEssays 22:1142–1152, 2000. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)