It is often claimed that liberalism is falsely and perniciously universalist. I take this charge seriously, exploring three positions: the communitarians’, Rorty’s, and that of “comprehensive” liberalism. After explaining why universalism is thought impossible, I examine the communitarian view that value is determined within communities and argue that it results in a form of relativism that is unacceptable. I next discuss Richard Rorty’s liberal acceptance of “conventionalism” and explain how, despite his rejection of universalism, Rorty remains a liberal. I then (...) present a defense of universalism, based in part on arguments that parallel Thomas Nagel’s arguments in defense of a “view from nowhere” and Jean Hampton’s objectivist arguments against Rawls’s moves to a “merely political” theory. That defense requires that we can distance ourselves from our ends to make moral judgments shorn of all partialities. (shrink)

Is a policy of economic growth compatible with the neutrality of the State? Some liberals (Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman, Larmore, Kymlicka) think so. I do not. I begin by explaining and discussing the different meanings of the neutrality thesis, then I show that, whatever meaning we give to the idea of neutrality, it is very difficult to argue convincingly that a policy of economic growth does not favour some conceptions of the good.

Dans les premières années qui ont suivi la parution de son monumentalA Theory of Justice, Rawls s'est surtout employé dans quelques articles à répondre à ses critiques, à dissiper les malentendus ainsi qu'à expliciter certains aspects de sa théorie, sans proposer de changements significatifs. À partir de la publication desDewey Lectures, sous la pression des critiques ou suivant le cours naturel de sa réflexion, Rawls a graduellement procéde à d'importantes révisions. Presque essentiellement préoccupé par la signification et la justification de (...) sa théorie, et laissant à peu prés intacts sa structure et son contenu, Rawls a successivement élaboré une conception de la personne et de la société, développé une méthodologie contextualiste et constructiviste, limité considérablement la portée de sa théorie et finalement, pour encadrer le tout, proposé une interprétation politique de la «justice en tant qu'équité». Ces changements, que d'aucuns ont perçus comme un recul ou comme un important virage, n'ont pas toujours été, selon Rawls, bien compris. Dans son dernier ouvrage,Political Liberalism, qui, est-il besoin de le dire? était depuis longtemps attendu, Rawls rassemble et raffine ses nouvelles idées, les présente de façon systématique et, somme toute, convaincante. (shrink)

Every instructor who teaches media ethics faces the challenge of balancing theory and practice i n the classroom. A typical approach involves training students i n theories of ethical deliberation applied to moral dilemmas presented i n case studies and decision-making exercises. This article callsfor more philosophical inquiry into the basic assumptions of media ethics. Based on a writing assignment that asked students to ponder a philosophical paradox, this article not only tackles the paradox involving ethical competence, but discusses how (...) such speculations can lead tofundamental understanding of what it means to be a professional journalist. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Self-authorship has been established as the basis of an influential liberal principle of legislation and public policy. Being the author of one’s own life is a significant component of one’s own well-being, and therefore is better understood from the viewpoint of the person whose life it is. However, most philosophical accounts, including Raz’s conception of self-authorship, rely on general and abstract principles rather than specific, individual psychological properties of the person whose life it is. We elaborate on the principles of (...) self-authorship on the basis of self-determination theory, an empirically based psychological theory that has been at the forefront of the study of autonomy and self-authorship for more than 45 years. Our account transcends distinctions between positive and negative freedom and attempts to pinpoint the exact properties of self-authorship within the psychological processes of intrinsic motivation and internalization. If a primary objective of public policy is to support self-authorship, then it should be devised on the basis of how intrinsic motivation and internalization can be properly supported. Self-determination theory identifies three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The satisfaction of these needs is associated with the support and growth of intrinsic tendencies and the advancement of well-being. Through this analysis, we can properly evaluate the significance of rationality, basic goods, and the availability of options to self-authorship. Implications for law and policy are discussed with an emphasis on legal paternalism and what many theorists call “liberal perfectionism,” that is, the non-coercive support and promotion of the good life. (shrink)

The article focuses on the definition of constitutional conflicts as moral dilemmas. It discusses the conception of tragic conflicts by which “loss” is a distinctive feature that identifies both moral and constitutional dilemmas. It also asserts the peculiarity of constitutional conflicts vis-à-vis moral dilemmas, as well as the possibility of legal solutions to constitutional conflicts.

In What's the Matter with Liberalism? Ronald Beiner diagnoses the ills of liberalism along the three broad fronts where it is now widely challenged: its pretensions to moral neutrality; its lack of cultural standards; and its inability to deal with crime, unemployment, family breakdown, homeless‐ness, rampant consumerism, and global environmental and economic problems. But even in its minimalist classical formulation, liberalism entails a substantive moral position, and is committed to resisting the violations of rights that lead to the crises with (...) which Beiner is concerned. (shrink)

In Bioethics and Secular Humanism: The Search for a Common Morality, Tristram Engelhardt examines various possibilities of finding common ground for moral discourse among people from different traditions and concludes their futility. In this paper I will argue that many of the assumptions on which Engelhardt bases his conclusion about the impossibility of a content-full secular bioethics are problematic. By starting with the notion of moral strangers, there is no possibility, by definition, for a content-full moral discourse among moral strangers. (...) It means that there is circularity in starting the inquiry with a definition of moral strangers, which implies that they do not share enough moral background or commitment to an authority to allow for reaching a moral agreement, and concluding that content-full morality is impossible among moral strangers. I argue that assuming traditions as solid and immutable structures that insulate people across their boundaries is problematic. Another questionable assumption in Engelhardt’s work is the idea that religious and philosophical traditions provide content-full moralities. As the cardinal assumption in Engelhardt’s review of the various alternatives for a content-full moral discourse among moral strangers, I analyze his foundationalist account of moral reasoning and knowledge and indicate the possibility of other ways of moral knowledge, besides the foundationalist one. Then, I examine Engelhardt’s view concerning the futility of attempts at justifying a content-full secular bioethics, and indicate how the assumptions have shaped Engelhardt’s critique of the alternatives for the possibility of content-full secular bioethics. (shrink)

(2000). Human rights and diverse cultures: Continuity or discontinuity? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 3, Human Rights and Global Diversity, pp. 27-50.

This paper interprets Bernard Williams's claim that all practical reasons must meet the internal reasons constraint. It is argued that this constraint is independent of any substantive Humean claims about reasons and its rationale is a content scepticism about the capacity of pure reason to supply reasons for action. The final sections attempt a positive reconciliation of the internal reasons account with the motivation for external reasons, namely, securing practical objecitivy in the form of a commitment to impartiality. Impartiality is (...) given a contractualist interpretation in the limited sense that socialised agents have a central disposition to hold those reasons that are defensible to reasonable interlocutors, but this is not a substantive constraint on their content. Such a commitment plays a structural role in motivation illustrated by the analogy of the internalisation of a relativised a priori principle. Theorists of moral motivation such as Nagel and Scheffler have uncovered the importance of such structural motivations, but they are best treated as an architectonic feature of a socialised agent's motivational set, not as a principle or motive akin to other principles or motives within that set. This gives us critical leverage on the motivational sets of individuals that goes beyond launching "optimistic internal reasons" statements at them, but it does not violate Williams's constraints on the idea of a practical reason in general. (shrink)

There has been considerable recent discussion of the social effects of “liberalism,” which are said to include a growth in out-of-wedlock childbirth, repudiation of traditions, a rise in populism, increased reliance on technocracy, inequality, environmental degradation, sexual promiscuity, deterioration of civic associations, a diminution of civic virtue, political correctness on university campuses, and a general sense of alienation. There is good reason for skepticism about these claims. Liberalism is not a person, and it is not an agent in history. Claims (...) about the supposedly adverse social effects of liberalism are best taken not as causal claims at all, but as normative objections that should be defended on their merits. These propositions are elaborated with reference to three subordinate propositions: liberalism, as such, does not lack the resources to defend traditions; liberalism, as such, hardly rejects the idea of “constraint,” though the domains in which liberals accept constraints differ from those of antiliberals, and vary over time; liberalism, as such, does not dishonor the idea of “honor.” There is a general point here about the difficulty of demonstrating, and the potential recklessness of claiming, that one or another “ism” is causally associated with concrete social developments. (shrink)

The justification debate has always been a major issue within philosophy of education. In this study Wittgensteinian interpretation of this matter is offered. It is argued that in using his framework justification itself has to be thought of differently, i.e. as making explicit the bedrock of the form of life the educator finds him or herself in. But Wittgenstein's insights highlight too the particularity of the ethical and therefore also of the educational situation. The paper argues that educators cannot but (...) take a stance, cannot but act in accordance with what appeals to them in the midst of the irreconcilable desires of others. It is therefore considered that the demand for particularity reveals itself here as a demand for authenticity. (shrink)

The justification debate has always been a major issue within philosophy of education. In this study Wittgensteinian interpretation of this matter is offered. It is argued that in using his framework justification itself has to be thought of differently, i.e. as making explicit the bedrock of the form of life the educator finds him or herself in. But Wittgenstein’s insights highlight too the particularity of the ethical and therefore also of the educational situation. The paper argues that educators cannot but (...) take a stance, cannot but act in accordance with what appeals to them in the midst of the irreconcilable desires of others. It is therefore considered that the demand for particularity reveals itself here as a demand for authenticity. (shrink)

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense – thus meeting the demands of universalism – but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations – thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here are (...) those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

RÉSUMÉ: Plusieurs libéraux modernes soutiennent que le pluralisme des valeurs a d’importantes conséquences pour l’élaboration des procédures et des institutions politiques. Mais les arguments fondés sur l’incommensurabilité et sur l’indétermination de la rationalité ou de la délibération se révèlent tous compatibles avec le monisme; et certaines formes de pluralisme sont compatibles soit avec une hiérarchisation des valeurs soit avec une hiérarchisation méta-éthique de certains types de concepts normatifs. En outre le «pluralisme» en tant que thèse métaphysique concernant les valeurs est (...) souvent confondu avec la thèse descriptive qu’il existe une pluralité de conceptions du bien dans les sociétés modernes, qui, elle, fournit la véritable justification du libéralisme dans l’organisation politique. Or cette forme de pluralisme est également compatible avec le monisme des valeurs. Le libéral pluraliste se trouve ainsi confronté à un dilemme: soit certaines valeurs sont d’importance prioritaire pour la justification de l’organisation politique, soit les conséquences du pluralisme des valeurs en pareil domaine sont indéterminées. (shrink)

R. M. Hare has argued for and defended a ‘two-level’, view of moral agency. He argues that moral agents ought to rely on the rules of ‘intuitive moral thinking’ for their ‘everyday’ moral judgments. When these rules conflict or when we do not have a rule at hand, we ought to ascend to the act-utilitarian,‘critical’ level of moral thinking. I argue that since the rules at the intuitive level of moral thinking necessarily conflict much more often than Hare supposes, and (...) since we often do not have ready-made rules for our moral judgments, we must necessarily use critical moral thinking very frequently. However, act-utilitarian judgements at this level will sharply conflict with our strongly held ‘intuitive’ moral convictions. I show that Hare's attempt to balance these two aspects of moral judgment requires us to simultaneously adopt two conflicting sets of moral standards, and thus an attempt to inculcate such standards constitutes a ‘schizophrenic’ moral education. Finally, I briefly outline an alternative conception of moral education, based on Aristotelian phronesis. (shrink)

The ethics of bioculture deals with moral questions raised by the cultivation and farming of living things. P. W. Taylor believes that they have an inherent worth just like animals and wild plants. Therefore, judgment about how they should be treated cannot be limited to the principle of greater efficiency for the benefit of humans. Taylor developed a comprehensive theory that is founded on the symmetry between human and environmental ethics. He believes that every living thing is teleologically oriented and (...) a member of the earth's biotic community. A systemic and hologrammatic approach is the alternative to Taylor's ethics of bioculture. Each component of an ecosystem characterised by contingency, plays a role in co-evolution. Therefore, as moral agents, we must take historical responsibility for domesticating and employing other living things, and we should reconsider the emerging model of economic development and define criteria of ethical sustainability for bioculture companies. Such an ethics of bioculture can contribute to oriented decision-making to ensure that an increase in well-being for all living things is an economically and environmentally sustainable and political perspective. (shrink)

(Winner of The Res Publica Essay Prize) This article defends a moderate version of state perfectionism by using Gerald Gaus’s argument for liberal neutrality as a starting point of discussion. Many liberal neutralists reject perfectionism on the grounds of respect for persons, but Gaus has explained more clearly than most neutralists how respect for persons justifies neutrality. Against neutralists, I first argue that the state may promote the good life by appealing to what can be called “the qualified judgments about (...) the good life,” which have not been considered by liberal perfectionists including Joseph Chan and Steven Wall. Then I clear up several possible misunderstandings of these judgments, and argue that: (a) moderate perfectionism does not rely on controversial rankings of values and is committed to promoting different valuable ways of life by pluralistic promotion; and (b) moderate perfectionism requires only an indirect form of coercion in using tax money to support certain moderate perfectionist measures, which is justifiable on the grounds of citizens’ welfare. Thus, I maintain that moderate perfectionism does not disrespect citizens, and is not necessarily unfair to any particular group of people. It is, in fact, plausible and morally important. The defence of moderate perfectionism has practical implications for the state’s policies regarding art development, drug abuse, public education, and so on. (shrink)

Learning to address moral dilemmas is important for participants on courses in business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). While modern, rule-based ethical theory often provides the normative input here, this has faced criticism in its application. In response, post-modern and Aristotelian perspectives have found favour. This paper follows a similar line, presenting an approach based initially on a critical interpretation of Ross's theory of prima facie duties, which emphasises moral judgement in actual situations. However, the retention of a modern (...) element is suggested, with an invitation to hypothetically universalise detailed proposals for action, following Hare. This further step may reassure students/managers who seek additional closure in their decision-making. Some pedagogical implications are also briefly raised regarding the use of case material and the need to recognise questions of social interaction and personal character as features of dilemma resolution in actual organisational contexts. (shrink)

Hayek's argument that social justice is a mirage consists of six claims: that the very idea of social justice is meaningless, religious, self‐contradictory, and ideological; that realizing any degree of social justice is unfeasible; and that aiming to do so must destroy all liberty. These claims are examined in the light of contemporary theories and debates concerning social justice in order to assess whether the argument's persuasive power is due to sound reasoning, and to what extent contemporary theories of justice (...) meet or escape the Hayekian challenge. (shrink)

This paper examines whether or not children’s continued electoral exclusion is morally defensible. Ultimately; there is a deep tension between the egalitarian presuppositions of democracy and our apparent unwillingness to grant children voting rights. Unless a plausible distinction can be found; then; between adults and children that also tracks the underlying reasons for endorsing democracy in the first place; the continued political disenfranchisement of our youngest citizens is shown for what it is: social injustice. e paper begins by exploring some (...) of the conceptual difficulties that childhood creates in relation to democracy. It then assesses the implications of two very different approaches to democracy for children’s voting rights: proceduralism and a child’s supposed right to an open future. (shrink)

But with the member of a Nonconforming or self-made religious community, how different! The sectary's eigene grosse Erfindungen, as Goethe calls them,—the precious discoveries of himself and his friends for expressing the inexpressible and defining the undefinable in peculiar forms of their own,—cannot but, as he has voluntarily chosen them and is personally responsible for them, fill his whole mind. He is zealous to do battle for them and affirm them; for in affirming them, he affirms himself, and that is (...) what we all like. Matthew Arnold. (shrink)

The justification for advance directives is grounded in the notion that they extend patient autonomy into future states of incompetency through patient participation in decision making about end-of-life care. Four objections challenge the necessity and sufficiency of individual autonomy, perceived to be a defining feature of liberal philosophical theory, as a basis of advance care planning. These objections are that the liberal concept of autonomy (i) implies a misconception of the individual self, (ii) entails the denial of values of social (...) justice, (iii) does not account for justifiable acts of paternalism, and (iv) does not account for the importance of personal relationships in the advance care planning process. The last objection is especially pertinent in light of recent empirical research highlighting the importance of personal relationships in advance care planning. This article examines these four objections to autonomy, and the liberal theoretical framework with which it is associated, in order to re-evaluate the philosophical basis of advance care planning. We argue that liberal autonomy (i) is not a misconceived concept as critics assume, (ii) does not entail the denial of values of social justice, (iii) can account for justifiable acts of paternalism, though it (iv) is not the best account of the value of personal relationships that arise in advance care planning. In conclusion, we suggest that liberalism is a necessary component of a theoretical framework for advance care planning but that it needs to be supplemented with theories that focus explicitly on the significance of personal relationships. (shrink)

The article considers whether tolerance, in the classical liberal sense, should be promoted in public education. The most substantial counter-argument is that it is problematic to uphold the ?objection condition,? explained below, which is an integral part of classical tolerance, while maintaining tolerance as a virtue. As a response to this, I first discuss an alternative interpretation of tolerance ? ?tolerance as being open-minded, unprejudiced and positive towards difference.? I contend that this understanding is not the preferable one in public (...) education, because it lacks sufficient distinctiveness and threatens to marginalize or exclude the classical concept of tolerance. I instead propose a modified version of classical tolerance to be promoted in public education, whereby permissible objections are restricted so as not to disrespect persons. This version allows, however, for pupils to have a wide range of objections while still being candidates for being called tolerant, with the result that promoting tolerance may clash with other important educational objectives. I argue that promoting tolerance is still needed as part of a robust educational approach to plurality in modern democratic states, but that we must be willing to accept that promoting tolerance sometimes assumes the place of a second-best educational alternative. (shrink)

A number of ethical frameworks have been proposed to support decision-making in public health and the evaluation of public health policy and practice. This is encouraging, since ethical considerations are of paramount importance in health policy. However, these frameworks have various deficiencies, in part because they incorporate substantial ethical positions. In this article, we discuss and criticise a framework developed by James Childress and Ruth Bernheim, which we consider to be the state of the art in the field. Their framework (...) distinguishes aims, such as the promotion of public health, from constraints on the pursuit of those aims, such as the requirement to avoid limitations to liberty, or the requirement to be impartial. We show how this structure creates both theoretical and practical problems. We then go on to present and defend a more practical framework, one that is neutral in avoiding precommitment to particular values and how they ought to be weighted. We believe ethics is at the very heart of such weightings and our framework is developed to reflect this belief. It is therefore both pluralist and value-based. We compare our new framework to Childress and Bernheim’s and outline its advantages. It is justified by its impetus to consider a wide range of alternatives and its tendency to direct decisions towards the best alternatives, as well as by the information provided by the ranking of alternatives and transparent explication of the judgements that motivate this ranking. The new framework presented should be useful to decision-makers in public health, as well as being a means to stimulate further reflection on the role of ethics in public health. (shrink)

This paper proposes a Wittgenstein-inspired critique of the prism of translation that frames the recent literature about the debate between Rawls and Habermas on the role of religious reasons in the public sphere. This debate originates with the introduction of Rawls’s proviso in his conception of the public use of reason, 765-807, 1997), which consists in the “translation” of religious reasons into secular ones, which he thinks is necessary in order for religious reasons to be legitimate in the public sphere. (...) Even though Wittgenstein is not himself concerned with religious pluralism as a political issue, there are numerous scholars who have discussed the political implications of his remarks, 691–715, 2007; Moore Philosophy and Social Criticism, 36, 1113-1136 2010; Pohlhaus and Wright Political Theory, 30, 800–27, 2002). The thesis of this paper is that the interpretation proposed by Cora Diamond in regards to ethical and religious questions turns out to be a suitable way out of the “translation requirement”. According to this solution, if there is to be an understanding between secular and religious citizens on the basis of religious reasons, it should not rely on a “translation” but rather on mutual self-representation. (shrink)

The two leading traditions of theorizing about democratic legitimacy are liberalism and deliberative democracy. Liberals typically claim that legitimacy consists in the consent of the governed, while deliberative democrats typically claim that legitimacy consists in the soundness of political procedures. Despite this difference, both traditions see the need for legitimacy as arising from the coercive enforcement of law and regard legitimacy as necessary for law to have normative authority. While I endorse the broad aims of these two traditions, I believe (...) they both misunderstand the nature of legitimacy. In this essay I argue that the legitimacy of a law is neither necessary nor sufficient for its normative authority, and I argue further that the need for legitimacy in law arises regardless of whether the law is coercively enforced. I thus articulate a new understanding of the legitimacy and authority of law. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a distinctive epistemic rationale for the liberal practice of constant and ostentatious reason-giving in the political context. Epistemic trust is essential to democratic governance because as citizens we can only make informed decisions by relying on the claims of moral, scientific, and practical authorities around us. Yet rational epistemic trust is also uniquely fragile in the political context in light of both the radical inclusiveness of the relevant epistemic community (i.e., everyone who participates in the (...) political process) and the conflicting interests bound up in policy debate. I argue that liberal justification is a necessary condition for warranted epistemic trust in this context, and therefore a necessary condition for healthy public inquiry about politically significant questions. (shrink)

One of the most pressing dilemmas of the moment concerns pluralism and the issue of justification: how does one defend a commitment to any particular position? The fear is that pluralism undercuts our ability to justify our moral and political views, and thereby leads to relativism. As I argue here, Isaiah Berlin provides an exemplary argument concerning the ties between pluralism and liberalism. Although Berlin admits there is no logical link between pluralism and liberalism, he nevertheless highlights plausible ties between (...) pluralism and the fields of philosophy, history and politics, all of which provide good reasons for him to endorse liberalism. Moreover, these arguments indicate how pluralism differs from relativism, so that pluralists such as Berlin are not guilty of the charge of moral subjectivism. A reconsideration of Berlin's position thus provides insight into the problem of justification in a pluralist condition, one that illuminates certain features of pluralism, as well as exemplifies its compatibility with liberalism. (shrink)

This paper attempts to account for the peculiarly ‘otherworldly’ character of much contemporary management critique. It does so rather circuitously by focusing upon elements of the work of a moral philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre's comments about the ‘character’ of the ‘manager’ have commanded considerable support within critical organizational and management studies and have been regularly cited by critical intellectuals, keen to unmask an ethical and emotional vacuum at the heart of contemporary management practice. In what follows, I attempt to show (...) that the prestige and status accorded to MacIntyre's critique of the manager within organizational and management studies is directly proportional to its abstraction from the institutional realities of managing. In particular, I focus upon the ways in which MacIntyre attempts to hold the character of the manager accountable to a particular ideal of the person, one that derives many of its characteristics from Christian theology. (shrink)

This article outlines the basic tenets of political liberalism, a recent twist in liberal theories of justice, and distinguishes a ?sufficiency? approach from its more ?egalitarian? rivals. The article argues that a ?sufficiency? principle as the basis for distributing social and material goods, is a logical extension of the commitment to a democratic ideal, one that is required to give substance to political rights guaranteed to all citizens as free and equal members of society. To illustrate the attractiveness of this (...) approach, the paper illustrates how political liberalism offers a compelling way of characterising and interpreting the new South African constitution. As a pluralist society which has until recently been ruled by an unjust regime, political liberalism in general, and the ?sufficiency? version in particular, would offer an effective and inclusive way of addressing what ought to be the paramount concern for all citizens: namely, how to prevent the state's coercive powers from being used by one sectarian group to dominate and repress other groups. (shrink)

This paper challenges one of the main contributions of Political Liberalism (PL), namely the burdens of judgment (BoJ), on the grounds that it is superfluous to the project of excluding matters of the good from politics and it makes PL susceptible to a scepticism objection. From Rawls’s PL, we can extract two arguments for epistemic restraint in the public realm. The first is a moral argument based on the principles of fairness and reciprocity. The second is an epistemic argument derived (...) from the idea of the insurmountability of BoJ. The second of these arguments, I contend, is superfluous for two reasons: (i) BoJ, as a descriptive claim cannot itself explain why citizens should uphold a form of toleration that requires them to honor their epistemic restraint in politics. (ii) The moral argument alone is sufficient to justify epistemic constraint in the public realm through the reasonable exercise of political power. -/- Moreover, acceptance of the BoJ is incompatible with subscribing to a reasonable comprehensive doctrine (RCD) with a degree of certainty that is required to be convinced of any such doctrine. The relation between BoJ and scepticism has been addressed before but these thinkers assume that it is the implication of BoJ namely, reasonable disagreement that entails scepticism. This paper lays new sceptical challenges at the doorstep of PL and these new challenges focus on the very idea of the insurmountability of BoJ. Furthermore, it argues that scepticism is not an appropriate epistemic commitment for PL as it is incompatible with the aim of freestanding political conception of justice. Also, it is subversive of the purpose of an overlapping consensus because the idea underpinning an overlapping consensus is that citizens should not only appreciate liberal political principles as reasonable but they should also accept them as true on the basis of their own religious or philosophical reasons. Provided that BoJ entails scepticism, BoJ makes citizens’ religious and philosophical truth claims utterly irrelevant to the stability of society. Accordingly, I argue that the Rawlsian account of reasonableness must relinquish the epistemic component, BoJ; instead it should articulate how the moral component of reasonableness entails the principles of epistemic restraint in politics and acting from public reasons. (shrink)

With the 1985 publication of "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", John Rawls ushered in a new era in political philosophy. In JAF Rawls provided the first detailed articulation of his conception of "political liberalism"—a concept and a term that would soon thereafter become familiar features of contemporary political theory. In the wake of this development, theorists did more than simply analyse Rawls’ provocative, new propositions; a few also began to develop and articulate their own conceptions of political liberalism. One (...) such individual was Charles Larmore. Of those theorists who have joined Rawls in his effort to develop and promote the concept of political liberalism, none has been more dedicated to the endeavour than Larmore. Beginning most notably with his Patterns of Moral Complexity and continuing through to his 1999 article entitled "The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism," Larmore has sought to articulate a feasible conception of political liberalism and in the course of so doing explain the benefits and necessity of its adoption. Not surprisingly, there has been a substantial degree of convergence between Larmore’s and Rawls’ arguments. While both Larmore and Rawls readily acknowledge the similarities between their conceptions, Larmore also, understandably, believes that there are important differences between the two. In turn, Larmore argues that these differences enable him to better demonstrate the appropriateness and necessity of political liberalism, and thereby more effectively than Rawls justify the claim that the concept of political liberalism offers the "best" foundation for a conception of justice for modern liberal democracies. The purpose of this essay is to review the principal features of Larmore’s conception of political liberalism and note some important similarities and purported differences between it and Rawls’ conception. Completing this exercise will not only reveal the extent to which the two conceptions mimic each other, but also show that when examined closely the differences cited by Larmore are in fact cosmetic in character and insignificant in their effect. (shrink)

Religions and religious actors are increasingly associated with extremism and violence. A mainstream view that sees religions as prone to violence has been affirmed within the West. Yet, to affirm that religions promote anti-democratic projects and are inclined to violence can only partially capture the impact of religious voices in contemporary societies. In fact, religions have often played an important role in promoting democratic transition and religiously inspired doctrines have importantly supported peace and reconciliation processes in divided societies. This paper (...) argues that the mainstream view reproduces and extends a traditional liberal wariness toward the alleged incendiary role of religions in politics, the so-called doctrine of religious restraint. This view, I argue, is based on a misinterpretation of contemporary liberal theory and, especially, of Rawls’s Political Liberalism. The paper shows that Rawls’s framework instead provides an extensive accommodation of religions in political life. Starting from this premise, this paper responds to the mainstream view by focussing on the role of religious actors and sensitivities in reconciling divided societies. (shrink)