Aristotle: Truth

Truth is a key notion in Ockham’s philosophical reductionist program, a notion that has been the object of contrasting interpretations in scholarship. My interpretation is that, for Ockham, ‘being true’ expresses an epistemological relation, namely the one through which our mind reflects on a proposition of language, compares it with an extra-mental state of affairs, and thus ascertains their correspondence. Placing truth at a point of intersection of language with mind and reality, Ockham’s interpretation of Aristotle’s characterization of philosophy as (...) the science of truth comes to be innovative. For Ockham, philosophy is a meticulous training of interpretation of language in order to account correctly for the truth-value of propositions. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2022.

In this second of a 2-part survey of Aristotle’s epistemology, I present an overview of Aristotle’s views on technē (craft or excellent productive reason) and phronēsis (practical wisdom or excellent practical reason). For Aristotle, attaining the truth in practical matters involves actually doing the right action. While technē and phronēsis are rational excellences, for Aristotle they are not as excellent or true as epistēmē or nous because the kinds of truth that they grasp are imperfect and because they are excellent (...) states for humans, not simply speaking. I then discuss why Aristotle takes sophia (wisdom), understanding and scientific knowledge of the best things, to be its own excellence. While this is the best cognitive state for human beings, I argue that Aristotle thinks divine cognitive activity is different in kind and more perfect than any human activity. (shrink)

The Question of Truth in Pedro da Fonseca: the Problem of the simplex apprehensio and the Foundation of Logical Identities. This article deals with the theory of truth in Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) as it is presented in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1577-1612). The first part of the paper is dedicated to Fonseca’s definition of intellective truth within the doctrinal topography of the Aristotelian tradition. The Author especially points out Fonseca’s attempt to justify the notion of a “simple” truth (...) of the “simple apprehension”, based on a specific use of Cajetan’s distinction between “signified act” and “exercised act” as well as on a (partially) nominalist account of the relationship between “simple” and “enunciative” concepts. The second part deals instead with Fonseca’s definition of transcendental truth, understood as the conformity between the intellect and the esse realis of the res, and as the conformity of the latter with exemplars in God’s mind. Here the Author also reconstructs Fonseca’s theory of divine ideas and his theory of logical identities. (shrink)

Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this (...) argument, it is the best argument that he could use to defend some of his statements in the second paragraph of Γ 4. Since the argument relies on only a few of Aristotle’s core views about truth, I propose that it is faithful to his considered position throughout his corpus, and it may be the strongest argument he could offer for the indemonstrability of the PNC. (shrink)

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar a análise, o problema, a solução, mas, em particular, o conceito de verdade formulado por Franz Brentano, em 1889. Como base textual, eu analiso a comunicação de Brentano apresentada à comunidade filosófica de Viena, em março de 1889, intitulada Sobre o conceito de verdade (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), e faço uma exposição sistemática da análise de Brentano acerca dos problemas que envolvem a interpretação do conceito aristotélico de verdade como correspondência. Minha interpretação (...) explicita o modo como Brentano reinterpretou o conceito aristotélico de verdade como correspondência, no contexto da estrutura conceitual de sua psicologia descritiva. (shrink)

Aristotle’s philosophy is considered with respect to one central concept of his philosophy, viz. opposition. Far from being a mere side-effect of syllogistic, it is argued in the present paper that opposition helps to articulate ontology and logic through an account of what can be or cannot be in a systematic and structural way. The paper is divided into three main parts. In Section I, the notion of Being is scrutinized through Aristotle’s theory of categories. In Section II, the notion (...) of Non-Being is connected to Aristotle’s theory of oppositions. In Section III, the notion of essence is revisited in order to bring about a holist theory of meaning by individuating through opposite properties. In conclusion, the legacy of Aristotle is depicted as balanced between a powerful reflection around Being and a restrictive ontology of substance. (shrink)

This contribution examines two related points in relation to Aquinas’s understanding of contemplation, which is a sorely neglected topic in scholarship. First, after having outlined that the final act of contemplation culminates in an intellective, simple apprehension of the truth, I will examine how this act relates to the three operations of the intellect Aquinas identifies in a number of places. Second, I argue that his view of contemplation as simple insight is significantly indebted to Neoplatonic sources; therefore, we must (...) pay attention to the way he introduces Neoplatonic elements into his Aristotelian framework. I conclude this contribution by suggesting some reasons—of a theological nature—why Aquinas would have been drawn towards a non-discursive or “intuitive” notion of contemplation. (shrink)

A philosophical history of the Aristotelian notion of truth, in consideration of later developments of comparative logic and dialectic.

Aristotle famously proclaims at Metaphysics Г.7, 1011b26–27: To men gar legein to on mê einai ê to mê on einai pseudos, to de to on einai kai to mê on mê einai alêthes, . . . Aristotle is inclined to think of this as a definition of truth and falsehood;1 we are inclined to wonder what he means by it. Perhaps a reasonable approximation in English would amount to something like: Tdf: For to state [of] that which is [that] it (...) is not or [of] that which is not [that] it is [is] false, and [to state of] that which is [that] it is and [of] that which is not [that] it is not [is] true. Many have considered this to be the expression of a correspondence theory of truth, and so it is tempting to .. (shrink)

This paper shows that Aristotle's De Interpretatione does not separate syntax from semantics. Linguistic sentences are not syntactic entities, and non-linguistic meanings are not semantic propositions expressed by linguistic sentences. In fact, Aristotle resorts to a mental conception of meaning, distinguishing linguistic meanings in a given language from non-linguistic mental contents in relation to actual things: while the former are not the same for all, the latter are shared by everyone. Aristotle is not a modern logician, like Boole, Frege, or (...) Russell, in so far as a mental conception of meaning does not reveal an abstract semantics for a syntactic language. (shrink)

Con el fin de mostrar la importancia de la consideración de la "verdad práctica" como un concepto clave a la hora de dar cuenta de la teoría aristotélica de la acción, se procederá a dilucidar el sentido y alcance de este concepto mediante un análisis de la conexión estructural existente entre la parte racional e irracional del alma (razón y deseo) en la psicología moral de Aristóteles. Luego se pasará a examinar el breve pasaje de Ética Nicomaquea VI 2, en (...) el que Aristóteles señala los requerimientos para que se dé la "verdad práctica", lo cual quedará mucho más claro si se lo revisa a la luz del análisis de la estructura formal de la acción que Aristóteles elabora en el llamado "silogismo práctico". En este artículo se abordará principalmente el problema del sentido de la sintética declaración de Aristóteles de que, para que haya "verdad práctica", "el lógos debe ser verdadero". Esto se encuentra vinculado al problema del papel de la prudencia para determinar los medios conducentes al fin de la acción, pero también para establecer su fin mismo. (shrink)

A tese central deste trabalho consiste em reconstruir em bases filosóficas as linhas gerais da teoria aristotélica da verdade mostrando, a partir da análise do Livro IV da Metafísica, que esta teoria está fundada naquilo que é chamado nesta investigação de princípio transcendental de verdade, o qual é constituído pela bi- implicação modal dos princípios de não-contradição, do terceiro excluído e de identidade.

Die von Aristoteles so genannte praktische Wahrheit besteht nach ihm in der Übereinstimmung des praktischen Verstandes mit dem richtigen Streben, d. h. darin, daß die Mittel, die jemand nach dem Urteil seines praktischen Verstandes zur Erreichung eines bestimmten Zieles wählen soll, die richtigen Mittel zur Erreichung des richtigen Zieles sind. Da man nicht nur das, was ein praktisches Urteil demjenigen, der es sich bildet, zu tun vorschreibt, sondern auch das, was jemand, der sich ein theoretisches Urteil bildet, damit tut, als (...) eine Handlung betrachten kann, läßt sich die Art und Weise, in der Aristoteles den Begriff der praktischen Wahrheit bestimmt, für ein besseres Verständnis derjenigen Wahrheit fruchtbar machen, die einem wahren theoretischen Urteil zukommt. Man kann nämlich sagen, daß ein solches Urteil genau dann im theoretischen Sinne wahr ist, wenn das praktische Urteil, dem zufolge man es sich bilden soll, im praktischen Sinne wahr ist. Die Wahrheit einer Aussage, wie man ein theoretisches Urteil gewöhnlich nennt, besteht somit darin, daß die betreffende Aussage als ein Mittel, mit dem man das Ziel, die Wirklichkeit in einer bestimmten Hinsicht so zu beschreiben, wie sie ist, erreichen will, mit derjenigen Aussage übereinstimmt, mit der man dieses Ziel tatsächlich erreicht. (shrink)

Aristotle's theory of truth, which has been the most influential account of the concept of truth from Antiquity onwards, spans several areas of philosophy: philosophy of language, logic, ontology and epistemology. In this 2004 book, Paolo Crivelli discusses all the main aspects of Aristotle's views on truth and falsehood. He analyses in detail the main relevant passages, addresses some well-known problems of Aristotelian semantics, and assesses Aristotle's theory from the point of view of modern analytic philosophy. In the process he (...) discusses most of the literature on Aristotle's semantic theory to have appeared in the last two centuries. His book vindicates and clarifies the often repeated claim that Aristotle's is a correspondence theory of truth. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in both ancient philosophy and modern philosophy of language. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the theory of simple apprehension held in the Kiev-Mohyla Academy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We start from Aristotle’s idea of two kinds of knowing and from the Thomist theory of the two operations of the intellect in view of the ontological distinction between essence and actuality. In dealing with the theory of the activities of the intellect in the Kiev-MohylaAcademy, we consider simple apprehension as a form of Aristotle’s immediate knowledge. (...) We conclude by introducing the notion of non-representational simple apprehension. (shrink)

The third chapter of Brentano's dissertation "On the Manifold Meaning of Being According to Aristotle" (1862) analyzes "Being in the sense of the True." Because Heidegger has always related the Question of Being to the Question of Truth, and because he calls Brentano's work the "chief help and guide" of his first venture into philosophy, the question arises: does Brentano's account of "Being in the sense of the True" have significant bearing on Heidegger's response to the principal matter of his (...) thought, i.e., Aletheia as the Unconcealment of Beings in Presence? This article traces the parallels and divergencies in Brentano's and Heidegger's accounts of the relation between Being and Truth. (shrink)