A Teoria da Demonstração Científica de Aristóteles em Segundos Analíticos 1.2-9 e 1.13

Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 30:e03021 (2020)
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I defend an interpretation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics Book I which distinguishes between two projects in different passages of that work: (i) to explain what a given science is and (ii) to explain what properly scientific knowledge is. I present Aristotle’s theory in answer to ii, with special attention to his definition of scientific knowledge in 71b9-12 and showing how this is developed on chapters I.2-9 and I.13 into a solid Theory of Scientific Demonstration. The main point of this theory is that demonstrations need to capture relevant explanations. Some formal requirements of the demonstration (as the syllogistic structure and coextension between terms) are unfoldings of the main project, i.e., to capture and present properly relevant causal-explanatory relations.

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Davi Heckert César Bastos
University of Campinas

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Aristotle’s Definition of Scientific Knowledge.Lucas Angioni - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):79-104.
Aristóteles, Segundos Analíticos, Livro I.Lucas Angioni - 2004 - Campinas, Brazil: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de Campinas.

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