Principles of Philosophy. Author’s Letter to the Translator (Preface).

For many years the intellectual activities of the Society of Jesus were dismissed as wholly conservative, as their Ratio studiorum clung to a Ptolemaic–Aristotelian world‐picture despite the rising...

The Descartes Dictionary is an accessible guide to the world of the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes. Meticulously researched and extensively cross-referenced, this unique book covers all his major works, ideas and influences, and provides a firm grounding in the central themes of Descartes' thought. The introduction provides a biographical sketch, a brief account of Descartes' philosophical works, and a summary of the current state of Cartesian studies, discussing trends in research over the past four decades. The (...) A-Z entries include clear definitions of the key terms used in Descartes' writings and detailed synopses of his works. Also included are entries noting philosophical influences, of both figures that influenced Descartes and those that he in turn influenced. For anyone reading or studying Descartes, rationalism, or modern philosophy more generally, this original resource provides a wealth of useful information, analysis, and criticism. Including clear explanations of often complex terminology, The Descartes Dictionary covers everything that is essential to a sound understanding of Descartes' philosophy. (shrink)

Linking the process of rational decision making to emotions, an award-winning scientist who has done extensive research with brain-damaged patients notes the dependence of thought processes on feelings and the body's survival-oriented regulators. 50,000 first printing.

Descartes and the last Scholastics: objections and replies -- Descartes and the Scotists -- Ideas, before and after Descartes -- The Cartesian destiny of form and matter -- Descartes, Basso, and Toletus: three kinds of Corpuscularians -- Scholastics and the new astronomy on the substance of the heavens -- Descartes and the Jesuits of La Fleche: the Eucharist -- Condemnations of Cartesianism: the extension and unity of the universe -- Cartesians, Gassendists, and censorship -- The (...) cogito in the seventeenth century. (shrink)

Centuries ago, Descartes and Locke initiated a foundational debate in epistemology over the relationship between knowledge, on the one hand, and practical factors, on the other. Descartes claimed that knowledge and practice are fundamentally separate. Locke claimed that knowledge and practice are fundamentally united. After a period of dormancy, their disagreement has reignited on the contemporary scene. Latter-day Lockeans claim that knowledge itself is essentially connected to, and perhaps even constituted by, practical factors such as how much is (...) at stake, how important the situation is, or how one should act. Latter-day Cartesians claim, by contrast, that knowledge is entirely constituted by truth-related factors such as truth, belief, and evidence. Each side has supported its case with claims about patterns in ordinary behavior and knowledge judgments. Lockeans argue that these patterns are best explained by positing a fundamental and direct link between knowledge and practical factors. Cartesians argue that the patterns can be equally well explained by positing an indirect link, entirely mediated by the traditional factors of truth, belief, and evidence, thereby rendering the Lockean hypothesis unnecessary. We argue that Cartesians are right about some practical factors, in particular stakes and how important a situation is, which have, at best, a modest indirect relationship to knowledge. However, Lockeans are right about actionability: whether a person should pursue a course of action is unquestionably very powerfully and directly connected to knowledge. (shrink)

This volume brings together some of the best articles on Descartes published in the last fifty years. Edited by the renowned Descartes specialist John Cottingham, the selection covers the full range of Descartes's thought, including chapters on the central issues in Cartesian metaphysics, the relationship between mind and body, human nature and the passions, and the structure of scientific explanation.

Descartes has often been called the 'father of modern philosophy'. His attempts to find foundations for knowledge, and to reconcile the existence of the soul with the emerging science of his time, are among the most influential and widely studied in the history of philosophy. This is a classic and challenging introduction to Descartes by one of the most distinguished modern philosophers. Bernard Williams not only analyzes Descartes' project of founding knowledge on certainty, but uncovers the philosophical (...) motives for his search. With acute insight, he demonstrates how Descartes' _Meditations _are not merely a description but the very enactment of philosophical thought and discovery. Williams covers all of the key areas of Descartes' thought, including God, the will, the possibility of knowledge, and the mind and its place in nature. He also makes profound contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and philosophy generally. With a new foreword by John Cottingham. (shrink)

Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and (...) his philosophical importance redeemed. (shrink)

This essential work is made up of eight interrelated essays grouped to elucidate two major themes -- Descartes's role in the dilemma of modern philosophy, and ...

This book is a systematic study of Descartes' relation to Augustine. It offers a complete reevaluation of Descartes' thought and as such will be of major importance to all historians of medieval, neo-Platonic, or early modern philosophy. Stephen Menn demonstrates that Descartes uses Augustine's central ideas as a point of departure for a critique of medieval Aristotelian physics, which he replaces with a new, mechanistic anti-Aristotelian physics. Special features of the book include a reading of the Meditations, (...) a comprehensive historical and philosophical introduction to Augustine's thought, a detailed account of Plotinus, and a contextualization of Descartes' mature philosophical project which explores both the framework within which it evolved and the early writings, to show how the collapse of the early project drove Descartes to the writings of Augustine. (shrink)

Descartes a entrepris de détruire la pratique aristotélicienne de la philosophie : à son savoir seulement probable, les Regulae, puis les Essais opposent une science certaine d'objets clairs et distincts. Mais cette instauration concerne aussi, peut-être même d'abord, l'idéal pratique qu'Aristote ne cesse de viser dans les sciences théorétiques : le sage parvient à la félicité par l'exercice même d'une connaissance si parfaite qu'elle imite celle du dieu, qui pense sa pensée en acte et éternellement. Descartes met décidément (...) en crise la félicité par la contemplation, dont la pensée médiévale avait hérité d'Aristote. Pourtant, une autre figure de la félicité se dégage tout aussi indiscutablement de l'entreprise cartésienne : la méthode, la certitude scientifique qu'elle permet et les principes métaphysiques qui assurent l'une et l'autre restent, à chaque moment, solidaires d'une attitude et d'une ambition proprement morales - la volonté infinie aboutit à la générosité, où la considération du bon usage de notre libre-arbitre permet le - contentement de soi-même -. Ainsi la philosophie atteint-elle, pour Descartes aussi, à une félicité. Mais à une félicité volontaire et non plus contemplative. On tentera donc d'abord de mesurer, dans différents champs de la philosophie cartésienne, l'impact de la certitude jusque sur les questions d'éthique ; ensuite, de souligner la référence constante, quoique souvent implicite, de Descartes à la félicité telle qu'Aristote la visait ; enfin, de suivre leur dialogue au fil conducteur de leurs versions divergentes, mais complices, de l'admiratio et du thaumazein. (shrink)

In this book, Ben-Yami reassesses the way Descartes developed and justified some of his revolutionary philosophical ideas. The first part of the book shows that one of Descartes' most innovative and influential ideas was that of representation without resemblance. Ben-Yami shows how Descartes transfers insights originating in his work on analytic geometry to his theory of perception. The second part shows how Descartes was influenced by the technology of the period, notably clockwork automata, in holding life (...) to be a mechanical phenomenon, reducing the soul to the mind and considering it immaterial. Ben-Yami explores the later role of the digital computer in Turing's criticism of Descartes' ideas. The last part discusses the Meditations: far from starting everything afresh without presupposing anything that can be doubted, Descartes' innovations in the dream argument, the cogito and elsewhere are modifications of old ideas based upon considerations issuing from his separately developed theories, formed under the influence of the technology, mathematics and science of his age. (shrink)

Descartes’ accounts of sensory perception have long troubled his interpreters, for their lack of clear and explicit statements on some fundamental issues. His readers have wondered whether he allows spatial sensory ideas (spatial qualia); whether sensory ideas such as color or pain are representations and, if so, what they represent; and what cognitive value Descartes attributed to sense perception. Recent discussions take differing stands on the questions just mentioned, and also disagree over Descartes’ account of the externalization (...) of sensory qualities, on the origin and correct analysis of the “material falsity” he attributes to some sensory ideas, and on the value of the “teachings of nature.” Such disagreement should not be surprising, for although sensory perception was an important topic for Descartes, his treatment of these particular issues is not systematic – or at least not apparently so. Generally, there are no proof texts that unequivocally settle questions about Descartes’ views on spatial qualia, the representationality of sensory ideas, their cognitive value, externalization, material falsity, and the status of the teachings of nature. Yet these questions and topics naturally arise from matters about which Descartes is explicit and (reasonably) consistent, regarding the role of the senses in philosophy and everyday life and concerning the nature of minds and ideas. It is, therefore, worthwhile to ask what his positions might have been. This chapter develops answers by considering Descartes’ systematic doctrines on the nature of the mind and its ideas and by combing his statements on sensation and perception for hints about how to apply such principles. The first section reviews some key texts. Succeeding sections develop positions on representationality, cognitive value, externalization, material falsity, and the teachings of nature. Ultimately, I favor an interpretation in which, for Descartes, all sensory ideas represent by resemblance, different kinds of sensory ideas vary in cognitive value, externalization arises through spatial localization, and, with sensory ideas of color and the like, as materially false they do not intrinsically misrepresent but afford occasion for false judgments, which arise as merely apparent, and so not actually legitimate, teachings of nature. (shrink)

Descartes's approach to practical judgments about what is beneficial or harmful, or what to pursue or avoid, is almost exactly the opposite of his approach to theoretical judgments about the true nature of things. Instead of the cautious skepticism for which Descartes is known, throughout his ethical writings he recommends developing the habit of making firm judgments and resolutely carrying them out, no matter how doubtful and uncertain they may be. Descartes, strikingly, takes irresolution to be the (...) source of remorse and repentance, of vice, and of a weak soul. In order to explain its dangerousness, this essay offers an analysis of irresolution as a failure of the will to determine itself to follow a judgment in the face of ignorance or uncertainty. This analysis connects irresolution to weakness of will and explains why Descartes regards resolution as an essential component of virtue. (shrink)

This essay explores two of the more neglected hypotheses that comprise, or supplement, Descartes’ relationalist doctrine of bodily motion. These criteria are of great importance, for they would appear to challenge Descartes’ principal judgment that motion is a purely reciprocal change of a body’s contiguous neighborhood. After critiquing the work of the few commentators who have previously examined these forgotten hypotheses, mainly, D. Garber and M. Gueroult, the overall strengths and weaknesses of Descartes’ supplementary criteria will be (...) assessed. Overall, despite their ingenuity, it will be demonstrated that Descartes’ criteria cannot rescue his brand of natural laws from the inherent limitations of his strong relational account of motion. (shrink)

I discuss Descartes’ metaphysics of selfhood, and relevant parts of contemporary philosophy regarding the first person. My two main concerns are the controversy that surrounds Descartes’ conception of conscientia, mistranslated as ‘consciousness’, and his conception of selfhood and its essential connection to conscientia. ‘I’-thoughts give rise to the most challenging philosophical questions. An answer to the questions concerning the peculiarities of the first person, self-identification and self-ascription, is to be found in Descartes’ notion of conscientia. His conception (...) of selfhood insightfully informs his conception of personhood. I offer a unified account of selfhood, conscientia, the first person, and personhood anchored in the self’s authority of reason and autonomy of freedom. (shrink)

In this new introduction to the life, thought and works of one of the greatest seventeenth-century philosophers, John Cottingham aims to place Descartes' ideas in their historical context while at the same time showing how they relate to a network of philosophical problems that are still vigorously debated today. Separate chapters are devoted to Descartes' life and the intellectual climate of his times; the Cartesian method; the reconstruction of knowledge from self to God and to the external world; (...) Descartes' theory of the material universe; his account of mind and body; and his psychology and theory of the will and passions. While doing justice to the complexities of Descartes' thought, the book presupposes no philosophical training, and all technical philosophical notions are explained in such a way as to be intelligible to the first-year student or general reader. (shrink)

Descartes's concept of the mind, as distinct from the body with which it forms a union, set the agenda for much of Western philosophy's subsequent reflection on human nature and thought. This is the first book to give an analysis of Descartes's pivotal concept that deals with all the functions of the mind, cognitive as well as volitional, theoretical as well as practical and moral. Focusing on Descartes's view of the mind as intimately united to and intermingled (...) with the body, and exploring its implications for his philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Lilli Alanen argues that the epistemological and methodological consequences of this view have been largely misconstrued in the modern debate. Informed by both the French tradition of Descartes scholarship and recent Anglo-American research, Alanen's book combines historical-contextual analysis with a philosophical problem-oriented approach. It seeks to relate Descartes's views on mind and intentionality both to contemporary debates and to the problems Descartes confronted in their historical context. By drawing out the historical antecedents and the intellectual evolution of Descartes's thinking about the mind, the book shows how his emphasis on the embodiment of the mind has implications far more complex and interesting than the usual dualist account suggests. (shrink)

"This stunning work is without question a major contribution to Cartesian studies, to the field of early modern philosophy, and to general epistemology--original, provocative, and philosophically interesting.

" Descartes ne qualifie sa cosmologie que sous le modeste diminutif d'une "fable du monde". Ceci peut s'interpréter comme l'aveu d'une impuissance de la raison à atteindre l'authentique fabrique du monde. Mais avant d'être une fiction dénuée de toute vérité, une fable est d'abord un récit, comme celui que l'Ecriture propose au premier livre de la Genèse. Nous enquêtons ici sur le commentaire cartésien de la Genèse, texte perdu, mais suffisamment avancé pour que Descartes envisageât, en 1640, de (...) le soumettre à l'approbation de la Sorbonne. Qu'y aurait-il montré? Qu'en concevant le mouvement comme une séparation réciproque des parties de l'étendue, il se conformait à la lettre au récit mosaïque de la création. Descartes s'appuie sur une lecture précise de la Genèse, mais une lecture si originale et si peu orthodoxe qu'il doit presque aussitôt renoncer à en faire une caution pour sa philosophie naturelle. Nous enquêtons donc moins sur cet In Genesim, que sur les raisons de sa disparition. ". (shrink)

Descartes a entrepris de détruire la pratique aristotélicienne de la philosophie : à son savoir seulement probable, les Regulae, puis les Essais opposent une science certaine d'objets clairs et distincts. Mais cette instauration concerne aussi, peut-être même d'abord, l'idéal pratique qu'Aristote ne cesse de viser dans les sciences théorétiques : le sage parvient à la félicité par l'exercice même d'une connaissance si parfaite qu'elle imite celle du dieu, qui pense sa pensée en acte et éternellement. Descartes met décidément (...) en crise la félicité par la contemplation, dont la pensée médiévale avait hérité d'Aristote. Pourtant, une autre figure de la félicité se dégage tout aussi indiscutablement de l'entreprise cartésienne : la méthode, la certitude scientifique qu'elle permet et les principes métaphysiques qui assurent l'une et l'autre restent, à chaque moment, solidaires d'une attitude et d'une ambition proprement morales - la volonté infinie aboutit à la générosité, où la considération du bon usage de notre libre-arbitre permet le - contentement de soi-même -. Ainsi la philosophie atteint-elle, pour Descartes aussi, à une félicité. Mais à une félicité volontaire et non plus contemplative. On tentera donc d'abord de mesurer, dans différents champs de la philosophie cartésienne, l'impact de la certitude jusque sur les questions d'éthique ; ensuite, de souligner la référence constante, quoique souvent implicite, de Descartes à la félicité telle qu'Aristote la visait ; enfin, de suivre leur dialogue au fil conducteur de leurs versions divergentes, mais complices, de l'admiratio et du thaumazein. (shrink)

The seventeenth century was a period of extraordinary invention, discovery and revolutions in scientific, social and political orders. It was a time of expansive automation, biological discovery, rapid advances in medical knowledge, of animal trials and a questioning of the boundaries between species, human and non-human, between social classes, and of the assumed naturalness of political inequality. This book gives a tour through those objects, ordinary and extraordinary, which captivated the philosophical imagination of the single most important French philosopher of (...) this period, Rene Descartes. Deborah J. Brown and Calvin G. Normore document Descartes' attempt to make sense of the complex, composite objects of human and divine invention, consistent with the fundamental tenets of his metaphysical system. Their central argument is that, far from reducing all the categories of ordinary experience to the two basic categories of substance, mind and body, Descartes' philosophy recognises irreducible composites that resist reduction, and require their own distinctive modes of explanation. (shrink)

Bei den korpuskulartheoretischen Erklärungen von Naturphänomenen, wie sie Descartes in den Principia philosophiae vornimmt und im Discours de la methode anspricht, lassen sich zwei verschiedene und nur teilweise miteinander vereinbare Bedeutungsgruppen des Hypothesenbegriffs nachweisen. Sie verbinden sich mit unterschiedlichen Bewertungen des Status von Hypothesen im wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisprozeß. Einerseits findet man eine Verwandtschaft zum heute wissenschaftstheoretisch verbreiteten Verständnis von Hypothesen als positivem und integralem Bestandteil der Naturerkenntnis. Typischer für Descartes' Naturphilosophie ist jedoch die andererseits von ihm vertretene Vorstellung, daß (...) der Umfang des bloß hypothetischen Wissens im Fortgang der Naturerkenntnis zu minimieren sei. Mit dieser Forderung erweist sich Descartes als Vertreter einer neuzeitlichen Wissenschaftsauffassung, die deutlich vom modernen Verzicht auf ein ausschließlich geltendes System der Naturerkenntnis abgehoben ist. (shrink)

Descartes is often accused of having fragmented the human being into two independent substances, mind and body, with no clear strategy for explaining the apparent unity of human experience. Deborah Brown argues that, contrary to this view, Descartes did in fact have a conception of a single, integrated human being, and that in his view this conception is crucial to the success of human beings as rational and moral agents and as practitioners of science. The passions are pivotal (...) in this, and in a rich and wide-ranging discussion she examines Descartes' place in the tradition of thought about the passions, the metaphysics of actions and passions, sensory representation, and Descartes' account of self-mastery and virtue. Her study is an important and original reading not only of Descartes' account of mind-body unity but also of his theory of mind. (shrink)

„Descartes, der größte Demokrat“ (Tocqueville 2010, 700, FN e). Auch wenn dieser Satz nicht den Weg in die Endfassung des zweiten Bandes der Démocratie gefunden hat, so fasst er doch wahrscheinlich besser als jeder andere (und es gibt deren so gut wie keine) Tocquevilles Ansichten über seinen Landsmann René Descartes und dessen Philosophie zusammen. Das erste Kapitel, in dem „die philosophische Methode der Amerikaner“ vorgestellt wird, zeigt, wieso die Philosophie Descartes’ – mit der sich Tocqueville vermutlich 1834, (...) zusammen mit seinem Freund Kergorlay, eingehender befasst hatte (OC XIII, 1, 384–389) – einen derart großen Erfolg in Amerika hat, obwohl die allerwenigsten Amerikaner Descartes kennen, geschweige denn seine Werke, allen voran den berühmten Discours de la méthode, gelesen haben. (shrink)

데카르트는 자신이 『정념론(Les passions de l’âme)』을 쓴 목적은 정념을 지배하는(maîtriser) 것이라고 여러 차례 말한다. 그렇다면 우리는 어떻게 정념을 제어하고 통제할 수 있을까? 데카르트는 송과선 안의 생리적 운동을 그것과 연결되어 있는 정념으로부터 분리함으로써 정념을 교정할 수 있다고 말한다. 즉 정념을 제어하는 방법은 신체 안의 생리적 운동과 그것과 연결되어 있는 영혼(정신)의 정념을 ‘우리 자신 안에서’ 분리하는 것이다. 그렇게 함으로써 우리에게 해가 되는 정념과 연결된 우리 신체 안의 정기의 운동을 우리에게 유익한 정념과 연결시키는 것이다. 이 논문의 목적은 데카르트 철학에서 어떻게 정념을 통제하고 지배할 (...) 수 있을지를 구체적으로 해명하는 것이다. 우선 첫 번째 절에서는 데카르트 이원론에서 신체의 운동과 정신의 정념이 어떻게 연결되어 있는지를 살펴볼 것이다. 두번째 절에서는 이러한 연결이 인간이 의지를 통해서 새롭게 연결시킬 수 있다는 주장을 살펴볼 것이다. 세 번째 절에서는 신체의 생리적 운동과 정신의 정념의 연결은 개인마다 차이가 있다는 주장을 살펴볼 것이다. 마지막 절에서는 데카르트의 주장에 대한 하나의 반박을 살펴볼 것이다. (shrink)

이 논문의 목적은 데카르트 윤리학에서 덕 개념을 해명하는 것이다. 데카르트 윤리학에서 최고선은 덕이기 때문에 이 덕 개념을 해명하면 데카르트 윤리학의 다른 핵심 개념들이 더 분명하게 드러난다. 데카르트에게 행복은 ‘정신의 완전한 만족과 내적인 충족’이고, 이러한 만족과 충족은 외부에서 오는 것이 아니라 자기 자신의 노력으로만 얻을 수 있는 것이다. 하지만 데카르트 윤리학은 행복을 최고선으로 규정한 아리스토텔레스 윤리학과 달리 행복은 최고선이 아니라 최고선을 전제한다. 또 데카르트에 따르면, ‘최고선=덕=이성이 최선이라고 판단한 것을 수행하려는 확고하고 지속적인 의지(결의)’이다. 이러한 데카르트의 덕 개념은 데카르트 철학 내에서 매우 독특한데, (...) 왜냐하면 데카르트는 그저 최선이라고 판단되는 것을 수행하라고 말하기 때문이다. 즉 데카르트는 이론적 영역에서의 ‘형이상학적 확실성’과 실천적 영역에서 ‘도덕적 확실성’을 구분한다. 또 데카르트는 덕이 습관이라는 사실, 습관을 통해서 얻을 수 있는 ‘정신적 성향’임을 강조한다. 데카르트의 덕 개념이 가지고 있는 또 다른 특징은, 데카르트에게는 복수의 덕이 아니라 하나의 덕만이 존재하기 때문에 아리스토텔레스의 덕 개념과도 다르고, 행복이 최고선은 아니지만 최고선인 덕이 행복의 충분조건이라는 점에서 스토아 철학의 덕 개념과도 차이가 난다는 점이다. (shrink)

The demon is, in the thinker,s words, "supremely powerful and clever", and it is only the combination of these two traits with the demon's incessant deception that empowers Descartes to stage the radical doubt that will terminate in his attempted proofs of God and the material world. The reason the demon is necessary is that the thinker cannot prove that it would be wrong for God to allow us to be deceived occasionally. Thus, Descartes needed, methodologically and rhetorically, (...) something more than just an imperfect God or a lack of God altogether; he needed a being with exactly as much power as God but without God's goodness. In short, one should utilize philosophy for the everyday analogue to lucid dreaming. For those unfamiliar with the phenomenon, lucid dreaming involves training oneself, by a simple concentration exercise performed before falling asleep, to be able to become conscious of being in a dream while still in it and without thereby ending it. (shrink)

Quatre siecles apres la naissance de Rene Descartes, le colloque Lire Descartes aujourd'hui se propose de faire etat de la lecture a laquelle sa philosophie se prete aujourd'hui. Cette tentative de bilan s'articule autour de quatre sections, respectivement consacrees a la tradition medievale dont on sait beaucoup mieux aujourd'hui ce que le philosophe lui devrait; au fondement proprement metaphysique - s'il en est un - de sa philosophie; au rapport qu'entretient cette metaphysique avec la science moderne; enfin et (...) surtout, a la reception phenomenologique du cartesianisme. (shrink)

Descartes is notorious for holding a strong anti-vacuist position. On his view, according to the standard reading, empty space not only does not exist in nature, but it is logically impossible. The very notion of a void or vacuum is an incoherent one. Recently Eric Palmer has proposed a revisionist reading of Descartes on empty space, arguing that he is more sanguine about its possibility. Palmer makes use of Descartes’ early correspondence with Marin Mersenne, including his commentary (...) on Galileo’s Two New Sciences. I argue that Palmer’s reading is mistaken, and that it relies on an understandable but faulty inference—i.e., that if Descartes considers the implications of an opposing view, he must find it at least coherent. Descartes, as I show from his correspondence and other texts, uses a variety of persuasive strategies, and levels charges of different logical strength, against positions which he takes to be incoherent. Thus we cannot infer from the fact that Descartes argues, e.g., that something is a superfluous theoretical entity, that he admits that entity’s coherence. He often chooses to argue a weaker thesis against an opponent so that he can use an argument to which the opponent is more likely to agree. (shrink)

이 논문은 데카르트의 『음악입문』(Compendium Musicae)에서 대상(objectum)의 개념을 근대성의 관점에서 분석한 연구이다. 데카르트가 근대적 주체의 이념을 선구적으로 제시한 철학자라는 것은 일반적으로 받아들여지고 있으나 그가 근대적 의미에서 대상의 개념을 처음으로 제시한 철학자인지 어떤지는 그렇게 분명치는 않다. 하지만 철학자이면서 음악학자였던 요한네스 로만은 데카르트의 『음악입문』에서 근대적 대상의 개념이 처음으로 등장한다고 주장한다. 그러나 그는 자신의 주장에 대해 아무런 근거도 제시하지 않았다. 이 논문은 먼저 로만의 주장을 제시하고 그 타당성을 검토하기 위해 토마스 아퀴나스에게서 학문의 주제와 능력의 대상의 구별을 살펴보고 그것이 후기 중세에서 근대에 이르는 과정에서 어떻게 (...) 변화되어 왔는지를 살펴본다. 그런 뒤에 음악 자체의 변화로 눈길을 돌려 차를리노에서부터 데카르트 직전의 칼비시우스에 이르기까지 음악의 주제가 변해온 과정을 살펴본다. 그리고 『음악입문』에서 데카르트가 대상 개념을 사용하는 용례를 검토한 뒤에 최종적으로 데카르트가 이 저작에서 새로운 대상 개념을 사용하기 시작하면서 고대와 중세에 자명하게 받아들여진 존재의 지평을 넘어서는 대상의 지평을 새롭게 제시했음을 밝힌다. (shrink)

"This stunning work is without question a major contribution to Cartesian studies, to the field of early modern philosophy, and to general epistemology- ...

This book offers a new way of approaching the place of the will in Descartes' mature epistemology and ethics. Departing from the widely accepted view, Noa Naaman-Zauderer suggests that Descartes regards the will, rather than the intellect, as the most significant mark of human rationality, both intellectual and practical. Through a close reading of Cartesian texts from the Meditations onward, she brings to light a deontological and non-consequentialist dimension of Descartes' later thinking, which credits the proper use (...) of free will with a constitutive, evaluative role. She shows that the right use of free will, to which Descartes assigns obligatory force, constitutes for him an end in its own right rather than merely a means for attaining any other end, however valuable. Her important study has significant implications for the unity of Descartes' thinking, and for the issue of responsibility, inviting scholars to reassess Descartes' philosophical legacy. (shrink)

Peut-on tenter une nouvelle approche de Descartes? Penser philosophiquement la notion de creation, c'est la traduire dans le registre des quatre causes: ainsi la cause efficiente relie et separe a la fois le createur et le cree; mais Dieu est aussi cause formelle, ce qui sauve la continuite entre l'auteur et son ouvrage. Cette continuite se nomme analogie et cette analogie assure l'autonomie de la pensee finie. Ce transfert d'autorite dans la production meme, particulierement manifeste chez Descartes, permet (...) de comprendre la devolution a l'homme d'un certain pouvoir createur. L'agir humain peut etre inaugural. L'est-il en matiere de philosophie? La dette de Descartes envers la scolastique tardive semble indiquer qu'on ne pense qu'a partir de ce qu'on herite. L'ambivalence de la notion de creation ne nous permettrait-elle pas cependant de montrer que le commencement dans la pensee reste a tout moment possible? Telle pourrait etre l'explication du radicalisme cartesien. (shrink)

Descartes has often been called the 'father of modern philosophy'. His attempts to find foundations for knowledge, and to reconcile the existence of the soul with the emerging science of his time, are among the most influential and widely studied in the history of philosophy. This is a classic and challenging introduction to Descartes by one of the most distinguished modern philosophers. Bernard Williams not only analyzes Descartes' project of founding knowledge on certainty, but uncovers the philosophical (...) motives for his search. With acute insight, he demonstrates how Descartes' _Meditations _are not merely a description but the very enactment of philosophical thought and discovery. Williams covers all of the key areas of Descartes' thought, including God, the will, the possibility of knowledge, and the mind and its place in nature. He also makes profound contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and philosophy generally. With a new foreword by John Cottingham. (shrink)

Descartes has often been called the 'father of modern philosophy'. His attempts to find foundations for knowledge, and to reconcile the existence of the soul with the emerging science of his time, are among the most influential and widely studied in the history of philosophy. This is a classic and challenging introduction to Descartes by one of the most distinguished modern philosophers. Bernard Williams not only analyzes Descartes' project of founding knowledge on certainty, but uncovers the philosophical (...) motives for his search. With acute insight, he demonstrates how Descartes' _Meditations _are not merely a description but the very enactment of philosophical thought and discovery. Williams covers all of the key areas of Descartes' thought, including God, the will, the possibility of knowledge, and the mind and its place in nature. He also makes profound contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and philosophy generally. With a new foreword by John Cottingham. (shrink)

In this work I argue that Descartes was not a trialist by showing that the main tenets of trialist interpretations of Descartes's theory of substance are either not supported by the text or are not sufficient for establishing the trialist interpretation.

Descartes has often been called the 'father of modern philosophy'. His attempts to find foundations for knowledge, and to reconcile the existence of the soul with the emerging science of his time, are among the most influential and widely studied in the history of philosophy. This is a classic and challenging introduction to Descartes by one of the most distinguished modern philosophers. Bernard Williams not only analyzes Descartes' project of founding knowledge on certainty, but uncovers the philosophical (...) motives for his search. With acute insight, he demonstrates how Descartes' _Meditations _are not merely a description but the very enactment of philosophical thought and discovery. Williams covers all of the key areas of Descartes' thought, including God, the will, the possibility of knowledge, and the mind and its place in nature. He also makes profound contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and philosophy generally. With a new foreword by John Cottingham. (shrink)

I argue that Descartes uses his method as evidence in the Discours and Les Météores. I begin by establishing there is a single method in Descartes’ works, using his meteorology as a case study. First, I hold that the method of the Regulae is best explained by two examples: one scientific, his proof of the anaclastic curve (1626), and one metaphysical, his question of the essence and scope of human knowledge (1628). Based on this account, I suggest that (...) the form of his early metaphysics (not its content) is similar to the method of doubt of the Meditationes. Second, I argue that Descartes’ explanation of the cause of parhelia (1629) likewise contains a formulation of this procedure. I provide a novel reading of Les Météores, where, following Descartes’ guidance in the Discours and Correspondance, I interpret his meteorology by reasoning from effects to causes, in this case, from Christoph Scheiner’s 1626 observation of parhelia to his meteorological foundation. This backwards orientation to Les Météores, I argue, reveals an instance of Descartes’ scientific method. I conclude with remarks on Descartes’ concept of evidentia, in which I explain how he incorporates a posteriori evidence and an apparent hypothetical foundation into his rationalist epistemology where he uses his method as evidence for his claims. (shrink)