The use of Intelligent Assistive Technology in dementia care opens the prospects of reducing the global burden of dementia and enabling novel opportunities to improve the lives of dementia patients. However, with current adoption rates being reportedly low, the potential of IATs might remain under-expressed as long as the reasons for suboptimal adoption remain unaddressed. Among these, ethical and social considerations are critical. This article reviews the spectrum of IATs for dementia and investigates the prevalence of ethical considerations in the (...) design of current IATs. Our screening shows that a significant portion of current IATs is designed in the absence of explicit ethical considerations. These results suggest that the lack of ethical consideration might be a codeterminant of current structural limitations in the translation of IATs from designing labs to bedside. Based on these data, we call for a coordinated effort to proactively incorporate ethical considerations early in the design and development of new products. (shrink)

Background Advances in artificial intelligence, robotics and wearable computing are creating novel technological opportunities for mitigating the global burden of population ageing and improving the quality of care for older adults with dementia and/or age-related disability. Intelligent assistive technology is the umbrella term defining this ever-evolving spectrum of intelligent applications for the older and disabled population. However, the implementation of IATs has been observed to be sub-optimal due to a number of barriers in the translation of novel applications from the (...) designing labs to the bedside. Furthermore, since these technologies are designed to be used by vulnerable individuals with age- and multi-morbidity-related frailty and cognitive disability, they are perceived to raise important ethical challenges, especially when they involve machine intelligence, collect sensitive data or operate in close proximity to the human body. Thus, the goal of this paper is to explore and assess the ethical issues that professional stakeholders perceive in the development and use of IATs in elderly and dementia care. Methods We conducted a multi-site study involving semi-structured qualitative interviews with researchers and health professionals. We analyzed the interview data using a descriptive thematic analysis to inductively explore relevant ethical challenges. Results Our findings indicate that professional stakeholders find issues of patient autonomy and informed consent, quality of data management, distributive justice and human contact as ethical priorities. Divergences emerged in relation to how these ethical issues are interpreted, how conflicts between different ethical principles are resolved and what solutions should be implemented to overcome current challenges. Conclusions Our findings indicate a general agreement among professional stakeholders on the ethical promises and challenges raised by the use of IATs among older and disabled users. Yet, notable divergences persist regarding how these ethical challenges can be overcome and what strategies should be implemented for the safe and effective implementation of IATs. These findings provide technology developers with useful information about unmet ethical needs. Study results may guide policy makers with firsthand information from relevant stakeholders about possible solutions for ethically-aligned technology governance. (shrink)

Ethische Leitlinien für die klinische Praxis erfreuen sich zunehmender Beliebtheit. Damit klinisch-ethische Leitlinien aber überhaupt erfolgreich wirksam werden können, ist noch Pionierarbeit zu leisten. Solche Leitlinien müssen wissenschaftlich stärker fundiert und ihre praktische Anwendbarkeit muss verbessert werden. In dieser Arbeit werden die ersten Schritte des Projekts METAP zur methodischen Entwicklung und praktischen Implementierung einer Leitlinie für eine patientengerechte Versorgung am Krankenbett beschrieben und zur Diskussion gestellt. Das Projekt orientiert sich methodisch an der Entwicklung medizinischer Leitlinien und generiert damit eine forschungs- (...) und konsensgestützte Leitlinie, die systematischer Evaluation und Modifikation unterliegt und Rechenschaft über ihre wissenschaftliche Fundierung gibt. Zusätzlich zur Leitlinie bietet das Projekt in der Form eines Handbuchs ein Entscheidungsfindungsverfahren an, welches unter anderem deliberative Aspekte unterstützt. Das Handbuch konzentriert sich auf ethische Fragen der Mikroallokation und liefert darüber hinaus Informationen über empirische, ethische und rechtliche Grundlagen für Therapieentscheidungen. Anhand eines Eskalationsmodells können unterschiedliche Instrumente nach Bedarf als ethische Lösungsstrategien eingesetzt werden, von der Kurzfassung im Kitteltaschenformat („Leporello“) mit den wichtigsten Fakten, weiterführenden Texten und Empfehlungen mit normativen und prozeduralen Hinweisen, über stationsinterne Lösungsversuche bis hin zum Ethikkonsil. Klinische Partner sind von Beginn an aktiv in den Entwicklungsprozess eingebunden und verbessern so die Praxistauglichkeit und Akzeptanz sowie die Ausrichtung des Instrumentariums an den tatsächlichen Bedürfnissen. Dieses partnerschaftliche, partizipative Vorgehen scheint eine wichtige Voraussetzung dafür zu sein, dass METAP in der Klinik Fuß fassen konnte. (shrink)

Recently, ethical guidelines for clinical practice have gained increased popularity, but in order to become useful they require more pioneer’s work. Clinical-ethical guidelines need to be based on a scientific foundation and their practicability must be improved. We present and put to discussion the initial steps of the METAP Project about the development and practical implementation of a clinical-ethical guideline dedicated to a fair resource-allocation at the bedside. -/- With its methodological orientation, the project represents a guideline which is based (...) on both research and consensus-building, undergoing systematic evaluation and modification. In addition to the guideline, the project comes with a manual (a tool kit) including a procedural instrument for making decisions supporting deliberative aspects. It focuses on issues of micro-allocation; furthermore, it provides empirical, ethical and legal basics for making fair treatment decisions that should help to prevent overtreatment, undertreatment or discrimination in patient care. We propose an Escalation Model with various instruments serving as problem solving strategies that correspond to the respective needs; these instruments include a pocket-summary (“Leporello”) with the most important facts; further reading material; normative and procedural recommendations; ward-specific strategies, and also the option of clinical ethics consultation. -/- Clinical partners have been actively involved in the developmental process from the beginning and contributed to the practical applicability, acceptance and a valid need-orientation of the whole tool kit. This partnership and the participatory approach seem to have helped METAP to gain a foothold in the clinic. (shrink)

At the intersection of epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of science, this exciting new book examines the epistemic limits of empirical science. It makes a unique contribution to research on epistemological naturalism in Quine’s tradition by criticizing the position based on first-order data from empirical psychology and the history of natural science. This way, it meets the naturalist on their own ground not only regarding subject matter, but also regarding their epistemic methods. The book explores the works of a variety of (...) philosophers in the field, including W. V. Quine, Penelope Maddy, Tyler Burge, Stathis Psillos and Howard Sankey. By carefully considering experimental results from behaviourism as well as developmental and perceptual psychology, Gubelmann finds that none of these disciplines can furnish the epistemic means to successfully naturalize the central cognitive preconditions of scientific theorizing. Furthermore, Gubelmann presents novel arguments for the claims that epistemological naturalists are committed to scientific realism, and that they are unable to defend this position. Based on these results, Gubelmann concludes that epistemology is not part of empirical science, which directly contradicts epistemological naturalism. (shrink)

W. V. O. Quine is generally seen as one of the foremost empiricists of the twentieth century. For large parts of his career, the label “empiricist” is accurate; in his mature work, however, he integrated decidedly antiempiricist elements in his epistemology. From The Roots of Reference onward, he enlists natural selection and innate cognitive structures to ensure that scientific concepts have a “degree of objective validity.” From From Stimulus to Science onward, he also explains the very possibility of communication via (...) a preestablished harmony of innate cognitive structures that is guaranteed by natural selection. This article reconstrues the reasons that compelled Quine to these commitments, and it details the development of Quine’s thinking on these topics across more than 3 decades; in particular, the article argues that recognizing that so-called stimulus meanings are private decisively shaped Quine’s views. By means of a critical evaluation, the article argues that natural selection can make plausible that scientific concepts have a degree of objective validity—if this Quinean claim is properly understood; in contrast, the article suggests, with recourse to research by Robert C. Richardson, that it is doubtful whether natural selection can underpin the preestablished harmony that Quine requires to explain communication. (shrink)

Identidad y misión de la Universidad Católica - Constitución Apostólica ex corde eclesial sobre la Universidad Católica (extracto) Juan Pablo II - La Universidad latinoamericana hoy / Ignacio Martín Baró, S.J. / - El rol de las Universidades Católicas en la tarea de evangelizar las culturas en América Latina / César Jerez S.J. / - Generar cultura autónoma / Ignacio Martín Baró, S.J / - La enseñanza de cómo ser crítico / John Passmore / - El capitalismo del saber / (...) Iván Illich / - Ensayo sobre educación en América Latina / Ernesto Sábato / - Los retos de la conciencia moderna - Discurso sobre espíritu positivo / Augusto Comte / - En torno a la crítica de la filosofía del derecho de Hegel / Kart Marx / - Prólogo a la contribución a la crítica de la economía política (1859) / Kart Marx / - El neocapitalismo como caldo de cultivo / Carlos Díaz / - La defensa de la libertad / Josef Pieper / - Moral para intelectuales / Carlos Vaz Ferreira / - Desafíos de la globalización / Luis Ugalde S.J.... (shrink)

Aunque el Libro I de República parece un diálogo socrático estándar sobre un término moral como justicia, que culmina con un estado de aparente aporía, se termina afirmando que la justicia es como un estado del alma caracterizado por el conocimiento. El libro I termina siendo el preámbulo para mostrar que ser justo es mejor que ser injusto, y que la justicia es en y por sí misma beneficiosa sin relación con cualquier ‘recompensa o consecuencia’ que devenga para el individuo (...) justo (358b). Ello mueve a Adimanto y Glaucon a retar a Sócrates a que muestre cómo independientemente de cualquier otra consideración, el hombre verdaderamente justo está mejor que el verdaderamente injusto, aun cuando el hombre verdaderamente justo se halle en el máximo de dolor y su reputación de bueno haya sido destruida, y el hombre malo no esté sufriendo ningún dolor y disfrute de una reputación de absolutamente virtuoso. En el presente artículo se examina este argumento y la relación entre justicia y eudaimonía, como solución platónica al reto de los sofistas. La clave interpretativa consiste en examinar los sentidos en los que se entiende la noción de eudaimonía en el contexto del reto. Palabras clave: Platón; República; Sócrates; Justicia; EudaimoníaAlthough Republic’s Book I seems a standard Socratic dialogue on a moral term as justice, which culminates with a state of apparent aporia, it ends up asserting that justice is like a state of the soul characterized by knowledge. Book I ends up being the preamble to show that being just is better than being unjust, and that justice is in itself and by itself beneficial, regardless of any ‘reward or consequence’ to the just individual (358b). This leads Adeimantus and Glaucon to challenge Socrates to show how, regardless of any other consideration, the truly just man is better than the truly unjust one, even when the truly just man found himself in the highest pain and his reputation as a good man had been destroyed, while the mean man did not suffer any pain and enjoyed a reputation as an absolutely virtuous man. In this paper we examine this argument and the relation between justice and eudemonia, as a Platonic solution to the sophists’ challenge. The interpretative key consists in examining the senses in w ich the notion of eudemonia is understood in the context of the challenge. Keywords: Plato; Republic; Socrates; Justice; Eudaimonia. (shrink)

Model evaluation for long-term climate predictions must be done on quantities other than the actual prediction, and a comprehensive uncertainty quantificationUncertainty quantification is impossible. An ad hoc alternative is provided by coordinated model intercomparisonsModel intercomparisons which typically use a “one model one vote” approach. The problem with such an approach is that it treats all models as independent and equally plausible. Reweighting all models of the ensemble for performance and dependence seems like an obvious way to improve on model democracy, (...) yet there are open questions on what constitutes a “good” model, how to define dependency, how to interpret robustnessRobustness, and how to incorporate background knowledgeBackground knowledge. UnderstandingUnderstanding those issues have the potential to increase confidence in model predictions in modeling efforts outside of climate scienceClimate science where similar challenges exist. (shrink)

Things and Their Place in Theories Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and ...

In this article, I develop a loosely Wittgensteinian conception of what it takes for a being, including an AI system, to understand language, and I suggest that current state of the art systems are closer to fulfilling these requirements than one might think. Developing and defending this claim has both empirical and conceptual aspects. The conceptual aspects concern the criteria that are reasonably applied when judging whether some being understands language; the empirical aspects concern the question whether a given being (...) fulfills these criteria. On the conceptual side, the article builds on Glock’s concept of intelligence, Taylor’s conception of intrinsic rightness as well as Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. On the empirical side, it is argued that current transformer-based NNLP models, such as BERT and GPT-3 come close to fulfilling these criteria. (shrink)

Model evaluation for long term climate predictions must be done on quantities other than the actual prediction, and a comprehensive uncertainty quantification is impossible. An ad hoc alternative is provided by coordinated model intercomparisons which typically use a “one model one vote” approach. The problem with such an approach is that it treats all models as independent and equally plausible. Reweighting all models of the ensemble for performance and dependence seems like an obvious way to improve on model democracy, yet (...) there are open questions on what constitutes a “good” model, how to define dependency, how to interpret robustness, and how to incorporate background knowledge. Under¬standing those issues has the potential to increase confidence in model predictions in modeling efforts outside of climate science where similar challenges exist. (shrink)

Transformer-based Pre-Trained Language Models currently dominate the field of Natural Language Inference (NLI). We first survey existing NLI datasets, and we systematize them according to the different kinds of logical inferences that are being distinguished. This shows two gaps in the current dataset landscape, which we propose to address with one dataset that has been developed in argumentative writing research as well as a new one building on syllogistic logic. Throughout, we also explore the promises of ChatGPT. Our results show (...) that our new datasets do pose a challenge to existing methods and models, including ChatGPT, and that tackling this challenge via fine-tuning yields only partly satisfactory results. (shrink)

Auch wenn der Mensch ein zur Selbstbestimmung fähiges Wesen ist, kann er nicht vollkommen autark leben. Als soziales Wesen ist er auf seine Mitmenschen angewiesen und muss sich mit den komplexen Fragen des Zusammenlebens auseinandersetzen. Brisant wird es immer dann, wenn unterschiedliche Lebensentwürfe und Lebensgestaltungen aufeinanderprallen, die sich nicht ohne weiteres miteinander vereinbaren lassen. In diesem zweiten Band der Vadian Lectures beleuchten Heinz Kleger, Alois Riklin, Martin Hartmann und Ludwig Hasler die verschiedenen Facetten menschlicher Koexistenz.

Religionen unterbreiten Sinnstiftungsangebote und beeinflussen nicht unwesentlich den Umgang der Menschen miteinander. Sie können zu Fortschritt und Freiheit der Menschen beitragen, aber auch zu Fanatismus und Intoleranz führen. Deshalb ist ihr Stellenwert in einer säkularen Gesellschaft umstritten. Welcher Umgang mit Religionen empfiehlt sich? Ist es für eine soziomoralische Fundierung der Gesellschaft nicht besser, allein auf eine vernunftbasierte Ethik zu setzen? Und lassen sich Glauben und Wissen überhaupt miteinander versöhnen? Mit Beiträgen von Konrad Paul Liessmann, Volker Gerhardt, Nadia Baghdadi und Jan (...) Assmann. (shrink)

Was der Mensch ist, wird seit Jahrtausenden lebhaft diskutiert. Sowohl religiöse als auch säkulare Begründungen stehen dabei als Erklärungsmodelle zur Verfügung, allerdings ohne bisher eine überzeugende Antwort geben zu können. Aus vier unterschiedlichen Perspektiven wird in diesem Band der Frage nachgegangen, was den Menschen auszeichnet. Die allgemeinverständlichen Beiträge von Dagmar Fenner, Annemarie Pieper, Wilhelm Schmid und Dieter Thomä widerstehen dabei der Verführung, endgültige Antworten geben zu wollen, sondern regen zur Selbstreflexion an.

Explores the nature and types of mystical experience and discusses the value of mysticism for humanity.

This article sets in with the question whether current or foreseeable transformer-based large language models (LLMs), such as the ones powering OpenAI’s ChatGPT, could be language users in a way comparable to humans. It answers the question negatively, presenting the following argument. Apart from niche uses, to use language means to act. But LLMs are unable to act because they lack intentions. This, in turn, is because they are the wrong kind of being: agents with intentions need to be autonomous (...) organisms while LLMs are heteronomous mechanisms. To conclude, the article argues, based on structural aspects of transformer-based LLMs, that these LLMs have taken a first step away from mechanistic artificiality to autonomous self-constitution, which means that these models are (slowly) moving into a direction that someday might result in non-human, but equally non-artificial agents, thus subverting the time-honored Kantian distinction between organism and mechanism. (shrink)

W. V. Quine is one of the most eminent philosophers alive today. Now in his mid-eighties he has produced a sharp, sprightly book that encapsulates the whole of his philosophical enterprise, including his thinking on all the key components of his epistemological stance--especially the value of logic and mathematics. New readers of Quine may have to go slowly, fathoming for themselves the richness that past readers already know lies between these elegant lines. For the faithful there is much to ponder. (...) In this short book, based on lectures delivered in Spain in 1990, Quine begins by locating his work historically. He provides a lightning tour of the history of philosophy (particularly the history of epistemology), beginning with Plato and culminating in an appreciative sketch of Carnap's philosophical ambitions and achievements. This leads, in the second chapter, to an introduction to Quine's attempt to naturalize epistemology, which emphasizes his continuities with Carnap rather than the differences between them. The next chapters develop the naturalistic story of the development of science to take account of how our conceptual apparatus is enhanced so that we can view the world as containing re-identifiable objects. Having explained the role of observation sentences in providing a checkpoint for assessing scientific theories, and having despaired of constructing an empirical criterion to determine which sentences are meaningful, Quine in the remaining chapters takes up a variety of important issues about knowledge. He concludes with an extended treatment of his views about reference and meaning and his attitudes toward psychological and modal notions. The presentation is distinctive, and the many small refinements of detail and formulation will fascinate all who know Quine's philosophy. (shrink)

Im Zentrum der Abhandlung steht Nietzsches Entscheidung, den Antichrist schliesslich als vollendete Umwertlung aller Werthe zu betrachten. Merkwürdigerweise wurde bisher nie näher nach dem Zustandekommen und dem Sinn dieser Entscheidung gefragt. Sie geschieht im Zuge von Nietzshes Arbeit an Ecce homo, d.h. im Rückblick auf sein Leben und seine philosophische Entwicklung. Entscheidend dürfte dabei seine ;Wiederbegegnung' mit Zarathustra gewesen sein. In diesem Werk sieht Nietzsche den 'Begriff des Dionysos' - der seine 'positive' Philosophie subsumieren soll - in unüberbietbarer Weise schon (...) gegeben. 'Dionysos' verkörpert dabei eine höchste Form der Bejahung, die insbesondere auch die Lust am Verneinen und Vernichten mit einschliesst bzw. das Neintun nicht vom Jasgen zu trennen weiss. Insofern aber dann Nietzshe seine antichristlich Umwerthung selbst als Ausdruck und Beweis seines positiven Gegen-Ideals verstehen.The paper details with Nietzsche's decision to view The Antichrist as teh complete Revaluation of all Values. Oddly enough, it has never been asked now Nietzsche came to this decision and whether he had good reasons for it. The Antichrist became the complete Revaluation in the course of Nietzsche's work on Ecce homo, when the looked back on his life and philosophical development. His rereading of Zarathustra thereby seems to be most important. in this work Nietzsche sees his 'notion of Dionysos' - under which his 'positive' philosophy should be subsumed - already presented in an unsurpassable way. 'Dionysos' is incorporating a highest form of life-affirmation, including the pleasure in denying and destroying i.e. not knowing how to separate No-doing from Yes-saying. In this sense however Nietzsche can understand his antichristian Revaluation itself as expression and evidence of his positive counter-ideal. (shrink)

Nietzsches entschiedene Wendung gegen den Idealismus und die romantische Vergötterung "grosser Menschen" seit Menschliches, Allzumenschliches beduetet offensichtlich nicht eine Absage an jeglich Form des Ideals "Bleibt der Erde treu", gilt von nun an jedoch als Maxime, der jedes Streben nach einer höheren Kultur unterworfen wird. Nietzsches höchster Typus Mensch zeichnet sich nicht nur dadurch aus, dass er die Realität werden kann. Er sei kein ""idealistischer" Typus einer höheren Art Mensch", wird in Ecce homo ausdrücklich bekräftigt. Während in Also spruch Zarathustra (...) das einholen des Ideals exemplarisch vorgeführt wird, setzt Nietzsche seinerseits alles daran, es seinem "Sohn Zarathustra" gleichzutun d.h. seinem "höeren Selbst" tatsächlich gerecht zu werden.Nietzsche's decisive turn against idealism and the romantic adulation of "great men" since Human, All Too Human obviously does not entail a refusal of any kind of ideal. All striving for a superior culture however should from now on follow the maxim to "remain true to the earth". Not only does Nietzsche's highest type of man conceive reality as it is: the overman himself is conceived as an ideal that actually can become real. he is not an ""idealistic" type of a higher kind of man", as Ecce homo explicitly confirms. Whereas Thus Spoke Zarathustra shows the protagonists catching up with his ideal, Nietzsche himself is determined to live up to his "son Zarathustra", i.e. to fulfill the demands and standards of his "higher self". (shrink)

In his “Kant and Finitism” Tait attempts to connect his analysis of finitist arithmetic with Kant’s perspective on arithmetic. The examination of this attempt is the basis for a distinctive view on the dramatic methodological shift from Kant to Dedekind and Hilbert. Dedekind’s 1888 essay “Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?” gives a logical analysis of arithmetic, whereas Hilbert’s 1899 book “Grundlagen der Geometrie” presents such an analysis of geometry or, as Hilbert puts it, of our spatial intuition. This (...) shift in the late ninteenth century required a radical expansion of logic: first by the inclusion of principles for “systems” and “mappings”, but second by a structuralist broadening of axioms and inferential principles. The interaction of mathematics and logic in mathematical logic opened, around 1920, fields of investigation with enormous impact on the philosophy of mathematics, promoting a deeper integration of mathematical practice and philosophical reflection. (shrink)

While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social (...) ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments. (shrink)

This article critically assesses the empirical research that leads Quine, in his posthumously published work, to abandon his empiricist principle that humans do not have any innate concepts, or knowledge. It is the same empirical research that Penelope Maddy capitalizes on to develop her own contributions to naturalized epistemology, and it has been pioneered by developmental psychologist Elisabeth Spelke. Spelke employs the method of habituation and preferential looking to argue that human infants have innate concepts, and that they have some (...) knowledge about what can and cannot happen to physical objects. Taking into account empirical studies as well as methodological considerations, this article examines whether this research can support these strong philosophical conclusions drawn from it, finding that it likely cannot provide such support. (shrink)

P. KOnig: Einleitung - P. ZIche: Idiographik und allgemeine Wissenschaftlichkeit - Windelband und die Wissenschaftsreflexion um 1900 - G. HArtung: Ein Philosoph korrigiert sich selbst - Wilhelm Windelbands Abkehr vom Relativismus - O. SChlaudt: Philosophie am Leitfaden der Empirie. WIndelbands relativistisches Programm - S. KUft: Windelbands Konzeption von Transzendentalphilosophie und ihr Bezug zur Kulturphilosophie - R. BOnito Oliva: Windelband. KUlturphilosophie und Kulturkrise - P. KOnig: Teleologie und Geschichte bei Wilhelm Windelband - J. BOhr: Im Fortschreiben der Probleme: Windelbands 19. JAhrhundert (...) - T.-H. CHang: Der Wertbegriff beiWilhelm Windelband und sein Konzept der Problemgeschichte - T. KUbalica: Die Geschichte der Philosophie als Problemgeschichte - J. MEhlich: Windelbands Praludien und das Silberne Zeitalter in Russland - G. SChluter: Windelbands italienische Kontakte und Bezugnahmen - D. STefanelli: Notizen uber Karl Vossler und die "Sudwestdeutsche Schule" - C. ZAnfi: Geschichte, Natur und Leben: Windelband und Bergson in der Historismus-Debatte - J.-I. LIndén: Der beseelte Geist: Dilthey als Kritiker der badischen Schule - H. GUndlach: Windelbands Ringen mit der Psychologie - Anhang: Wilhelm Windelband: Blaue Hefte zur Psychologie. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

... dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed.