People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In Experiments 2 (...) and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning. (shrink)

Conditional inferences can be phrased with unspecific terms (“If a person is on a diet, then the person loses weight. A person is on a diet. The person loses weight”) or specific terms (“If Anna is on a diet, then Anna loses weight. Anna is on a diet. Anna loses weight”). We investigate whether the specificity of terms affects people's acceptance of inferences. In Experiment 1, inferences with specific terms received higher acceptance ratings than inferences with unspecific terms. In Experiments (...) 2 and 3, we used the same problems as in Experiment 1 but also problems with unspecific terms in the conditional and specific terms in the categorical and vice versa. When the conditional and the categorical had the same specificity, results were as in Experiment 1. When the specificity of the conditional and the categorical mismatched, acceptance ratings were lower. Our results illustrate the importance of phrasing on reasoning. (shrink)

Edited by a leading exponent of the school, this book offers--in the words of the movement's founders--logical positivism's revolutionary theories on meaning and metaphysics, the nature of logic and mathematics, the foundations of knowledge ...

Probabilistic theories of reasoning assume that people use their prior knowledge to estimate the conditional probability of q given p and that this probability predicts the acceptance of modus ponens inferences. But how do people reason with unfamiliar conditionals for which they do not have prior knowledge? Reasoning without prior knowledge has been extensively investigated in experiments in which participants were instructed to reason deductively. But it is still not clear how people reason with unfamiliar conditionals when they are instructed (...) to reason as in daily life. Can probabilities also predict reasoning with unfamiliar content? In two experiments we instructed participants to reason as in everyday life and to evaluate conclusions from familiar and unfamiliar conditionals. Results showed that reasoning with familiar conditionals can be predicted by the conditional probability. For unfamiliar conditionals, however, this was not the case. Conclusions from unfamiliar conditionals were accepted more strongly than what could be expected according to their conditional probability. Our findings challenge probabilistic theories of reasoning and suggest that other approaches, such as a dual-strategy model, describe our results more adequately. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead's SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD, originally published in 1925, redefines the concept of modern science.

Le present volume rassemble plusieurs etudes qu' Alfred Schutz avait consacrees a diverses questions qui gravitent autour d'un probleme philosophique majeur: celui de la socialite. La plupart de ces etudes ont Me publiees ailleurs, mais elles etaient dispersees et d'un acces parfois difficile. Tel quel, l'ouvrage que nous presentons n' est que la premiere partie d'un ensemble dans lequell'auteur se proposait de faire reunir par son disciple et ami Maurice Natanson les nombreux essais qu'il avait ecrits depuis son arrivee (...) aux Etats-Unis au debut de la demiere guerre. La mort l'empecha de voir realiser ce projet. 11 nous a semble que la pUblication successive de cet ensemble, dans la fidelite aux indications laissees par l'auteur, etait Ie plus bel hommage que nous pussions rendre a ce penseur qui fut notre ami et meritait sans nul doute de tenir dans Ie courant phenomenologique une place de premier plan que faillirent lui refuser les circonstances dramatiques de sa vie, jointes a sa trop grande modestie per­ sonnelle. II me faudrait ici parler de l'homme, evoquer sa finesse d'esprit, son ironie penetrante, sa serenite et son courage dans l' exil, l' event ail tres vaste de ses preoccupations, Ie don de jeu­ nesse et de sympathie grftce auquel il entreprit a quarante ans d'assimiler avec bonheur une culture nouvelle, pour y exceller bientOt. (shrink)

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide (...) on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

A. J. Ayer was one of the foremost analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, and was known as a brilliant and engaging speaker. In essays based on his influential Dewey Lectures, Ayer addresses some of the most critical and controversial questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science, examining the nature of inductive reasoning and grappling with the issues that most concerned him as a philosopher. This edition contains revised and expanded versions of the lectures and two additional essays. Ayer (...) begins by considering Hume's formulation of the problem of induction and then explores the inferences on which we base our beliefs in factual matters. In other essays, he defines the three kinds of probability that inform inductive reasoning and examines the various criteria for verifiability and falsifiability. In his extensive introduction, Graham Macdonald discusses the arguments in _Probability and Evidence_, how they relate to Ayer's other works, and their influence in contemporary philosophy. He also provides a brief biographical sketch of Ayer, and includes a bibliography of works about and in response to _Probability and Evidence_. (shrink)

No es posible una comprensión integral del influyente pensamiento de Anselmo de Canterbury (1033-1109) sin incluir su concepción de la verdad. La articulación entre la famosa demostración de Dios en el "Proslogion" con sus ideas acerca de la libertad en su "Tratado sobre la libertad del albedrío", mediadas por sus planteamientos sobre el origen y el significado del mal en su "Tratado sobre la caída del demonio", requiere centrarse en la presente obra. La presente edición está acompañada de una serie (...) de ensayos sobre el problema de la verdad en la Antigüedad y en la Edad Media que pasa por Aristóteles, Agustín de Hipona, Boecio, Dionisio Areopagita, Tomás de Aquino, Ockham y otros. (shrink)

El resultado más importante de la epistemología de Evandro Agazzi ha sido probablemente la elaboración de un concepto analógico de ciencia, en el sentido de que, después de haber caracterizado la ciencia como conocimiento objetivo y riguroso, ha mostrado que estas dos características se satisfacen de forma diferente según las condiciones epistémicas, ontológicas y pragmáticas del conocimiento, dando lugar a las diferentes ciencias, naturales, humanas o sociales. El presente artículo subraya el hecho de que cada ciencia se caracteriza entonces por (...) su propia forma de racionalidad y, por lo tanto, el mismo concepto de racionalidad científica tiene un significado analógico bajo las mismas condiciones. Además, la analogía concierne a la racionalidad en cuanto tal y por esta vía se evita el dogmatismo que pretende reconocer una única forma de racionalidad, así como el relativismo que desconoce cualquier forma de racionalidad. Como introducción a este análisis se ofrece una presentación de los elementos fundamentales de la doctrina de la analogía según la tradición clásica y sus concepciones actuales y luego se procede a aplicar dichos requisitos al caso de la racionalidad, llegando a precisar el concepto de racionalidad analógica. (shrink)

Philospher, mathematician, and general man of science, Alfred North Whitehead was a polymath whose interests and generous sympathies encompassed entire worlds.

A dissertation in the tradition of logical positivism includes a discussion of the functions and methods of philosophy and a critique of ethics and theology.

We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...) understood. (shrink)

Autonomous Agents addresses the related topics of self-control and individual autonomy. "Self-control" is defined as the opposite of akrasia-weakness of will. The study of self-control seeks to understand the concept of its own terms, followed by an examination of its bearing on one's actions, beliefs, emotions, and personal values. It goes on to consider how a proper understanding of self-control and its manifestations can shed light on personal autonomy and autonomous behaviour. Perspicuous, objective, and incisive throughout, Alfred Mele makes (...) a convincing case for the value of individual autonomy. (shrink)

A través del siguiente artículo presento algunas ideas acerca de la forma en que pienso el ejercicio del terapeuta filosófico. En breves apartados planteo la necesidad de entender que la Asesoría Filosófica se debe acercar a los enfoques propuestos por la teoría general de los sistemas, por lo tanto, es preciso que se conciba su quehacer en términos de integridad y de unidad, tanto disciplinar, como en su práctica terapéutica. Para ello, abordaré aspectos generales que ayuden a comprender algunos problemas (...) de la asesoría filosófica o filosofía clínica, y luego haré una reflexión que invita a pensar, que enfoques de la teoría general de los sistemas, pueden favorecer las prácticas terapéuticas dentro de este nuevo-viejo modo de hacer filosofía. Philosophy and Unity. A Reflection on Philosophical Counseling as a systemic work Throughout the following paper I present some ideas about the way I think of the philosophical therapist’s practice. In short sections I pose the need to understand that Philosophical Counseling is to come closer to the approaches proposed by the general theory of systems, and consequently that it is to conceive its work in terms of integrity and unity, both thas discipline and in its therapeutic practice. To this aim, I will address general aspects that help to understand some problems of philosophical counseling or clinical philosophy. After that I will reflect on how approaches from the general theory of systems might favor therapeutic practices within this both new-fashioned and old-fashioned way to do philosophy. (shrink)

En este artículo revisamos la relación que se establece entre la democracia y el proyecto socialista. Debido a que las democracias actuales son predominantemente representativas de tradición liberal, también analizamos su ideal central: la libertad, en relación con el valor más importante de toda propuesta socialista: la igualdad. Nos referimos a la propuesta de Cornelius Castoriadis de un proyecto de autonomía personal y colectiva que entiende la libertad y la igualdad como propósitos políticos, por lo que la verdadera democracia se (...) identificaría con el socialismo. Palabras clave: Democracia; socialismo; libertad; igualdad; autonomía. Democracy and Socialism? An approach to Cornelius Castoriadis’ proposalIn this paper we review the relation between democracy and the socialist project. Since current democracies are predominantly representative and liberal, we also analyze their central ideal, namely, freedom, in connection with the most important value of every socialist proposal, namely, equality. We will refer to Cornelius Castoriadis’ proposal, centered on a project of personal and collective autonomy that recognizes both freedom and equality as political purposes, whereby true democracy would be identified with socialism. Keywords: Democracy; socialism; freedom; equality; autonomy. (shrink)

The latest offering in the highly successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, The Philosophy of Action features contributions from twelve leading figures in the field, including: Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, Donald Davidson, Wayne Davis, Harry Frankfurt, Carl Ginet, Gilbert Harman, Jennifer Hornsby, Jaegwon Kim, Hugh McCann, Paul Moser, and Brian O'Shaughnessy. Alfred Mele provides an introductory essay on the topics chosen and the questions they deal with. Topics addressed include intention, reasons for action, and the nature and explanation of (...) internal action. A selective bibliography is included as a guide to further reading. Comprehensive and up-to-date, this collection provides an accessible and stimulating introduction for readers interested in the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo discuto la consistencia que elargumento de la inferencia a la mejor explicación ofrece al realismo, en particularal realismo científico. Mi trabajo está dividido endos partes. En la primera, trataré de explicar lasvirtudes del realismo, relacionándolo con la IME.En otras palabras, expondré los argumentos de porqué la IME es importante para el realismo científico.Adicionalmente mencionaré algunas definicionessobre teorías de la verdad para justificar cuál deellas es la más afín al realismo en general; y mereferiré a las diferencias (...) que existen sobre losdistintos niveles de realismo para mostrar que,por lo menos, uno de ellos puede ser compatiblecon una postura antirrealista, que en últimas esla que voy a defender. En la segunda, mostrarétres réplicas que se le pueden hacer a la IME si lointerpretamos como un razonamiento distintivodel realismo científico. El primer reparo es que losrealistas científicos incurren en un error categorialcuando hablan de términos observacionales yentidades teóricas; el segundo es que la IMEconstituye una petición de principio, siempre ycuando se use como un argumento realista; y latercera objeción consiste en mostrar que la IMEno es genuinamente un argumento exclusivo delrealismo científico ya que puede ser compatible conposturas empiristas o instrumentalistas.In this paper I try to discuss the consistencyargument that the inference to the best explanation offers to realism, in particular toscientific realism. My paper will be divided in twoparts. In the first one, I try to explain the virtuesof realism, relating it to IBE. In other words, I willdiscuss the arguments of why IBE is important forscientific realism. I also mention some definitionson theories of truth to justify which one is moreakin to realism in general. In addition, I will focuson the differences of various levels of realism toshow that, at least one of them may be compatiblewith an anti-realist position, which ultimately iswhat I defend. In the second part, I offer threereplies that can be given to IBE if we interpret it asan argument typical of scientific realism. The firstobjection is that scientific realists make a categorymistake when they talk about observation termsand theoretical entities, the second is that IBE turnsout to be a petitio principii, provided it is realisticto use it as an argument, and the third objection isthat IBE is not genuinely an argument exclusive ofscientific realism, since it may also be compatiblewith empiricist or instrumentalist views. (shrink)

Hume is one of the greatest of all British philosophers, and even in his own lifetime was celebrated as one of the pivotal figures of the Enlightenment. A central theme of his philosophy is the conviction that questions traditionally thought of as completely independent of the scientific realm--questions about the mind, about morality, and about God, for example--are actually best explained using the experimental methods characteristic of the natural sciences. Hume's 'naturalist' approach to a wide variety of philosophical topics resulted (...) in highly original theories about perception, self-identity, causation, morality, politics, and religion, all of which are discussed in this stimulating introduction by A J Ayer, himself one of the twentieth century's most important philosophers. Ayer also gives an account of Hume's fascinating life and character, and includes generous quotations from Hume's lucid and often witty writings. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to analyze the convergences and divergences between two conceptions of realism: Markus Gabriel’s “new realism” and Evandro Agazzi’s realism. Firstly, the main theses behind “new realism” will be presented, drawing on Gabriel’s text ‘_Why the World Does Not Exist’_ (2015), originally published in German as _Warum es die Welt nicht gibt_ in 2013. Secondly, the constitutive aspects of realism developed by Agazzi will be explored, primarily in works such as ‘_Temas y problemas de filosofía (...) de la física’_ (1978), ‘_Filosofia, scienza e verità’_, Rusconi, Milano (1989), ‘_El bien el mal y la ciencia_’ (1996), and ‘_Filosofía de la Naturaleza. Ciencia y Cosmología’_ (2000), among others. Finally, the convergences and divergences between these two conceptions of realism will be analyzed, allowing for an inference, based on sound reasoning, about the potential novelty of the so-called “new realism”. (shrink)

En la abundante historiografía del siglo XIX mexicano hay varias explicaciones sobre las causas del colapso económico y se distinguen tres etapas: un periodo de muy bajo crecimiento entre 1820 y 1850, un periodo de retroceso absoluto entre 1850 y 1870 y finalmente una recuperación moderada a partir de la década de 1870. Una forma de articular coherentemente todas estas explicaciones consiste en poner el énfasis en la cuestión fiscal, aprovechando algunas novedades teóricas que arrojan nuevas luces sobre discusiones añejas. (...) Así se abona a la discusión sobre la formación del Estado mexicano y su relación con el desarrollo económico. (shrink)

ResumenEn este artículo me propongo realizar una defensa del naturalismo como fundamento metafísico de la ciencia, mostrando para ello que el “nuevo realismo” de Markus Gabriel es otra versión contemporánea del relativismo y del idealismo y a pesar de que Gabriel acepta la distinción fregeana de sentido y referencia, sus implicaciones son explícitamente antinaturalistas. En concreto, la defensa al naturalismo que intento ofrecer aquí es una crítica abierta a las consecuencias antinaturalistas y pseudocientíficas del “nuevo realismo” de Gabriel. Otra manera (...) de comprender este trabajo es mostrar que el naturalismo puede ser una pieza clave para entender la discusión contemporánea entre la ciencia y la pseudociencia.Palabras clave: Gabriel; naturalismo; nuevo realismo; demarcación; ciencia. (shrink)

The Structures of the Life-World is the final focus of twenty-seven years of Alfred Schutz's labor, encompassing the fruits of his work between 1932 and his death in 1959. This book represents Schutz's seminal attempt to achieve a comprehensive grasp of the nature of social reality. Here he integrates his theory of relevance with his analysis of social structures. Thomas Luckmann, a former student of Schutz's, completed the manuscript for publication after Schutz's untimely death.

In this book, the author of "Language, Truth and Logic" tackles one of the central issues of philosophy - how we can know anything - by setting out all the sceptic's arguments and trying to counter them one by one.

What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.