How can we figure out what’s right or wrong, if moral truths are neither self-evident nor something we can perceive? Very roughly, the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) says that we should begin moral inquiry from what we already confidently think, seeking to find a a match between our initial convictions and general principles that are well-supported by background theories, mutually adjusting both until we reach a coherent outlook in which our beliefs are in harmony (the equilibrium part) and we (...) know why and how they support each other (the reflective part). It has been central to the self-understanding of normative ethics and other branches of philosophy in the last half a century. In this chapter, we examine the history of the idea of RE and introduce a schema for generating 256 variants. We explain why RE is subject to serious objections insofar as it purports to yield epistemic justification in virtue of achieving coherence. However, we also develop a new argument to the effect that RE is the best feasible method for us to achieve moral understanding and the ability to justify our judgments to others. It may thus be crucial for responsible moral inquiry, even if coherence among considered judgments and principles is neither sufficient nor necessary for justified moral belief. (shrink)

In recent years, many studies have shown that perceiving other individuals’ direct gaze has robust effects on various attentional and cognitive processes. However, considerably less attention has been devoted to investigating the affective effects triggered by eye contact. This article reviews research concerning the effects of others’ gaze direction on observers’ affective responses. The review focuses on studies in which affective reactions have been investigated in well-controlled laboratory experiments, and in which contextual factors possibly influencing perceivers’ affects have been controlled. (...) Two important themes emerged from this review. First, explicit affective evaluations of seeing another’s direct versus averted gaze have resulted in rather inconsistent findings; some studies report more positive subjective feelings to direct compared to averted gaze, whereas others report the opposite pattern. These contradictory findings may be related, for example, to differences between studies in terms of the capability of direct-gaze stimuli to elicit feelings of self-involvement. Second, studies relying on various implicit measures have reported more consistent results; they indicate that direct gaze increases affective arousal, and more importantly, that eye contact automatically evokes a positively valenced affective reaction. Based on the review, possible psychological mechanisms for the positive affective reactions elicited by eye contact are described. (shrink)

Underestimation of reliability is discussed from the viewpoint of deflation in estimates of reliability caused by artificial systematic technical or mechanical error in the estimates of correlation. Most traditional estimators of reliability embed product–moment correlation coefficient in the form of item–score correlation or principal component or factor loading. PMC is known to be severely affected by several sources of deflation such as the difficulty level of the item and discrepancy of the scales of the variables of interest and, hence, the (...) estimates by Rit and λi are always deflated in the settings related to estimating reliability. As a short-cut to deflation-corrected estimators of reliability, this article suggests a procedure where Rit and λi in the estimators of reliability are replaced by alternative estimators of correlation that are less deflated. These estimators are called deflation-corrected estimators of reliability. Several families of DCERs are proposed and their behavior is studied by using polychoric correlation coefficient, Goodman–Kruskal gamma, and Somers delta as examples of MEC-corrected coefficients of correlation. (shrink)

There is an urge to introduce high technology and robotics in care settings. Assisted living is the fastest growing form of older adults’ long-term care. Resident autonomy has become the watchword for good care. This article sheds light on the potential effects of care robotics on the sense of autonomy of older people in AL. Three aspects of the residents’ sense of autonomy are of particular interest: interaction-based sense of autonomy, coping-based sense of autonomy, and potential-based sense of autonomy. Ethnographical (...) data on resident autonomy in an AL facility and existing literature on care robots are utilized in studying what kind of assurances different types of robots would provide to maintain the sense of autonomy in AL. Robots could strengthen the different types of sense of autonomy in multiple ways. Different types of robots could widen the residents’ space of daily movements, sustain their capacities, and help them maintain and even create future expectations. Robots may strengthen the sense of autonomy of older persons in AL; however, they may simultaneously pose a threat. Multi-professional discussions are needed on whether robots are welcomed in care, and if they are, how, for whom, and in what areas. (shrink)

Antti Kauppinen Les philosophes se sont efforcés de montrer que nous devons être vertueux pour être heureux. Mais tant que nous nous en tenons à la compréhension moderne du bonheur comme quelque chose de vécu par un sujet – et je soutiens contre les eudaimonistes contemporains que nous devrions effectivement le faire – il peut au mieux exister un lien de causalité contingent entre la vertu et le bonheur. Néanmoins, nous avons de bonnes raisons de penser qu’être vertueux est (...) non accidentellement propice au bonheur. Pourquoi? Premièrement, le bonheur est, sommairement, la condition expérientielle de jouir d’états phénoménaux affectifs principalement positifs concernant des choses qui sont subjectivement importantes pour nous. Je soutiens que ce sentimentalisme à propos du bonheur a plusieurs avantages par rapport à la conception de Daniel Haybron comme état émotionnel. Deuxièmement, dans la mesure où nous sommes vertueux, nous pouvons identifier correctement ce qui vaut la peine d’être fait dans notre situation particulière et nous la poursuivrons habilement. En même temps, nous ne sommes pas dérangés par des choses qui ne valent pas la peine d’être prises en charge ou de s’inquiéter. Par conséquent, les personnes vertueuses sont susceptibles de profiter d’émotions positives centrales liées au succès et à l’approbation des autres, et d’éviter les émotions négatives communes liées à la comparaison sociale ou à l’avarice. Bien que leur bonheur soit encore en partie une question de chance, il l’est dans une moindre mesure que pour le reste d’entre nous. (shrink)

On varsin yleisesti hyväksyttyä, että rangaistuksen ilmaisullinen tehtävä - eli se, että se ilmaisee yhteisön paheksuntaa - on yksi sen ominaispiirre. Viime aikoina on kuitenkin esitetty myös kunnianhimoisempia väitteitä siitä, että rangaistuksen voisi oikeuttaa sen ilmaisullisella tehtävällä. Nämä näkemykset ovat myös saaneet runsaasti kritiikkiä. Tässä esseessä kehittelen aiemmin muotoilemaani versiota ekspressiivisestä rangaistusteoriasta, jonka mukaan asenteiden toiminnallinen ilmaisu rankaisemalla on oikeutettua siksi, että muuten rikoksen uhrilla ei ole hänelle kuuluvaa oikeudenhaltijan statusta. Jos ihmisen oikeuksia voi loukata rangaistuksetta, ne jäävät moraaliseksi ihanteeksi (...) eivätkä toteudu sosiaalisina tosiasioina. Esitän, että tämä näkemys välttää ainakin useimmat muille ilmaisuteorioille esitetyt haasteet. (shrink)

The ageing populations of the Western world present a wide range of economic, social, and cultural implications, and given the challenges posed by deteriorating maintenance ratios, the scenario is somewhat worrying. In this paper, I investigate whether Martha C. Nussbaum's capabilities approach could secure dignity for older people in long‐term care, despite the per capita decreases in resources. My key research question asks, ‘What implications does Nussbaum's list of central human capabilities have for practical social care?’ My methodology combines Nussbaum's (...) list with ethnographic data gathered from a Finnish sheltered home for older people. On the basis of this study, it seems that the capabilities approach is a plausible framework for the ethics of care because it highlights differences in the ability to function and thus differences in opportunities to pursue a good life. The ideas presented in this article could assist social policy planners and executives in creating policies and practices that help old people to maintain their dignity until the end of their days. (shrink)

The reliability of a test score is discussed from the viewpoint of underestimation of and, specifically, deflation in estimates or reliability. Many widely used estimators are known to underestimate reliability. Empirical cases have shown that estimates by widely used estimators such as alpha, theta, omega, and rho may be deflated by up to 0.60 units of reliability or even more, with certain types of datasets. The reason for this radical deflation lies in the item–score correlation embedded in the estimators: because (...) the estimates by Rit are deflated when the number of categories in scales are far from each other, as is always the case with item and score, the estimates of reliability are deflated as well. A short-cut method to reach estimates closer to the true magnitude, new types of estimators, and deflation-corrected estimators of reliability, are studied in the article. The empirical section is a study on the characteristics of combinations of DCERs formed by different bases for estimators, different alternative estimators of correlation as the linking factor between item and the score variable, and different conditions. Based on the simulation, an initial typology of the families of DCERs is presented: some estimators are better with binary items and some with polytomous items; some are better with small sample sizes and some with larger ones. (shrink)

Effective teachers use mnemonic tools or mnemonic triggers to improve the students’ retention of the study material. This article discusses mnemonic triggers from a theoretical viewpoint based on Jerome S. Bruner’s writings. Fifty small linguistic–cognitive, constructive-, rhetorical-, and phonological mnemonic triggers are detected. These triggers may be the elements our brain use when “constructing the realities” in a Brunerian sense when ordering, differentiating, comparing, and handling information, stories and experiences in our brain. Many of these are small, hidden linguistic elements (...) in speech. This article discusses their usage in the educational talk and textbooks. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the study of explicit performative utterances in the following ways. First, it presents arguments that support Austin’s view that these utterances are not assertions. In doing so, it offers an original explanation of why they cannot be true or false. Second, it puts forward a new analysis of explicit performatives as cases of showing performing, rather than of instances of asserting or declaring that one is performing a particular act. Finally, it develops a new account of (...) the role of the performative prefix in signalling performative intentions that shows how the prefix can play a special role in the interpretation of performatives utterances. (shrink)

In _Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism_, Jari Kaukua offers a new interpretation of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī’s (d. 1191 CE) illuminationist (_ishrāqī_) philosophy. Commonly portrayed as a mystic, Suhrawardī appears here as a critical and systematic philosopher.

This article argues that what Grice termed ‘particularized conversational implicatures’ can be divided into two types. In some cases, it is possible to reconstruct the inference from the explicit content of the utterance to the implicature without employing a premise to the effect that that the speaker expressed that content (by means of an utterance). I call these ‘material implicatures’. Those whose reconstruction relies on a premise about the speaker's verbal behaviour, by contrast, I call ‘behavioural implicatures’. After showing that (...) the division is theoretically significant, I ask whether current pragmatic theory is able to accommodate it. I conclude that, while (neo)-Gricean pragmatics cannot do so straightforwardly, the distinction is already implicit in Relevance Theory. The article ends by considering the question of whether, in the light of previous discussion, speaker meaning really is always an instance of non-natural meaning. (shrink)

In disputes about conceptual analysis, each side typically appeals to pre-theoretical 'intuitions' about particular cases. Recently, many naturalistically oriented philosophers have suggested that these appeals should be understood as empirical hypotheses about what people would say when presented with descriptions of situations, and have consequently conducted surveys on non-specialists. I argue that this philosophical research programme, a key branch of what is known as 'experimental philosophy', rests on mistaken assumptions about the relation between people's concepts and their linguistic behaviour. The (...) conceptual claims that philosophers make imply predictions about the folk's responses only under certain demanding, counterfactual conditions. Because of the nature of these conditions, the claims cannot be tested with methods of positivist social science. We are, however, entitled to appeal to intuitions about folk concepts in virtue of possessing implicit normative knowledge acquired through reflective participation in everyday linguistic practices. (shrink)

This important book investigates the emergence and development of a distinct concept of self-awareness in post-classical, pre-modern Islamic philosophy. Jari Kaukua presents the first extended analysis of Avicenna's arguments on self-awareness - including the flying man, the argument from the unity of experience, the argument against reflection models of self-awareness and the argument from personal identity - arguing that all these arguments hinge on a clearly definable concept of self-awareness as pure first-personality. He substantiates his interpretation with an analysis (...) of Suhrawardī's use of Avicenna's concept and Mullā Sadrā's revision of the underlying concept of selfhood. The study explores evidence for a sustained, pre-modern and non-Western discussion of selfhood and self-awareness, challenging the idea that these concepts are distinctly modern, European concerns. The book will be of interest to a range of readers in history of philosophy, history of ideas, Islamic studies and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

There are three conditions which an item has to fulfill in order to be listed into an inventory. Based on those three conditions, the logically basic entities are introduced: they are points, sets, and collections. These logically basic entities are related with three different logical relations, i.e., “is an element of”, “is a subset of”, and “is a part of” –relations, to constitute concepts. Those three logical relations have different relational properties, and thus they are to be distinguished. The logically (...) basic entities are said to exist whereas the concepts constituted by them are said to subsist. One of the most important results is that we should not mix two inventories together, since otherwise inconsistencies follow. (shrink)

In this paper three different solutions to Grelling’s paradox, also called the heterological paradox, are given. Firstly, after given the original formulation of the paradox by Grelling and Nelson in 1908, a solution to this paradox offered by Frank Plumpton Ramsey in 1925 is presented. His solution is based on the different meanings of the word “meaning.” Secondly, Grelling himself advocated the solution proposed by Uuno Saarnio in 1937. Saarnio’s solution is based on the exact definitions of the concept of (...) word, and the concept of denoting. Thirdly, a solution to this paradox was proposed also by Georg Henrik von Wright in 1960, but his solution consists of saying that the word “heterological” does not name a concept—or it names a concept only up to a singular point. (shrink)

Everyone agrees that not all norms that govern belief and assertion are epistemic. But not enough attention has been paid to distinguishing epistemic norms from others. Norms in general differ from merely evaluative standards in virtue of the fact that it is fitting to hold subjects accountable for violating them, provided they lack an excuse. Different kinds of norm are most readily distinguished by their distinctive mode of accountability. My thesis is roughly that a norm is epistemic if and only (...) if its violation makes it fitting to reduce epistemic trust in the subject, even if there is no doubt about their sincerity, honesty, or other moral virtues. That is, violations of epistemic norms don’t merit resentment or other forms of blame, but rather deduction of credibility points in internal scorekeeping and related attitudinal and behavioral changes. As Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice shows, such distrust is undesirable from the point of view of an epistemic agent. Consequently, when one manifests epistemic distrust towards a subject in suitable circumstances, it amounts a way of holding her accountable. Since this form of accountability involves no opprobrium, there is good reason to think it is not linked to voluntary control in the same way as moral accountability. Finally, I make use of this account of what makes epistemic norms distinctive to point out some faulty diagnostics in debates about norms of assertion. My aim is not to defend any substantive view, however, but only to offer tools for identifying the right kind of evidence for epistemic norms. (shrink)

(Pdf updated to final, slightly revised version of November 2010) -/- Almost everyone would prefer to lead a meaningful life. But what is meaning in life and what makes a life meaningful? I argue, first, for a new analysis of the concept of meaningfulness in terms of the appropriateness of feelings of fulfilment and admiration. Second, I argue that while the best current conceptions of meaningfulness, such as Susan Wolf’s view that in a meaningful life ‘subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness’, (...) do a fairly good job capturing meaningfulness at a time, we need an account that makes sense of the intimate connection between meaningfulness and having a direction in one’s life. According to the Teleological View I propose, what makes a single chapter of a life most meaningful is success in reaching central, objectively valuable goals as a result of exercising essential human capacities. Life as a whole is most meaningful when past efforts increase the success of future goal-setting, goal-seeking, and goal-reaching, so that the life forms a coherent whole without being dedicated to a single aim. Since coherence in this sense is a holistic property of a life, global prudential value is not a function of local prudential values. I suggest that just as pleasure is the final good of human beings as subjects of experience, meaningfulness is the final good of human beings as active agents. (shrink)

At the heart of Jürgen Habermas's explication of communicative rationality is the contention that all speech acts oriented to understanding raise three different kinds of validity claims simultaneously: claims to truth, truthfulness, and normative rightness. This paper argues that Habermas presents exactly three distinct, logically independent arguments for his simultaneity thesis: an argument from structure; an argument from criticizability/rejectability; and an argument from understanding/reaching understanding. It is further maintained that the simultaneity thesis receives cogent support only from the Argument from (...) understanding/reaching understanding, and only if the notion of 'understanding' is expanded to that of 'agreement'. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to describe and reflect ethical challenges in a grounded theory study on the dynamics of hope in HIV-positive adults and their significant others. It concentrates on the justification of a research problem, sensitive research and the relationship between the researcher and the participants in data collection. The basis of ethically sound nursing research on the dynamics of hope in these two vulnerable groups lies in the relationship between the researcher and the participant. However, it (...) is also obvious that the content, the process, the methods used and the ethics of the study cannot be divorced from this relationship. In conducting grounded theory research on the dynamics of hope in this research population, the researcher has to consider the surrounding world, that is, the reality in which these people live in hope or despair. (shrink)

What should we believe if epistemic and practical reasons for belief point in different directions? I argue that there’s no single answer, but rather a Dualism of Theoretical and Practical Reason is true: what we epistemically ought to believe and what we practically ought to believe may come apart, and both are independently authoritative. I argue in particular against recently popular views that subordinate the epistemic to the practical: it’s not the case that epistemic reasons bear on what we ‘just (...) plain ought’ to believe just to the extent we have practical reason to believe epistemically correctly. Why? Because epistemic reasons give rise to authoritative demands independently of the practical pay-off of believing accordingly. This is shown in particular by the fact that it can be fitting to epistemically ‘blame’ us just because we fail to believe as we epistemically ought, even if we don’t have sufficient practical reason to believe so. I also argue that we don’t need to come up with what we ‘just plain ought’ to believe, because contrary epistemic and practical responsibility responses can be simultaneously fitting in conflict cases, and because epistemic and practical ought judgments give rise to different enkrasia requirements, among other things. (shrink)

Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives an overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.

Postmerger integration is a highly challenging and demanding task. Its success depends not only on economic factors but also on the organisational members' feelings and their personal contribution to the new entity. Mergers are usually made for the sake of profitability in the first place, whereas less attention is paid to employees in such situations. This article describes various ethical observations made in our study on corporate mergers in the Nordic Electro-business industry. We examine how the organisational change was experienced (...) by personnel, what kinds of ethical reflections surfaced in different phases of the process, and what conclusions might be drawn from them. The main focus is on the ethical meanings that emerged in our interviewees' stories spontaneously, without the topic of ethics having been separately brought up in the interview situation. The organisational members: we interviewed 35 electro-business employees who were either transferred from Vattenfall's contracting unit to the acquiring company or were already working there at the time of the merger. These persons were interviewed twice: first in 2001, the year of the initial merger, and again in 2005, 4 years from the start of the process and 1 year from the final ownership change. The merger process seemed to lead to decreased responsibility among the organisational members, which highlights the discrepancy between genuine ethical thinking and executive talk. Our study also revealed a dramatic shift in the moral attitudes of the managers who fell from power in the turmoil of organisational change. This moral dimension is evident in their sharply critical argumentation against the new operating model and new corporate management, as well as in their eventual indifference and non-commitment to the organisation. The ethical meanings of 'the good life' and a happy work community slowly disintegrated and were replaced by a longing for the earlier communality and sense of togetherness in their old organisation. This meant that 'the good life' would have to be sought elsewhere. (shrink)

The ability to attribute false-beliefs to others — the hallmark of a representational theory of mind — has been shown to be reliant on linguistic ability, specifically on competence in sentential complementation after verbs of communication and cognition such as `say that' and `think that'. The reason commonly put forward for this is that these structures provide a representational format which enables the child to think about another's thoughts. The paper offers an alternative explanation. Drawing on the work of the (...) philosophers Michael Dummett and Robert Brandom, it argues that the available data better fits an account that grounds the notion of representation in the commitments undertaken by asserters. The competence in sentential complementation that precedes false-belief attribution is viewed as a result of the child developing a meta-awareness of the syntactic forms employed in assertion. This meta-awareness gives the child access to discourse about the commitments undertaken by speakers and the consequences of these for their behaviour. This understanding constitutes the child's grasp of the representational nature of discourse and thought. The paper thus offers an illocutionary account of theory-of-mind development. (shrink)

The ability to attribute false-beliefs to others — the hallmark of a representational theory of mind — has been shown to be reliant on linguistic ability, specifically on competence in sentential complementation after verbs of communication and cognition such as `say that' and `think that'. The reason commonly put forward for this is that these structures provide a representational format which enables the child to think about another's thoughts. The paper offers an alternative explanation. Drawing on the work of the (...) philosophers Michael Dummett and Robert Brandom, it argues that the available data better fits an account that grounds the notion of representation in the commitments undertaken by asserters. The competence in sentential complementation that precedes false-belief attribution is viewed as a result of the child developing a meta-awareness of the syntactic forms employed in assertion. This meta-awareness gives the child access to discourse about the commitments undertaken by speakers and the consequences of these for their behaviour. This understanding constitutes the child's grasp of the representational nature of discourse and thought. The paper thus offers an illocutionary account of theory-of-mind development. (shrink)

During the colonial contact and especially after the 2nd World War in the Solomon Islands local communities various traditions of woodcarving and other handicrafts have transformed from religious and ritual objects to commercial 'tourist arts' that have become economically important for local communities. In the course of culture change Western concepts such as art and culture have been adopted to local languages and they have replaced local terminologies and classifications in various ways. These processes may be described as 'conceptual colonialism'. (...) The meaning shifts and emerging new conceptual categories produce homogenising effects that transform the local ways of cultural thinking towards the direction of hegemonic Western interpretations of socio-cultural phenomena. The concept of art should be treated as one major element in this linguistic power play between the local and the global. (shrink)

in a seminal and highly influential study, Werner Jaeger presented the development of Aristotle, or Aristotelianism, as the emergence of an empiricist alternative to the rationalist fold of Plato and Platonism.1 Pitting perceived phenomena against the recollection of innate ideas, Aristotle founded knowledge on the perception of universal features and regularities in concrete things instead of an intuitive access to a separate world of incorporeal forms. In close analysis, such a straightforward opposition is forced, of course, and sets aside a (...) number of complicated questions of interpretation. To say nothing of Plato, Aristotle's alleged empiricism stands in rather stark contrast to the axiomatic tendencies in his... (shrink)

According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, according to which (...) the phenomenal feel of emotions is crucial for their intentional content. (shrink)

The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show (...) how this view can account for structural rationality on the assumption that intentions and beliefs as such involve competent perceptions of downstream reasons, and explore various implications of the account. (shrink)

Avicenna’s logical theory of negative judgement can be seen as a systematic development of the insights Aristotle had laid out in the De interpretatione. However, in order to grasp the full extent of his theory one must extend the examination from the logical works to the metaphysical and psychological bases of negative judgement. Avicenna himself often refrains from the explicit treatment of the connections between logic and metaphysics or psychology, or treats them in a rather oblique fashion. Time and again (...) he is satisfied with noting that this or that question is not proper for a logician and should be dealt with in metaphysics or psychology—without bothering to refer his reader to the exact loci. The following is an attempt at a reconstruction of Avicenna’s theory of negative judgement in such a broad fashion. I will begin with his analysis of negative judgement as resulting from an operation of ‘removing’ the predicate term from the subject term. On this basis, I will move on to discuss how he conceives of the relation between negative judgements and affirmative judgements that contain privative or metathetic terms as well as the question of whether negative judgements can be reduced to affirmative ones. Having thus laid out his logical theory of negation, I move on to discuss the underlying metaphysics by looking at the relation between existence and non-existence, and existence and privation. Finally, I will address Avicenna’s scattered psychological remarks on how we can conceive of what does not exist. (shrink)

This is a critical comment on Adamson and Benevich, published in issue 4/2 of the Journal of the American Philosophical Association. I raise two closely related objections. The first concerns the objective of the flying man: instead of the question of what the soul is, I argue that the argument is designed to answer the question of whether the soul exists independently of the body. The second objection concerns the expected result of the argument: instead of knowledge about the quiddity (...) of soul, I claim the argument yields knowledge about the soul's existence independently of the body. After the objections, I turn to the masked man fallacy, claiming that although the Adamson-Benevich interpretation does save the argument from the fallacy, this comes at the cost of plausibility. I then give a more modest interpretation that both avoids the fallacy and is plausible. The paper concludes with a remark about the metaphysical possibility of the flying man. (shrink)

In this paper I pursue a possibility that some versions of arguments addressed against the libertarian notion of self-ownership have some definitive implications regarding the equalisandum debate carried out by egalitarians. I have in mind specifically the kind of approach that challenges self-ownership as a morally fundamental value through some inventive counterexamples. So, while I shall argue that the negative arguments against self-ownership are conclusive, my primary attempt is to demonstrate that such arguments can be employed to say something interesting (...) about the equalisandum debate itself; namely, that resources cannot function as the desirable equalisandum, and that there are some reasons for preferring capabilities over welfare as the desired currency for egalitarianism. (shrink)

In this paper I pursue a possibility that some versions of arguments addressed against the libertarian notion of self-ownership have some definitive implications regarding the equalisandum debate carried out by egalitarians. I have in mind specifically the kind of approach that challenges self-ownership as a morally fundamental value through some inventive counterexamples. So, while I shall argue that the negative arguments against self-ownership are conclusive, my primary attempt is to demonstrate that such arguments can be employed to say something interesting (...) about the equalisandum debate itself; namely, that resources cannot function as the desirable equalisandum, and that there are some reasons for preferring capabilities over welfare as the desired currency for egalitarianism. (shrink)

In their effort to understand some phenomena, mechanisms, or relations between them, scientists observe reality and construct theories and models to explain their observations. The process is interactive: On the one hand, observations lead to formulating certain models and theories. On the other hand, models and theories direct scholars' observations, because they include conceptualizations of reality and also ideas how the observations should be made. Scientists, in fact, behave just like any human being and most of the animals: all create (...) representations and schemata concerning their living environments which then later on help them to behave in adaptive ways (Neisser 1976).Compared to everyday observations that .. (shrink)

This paper discusses refinements of the natural ordering of them-degrees (1-degrees) of strong recursive reducibility classes. Such refinements are obtained by posing complexity conditions on the reduction function. The discussion uses the axiomatic complexity theory and is hence very general. As the main result it is proved that if the complexity measure is required to be linearly bounded (and space-like), then a natural class of refinements forms a lattice with respect to a natural ordering upon them.

Let A and B be subsets of the set of natural numbers. The well-known strong reducibilities are dened as follows: A m B i 2 B)) A 1 B i A m B and the reduction function f is one-one. where T ot denotes the set of total recursive functions. These reducibilities induce an equivalence relation of interreducibility, the equivalence classes of which are commonly called the m-degrees and the 1-degrees, respectively. The ordering of these degrees has been extensively studied. (...) In this paper the renements of the ordering of the m-degrees are studied by posing complexity conditions on the reduction func- tion. The discussion uses the axiomatic complexity theory and is hence very general. The paper is self-contained in the sense that the basic framework of the axiomatic complexity theory is brie y presented. (shrink)