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  1. Are Explicit Performatives Assertions?Mark Jary - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (2):207 - 234.
    This paper contributes to the study of explicit performative utterances in the following ways. First, it presents arguments that support Austin’s view that these utterances are not assertions. In doing so, it offers an original explanation of why they cannot be true or false. Second, it puts forward a new analysis of explicit performatives as cases of showing performing, rather than of instances of asserting or declaring that one is performing a particular act. Finally, it develops a new account of (...)
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  2.  50
    Two Types of Implicature: Material and Behavioural.Mark Jary - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):638-660.
    This article argues that what Grice termed ‘particularized conversational implicatures’ can be divided into two types. In some cases, it is possible to reconstruct the inference from the explicit content of the utterance to the implicature without employing a premise to the effect that that the speaker expressed that content (by means of an utterance). I call these ‘material implicatures’. Those whose reconstruction relies on a premise about the speaker's verbal behaviour, by contrast, I call ‘behavioural implicatures’. After showing that (...)
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  3.  20
    Assertion and False-Belief Attribution.Mark Jary - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (1):17-39.
    The ability to attribute false-beliefs to others — the hallmark of a representational theory of mind — has been shown to be reliant on linguistic ability, specifically on competence in sentential complementation after verbs of communication and cognition such as `say that' and `think that'. The reason commonly put forward for this is that these structures provide a representational format which enables the child to think about another's thoughts. The paper offers an alternative explanation. Drawing on the work of the (...)
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    Assertion and False-Belief Atribution.Mark Jary - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (1):17-39.
    The ability to attribute false-beliefs to others — the hallmark of a representational theory of mind — has been shown to be reliant on linguistic ability, specifically on competence in sentential complementation after verbs of communication and cognition such as `say that' and `think that'. The reason commonly put forward for this is that these structures provide a representational format which enables the child to think about another's thoughts. The paper offers an alternative explanation. Drawing on the work of the (...)
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  5.  33
    Critical Pragmatics: An Inquiry Into Reference and Communication by Kepa Korta & John Perry. [REVIEW]Mark Jary - 2014 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 29 (2):309-311.
  6.  34
    Indicative Mood, Assertoric Force and Relevance.Mark Jary - 2004 - Philosophica 4:2.
  7.  13
    Korta & Perry. 2011. Critical Pragmatics: An Inquiry Into Reference and Communication.Mark Jary - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (2):309-311.