In Posterior Analytics II 16-17, Aristotle seems to claim that there cannot be more than one explanans of the same scientific explanandum. However, this seems to be true only for “primary-universal” demonstrations, in which the major term belongs to the minor “in itself” and the middle term is coextensive with the extremes. If so, several explananda we would like to admit as truly scientific would be out of the scope of an Aristotelian science. The secondary literature has identified a second (...) problem in II 16-17: the middle term of a demonstration is sometimes taken as the definition of the minor term (the subject), other times as the definition (or the causal part of the definition) of the major (the demonstrable attribute). I shall argue that Aristotle’s solution to the first problem involves showing that certain problematic attributes, which appear to admit more than one explanation, actually fall into the privileged scenario of primary-universal demonstrations. In addition, his solution suggests a conciliatory way-out to our second problem (or so I shall argue): the existence of an attribute as a definable unity depends on its subject having the essence it has, which suggests that both the essence of subjects and the essence of demonstrable attributes can play explanatory roles in demonstrations. (shrink)

For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles (...) of science could be known as such independently of their explanatory connections to demonstrable propositions. I shall argue that knowing first principles as such involves knowing them as explanatory of other scientific propositions. I shall then explain in which way noetic and demonstrative knowledge are in a sense interdependent cognitive states – even though νοῦς remains distinct from (and, in Aristotle’s words, more ‘accurate’ than) demonstrative knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore two possible readings of Republic IV, 439c2-d8, and of Plato’s claim that the just soul is governed by its rational element. My aim is to argue against a “desiderative” interpretation of the passage, according to which the motivational strength of rational desires depends on a set of desires given in advance and produced independently of reason. As an alternative, I advance a “cognitivist” reading according to which the rational desires of the just soul have as (...) its ultimate source a knowledge about the nature of goodness and happiness, with its own motivational force. Finally, I argue for a reinterpretation of 439a4-b1, a passage that, at first sight, seems to contradict my analysis of 439c2-d8. (shrink)

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle imposes some requirements on the formulation of scientific propositions: their terms must be able to perform the role of subject as well as of predicate; their terms should be universal; every demonstration must involve “primary” subjects denoted by terms that “cannot be said of another underlying subject”. Several interpreters, inspired by theses from the Categories, believed that this third requirement refers to names and descriptions of particular substances as basic subjects of predicative statements, since they (...) cannot perform the logical role of predicate. However, such reading puts the third requirement in conflict with the other two. I shall argue that this interpretation is wrong and that the third requirement does not assign to singular terms the function of basic subjects of scientific discourse, but rather acknowledges that substantial predicates have a certain prerogative to occur in denoting phrases. Consequently, Aristotle’s three demands turn out to be compatible with one another. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This is a review of David Bronstein's book "Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics".

according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge (...) of all scientific propositions were... (shrink)

This is an Editorial Note for the special volume of the journal Manuscrito (42: 4) devoted to Aristotle's theory of demonstration and its logical and metaphysical entanglements, which has been organized by me and Breno Zuppolini (as Guest Editors), with papers authored by Benjamin Morison, Owen Goldin, David Bronstein, Michail Peramatzis, Andrea Falcon, Laura Castelli, Paolo Fait, Joseph Karbowski, Adam Crager, Klaus Corcilius, Robert J. Hankinson, Raphael Zillig and Pieter Sjoerd Hasper.

This article discusses immediate premises in Aristotle’s epistemology. The traditional interpretation identifies immediacy with indemonstrability: immediate truths are the indemonstrable principles of science from which the theorems are derived by demonstration. Against this common reading, I argue that Aristotle’s recognition of two kinds of epistemic priority (priority by nature and priority to us) commits him to the existence of two types of immediacy, only one of which is equivalent to indemonstrability. As a result, my interpretation offers a better understanding of (...) a puzzling passage (APo. 1.13, 78a22–b4) that seems to contradict the standard view. (shrink)

This article offers a reconstruction of an argument against infinite regress formulated by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I 22. I argue against the traditional interpretation of the chapter, according to which singular terms and summa genera, in virtue of having restrict logical roles, provide limits for predicative chains, preventing them from proceeding ad infinitum. As I intend to show, this traditional reading is at odds with some important aspects of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. More importantly, it fails to explain how (...) his proof is connected to a defence of the existence of ultimate explanations, a connection that must be the case if I 19-22 is advancing a foundationalist way-out to a sceptical challenge raised in I 3. (shrink)

Most interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics believe that the term ‘ameson’ is used to describe the principles or foundations of a given system of justification or explanation as epistemically prior to or more fundamental than the other propositions in the system. Epistemic readings (as I shall call them) arguably constitute a majority in the secondary literature. This predominant view has been challenged by Robin Smith (1986) and Michael Ferejohn (1994; 2013), who propose interpretations that should be classified as non-epistemic according (...) to the definition above. My aim in this article is purely negative. I intend to show that these non-epistemic interpretations are liable to serious objections and are in conflict with some important features of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. (shrink)

At the beginning of the first book of Posterior Analytics, Aristotle‟s feature of demonstrative knowledge involves a certain concept of “necessity”. The traditional interpretation tends to associate this concept with modal necessity, which is found in the Prior Analytics and De interpretatione. The present article aims to show in which way the sixth chapter of book A of Posterior Analytics presupposes a set of essentialist theses that claims to base the necessity of scientific knowledge on predicative relations of essential character. (...) To acknowledge this essentialist background and simultaneously support a modal interpretation of scientific necessity urges us to attribute serious drawbacks to Aristotle‟s theory of demonstration, forcing us to reassess this interpretative tendency. (shrink)

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle imposes some requirements on scientific propositions: (i) they must be susceptible of syllogistic articulation, (ii) they must have universal terms as subjects of predication and (iii) their subjects must be primary, i.e. they cannot “be said of a distinct underlying subject”. However, it is problematic to meet those three requirements together. If associated with the theory of predication in Categories, the requirement (iii) shall prescribe names or descriptions of individuals within the category of substance as (...) subjects of predication, which are primary insofar as they cannot play the logical role of predicate. Nevertheless, if the requirement (i) is satisfied, then the terms of scientific proposition would be able to perform the function of subject as well as of predicate since the rules of conversion and syllogistic moods presuppose the interchangeability among terms of predication. The requirement (ii), by its turn, withdraws all particular subjects from scientific propositions and a fortiori individual substances. We offer as a solution for the aforementioned dilemma the association of theses from the Posterior Analytics, not with the treatise Categories, but with the new ontology of predication emerged in the Metaphysics, which, by introducing the hylomorphic analysis of compound substances, admits primary and notwithstanding universal subjects of predication: the specific forms. (shrink)

No tratado intitulado Segundos Analíticos, Aristóteles desenvolve uma teoria da demonstração científica e da ciência demonstrativa. Ali, o conhecimento científico é descrito pelo filósofo como envolvendo uma certa "necessidade". Alguns intérpretes associam esta noção de necessidade à necessidade modal, pertinente à silogística modal de Aristóteles. Esta interpretação, todavia, tornaria o modelo de ciência proposto nos Analíticos incompatível com os explananda das ciências da natureza, cuja cientificidade o próprio Aristóteles reiteradamente defendeu. A fim de evitar este inconveniente, abordamos e reconstruímos a (...) mencionada interpretação, reconhecemos suas falhas e propomos, seguindo outra tendência da literatura secundária, uma leitura alternativa da noção de necessidade como adequação explanatória, a qual garantiria a cientificidade dos fenômenos naturais. (shrink)

A obra pretende indicar a bipolaridade que constitui o objeto central da abordagem; por um lado, a problematização da funcionalidade do sistema penal e da expansão, sem precedentes, que experimenta na era da globalização; de outro, o problema dos déficits do conceito e da dimensão da cidadania, que experimentam ímpar minimização.

My aim in this paper is to engage with C. Thi Nguyen’s characterization of the echo chamber and to propose two things. First, I argue that a proper reading of his concept of echo chamber should make use of the notion of ignorance in the form of a structural epistemic insensitivity. My main contention is that ignorance as a substantive structural practice accounts for the epistemically deleterious effects of echo chambers. Second, I propose that from the talk of ignorance we (...) should be able to see echo chambers in terms of their more harmful impacts in our daily lives. To do that, I argue that we should think of echo chambers as tools to promote hermeneutical domination. If my representation of Nguyen’s concept is accurate, I believe we can see some important theoretical consequences stemming from the way Nguyen understands it. (shrink)

O processo de desenvolvimento da história (e demais ciências) das religiões, com objeto e metodologia próprios, pode ser analisado por meio das discussões que aprofundaram as relações entre a defesa do caráter racionalista do homem ocidental e a persistência de formas religiosas de expressão no transcorrer dos séculos XIX e XX (bem como neste início de século XXI). Por meio do estudo da história da teologia e das religiões, são estabelecidos critérios para o julgamento das convergências entre movimentos religiosos, também (...) de suas especificidades, aqui discutidos à luz de pressupostos subjacentes em obras de Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) e Mircea Eliade (1907-1986). A escolha dos autores se justifica pelo fato de representarem, cada qual a seu modo, estágios teórico-analíticos no desenvolvimento das ciências das religiões que abarcam o conflito entre racionalismo ocidental e formas religiosas. Pelo que guardam de semelhança ou contradição, especialmente pela presença do sagrado em sua argumentação, os três autores vêm a confirmar uma suspeita (do religioso) ou hipótese (do cientista): a religião persiste. Palavras-chave: Ciências da Religião. Teologia. Émile Durkheim. Rudolf Otto. Mircea Eliade.The process of the development of History (and other sciences) of Religions, with its object and methodology, can be analyzed by the discussions that deepened the relations between the defense of the rationalist character of the western man and the persistence of religious forms of expression in the 19th and 20th centuries (as well as in the beginning of the 21th century). Studying the History of Theology and of Religions, the criteria for the judgment of the convergences within religious movements can be established, as well their specificities, discussed here under the subjacent ideas found in Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) and Mircea Eliade (1907-1986). The selection of these authors can be justified by the fact that they represent each one on his own way, the theoretical analytical stages in the development of the Sciences of Religions that enclose the conflict between western rationalism and religious forms. Considering what they have in common and in contradiction, especially for the presence of the holy in their argumentation, the three authors confirm a suspicion (of the religious man) or a hypothesis (of the scientist): the religion persists. Keywords: Sciences of Religion. Theology. Émile Durkheim. Rudolf Otto. Mircea Eliade. (shrink)

Este artigo reconhece que nunca se falou tanto em fundamentalismo em nosso país como agora; e que o uso ampliado do conceito poucas vezes vem associado ao espectro do protestantismo definido pela hermenêutica literal das Escrituras, como nos primórdios do movimento fundamentalista. No Brasil contemporâneo, grosso modo, fundamentalista qualifica o evangélico conservador ou reacionário, quase sempre pentecostal, e com inserção na mídia e na política. Assim, é urgente que a ação de evangélicos fundamentalistas no espaço público-político brasileiro seja compreendida pelas (...) Ciências da Religião, uma vez que coloca em questão a democracia ao transformar interesses religiosos particulares em questões de Estado e ações de governo. O objetivo deste artigo, portanto, é avaliar como o qualificativo fundamentalista associado ao nome evangélico contribui para a compreensão da eleição de Jair Bolsonaro à presidência da República em 2018, adotando como recorte o caso da promessa de mudança da embaixada brasileira em Israel de Tel Aviv para Jerusalém. As conclusões alcançadas acerca das imbricações do assim chamado sionismo cristão com a eleição de Bolsonaro resultam de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, cujos dados empíricos foram retirados do jornal Folha de S. Paulo. (shrink)

Hax-Breno_On-identifying-and-identification.

The skin can be described as a niche structured by semiotic artefacts (tattoos) that work as symbolic–indexical devices (dicisigns). New biocompatible technologies responsive to organic and environmental variations change the role of the skin as a semiotic niche. New devices are transforming the skin into a niche of interactive interfaces. In this article we introduce a variety of techno-scientific artefacts, which are readily available, and their main characteristics. We are interested in the recent proliferation of devices based on biotechnologies that (...) can be coupled to the body, especially epithelial (superficial or invasive), and how they change what we know as ‘embodied communication’. (shrink)

This article studies the mathematical properties of two systems that model Aristotle's original syllogistic and the relationship obtaining between them. These systems are Corcoran's natural deduction syllogistic and ?ukasiewicz's axiomatization of the syllogistic. We show that by translating the former into a first-order theory, which we call T RD, we can establish a precise relationship between the two systems. We prove within the framework of first-order logic a number of logical properties about T RD that bear upon the same properties (...) of the natural deduction counterpart ? that is, Corcoran's system. Moreover, the first-order logic framework that we work with allows us to understand how complicated the semantics of the syllogistic is in providing us with examples of bizarre, unexpected interpretations of the syllogistic rules. Finally, we provide a first attempt at finding the structure of that semantics, reducing the search to the characterization of the class of models of T RD. (shrink)

This paper discusses the role of cultural anthropology in Cognitive Science. Culture is described as a very large pool of information passed along from generation to generation, composed of learned “programs” for action and understanding. These cultural programs differ in important ways from computer programs. Cultural programs tend to be unspecified and inexplicit rather than clearly stated algorithms learned through a slow process of guided discovery, and involve the manipulation of content based rather than formal symbol systems. Cultural symbol systems (...) often have affective as well as objective referents, giving them a strong directive effect. The argument is made that in the process of repeated social transmission and use, cultural programs come to take forms which have a good “fit” to the natural capacities and constraints of the human information processing system. (shrink)

The affective turn -- Violence against women: perspectives and strategies -- Notes -- References -- PART III: Togetherness and its forms -- 7. Feminist visions and socio-political meanings of non-monogamous love -- Contemporary bonding, plurality of love -- Consensual plurality and sustainability of bonding -- Notes -- References -- 8. The invisible ties We share: A relational analysis of the contemporary loving couple -- The semantics of love and the We -- Love in situation: the WeLR in motion -- Enminded (...) bodies in the WeLR -- Final remarks: the bonds the WeLR creates -- Notes -- References -- 9. Silent love: On Irigaray's suggestion of cultivating sexual difference -- A culture of two subjects -- Listening -- The meaning of the word 'silence' -- Silence as a condition of love -- Cultivating silence -- Silent love -- Notes -- References -- 10. Love, feminism and dialectics: Repairing splits in theory and practice -- Dialectical critical realism -- Benjamin: from existential tension to oppressive contradiction -- Dialectics, necessity and redemptive critique -- The reparative turn and the issue of transformation -- In the pulse of now -- Closing words -- Notes -- References -- Index. (shrink)

In this paper, I present two ways of conceiving a genealogical explanation of the concept of knowledge. The first one is through the epistemic state of nature hypothesis developed by Edward Craig, according to which knowledge is understood as a concept evolved from the concept of a good informant. After considering Craig’s project, I draw a parallel between this approach and Miranda Fricker’s value-laden account of the same concept. Then, I present and discuss Fricker’s social take on Craig’s genealogy, in (...) which she suggests that the notions of a good informant and of knowledge are necessarily dependent on the establishment of a credibility norm, and that this norm should be viewed as inherently political. Lastly, I defend an illustration, through Kristie Dotson’s work, of how both genealogical approaches could explain and offer solutions to failings in the normativity of our epistemic systems. (shrink)

O artigo se propõe a pensar o retorno dos adolescentes às escolas após a pandemia fazendo a articulação entre conceitos psicanalíticos e a importância da escola na transição que a adolescência representa para a constituição psíquica do sujeito. A partir de uma experiência de pesquisa-extensão em uma escola com estudantes do Ensino Médio, pensamos sobre como o laço social contemporâneo impacta os modos de subjetivação e a educação, relacionando-o ao mal-estar nos estudantes adolescentes nos contextos educativos brasileiros. Além disso, a (...) dimensão da temporalidade tanto a própria da adolescência, quanto da escola e da pandemia que lhe atravessam foram tomadas como direcionamentos sendo o artigo dividido três partes: tempo na pandemia, tempo da escola e o tempo da adolescência. (shrink)

A capoeira ou capoeiragem é uma expressão cultural brasileira que mistura jogo, esporte, arte marcial, cultura popular, tradição, dança e música. Desenvolvida no Brasil por descendentes de escravos africanos, a capoeira é caracterizada por golpes e movimentos ágeis e complexos, utilizando primariamente chutes e rasteiras, além de joelhadas e cabeçadas, cotoveladas, acrobacias aéreas ou em solo. Praticantes da capoeira aprendem não apenas a lutar e jogar, mas também a tocar os instrumentos típicos e cantar. Assim, os discentes do 6º ano (...) de uma escola estadual da cidade de Itabuna—BA, os quais apresentavam dificuldades para ler e escrever. Entretanto, nas aulas de capoeira, os alunos se mostravam mais motivados para ler. Então, surgiu o problema que norteou essa pesquisa, a saber: como o jogo de capoeira vem sendo trabalhado, para estimular a melhoria da aprendizagem em leitura dos alunos, do 6ºano, em um colégio estadual, na cidade de Itabuna – BA? Portanto, o objetivo geral desse artigo é analisar de que maneira o mestre usa o jogo da capoeira, como ferramenta motivacional, nas práticas pedagógicas, para a melhoria da aprendizagem da leitura, entre os alunos do 6º ano, do ensino fundamental II. Desse modo, a utilização de estratégias de leitura, partindo da diversidade dos gêneros textuais, de modo lúdico, através da capoeira, no processo de ensino-aprendizagem, é um assunto que é discutido nessa pesquisa, pois esta se justifica pela necessidade de contribuir para uma melhora do processo de ensino e aprendizagem, partindo de pressupostos presentes na BNCC. Palavras-chave: Capoeira, Fomento à Leitura, Gêneros Textuais, Lúdico. (shrink)

ResumoNo início do século xviii, Isaac Newton publicou seu principal trabalho sobre óptica, o Opticks. Impregnado por uma perspectiva indutiva, o livro logo se tornou a principal referência para os estudos sobre a luz e as cores, sendo amplamente popularizado pelos seguidores de Newton. Neste artigo, analisamos como dois importantes livros contribuíram para essa popularização e também qual era a imagem de ciência que tencionavam propagar, o Élements de la philosophie de Newton de Voltaire e o Newtonianismo per le dame (...) de Algarotti. Será possível perceber que ambos os autores distorceram o conteúdo do livro de Newton, no intuito de propagar uma imagem idealizada das ideias newtonianas e da própria filosofia natural.In the beginning of 18th century, Newton published his main work about light and colors, the Opticks. Impregnated by an inductive perspective, the book became the major reference for the studies about light and colors, being widely popularized by Newton's followers. In this article, we analyze how two important works contributed to this process of popularization and also what image of science they intended to propagate: Voltaire's Elements of Newton's philosophie and Algarotti's Sir Isaac Newton's philosophy explain'd for the use of the ladies. We will be notice that both authors distorted the content of the Opticks, in order to propagate an idealized image of Newtonian ideas and natural philosophy itself. (shrink)

[From SEP]: Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary VE research program. These (...) include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and which methods to use. It will be helpful to note some terminology before proceeding. First, we use ‘cognitive’, ‘epistemic’ and ‘intellectual’ synonymously. Second, we often use ‘normative’ broadly to include not only norms and rules, but also duties and values. Finally, ‘practitioners’ names contemporary virtue epistemologists. (shrink)