Hayek on Mill is a collection of decades worth of correspondence between John Stuart Mill and his wife, Harriet Taylor-Mill, gathered by F. A. Hayek. It showcases the intersections between Hayek and Mill and also brings together Hayek's related writings, which were widely credited with beginning a new era of Mill scholarship.

This is a three-part study of the relations between law and liberty.

"The studies of which this book is the result have from the beginning been guided by and in the end confirmed the somewhat old-fashioned conviction of the author that it is human ideas which govern the development of human affairs," Hayek ...

Every student of the twentieth century has heard both of the great Viennese economist Friedrich von Hayek and of the equally great philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. But what isn't well known is that the two were distant cousins and that, shortly after Wittgenstein's death in 1951, Hayek set out to write a biography of his cousin. The project was derailed by Wittgenstein family members, who felt it was to soon to publish such a work - especially one like (...) class='Hi'>Hayek's, so candid about his cousin's difficulties and depressions. But Hayek's draft acquired an underground readership, and Wittgensteins biographers have used it extensively. Here finally, is the text of that work itself - a true goldmine in being one great thinker's view of another, whom he knew personally, even if not well. Hayek's account has the great merit of being close to its subject; the draft, moreover sheds light, not only on Wittgenstein but on Hayek as well. (shrink)

In the history of modern liberal thought, the work of F.A. Hayek stands out as among the most significant contributions since that of J.S. Mill. In this book, Kukathas critically examines the nature and coherence of Hayek's defense of liberal principles, attempting both to identify its weaknesses and to show why it makes an important contribution to contemporary political theory. Kukathas argues that Hayek's defense of liberalism is unsuccessful because it rests on presuppositions which are philosophically incompatible. (...) In his view, the unresolved dilemma of Hayek's political philosophy is how to mount a systematic defense of liberalism if one emphasizes the limited capacity of human reason. Hayek's social philosophy, he argues, offers a significant theory of the nature of social processes, and is therefore an important account of how this must constrain our choice of political principles. (shrink)

Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against state intervention in the economy.1 We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an institutional thesis about which forms of state intervention and economic institutions could threaten personal and political freedom. Economic institutions pose a threat if they allow for coercive interventions, as described by Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty: by giving someone the power to force others to serve (...) one’s will by threatening to inflict harm, in the absence of general rules of conduct. According to the logic of the argument, welfare-state provisions are not coercive insofar as they do not allow the identification and discriminatory treatment of individuals. By contrast, we claim that a structure of coercion is likely to emerge from the command-and-control nature of protectionist institutions and immigration restrictions currently advocated by the radical right. (shrink)

Friedrich Hayek’s defense of neoliberal free market capitalism hinges on the distinction between economies and catallaxies. The former are orders instituted via planning, whereas the latter are spontaneous competitive orders resulting from human action without human design. I argue that this distinction is based on an incomplete semantic history of “economy.” By looking at the meaning of “oikonomia” in medieval providential theology as explained by Giorgio Agamben and Joseph Vogl, I argue how Hayek’s science of catallactics is itself (...) a secularization of providential theology. This exposes Hayek to three criticisms: he unjustifiably neglects the possibility of tendencies toward spontaneous disorder in free markets, he condemns the “losers” of neoliberal competition to being providential waste on the road to general prosperity, and he imposes on people the duty to consent to a neoliberal order that hinders them from cultivating their inoperativity. (shrink)

On insiste le plus souvent, que ce soit pour critiquer ou féliciter l’entreprise de l’économiste Friedrich August von Hayek, sur sa reprise de l’expression de « main invisible » d’Adam Smith. Hayek voit dans cette métaphore une manière particulièrement heureuse de traiter de ces ordres spontanés, de ces ordres produits de manière non intentionnelle, dont lui-même cherche à rendre compte, et, plus précisément, l’ordre de marché. Cependant, plusieurs questions restent alors ouvertes lorsque l’on emprunte uniquement cette voie : (...) de quoi Hayek cherche-t-il à rendre compte précisément lorsqu’il traite de ces ordres spontanés, c’est-à-dire que signifie le terme d’ordre ici? Pourquoi se penche-t-il principalement sur l’ordre économique? Pour répondre à ces questions, il est utile de mettre au jour une autre réappropriation conceptuelle à laquelle procède Hayek : celle qui prend pour objet le thème du doux commerce. Son analyse nous place au cœur de son projet de défense du libéralisme. Une étude adéquate de ce réinvestissement suppose cependant de mettre au jour le déplacement conceptuel qu’Hayek fait subir à ce thème. Il s’agit en effet pour ce dernier de défendre l’idée que les « “réseaux d’argent” […] soudent la Grande Société », c’est-à-dire sont au principe de l’ordre pacifique de la société moderne. (shrink)

In this paper we will analyze Lawson’s criticism of Hayek for not having transcended positivism. We will distinguish two levels in the criticism: methodological and ontological. So far as methodological criticism is concerned, we consider that Lawson’s positivist interpretation of Hayek regarding the method in economics is not the only possible, and we will try to develop another one. With respect to ontological criticism, we will state that though it is possible to understand Hayek as an ontological (...) positivist, since he assumes an ontological individualism, this fact would not necessarily lead to positivism -question to which Lawson seems to bring Hayek closer after 1955- but a moderate ontological individualism could be assigned to Hayek founded on a realistic interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. (shrink)

Focusing on the work of Friedrich von Hayek and Vernon Smith, we discuss some conceptual links between Austrian economics and recent work in behavioral game theory and experimental economics. After a brief survey of the main methodological aspects of Austrian and experimental economics, we suggest that common views on subjectivism, individualism, and the role of qualitative explanations and predictions in social science may favour a fruitful interaction between these two research programs.

The paper aims to establish that Terence Hutchison’s argument in The Politics and Philosophy of Economics (1981) to the effect that the young F.A. Hayek maintained a methodological position markedly similar to that of Ludwig von Mises fails to establish the relevant conclusion. The first problem with Hutchison’s argument is that it is not clear exactly what conclusion he meant to establish with regard to the methodological views of the two paragons of 20th century Austrian economics. Mises (in)famously maintained (...) a rather extreme methodological apriorism. However, Hutchison’s argument does not support the claim that Hayek was ever an apriorist of the Misesian variety. The concept of a priori knowledge that emerges from Hayek’s epistemology – specifically the epistemology implied by Hayek’s work in theoretical psychology – is the direct opposite of Mises’ treatment of a priori knowledge. Simply stated, Hayek conceived of a priori knowledge as fallible and relative, while Mises considered a priori knowledge to be infallible and absolute. Thus, it cannot be maintained – if, indeed, Hutchison meant to establish – that Hayek was a Misesian apriorist during the years in question. What’s more, the paper shows that Hutchison’s argument does not support a weaker interpretation of the relevant conclusion. There are alternative interpretations of the evidence adduced by Hutchison that are both more charitable and more in line with Hayek’s epistemology that undermine Hutchison’s conclusion. (shrink)

This article argues that Hayek employed a neo-Roman concept of liberty. It will show that Hayek’s definition of liberty conforms to that provided by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, respectively...

This book offers a distinctive treatment of Hayek's ideas as a "research program". It presents a detailed account of aspects of Hayek's intellectual development and of problems that arise within his work, and then offers some broad suggestions as to ways in which the program initiated in his work might be developed further. The book discusses how Popper and Lakatos' ideas about "research programs" might be applied within political theory. There then follows a distinctive presentation of Hayek's (...) intellectual development up to The Road to Serfdom, together with critical engagement with his later ideas. The discussion draws on a full range of his writings, makes use of some neglected earlier work on social theory and law, and also draws on archival material. This book should appeal to anyone with an interest in Hayek's work, as well as to those with a concern for twentieth century intellectual history. (shrink)

F. A. Hayek has had great influence upon recent political thought. Though he presents no organized account of Bentham his many references, mostly uncomplimentary, create the impression that Bentham's presentation was characteristically ‘crudely expressed’ and ‘naive’, and that Benthamite constructivism has been a major threat to individual liberty and a precursor of totalitarian social control. While Hayek has made a valuable contribution to the study of political ideas, this caricature has probably discouraged his readers from studying Bentham. It (...) will be argued, however, that Bentham and Hayek share much common ground, and that an appreciation of the ways in which Bentham's position differs from Hayek's may contribute to a useful critique of Hayek's system. (shrink)

Friedrich Hayek was a fervent advocate of the methodological specificity of the social sciences. However, given his contact with Karl Popper, several historians and philosophers have characterized his final position as Popperian, that is, a position that would have accepted the unity of scientific method. A closer look at Hayek's philosophy and Popper's own intellectual course shows that such a thesis is based on misconceptions that can be overcome by taking the Hayekian concept of 'spontaneous order' as the (...) foundation of a methodology immune to any kind of methodological monism. (shrink)

本书包括:法律与立法的二元观、普通法法治国的建构、普通法法治国的建构过程等内容。.

F.A. Hayek essentially quit economic theory and gave up the phenomena of industrial fluctuations as an explicit object of theoretical investigation following the publication of his last work in technical economics, 1941’s The Pure Theory of Capital. Nonetheless, several of Hayek’s more methodologically-oriented writings bear important implications for economic phenomena, especially those of industrial fluctuations. Decisions (usually, for Hayek, of a political nature) taken on the basis of a “pretence” of knowledge impede the operation of the price (...) system’s belief-coordinating function and thereby contribute to episodes of economic disequilibrium. Moreover, this later account – which I call Hayek’s epistemic theory of industrial fluctuations – implies certain aspects of his earlier theory. The two accounts are connected in virtue of the role that ignorance and the limits of human knowledge play in each. Indeed, it turns out that – substantively, if not methodologically – Hayek’s early theory of the cycle is a special case of the more general epistemic account. (shrink)

There is much in The Sensory Order that recommends the oft-made claim that Hayek anticipated connectionist theories of mind. To the extent that this is so, contemporary arguments against and for connectionism, as advanced by Jerry Fodor, Zenon Pylyshyn, and John Searle, are shown as applicable to theoretical psychology. However, the final section of this chapter highlights an important disanalogy between theoretical psychology and connectionist theories of mind.

By exploring the writings of Mandeville, Hume and Smith, this book offers a critique of Hayek's theory of cultural evolution and explores the roots of his powerful defence of liberalism.

Revered by some as the most important twentieth century theorist of free society, Friedrich A. Hayek has been reviled by others as a mere reactionary. Impartial throughout, the author offers a clear exposition and balanced assessment that judges Hayek's theory by its own lights. The author argues that the key to understanding Hayek lies in an appreciation of the proper link between descriptive social science and normative political theory. He probes the idea of a spontaneous order and (...) other notions central to Hayek's thought, and concludes that they are unable to provide the "scientific" foundation Hayek seeks for his liberalism. By drawing out the distinctive character of Hayek's thought, the author presents a new and more accurate picture of this important social and political theorist. (shrink)

Develops a critique of utopianism through a comparison of the works of Karl Marx and F. A. Hayek, challenging conventional views of both Marxian and Hayekian thought.

La réception de la pensée de Friedrich Hayek au Japon dépend naturellement de caractéristiques propres à l’histoire de la modernisation dans ce pays, à partir de la seconde moitié du xix e siècle. Le contexte géographique et culturel est-asiatique, les clichés attachés au Japon peuvent conduire à s’étonner du succès de la pensée de l’auteur représentant d’une forme de « néolibéralisme ». Mais des traits épistémologiques et philosophiques, dont la démonstration est proposée ici, rendent compte de ce fait frappant. (...) Au pays de la vie organisée en groupes à tous niveaux, l’impact fut considérable des idées du théoricien de l’individualisme méthodologique, militant du libre-échange et héritier sans doute le plus fameux de l’école économique autrichienne. L’écho de la pensée du fondateur de l’école, Carl Menger (1840-1921) dont les archives sont en partie conservées au Japon s’y fait également entendre. Un pan de théorie économique du libéralisme au xx e siècle a ainsi rencontré, loin de sa base d’origine, une réception attentive au pays du Soleil levant. (shrink)

Professor Hayek'S book is a massive contribution to the persistent question of the limits of state action. It runs counter to prevailing notions about the role of government in economic and social matters to such an extent that a common reaction to its publication has been to simply shrug it off as eccentric or antediluvian. But the rarity of any fundamental discussion of our political ideals and the assumptions of our social policy ought of itself to ensure a wide (...) welcome for a work that constitutes a formidable challenge to accepted standards in this realm. Unfortunately, opinions about its value are likely to continue along established lines. (shrink)

Given the multiple crises that are occurring after decades of neoliberalism we should take care to examine neoliberalism’s claims and subject them to critical scrutiny. What I propose to do here is to examine some of the philosophical claims made by Friedrich Hayek and then submit them to scrutiny using tools from Hayek’s cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein.

The paper challenges Joseph Salerno’s recent revisionist account in “The Place of Human Action in the Development of Economic Thought” of the relationship between Friedrich von Wieser and F.A. Hayek and of their views on equilibrium theory. The paper argues, contra Salerno, that Wieser was not a proponent of general equilibrium theory, so could not have influenced Hayek in the manner Salerno suggests; that there was not a concerted effort by Schumpeter, Wieser, Mayer, and Hayek to advocate (...) general equilibrium theory in the prewar and inter-war years among the Austrians; and finally, that Hayek’s early attraction to what he called “equilibrium analysis” had causes independent of those alleged by Salerno.Cet article récuse l’interprétation révisionniste récente de Joseph Salerno dans son article “The Place of Human Action in the Development of Economic Thought” à propos des relations entre Friedrich von Wieser et Friedrich Hayek, et de leurs visions au sujet de l’équilibre. S’inscrivant en cela en opposition avec ce qu’avance Salerno, cet article suggère que Wieser n’était pas un partisan de la théorie de l’équilibre général et, en conséquence, ne peut avoir influencé Hayek comme le suggère Salerno ; qu’il n’y a eu aucun effort concerté entre Schumpeter, Wieser, Mayer et Hayek pour promouvoir la théorie de l’équilibre général parmi les autrichiens durant les années d’avant-guerre et celles de l’entre-deux guerres ; et enfin, que l’intérêt du jeune Hayek dans ce qu’il appelait “l’analyse de l’équilibre” avait des causes autres que celles évoquées par Salerno. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHayek’s social theory is resolutely anti-conspiratorial: He consistently rejects conceiving complex orders as though they were designed or planned. His account of democratic politics, by contrast, treats it as conducive to conspiracy, organized deception, and ultimately totalitarianism. His epistemology of spontaneous order and his radical suspicion of democratic politics are connected: The decay of democracy is itself a complex consequence of popular misunderstandings of social order. However, since Hayek is unable to account for self-correction within democratic structures, his argument (...) has the unanticipated consequence of leading him to an implicitly authoritarian position. (shrink)