_The purpose _of this article is to find out whether philosophical and anthropological studies of human nature affect the legitimization of decisions about human life and death, using the example of a philosophical analysis of the problem of euthanasia. _Theoretical__ basis._ Philosophically and anthropologically based situational analysis in bioethics is chosen as the research methodology, which reveals the legitimation of euthanasia as a complex and highly responsible moral decision, which should be based on both the consideration of all the patient’s (...) special circumstances and the competent and adequate application of fundamental knowledge about the human being. _Originality._ From a philosophical point of view, it would be correct to legalize euthanasia, but under the condition of significantly limiting the cases of its application, clearly defining the conditions for its provision and strict control over its implementation. It is morally unacceptable to justify either murder or torture, so euthanasia appears as an attempt to avoid both at the same time. _Conclusions._ Specific solutions to practical problems often indicate the necessary direction for solving theoretical difficulties. Thus, making proper moral decisions about euthanasia requires reliance on fundamental knowledge about human beings, but at the same time it provides arguments "for" and "against" artificial termination of life. The basic principles of bioethics – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and respect for the dignity of human life – serve as criteria for making balanced ethical decisions both in theory and in practice. These principles should be complemented by a coherent ethical, legal and philosophical position on euthanasia, which is achieved through legitimation procedures. Decisive for making a decision on euthanasia should be the strong desire of the patient himself. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The authors of this article aim to reveal how motivation and legitimacy ensure the normativity of the structuring and genesis of multiple social identity. _Theoretical basis._ Social constructivism was chosen as a research methodology. It reveals social identity as an identity constructed by its bearer on the basis of ready-made versions of social identity proposed by social groups and society. Social circles, identified by Georg Simmel, unite representatives of different social groups into a wider oneness, which can be interpreted (...) as a multiple social identity, and the motivation for its formation can be identified on the basis of Weber’s concept of legitimacy. _Originality._ Identifying the structure and genesis of a multiple social identity creates prerequisites for establishing its normative foundations, as well as for a specific analysis of the procedures for achieving its motivation and legitimacy. Georg Simmel’s concept of social virtues promotes consideration of the basic virtues of an individual as those that enable one’s to be a member of various social groups in which these virtues are manifested. _Conclusions._ The social virtues present in the social identities that are part of a multiple social identity determine not only the social status of these individuals in these social groups but also the ranking and normative significance of these groups for this individual. If the observance of virtues in a certain social group causes a higher motivation of an individual’s behavior, then this group acquires a higher legitimacy for her/him. Using the example of virtues, it is possible to search for other possible grounds for the formation of multiple social identity. Such grounds are primarily other characteristics of key social practices that support different social groups. (shrink)

The concept of deliberation in the Ukrainian philosophical discourse is both underestimated and overestimated. Underestimated — as a self-sufficient category that is not reducible to another con- cept, even if it is the concept of consensus or the concept of democracy. Deliberation appears pri- marily as a careful weighing and selection of arguments when making an important decision. Collegiality may or may not be present here, as well as openness. Therefore, the concept of deliber- ation is somewhat overestimated as something (...) that necessarily improves the quality of democratic procedures, and therefore, supposedly, deliberation itself is something democratic in nature. American political philosopher Joshua Cohen drew attention to the fact that deliberation can be of at least three types: individual deliberation, jury deliberation, and oligarch deliberation. The article analyzes these three types of deliberation and found that the closest to the democratic type of government is individual deliberation, or rather, joint deliberation of responsible citizens. While the deliberation of the jury is mostly closed, it is naturally limited access to the extent of the necessary competence of its possible participants. The deliberation of the oligarchs is even more closed and often even secret. However, the article states that it is more appropriate to replace the name «oligarchs» with the term «captains of business»: then the deliberation of the oligarchs ceases to be a cartel conspiracy, and turns into a coordinated protection of the interests of the national economy. However, for this, de- liberation itself is not enough, so not procedural, but other, namely, value factors of decision-making are needed. Democracy benefits from deliberation when the latter is complemented by the liberal and patriotic values of the participants in the deliberation. Already John Locke convincingly argues the importance of citizens achieving a common conscious agreement in state matters. However, for Locke, the very fact of having property was important, while in practice, achieving an effective agreement requires mechanisms for reconciling the positions of owners with very different amounts of property. To some extent, this problem can be solved by John Rawls` concept of justice. (shrink)

The defeat of russia on the battlefield must be accompanied by the delegitimization of the “russian world”, that is, the loss of attractiveness for the russians themselves of the concept of the supremacy of everything Russian over everything non-russian. Cultivating russia’s greatness as a key task of “russian world” is one of the main reasons for the current Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, but also for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in the world in general. The purpose of this article is (...) to clarify the main features of the delegitimization of the “russian world” in the regime of social education. To do this, the definition of “russian world” as a special symbolic system, which the modern russian political regime is trying to adjust from the standpoint of aggressive russian geopolitical subjectivity, has been previously clarified. This leads to the performative selfdenial of the “russian world”, which can be traced at the level of the accumulation of symbolic capital, the establishment of political elites (the authorities and the opposition), as well as at the level of the development of civil society. Social learning involves the search at the level of civil society for new forms of communicative self-organization at various levels of collective formation. A way out for such performative self-denial is possible only through the ways of social learning, the search for a change in one’s own identity, and not through attempts at autistic self-affirmation characteristic of the modern russian political regime, as well as the destruction of all political and cultural alternatives to the stateapproved canon. Social education is a way of soft and non-violent delegitimization of the “russian world”, in contrast to rebellion and revolutions, which in russia traditionally only lead to the emergence of even more brutal forms of state dictatorship. The monologic nature of the russian political space provokes the reation of new forms of social consensus outside the russian political system – in the sphere of culture, counterculture, and subcultures. (shrink)

Motivation is a key factor in getting involved in education, as well as in other things. After all, the existence of objective prerequisites for education is only a necessary basis for its success, but the use of these conditions properly depends to a large extent on the adequate motivation of participants in the educational process. Therefore, proper motivation is a sufficient basis for making efforts to achieve a better result. However, efforts also need to be directed correctly: there is not (...) enough to be passionate about, something must be done in a way that is acceptable to others and understandable to them. Therefore, motivation is inevitably more or less related to legitimacy, i.e. the provision of normative activities. For each case there is the best motivation for it and proper legitimacy. Motivation refers to the identification of basic values of a certain type of activity, legitimation requires a clear understanding and recognition of certain norms that are generally accepted in this activity. At different stages of adulthood, the motivation and legitimation of its activities alternately play a priority role, although both of them are more or less present at all stages of personality development. Therefore, both the excessive opposition of motivation and legitimacy and attempts to consider one as part of the other are wrong – these are relatively self-sufficient mechanisms to ensure the success of individual behavior. Motivation and legitimacy are closely linked to the individual's acceptance of certain obligations and responsibilities, which are the basis for the individual's acquisition of certain rights. Unsuccessful motivation and inappropriate legitimation of an individual's behavior is a sign of his unsuccessful socialization, which risks losing the connection of the individual with the main social institutions of society – especially with the state. In the case of their successful implementation, motivation and legitimacy are an important means of effective inclusion of the individual in the functioning of social systems, as well as – in the improvement and development of such functioning. (shrink)

Колективні емоційні стани раніше досліджували переважно як чинники соціальної аномії, тоді як соціальну норму асоціювали переважно з втіленням понять у соціальні норми. Цей підхід останні роки зазнає суттєвих коректив: українські та закордонні дослідники розглядають колективні емоційні стани як соціальну норму і постійну основу для досягнення стійкого раціонального консенсуса. Більше того, дослідники вже не стільки протиставляють емоції з інтелектом, скільки виявляють все більше взаємозв’язків і взаємозалежностей між ними. Це змінює уявлення про сутність легітимації та статус мотивації у перебігу соціальних процесів. Мотивація (...) постає не стільки як надто мінлива суб’єктивна психологічна характеристика, скільки як постійна колективна характеристика соціальних спільнот. Мотивація зумовлює соціальну ідентичність через постійне спрямування людей як членів соціальних спільнот до досягнення певних спільних бажаних цілей. Легітимація також постає як процес постійного визнання людьми одне одного під час встановлення спільно визнаних соціальних норм. У такому визнанні колективні емоції відіграють вирішальну роль. Біологічні основи емоційної поведінки людей не так редукують їхню поведінку до біологічних чинників, скільки емоції сприяють сублімації цих біологічних чинників до соціально прийнятних цілей. Емоційна основа утвердження національної ідентичності має свої негативні і свої позитивні сторони: якщо негативний вплив емоцій може викликати загострення радикального націоналізму, то позитивний вплив емоцій сприяє згуртуванню нації у ситуації екзистенційних викликів – таких як війна. Легітимація справедливої війни є одним із головних завдань спрямування колективних емоцій, зокрема праведного гніву, на мотивацію до соціальної мобілізації нації до спротиву збройній зовнішній агресії. (shrink)

Deleuze’ün Spinozacı yaşam tahayyülünde ‘ne yapmalıyız?’ sorusuna normatif, ahlaki ya da siyasi bir yanıt bulamıyoruz ama varoluşu düşünmenin içkin bir olanağını keşfediyoruz. Düşünmeye 'dışarıdan' yani dünyadan başlamak insani (kurgusal) bir dünyaya değil, içinde yaşadığımız gerçek dünyaya inanmak demektir. İçkinliğin politik anlamı düşünceyi dünyaya getirmektir.

Исследование посвящено философскому осознанию природы духовности человека. Автор рассматривает духовность внутреннего мира человека как единство высших чувств души и нравственного сознания. Для специалистов в области философии, методологии науки.

How do we refer to people in everyday conversation? No matter the language or culture, we must choose from a range of options: full name ('Robert Smith'), reduced name ('Bob'), description ('tall guy'), kin term ('my son') etc. Our choices reflect how we know that person in context, and allow us to take a particular perspective on them. This book brings together a team of leading linguists, sociologists and anthropologists to show that there is more to person reference than meets (...) the eye. Drawing on video-recorded, everyday interactions in nine languages, it examines the fascinating ways in which we exploit person reference for social and cultural purposes, and reveals the underlying principles of person reference across cultures from the Americas to Asia to the South Pacific. Combining rich ethnographic detail with cross-linguistic generalizations, it will be welcomed by researchers and graduate students interested in the relationship between language and culture. (shrink)

The first thorough study in English of the multi-faceted system of Mou Zongsan, this book examines key influences on the New Confucian thinker and introduces his Kantian- and Mahāyāna Fo-inflected moral metaphysical reading of the Lu-Wang Learning of the Mind.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is an open access, dynamic reference work designed to organize professional philosophers so that they can write, edit, and maintain a reference work in philosophy that is responsive to new research. From its inception, the SEP was designed so that each entry is maintained and kept up to date by an expert or group of experts in the field. All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they (...) are made public. (shrink)

In this age of DNA computers and artificial intelligence, information is becoming disembodied even as the "bodies" that once carried it vanish into virtuality. While some marvel at these changes, envisioning consciousness downloaded into a computer or humans "beamed" _Star Trek_-style, others view them with horror, seeing monsters brooding in the machines. In _How We Became Posthuman,_ N. Katherine Hayles separates hype from fact, investigating the fate of embodiment in an information age. Hayles relates three interwoven stories: how information lost (...) its body, that is, how it came to be conceptualized as an entity separate from the material forms that carry it; the cultural and technological construction of the cyborg; and the dismantling of the liberal humanist "subject" in cybernetic discourse, along with the emergence of the "posthuman." Ranging widely across the history of technology, cultural studies, and literary criticism, Hayles shows what had to be erased, forgotten, and elided to conceive of information as a disembodied entity. Thus she moves from the post-World War II Macy Conferences on cybernetics to the 1952 novel _Limbo_ by cybernetics aficionado Bernard Wolfe; from the concept of self-making to Philip K. Dick's literary explorations of hallucination and reality; and from artificial life to postmodern novels exploring the implications of seeing humans as cybernetic systems. Although becoming posthuman can be nightmarish, Hayles shows how it can also be liberating. From the birth of cybernetics to artificial life, _How We Became Posthuman_ provides an indispensable account of how we arrived in our virtual age, and of where we might go from here. (shrink)

We argue that the appraisal of models in social epistemology requires conceiving of them as argumentative devices, taking into account the argumentative context and adopting a family-of-models perspective. We draw up such an account and show how it makes it easier to see the value and limits of the use of models in social epistemology. To illustrate our points, we document and explicate the argumentative role of epistemic landscape models in social epistemology and highlight their limitations. We also claim that (...) our account could be fruitfully used in appraising other models in philosophy and science. (shrink)

Tipy mirovozzreniĭ -- Chuvstvennai︠a︡, intellektualʹnai︠a︡ i misticheskai︠a︡ intuit︠s︡ii︠a︡ -- Ideal-realizm.

A look at political ethics covers cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, betrayal and misanthropy, and is accompanied by a description of modern public opinion about ...