It is often claimed that only experiments can support strong causal inferences and therefore they should be privileged in the behavioral sciences. We disagree. Overvaluing experiments results in their overuse both by researchers and decision-makers, and in an underappreciation of their shortcomings. Neglecting other methods often follows. Experiments can suggest whether X causes Y in a specific experimental setting; however, they often fail to elucidate either the mechanisms responsible for an effect, or the strength of an effect in everyday natural (...) settings. In this paper, we consider two overarching issues. First, experiments have important limitations. We highlight problems with: external, construct, statistical conclusion, and internal validity; replicability; and with conceptual issues associated with simple X-causes-Y thinking. Second, quasi-experimental and non-experimental methods are absolutely essential. As well as themselves estimating causal effects, these other methods can provide information and understanding that goes beyond that provided by experiments. A research program progresses best when experiments are not treated as privileged but instead are combined with these other methods. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

Aleksandar Dundjerovic _The Cinema of Robert Lepage: The Poetics of Memory_ London and New York: Wallflower Press, 2003 ISBN 1-903364-33-7 181 pp.

In this paper I adopt Aquinas’ explanation of passivity and activity by means of acts remaining in the agent and acts passing over into external matter. I use it to propose a divide between immanent-type and transcendent-type acts. I then touch upon a grammatical distinction between three kinds of verbs. To argue for the activity and passivity of affectivity I refer to the group that includes acts of transcendent-type and whose verbs in both voices possess affective meaning. In the end (...) I focus on cases in which an act of affective f-ing is mirrored in its object as being affectively f-ed. (shrink)

Menachem Butler. Bibliography: Mark Steiner’s main works, pp. 3–7.

This chapter from André Barata and José Manuel Santos´s (eds.) book Formas de Vida, Forms of Life, Formes de Vie involves a critical discussion of the political philosophies of Richard Rorty and Chantal Mouffe. Rorty and Mouffe have both developed similar kinds of liberal political visions and both have taken inspiration from Wittgenstein. However, it is doubtful whether any such vision can be found in Wittgenstein’s work. In fact, it will be argued here that Wittgenstein’s work contains tools for criticising (...) the work of Rorty and Mouffe. Wittgenstein made a more dramatic break with the philosophical tradition than either Rorty or Mouffe. (shrink)

What are the possibilities for religious experience in the twenty-first century? While aggressive atheists might respond “None,” in thunder, any good Peircean knows we should not foreclose inquiry. For those who retain a post-orthodox religious temperament in post-modernity, Robert S. Corrington’s evolving account of Ecstatic Naturalism might prove a challenging, engaging framework for a transcendental naturalism. If one can read Emerson and Thoreau and ignore their religious dimension, so be it—attunement is crucial for Corrington, cultivating the habits of thought, (...) the psychosemiosis that enables an engagement with Ecstatic Naturalism and a recovery of the sacred. Those inclined to an experiential, naturalistic... (shrink)