Reducing health disparities and improving health outcomes are fundamental principles in global health. Environmental justice remains underrecognized and undervalued as a key driver of health dispar...

Subset Spaces were introduced by L. Moss and R. Parikh in [8]. These spaces model the reasoning about knowledge of changing states.In [2] a kind of subset space called intersection space was considered and the question about the existence of a set of axioms that is complete for the logic of intersection spaces was addressed. In [9] the first author introduced the class of directed spaces and proved that any set of axioms for directed frames also characterizes intersection spaces.We give (...) here a complete axiomatization for directed spaces. We also show that it is not possible to reduce this set of axioms to a finite set. (shrink)

Most of the surveys that were undertaken in the 19th century, particularly in France, among workers, were conducted essentially from viewpoints of social legislation, philanthropy, or were even animated by a bias against the labor movement. Marx, however, in the survey that he initiated in 1880, not only wanted to deliver information on working and living conditions of the workers to the public, but tried to clarify by the questionnaires the thoughts of the workers themselves on their own situation and (...) its social causes. The questionnaire containing about one hundred different questions utilizes, therefore, in adapting itself to the labor movement of the time and the character of the workers' education, the relevant categories of the Marxian theory of society.As an appendix, the essay contains a german translation of the questionnaire itself.Les enquêtes sur la situation sociale des ouvriers organisées dans le cours du xixe siècle en Angleterre et surtout en France, étaient entreprises avec des intentions de politique sociale ou de philanthropie ou même d’hostilité contre le mouvement ouvrier. Elles n’avaient souvent qu’un intérêt déterminé, limité à la mise au jour de l’état des choses réeL Au contraire, lorsque Marx organise en 1880 une enquête par questionnaires,, il ne veut pas seulement donner à l’opinion publique des informations précises sur les conditions de travail et de vie des ouvriers français ; le questionnaire qui, pour la première fois, s’adresse exclusivement aux ouvriers, eux-mêmes doit aussi servir à éclairer la classe ouvrière elle-même sur sa situation réelle et les causes sociales de sa misère. Aussi le questionnaire détaillé, qui comprend 100 questions, utilise-t-il les catégories essentielles de la théorie marxiste de la société de manière adaptée à l’état du mouvement ouvrier et à l’éducation de la classe ouvrière à cette époque.On a reproduit, en appendice de l’article, une traduction allemande du questionnaire. (shrink)

This volume addresses the issues of the Third Age--that time after retirement when financial stability and reduced obligations to others, together, allow for freedom--and good health makes it possible to enjoy that freedom. How, in this special time of life, is meaning and purpose to be found? And what alternatives are available? These difficult questions are responded to by scholars in the field of aging, some themselves in the Third Age.

The main object of this article is to give two novel proofs of the admissibility of Ackermann’s rule (γ) for the propositional relevant logic R. The results are established as corollaries of cut elimination for systems of tableaux for R. Cut elimination, in turn, is established both nonconstructively (as a corollary of completeness) and constructively (using Gentzen-like methods). The extensibility of the techniques is demonstrated by showing that (γ) is admissible for RQ* (R with constant domain quantifiers). The status of (...) the admissibility of (γ) for RQ* was, to the best of the author’s knowledge, an open problem. Further extensions of these results will be explored in the sequel(s). (shrink)

This commentary examines the interpretation of Parmenides developed by Rose Cherubin in her paper, “Parmenides, Liars, and Mortal Incompleteness.” First, I discuss the tensions Cherubin identifies between the definitions and presuppositions of justice, necessity, fate, and the other requisites of inquiry. Second, I critically assess Cherubin’s attribution of a sort of liar paradox to Parmenides. Finally, I argue that Cherubin’s handling of the Doxa, the section of Parmenides’ poem that deals with mortal opinion and cosmology, is unsatisfactory. I suggest that (...) her reading may contradict the text in denying that the Doxa contains truths. (shrink)

Traditional pedagogical approaches to the Platonic forms pose problems that can be best addressed by presenting students two rival interpretations: one that understands the forms in terms of definitions, and another in terms of ideals. The second, if not the first interpretation, models, for students of even a relativistic stripe, how one can conceive the existence of thought-objects about which no consensus exists. It also serves to illustrate how knowledge of such thought-objects may be attained nonetheless. This approach is to (...) be preferred, therefore, to traditional approaches that tend to reinforce, rather than counteract, relativism in students. (shrink)

Response to the first number of The Owl has been encouraging. The editor wishes to thank the many individuals who have written asking to be placed or maintained on the mailing list, and also those who have responded to the request for correspondence pertaining to Hegel scholarship. It is hoped that this interest will further manifest itself in continued applications for membership in the Hegel Society of America, in order that the Society, through The Owl and its other functions, may (...) better serve students and scholars of Hegel in America. * * * We are indebted to Professor Robert Perkins of the University of South Alabama, and to Professor Don Verene of Northern Illinois University for their assistance in publishing the first two numbers of The Owl. Although henceforward this operation will be handled entirely by the Department of Philosophy of The Florida State University, HSA membership applications should continue to be directed to the Treasurer, c/o the Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois 60115. * * * More than 2700 copies of The Owl are mailed quarterly to individuals and departments of philosophy in the United States, Canada and Europe. THE EDITOR ASKS DEPARTMENTAL CHAIRMEN EITHER TO POST THE THE OWL OR CALL IT TO THE ATTENTION OF APPROPRIATE FACULTY AND STUDENTS IN THE DEPARTMENT. As noted in out initial issue, the mailing list will gradually be restricted to those who either belong to the Society, or have indicated by a note to the editor their interest in continued receipt of the newsletter. This procedure is necessary due to the increased cost of future issues which we expect to have professionally printed and enlarged in scope. (shrink)

Philosophical orthodoxy has it that intentional action consists in one’s intention appropriately causing a motion of one’s body, placing the latter as (conceptually and/or metaphysically) prior to the former. Here I argue that this standard schema should be reversed: acting intentionally is at least conceptually prior to intending. The argument is modelled on a Williamsonian argument for the priority of knowledge developed by Jenifer Nagel. She argues that children acquire the concept KNOWS before they acquire BELIEVES, building on this alleged (...) developmental priority of knowledge to establish its conceptual priority. I start by taking a closer look at Nagel’s argument, canvassing extant objections to do both with the empirical adequacy of her claims and their philosophical implications. Doing so allows me in the second part of the paper to draw lessons that inform the construction of a revamped parallel argument for the priority of ACTS INTENTIONALLY. (shrink)

This text examines the philosophy of Paul Weiss. Much of Dr Weiss's impact has come through his example, discussions, and such activities as founding and editing the Review of Metaphysics and founding and leading the Metaphysical Society of America.

The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional action can make (...) once it is no longer taken to be a target for reductive analysis, in explaining other, non-intentional kinds of action and voluntariness. (shrink)

There has been a resurgence of interest lately within philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental act/bodily act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition, which arguably further undermine the credibility of the (...) distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on ‘inner’ acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action. (shrink)

The overwhelmingly predominant view in philosophy sees intending as a mental state, specifically a plan-like state. This paper rejects the predominant view in favor of a starkly opposed novel alternative. After criticizing both the predominant Bratman-esque view of intention, and an alternative view inspired by Michael Thompson, the paper proceeds to set out and defend the idea that acting with an intention to V should be understood disjunctively, as either one’s V-ing intentionally or one’s performing some kind of failed intentional (...) V-ing, where the two disjuncts share no common state of intention. Instructive structural parallels to perceptual disjunctivism are pointed out, and the view is shown, unlike its rivals, to successfully extend to capture both prospective and present intention, thereby unifying the three different guises of intention. (shrink)

The paper aims to defend the standard view of what it dubs ‘Self-understanding' — i.e., (very roughly) our knowledge of why we behave as we do — from the threat posed to it by Neo-Ryleanism. While the standard, entrenched view regards self-understanding as special in kind and status, the Neo-Rylean agrees with Gilbert Ryle that our method of understanding ourselves is much the same as our method of understanding others, involving self-interpretation on the basis of the available evidence. Neo-Ryleanism has (...) been gaining ground in recent decades, fueled by a wide range of empirical results which allegedly demonstrate that subjects confabulate items of self-understanding. The paper rejects this attack on the received view. After critically examining one extant response to the Neo-Rylean, which gratuitously accuses her of equivocation, the paper proceeds to offer its own response, casting doubt over the suggestion that the experimental results actually demonstrate widespread confabulation. (shrink)

The immune self is our reified way to describe the processes through which the immune system maintains the differentiated identity of the organism and itself. This is an interpretative process, and to study it in a scientifically constructive way we should merge a long hermeneutical tradition asking questions about the nature of interpretation, together with modern understanding of the immune system, emerging sensing technologies and advanced computational tools for analyzing the sensors' data.

The nature of attention has been the topic of a lively research programme in psychology for over a century. But there is widespread agreement that none of the theories on offer manage to fully capture the nature of attention. Recently, philosophers have become interested in the debate again after a prolonged period of neglect. This paper contributes to the project of explaining the nature of attention. It starts off by critically examining Christopher Mole’s prominent “adverbial” account of attention, which traces (...) the failure of extant psychological theories to their assumption that attending is a kind of process. It then defends an alternative, process-based view of the metaphysics of attention, on which attention is understood as an activity and not, as psychologists seem to implicitly assume, an accomplishment. The entrenched distinction between accomplishments and activities is shown to shed new light on the metaphysics of attention. It also provides a novel diagnosis of the empirical state of play. (shrink)

This chapter contributes to the ongoing debate over how to understand attention. It spells out and defends a novel account according to which attending is the most general type of mental act, that which one performs on some object if one performs any mental act on it at all. On this view, all mental acts are (to a first, rough approximation) species of attending. The view is novel in going against the grain of virtually all extant accounts, which work by (...) identifying the purported unique functional role of attention. It is inspired by Timothy Williamson’s account of knowledge as the most general factive mental state (Williamson, 2001: ch. 1). -/- Beyond the Williamsonian thin explanation of knowledge, the account of attention as the most general mental act is animated by two striking pre-theoretical features of attention, dubbed ubiquity and heterogeneity. The hope of accommodating these twin features seems to drive at least two other extant accounts of attention, very different from the one proposed here, offered by Mole and Wu, respectively. However, as the chapter explains, both Mole’s and Wu’s accounts fall short, leaving room for the novel account defended here, which does adequately capture both features. (shrink)

The average weight and height of National Basketball League players is decreasing year by year ; Curcic, Dimitrije. 2021. 70 years of height evolution in the NBA [4,504 players analyzed]. RunRepeat. https://runrepeat.com/height-evolution-in-the-nba ). The trend in basketball is to privilege the tallest and strongest. If so, then to what does the body modification of NBA players respond? Will these changes reformulate the corporeity of what is understood as an NBA player? This text seeks, from the postulates of Jacques Fontanille and (...) José Finol, to point out that the process of body modification arose both from the introduction of a new rule and the recognition to new corporealities. From data regarding players’ corporeality, shooting tendency and a body modification scheme, a new corporeality of the NBA player is proposed, one that is no longer determined entirely by height. (shrink)