Jan Zwicky suggests that Lyric Philosophy may be read as a “letter to a revered parent—with whom I have quarrelled, but by whom I still wish to be understood.” Though the “parent” thinker to whom she refers is Freud, Zwicky’s conversation with Simone Weil in Wisdom & Metaphor addresses Weil as a “foremother” in the act of making “herself clear to herself.” This paper examines Weil’s role in Wisdom & Metaphor and considers Weil as an influence in Zwicky’s poetry, reading (...) “relinquishing” in Zwicky’s poetry and “decreation” in Weil’s philosophy as metaphors that resonate and debate with each other. (shrink)

The anonymous treatise De sex inconvenientibus is a good example of the calculatores’ approach when dealing with motion. It is organized around four main questions relating to the determination of rapidity in four kinds of changes, i.e. in the generation of substantial forms, in alteration, in increase, and in local motion. In some arguments the author points out the paradoxes to which the two ways of determining the rapidity of a motion can lead: rapidity is determined by the effect produced (...) (the degree of quality generated, the space covered, etc.) or it results from the ratio between the moving power and the resistance of the mobile or patient. While this twofold approach to determining rapidity appears in the majority of calculator texts, the two points of view – the analysis according to its effects and the analysis according to its causes – have rarely been confronted. (shrink)

A notable aspect of contemporary fiction is the increasing importance acquired by the detective as a literary figure. From World War II up to today he has transcended a narrow role played in a narrow genre to become the symbol for man's existential quest and puzzlement in the face of mystery. If science fiction is the expression of our hopes and fears concerning the future of our technological society, the detective and a new form of literary detective fiction have lately (...) become the expression of our hopes and fears concerning the present, since mystery is not only, too obviously, in the future but, more subtly, in the present. While science fiction lacks a character typical of the genre who may embody and possibly transcend its purposes, the detective novel thanks to the multifold aspects of its “ordainer”—the detective—has progressively risen to literary prominence through the apparently paradoxical negation of its original functions. (shrink)

Husserl attempted to found logics and language on intuition, and particularly perception. The relationship between logical language and intuition is therefore one of the fundamental themes of his phenomenology. Husserl regarded the two as sharing an isomorphic structure, and this article shows that this structure can be characterized as “mediality.” That is, the “meaning” of language appears by mediation of sound or script, while the “I” as person appears by mediation of the body. I will show furthermore that intuitions themselves (...) appear through the mediation of language, and interpret this idea of mediality in terms of the Japanese language. Guided by Husserl’s notion of Sprachleib, I will also attempt an analysis of the “bodily” function of Chinese script and onomatopeia as aspects of Sprachleib and show how the Sprachleib functions as a “cultural living body” that makes community possible. (shrink)

In Exploring Robotic Minds: Actions, Symbols, and Consciousness as Self-Organizing Dynamic Phenomena, Jun Tani sets out to answer an essential and tantalizing question: How do our minds work? By providing an overview of his "synthetic neurorobotics" project, Tani reveals how symbols and concepts that represent the world can emerge in a neurodynamic structure--iterative interactions between the top-down subjective view, which proactively acts on the world, and the bottom-up recognition of the resultant perceptual reality. He argues that nontrivial problems (...) of consciousness and free will could be addressed through structural understanding of such iterative, conflicting interactions between the top-down and the bottom-up pathways. A wide range of readers will enjoy this wonderful journey of the mind and will follow the author on interdisciplinary discussions that span neuroscience, dynamical systems theories, robotics, and phenomenology. The book also includes many figures, as well as a link to videos of Tani's exciting robotic experiments. (shrink)

This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by (...) forecasting the increasing importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in regards to most- and myth-consciousness. (shrink)

Direct neurological and especially imaging-driven investigations into the structures essential to naturally occurring cognitive systems in their development and operation have motivated broadening interest in the potential for artificial consciousness modeled on these systems. This first paper in a series of three begins with a brief review of Boltuc’s (2009) “brain-based” thesis on the prospect of artificial consciousness, focusing on his formulation of h-consciousness. We then explore some of the implications of brain research on the structure of consciousness, finding limitations (...) in biological approaches to the study of consciousness. Looking past these limitations, we introduce research in artificial consciousness designed to test for the emergence of consciousness, a phenomenon beyond the purview of the study of existing biological systems. (shrink)

This study attempts to describe the notion of the ‘self’ using dynamical systems language based on the results of our robot learning experiments. A neural network model consisting of multiple modules is proposed, in which the interactive dynamics between the bottom-up perception and the top-down prediction are investigated. Our experiments with a real mobile robot showed that the incremental learning of the robot switches spontaneously between steady and unsteady phases. In the steady phase, the top-down prediction for the bottom-up perception (...) works well when coherence is achieved between the internal and the environmental dynamics. In the unsteady phase, conflicts arise between the bottom-up perception and the top-down prediction; the coherence is lost, and a chaotic attractor is observed in the internal neural dynamics. By investigating possible analogies between this result and the phenomenological literature on the ‘self', we draw the conclusions that the structure of the ‘self’ corresponds to the ‘open dynamic structure’ which is characterized by co-existence of stability in terms of goal-directedness and instability caused by embodiment; the open dynamic structure causes the system's spontaneous transition to the unsteady phase where the ‘self’ becomes aware. (shrink)

This paper will deal with the relationship between 'life' (Leben) and the 'life-world' (Lebenswelt) 1 as we find these concepts in the writings of Husserl's last years. The emphasis will be upon elucidating this relation- ship from the transcendental point of view. It is well known that Husserl initially introduced the concept of the life-world into his philosophy in connection with the problem of founding the sciences: accordingly, most studies up to date have dealt with the concept within this context (...) - that is, as part of the program for founding the sciences. However, it is important to remember that the life-world is also, for Husserl, a 'way to the transcendental reduction', and as such, can be ultimately clari- fied only by following this way to its end, and by comprehending it in its relationship to transcendental subjectivity. In his later years, Husserl came to think of the 'way of being' (Seinsweise) of transcendental sub- jectivity as 'world-experiencing-life' (welterfahrendes Leben). Thus it is my view that the problem of the 'life-world' is intimately related to that of 'life', and must necessarily be treated in the context of that rela- tionship. (shrink)

We have been left with a big challenge, to articulate consciousness and also to prove it in an artificial agent against a biological standard. After introducing Boltuc’s h-consciousness in the last paper, we briefly reviewed some salient neurology in order to sketch less of a standard than a series of targets for artificial consciousness, “most-consciousness” and “myth-consciousness.” With these targets on the horizon, we began reviewing the research program pursued by Jun Tani and colleagues in the isolation of the (...) formal dynamics essential to either. In this paper, we describe in detail Tani’s research program, in order to make the clearest case for artificial consciousness in these systems. In the next paper, the third in the series, we will return to Boltuc’s naturalistic non-reductionism in light of the neurorobotics models introduced (alongside some others), and evaluate them more completely. (shrink)

Memory dynamics need both stable and unstable properties simultaneously. Hence memory dynamics cannot be simulated by chaotic itinerant dynamics alone, with no real world correspondence. Memory dynamics are constrained by both semantics and causalities in the embodied cognition.

This study aimed to propose a novel method for designing a product recommendation virtual agent that can keep users motivated to interact with the agent. In prior papers, many methods of keeping users motivated postulated real-time and multi-modal interactions. The proposed novel method can be used in one-direction interaction. We defined the notion of the “hidden vector,” that is, information that is not mentioned by a PRVA and that the user can suppose spontaneously. We conducted an experiment to verify the (...) hypothesis that PRVAs having a hidden vector are more effective than other PRVAs. As a result, it was shown that PRVAs having a hidden vector were perceived as being more persuasive than other PRVAs and strongly motivated the users to use the PRVAs. From these results, the proposed method was shown to be effective. (shrink)

Consciousness – Bewußtsein – was one of the key concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. In contrast to this, Heidegger – regarded as Husserl’s most outstanding pupil – placed Dasein at the center of his own phenomenology. This change in key concepts may be seen as an upheaval in the phenomenology that purports to study the “things themselves”: as a shift of focus from the activity of a Bewußtsein that constitutes the Being of objects, to the passivity of a Dasein that receives (...) the donation of Being. But there is another aspect of Dasein that lies in the concept of “Da” (disclosedness), and it implies another possibility for the development of phenomenology that Heidegger did not fully develop. Kitaro Nishida, the Japanese philosopher who introduced phenomenology to Japan during the first half of the 20th century, developed this concept in his own way by analyzing the structure of disclosedness in terms of self-consciousness. (shrink)

This paper discusses possible correspondences between the dynamical systems characteristics observed in our previously proposed cognitive model and phenomenological accounts of immanent time considered by Edmund Husserl. Our simulation experiments in the anticiparatory learning of a robot showed that encountering sensory-motor flow can be learned as segmented into chunks of reusable primitives with accompanying dynamic shifting between coherences and incoherences in local modules. It is considered that the sense of objective time might appear when the continuous sensory-motor flow input to (...) the robot is reconstructed into compositional memory structures through the articulation processes described. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: Being impressed by Butz’s psychological account for the process of objectification of the subjective self, I would like to postulate, from my expertise in synthetic neuro-robotics studies, possible neuro-dynamic mechanisms that account for his psychological theorem.

Husserl’s phenomenology arose in a time of crisis for the sciences; today, we confront a crisis of interculturality. In this paper, I thematize the architectural and agricultural aspect of phenomenological thinking with regard to the notion of »culture«. Here, the ego is not so much a master who bestows sense on the world, but a Gesinde, who follows the direction of »sense« and through whom sense constitutes itself. Husserl’s method of Besinnung with regard to European history is based upon this (...) idea. This way of thinking is rooted in the European notion of »agriculture”«, where sense is built up slowly and we have time to accommodate ourselves to change. Today, however, we live in a situation of high-speed interculturality where egos of mutually foreign cultures encounter each other at such high speed that the safety mechanisms of agriculture no longer function. This is our present state of crisis. (shrink)

Japan has absorbed many western ideas since the late nineteenth century, but Japanese philosophers have often been reluctant to accept the western idea of the “I” in its entirety. The I transgresses to the Other more easily than western philosophies think and imports what belongs to the Other as his own. How is this possible? Husserl attempted to explain the constitution of the Other by the intentionality that goes from the I to the Other, mediated by the body. However, Husserl (...) later discovered that the constitution of both the I and the Other is more of a two-way movement. This double-movement is essential for all constitutions and departs from a deep (primal) dimension that is not yet egological. Even in the self-reflection of the I, a similar double-movement between the primal and egological dimensions can be seen. The I is supported, but at the same time threatened, by this movement. (shrink)