Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 207 Seiten: 175-183.

In this paper a set of categorical sentences called an antilogistic tetrad is presented as a perspective on Aristotle's square of opposition. An antilogistic tetrad is formed by collecting the premises of a pair of valid syllogisms the conclusions of which are contradictory categorical sentences. A set of such premises serves to bring together Aristotle's concern with debate and the syllogism, and as such may be seen as a way of “completing” Aristotle's analysis of the square of opposition.The debate context (...) is characterized by opposing views for which arguments are offered. The square of opposition captures that contending of opposing views; and is also basic to the presentation of categorical sentences, a necessary condition for the syllogism. By using C. S. Peirce's notion of abductive argument to produce the middle term, and hence to construct deductive syllogistic arguments, antilogistic tetrads may be formed on any contended subject. For that reason, the process sketched above for forming antilogistic tetrads is called “completing the square of opposition.”. (shrink)

Charles Peirce has it that ongoing experience in all its richness is all the product of semeiosis. The argument of this paper is that Carlo Rovelli’s book The Order of Time (2018) provides a context for the notion that the immediate sense of the passing of time emerges from the ongoing creation of experience by semeiosis.

The self is presented as a semeiotic matrix with the three categories each articulated with a fitting semeiosis.

Upper ontologies have traditionally arisen from the approach in which concepts that are common across a set of domains can be axiomatized at a general level. The rationale is that reuse across domains is to be supported through specialization of the general concepts from an upper ontology. Similarly, semantic integration between ontologies is to be achieved through the general concepts they specialize. The TUpper Ontology follows an alternative approach to the conventional upper ontology paradigm. Rather than think of an upper (...) ontology as a monolithic axiomatization centred on a taxonomy, the sideways approach considers an upper ontology to be a modular ontology composed of generic ontologies that cover concepts including those related to time, process, and space. TUpper is therefore composed of a set of generic ontologies, and each generic ontology axiomatizes a particular set of generic concepts. The TUpper Ontology is designed as a top-level ontology that contains modules from the ontologies within existing international standards. (shrink)

In this study, we examined the role of culture on early adolescents’ social reasoning about peer exclusion. A total of 80 U.S. and 149 Taiwanese early adolescents independently completed a social reasoning essay about peer exclusion. Analyses of the essays based on social-moral theories showed that U.S. students tended to reason about peer exclusion based on social conventional thinking whereas Taiwanese students were more attentive to personal and moral issues. Despite this difference, both groups of students referred to some common (...) social-moral concepts while reasoning about peer exclusion, including consideration of personal benefit, harming others’ welfare, personal concern, and punishment. The use of social reasoning strategies was similar across the two groups of students except that Taiwanese students relied more on judgment whereas U.S. students generated more alternative hypotheses. (shrink)

Der Staat hat die politische Moderne wie keine andere Institution und Ordnungsidee gepragt. Als eine Herrschaftsformation, die sich standig an die Umweltbedingungen anpasst, ist ihm die Funktionalitat des Wandels quasi institutionell in die Wiege gelegt. Dennoch ist der Nationalstaat im Prozess der Globalisierung und Europaisierung als Entgrenzung von Herrschaftsraumen der groae Verlierer geworden: Legitimations-, Souveranitats- und Steuerungsprobleme sind die Folge. Der Band erfasst den Staatswandel auf politik- und verwaltungswissenschaftlicher, geschichtswissenschaftlicher, soziologischer und offentlich-rechtlicher Ebene. Dabei behandeln die Beitrage exemplarisch Politikfelder wie (...) Soziales, Wirtschaft, Umwelt, Bildung, Wissenschaft und Verwaltung und bieten so ein breites Forum interdisziplinarer Staatsforschung. Inhalt Einfuehrung - Staat im Wandel. Ruediger Voigt zum 65. Geburtstag I. Konzeptualisierung und Systematisierung von Staatswandel Ralf Walkenhaus: Entwicklungslinien moderner Staatlichkeit. Konzeptualisierungsprobleme des Staatswandels Peter Nahamowitz: Themenkonjunkturen der Politikwissenschaft als Indikatoren fuer nachhaltige Veranderungen der Staatlichkeit in Deutschland? Zugleich ein Nachruf auf die okonomische Globalisierung II. Staatliche Steuerung in einzelnen Politikfeldern Nicolai Dose: Der informierende Staat: Information als Instrument staatlicher Steuerung Lutz R. Reuter: Zum Wandel des staatlichen Handelns im Bildungswesen Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz: Staatliche Wissenschaftssteuerung als organisations- und verfahrensrechtliche Aufgabe Dietrich Fuerst: Der Beitrag der Regionalplanung zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Eine steuerungstheoretische Perspektive Erhard Treutner: Staat und nachhaltige Entwicklung. Zur Bedeutung staatlicher Steuerung fuer Prozesse nachhaltiger Entwicklung III. Einzelaspekte Emanual Richter: Zur Rekonstruktion der Kategorie aNachhaltigkeito Stefan Machura: Der Einfluss der Parteien auf die dritte Gewalt Axel Gorlitz / Oliver Sigrist: Des Staates neue Kleider. Demokratie- und Rechtsstaatsdefizite der Verwaltungsreformkonzepte Peter Nitschke: Die Reterritorialisierung Europas auf subnationaler Identitatsebene. Uberlegungen zu einer Rekonstruktion der Theorie des apolitischen Raumeso Klaus A. Ziegert: Weltgesellschaft und Nationalstaat im 21. Jahrhundert. Eine rechtssoziologische Analyse Michael Staack: Multilateralismus, Unilateralismus und das Volkerrecht. Deutschland und die aBush-Revolutiono IV. Historische Bezuege Otwin Massing: Der (europaische) Praambelgott. Fetisch, sakralisierende Uberhohung oder Skandalon? Uber den Atavismus politischer Symbolsprache in amoderneno Staaten Rainer S. Elkar: Die Meister des Staates. Vom Scheitern und von der Aktualitat des Korporatismus Walter Demel: Verwaltung in China und Japan aus der Sicht des fruehneuzeitlichen Europa Georg-Christoph von Unruh: Widerstandsrecht und Widerstandspflicht Verzeichnis der Publikationen von Ruediger Voigt Verzeichnis der Doktoranden und Habilitanden von Ruediger Voigt Verzeichnis der Autoren. (shrink)

Over the last two decades there has been a growing interest in the transcendental dialectic of Critique of Pure Reason in Germany. Authors, however, often do not pay enough attention to the fact that Kant’s theory of reason (in the narrow sense) and the concept of ideas derived from it is not limited to this text. The purpose of this article is to compare and analyze the functionality of mind as a subjective ability developed by Kant and Fichte with the (...) Hegelian expansion of the mind to the idea of universal rationality. The relevance of such a comparison is connected with the need to demonstrate how the Hegelian paradigm of absolute rationality causes either the subsequent rejection of reason as a philosophical principle in the 19th and´20th centuries counter-discourse, or reduction of reason to the concept of pragmatic rationality. In the first part of this paper, the author intends to differentiate between at least 7 different types of ideas and their functions in Kant’s works. In the second part, he demonstrates how Fichte tries to systematize them beginning with reason, which at first creates an idea of itself. Special attention is paid to the way that Fichte categorizes them with the help of 5 spheres of action or 5 worldviews. The third and final part of the article discusses how Hegel goes beyond the frame of the transcendental philosophy of consciousness using different demands linked to the concepts of “reason” and “ideas”. Although these requirements are not found in Kant and Fichte, they entail a set of difficulties, which the author considers in conclusion. The author’s interpretation of the theory of ideas and their functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel demonstrates the dynamic character of the theories of reason in classical German philosophy, as well as the relevance of the 7 types of ideas that retain their significance for philosophy of the 21st century. Keywords: Kant and German idealism, types of ideas, functions of reason, worldviews, the problem of different demands. В Германии на протяжении последних двух десятилетий возрос интерес к трансцендентальной диалектике «Критики чистого разума». Однако авторы часто не обращают внимания на то, что кантовская теория разума (в узком смысле), в которой разворачивается работа с идеями, не ограничивается этим текстом. Целью данной статьи является сравнительный анализ разработанной Кантом и Фихте функциональности разума как субъективной способности с гегелевским расширением разума до идеи всеобщей разумности. Актуальность такого сравнения связана с необходимостью продемонстрировать то, каким образом гегелевская парадигма абсолютной разумности вызывает либо последующий отказ от разума как философского принципа в контрдискурсе XIX–XX вв., либо редукцию разума к понятию прагматической рациональности. В первой части данной статьи вводится различение по меньшей мере семи различных видов идей и связанных с ними функций в философии Канта. Во второй части демонстрируется попытка Фихте их систематизировать исходя из утверждения том, что разум должен сначала создать идею о самом себе. Проанализировано также предложенное Фихте распределение идей на пять сфер действенности или типов мировоззрения. В третьей, итоговой части статьи рассмотрен выход гегелевской мысли за рамки трансцендентальной философии сознания. Автор статьи связывает этот процесс с выдвижением не осуществимых в контексте философии Канта и Фихте требований к понятиям «разум» и «идея» и анализирует ряд сложностей, вызванных этими требованиями. Таким образом, интерпретация учения об идеях и их функциях у Канта, Фихте и Гегеля демонстрирует динамический характер теорий разума в классической немецкой философии и актуальность семи видов идей, которые сохраняют свое значение для философии XXI в. Ключевые слова: Кант и немецкий идеализм, виды идей, функции разума, мировоззрение, проблема различных требований. (shrink)

本書為魯惟一教授近年新作，英文版由Leiden & Boston: Brill出版社2011年出版，將董仲舒和他的聲望放到西漢歷史和思想發展的層面上，對公元前2世紀董仲舒在思想和決策上所扮演的角色進行了深入探討，並提出了具有顛覆性的觀點。 董仲舒的生卒年約為公元前198年至約前107年。 “罷黜百家，獨尊儒術”不太可能是漢武帝接受董仲舒的建議實行的封建統治政策。作者認為，董仲舒的某些觀點，例如〈天人三策〉中的內容後來成為「儒家思想」的重要部分，但因此認為西漢時期就已經存在一個統一連貫的 思想體系，或者說董仲舒等人是在傳播這一系統化的學說，顯然是不成熟的。 一直要到東漢時，這樣的系統才逐漸建立起來，而儒家學說真正發揮效力至少要等到唐代。我們在西漢的歷史文獻中並不能找到證據證明在董仲舒的時代，「儒家」已經成為一種治理百姓的理想或方式，或是壓倒其他各家而取得 了「勝利」。 董仲舒所謂的「一統」也無關朝代和政治的統一。 從研究古代文獻的普遍標準來看，現在很難再承認董仲舒是整部今本《春秋繁露》的作者。.

This article offers an analysis of intentionality for virtual objects and explores some of the ethical implications of this analysis. The main example which serves as a motivation for the article is the case of a Chinese gamer who, in 2005, committed murder in retaliation for the theft of a virtual object, the theft of his virtual dragon sabre. The intentional analysis reveals that the way in which we experience virtual objects shares a structural similarity with the way in (...) which we experience physical objects. Both virtual and physical objects are accessible through action and intersubjectively available. The final part of the article introduces three ethical points based on the intentional analysis. First, virtual objects can have the same ethical significance as physical objects. Second, it will be important to consider empirical results on the factors which influence one’s subjective level of immersion in the virtual world. Finally, the intentional analysis of virtual objects suggests specific questions for future research. (shrink)

In recent decades, perspectivism has developed into an epistemological research program claiming its independence. This autonomy stems from Perspectivism’s potential ability to resolve the contradictions between realist and constructivist programs. Perspectivism is based on the idea that the object depends on perspective, which constitutes any subjective attempt to cognize it. Perspectivists reconstruct and explain the factors involved in the formation of perspective, identifying the conditionality of epistemic acts, using concepts such as “position”, “point of view”, “view”, “angle”, “horizon”, “focus”, “picture”, (...) “context”, “aspect”, etc. Although these concepts are part of the perspectivist’s toolkit, their meanings and interrelation have so far been taken for granted and have not yet been critically and comprehensively analyzed. The purpose of this article is to take steps toward clarifying the conceptual basis for defending perspectivism as an epistemological program. Once consistently uncovered and correlated in a conceptual model, Perspectivist concepts can be used as a tool for a detailed analysis of theories, positions, and beliefs. The article begins with a preliminary description of the concept of perspectivism and its brief history as an epistemological program. In particular, the first modern attempts to outline perspectivist epistemology are described in the works of F. Kaulbach (1990), W. Stegmaier (2008), and M. Massimi (2017, 2020). The problem of identifying the special a priori status of perspectivist notions as a strategy for justifying the autonomy of Perspectivism is then posed. A method for demonstrating such a status, based on Kant’s transcendentalism and P. Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, is then suggested. (shrink)

Since Nietzsche, the term “perspectivism” has been used as the name for an ill-defined epistemological position. Some have tried to find an adequate meaning for the word “perspectivism,” tacitly investing it with a set of different predicates, such as “the dependence of cognition on position,” “pluralism,” “anti-universalism,” “epistemic humility,” etc. This approach is related to two contestable attitudes: the monolateral linguistic paradigm and the metaepistemological position of multiplicity of incompatible epistemological programs. The monolateral linguistic paradigm proceeds from the assumption that (...) there is no obligatory connection between word and meaning. This makes it possible to denote logical content by any possible sign, and to explicate the sign in any number of ways. The metaepistemological position of multiplicity of incompatible epistemological programs encourages the support of artificial antagonism in the theory of cognition and the creation of “new” positions with different denotations. These attitudes can be contrasted with the method of empirical “originalist” analysis within the bilateral paradigm, as well as the theory of one epistemology and universal epistemic language. The content of the term “perspectivism” can be reconstructed by analyzing the original meanings of its individual constituent morphemes and their combination. The extremely precise and empirically provable definition of the word “perspectivism” is “the tendency to act by seeing through something”. This points to the problem of the impossibility of analytically deducing from it “the dependence of cognition on position,” “pluralism,” and other predicates. The same problem of inconsistency between the name of the epistemological position and its content is also encountered, for example, in the literature on relativism. It freely attributes a set of doctrinal beliefs to the term “relativism” without explicit linguistic signification of the predicates and blurs the difference between perspectivism and relativism. This points to the inexpediency of constructing epistemological positions on the basis of words denoting one of all possible interrelated cognitive actions, and the need to rethink epistemological practice. (shrink)

Das Sammelwerk legt umfassend den Stand der Staatstheorie dar und arbeitet die Beiträge der bedeutendsten Staatsdenker und der wichtigsten Strömungen des Staatsdenkens zum heutigen Staatsverständnis exemplarisch heraus.Renommierte Philosophen, Historiker, Sozial-, Kultur- und Rechtswissenschaftler aus Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen in ganz Europa stellen in 15 gleichgewichteten Kapiteln das Staatsdenken von der Antike bis zur Postdemokratie facettenreich heraus. Jedes Kapitel firmiert unter einem Schwerpunkt, angefangen beim klassischen und konservativen über das liberale und feministische bis hin zum anarchistischen und religiösen Staatsdenken. Einen besonderen Stellenwert (...) nimmt dabei das Staatsdenken in anderen Kulturen ein, darunter China, Indien, die arabische Welt sowie das vor- und das postkoloniale Afrika.Die Schlussbetrachtung zum "Staat der Zukunft" bilanziert die Probleme von Souveränitätsverlust, Staatszerfall und Postdemokratie vor dem Hintergrund von Globalisierung, Ökonomisierung und Individualisierung.Praktische Querverweise und ein umfassendes Literaturverzeichnis erleichtern den Zugriff, detaillierte Stichwort- und Personenregister runden das Werk ab.Mit Beiträgen von:Helga Albrecht, Andreas Anter, Olaf Asbach, Friedrich Balke, Ernst Baltrusch, Michael Becker, Hannah Bethke, Karl-Heinz Breier, Michael Brie, Norbert Campagna, Lars Distelhorst, Sabine Doyé, Dominik Finkelde, Oliver Flügel-Martinsen, Alexander Gantschow, Eva Geulen, Gerhard Göhler, Dieter Grimm, Martin Gronau, Gregor Hain, Hendrik Hansen, Leonhard Harding, Oliver Hidalgo, Wilhelm Hofmann, Frauke Höntzsch, Dana Ionescu, Matthias Jestaedt, Dirk Jörke, John Kannankulam, Stefan Koslowski, Oliver W. Lembcke, Rochus Leonhardt, Roland Lhotta, Mathias Lindenau, Marion Löffler, Gundula Ludwig, Günter Maschke, Jean-Christophe Merle, Dominique Fabian Miething, Andreas Niederberger, Claudia Opitz-Belakhal, Henning Ottmann, Gregor Paul, Thore Prien, Walter Reese-Schäfer, Claudia Ritzi, Samuel Salzborn, Stefano Saracino, Birgit Sauer, Peter Seyferth, Thomas Schölderle, Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann, Ulrich Seeber, Veith Selk, Harald Sippel, Tine Stein, Kazuhiro Takii, Ulrich Thiele, Andreas Vasilache, Rüdiger Voigt, Christian Wendt, Stefanie Wöhl, Joachim Wurst, Holger Zapf und Barbara Zehnpfennig. (shrink)

This paper argues for incoherence in Nicholas of Cusa’s account of the hypostatic union in Christ, in light of his elevation of human nature to (nearly) divine status. It claims that this elevation destabilizes the individual’s place in the cosmos, and that Cusa extends ignorance too far. By seeking to avoid one paradox—the epistemological paradox of knowing objects whose being is derived from a fundamentally unknowable God—he creates another, elevating human nature beyond reasonable limits and destroying any possibility for a (...) coherent account of personal sin and individual redemption. (shrink)

Diese Publikation handelt von der Beziehung zwischen dem Staat und dem Islam im allgemein-politischen und im schulischen Kontext, wobei der Islam neben anderen islamischen Institutionen in erster Linie von der Islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGÖ) vertreten wird. Der IGGÖ - ebenso wie anderen Kirchen und Religionsgesellschaften (KuR) - werden im österreichischen Religionsrechtssystem weitreichende Autonomierechte eingeräumt, vor allem in der Schule in Form eines konfessionellen Religionsunterrichts (RU). Zur Erforschung dieser Beziehung in der Schule wird ein rechts- und politikwissenschaftlicher Blick auf die (...) rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen und die soziale Wirklichkeit des Islams und des RU der IGGÖ (IRU) in Wiener Mittelschulen geworfen. Konsequenterweise wird auch auf die verschiedenen involvierten Akteur*innen geblickt, insb. auf muslimische Schüler*innen und Eltern, Religionslehrer*innen, Fachinspektor*innen und sonstige Autoritäten der IGGÖ sowie Schuldirektor*innen, Bildungsdirektionen und das Bildungsministerium. Dafür wurden im Rahmen einer qualitativen Sozialforschung sieben (Schul-)Autoritäten der IGGÖ (IGGÖ-SA) als 'Vertreter*innen des Islams' und sechs Wiener Mittelschuldirektor*innen (MSD) als 'staatliche Vertreter*innen' interviewt. Die Interviews verfolgten drei Zwecke: 1) die Ergründung negativer rechtlicher, politischer, gesellschaftlicher und religionsgesellschaftlicher Einflussfaktoren auf die allgemeine Beziehung zwischen dem Staat und dem Islam bzw. der IGGÖ (und den Muslim*innen); 2) die Erhebung von Herausforderungen, Spannungen und Konflikten sowie Idealvorstellungen in der schulpolitischen, -bürokratischen, -organisatorischen, individuellen und korporativen Beziehungsdimension, sowie 3) die Erforschung von persönlichen Einstellungen und Haltungen von IGGÖ-SA und MSD zum Islam und dem IRU in der Schule sowie - vonseiten der IGGÖ-SA - zum Staat und der Gesellschaft. Während der dritte Zweck in dieser Publikation nur eine untergeordnete Rolle einnimmt, liegt das Hauptaugenmerk auf den abstrahierten Spannungsfeldern des 'gelebten Rechts' im Sinne der sozialen Wirklichkeit in den entsprechenden Beziehungsdimensionen, die in einer rechtssoziologischen Analyse dem normativem Recht gegenübergestellt und entlang idealtypischer Einstellungen und Haltungen auf Ursachen, Wirkungen und Lösungen untersucht werden. Die Analysethemen umfassen mitunter die Einbeziehung von Fachinspektor*innen für Religion in die Bildungsdirektionen, den Streit über die Abkürzung der IGGÖ für die Eintragung in Zeugnisse, die Schwierigkeiten in der Organisation mit dem RU, das (religiöse) Verhalten muslimischer Schüler*innen und Eltern in der Schule sowie die Grenzen der Lehre im IRU im Rahmen der staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung. Diesbezügliche Idealvorstellungen zu den Herausforderungen ermöglichen abschließend aus einer sozialintegrativen und pluralistischer Perspektive der IGGÖ-SA die Konturierung eines Österreichischen Islams bzw. eines idealtypischen IRU. (shrink)

T. 1. Worin die wahre Glückseligkeit des Menschen bestehe -- T. 2. Wie man glückselig werden könne.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesus the World-Protector:Eighteenth-Century Gelukpa Historians View Christianity1Michael J. SweetThe assumption that religion was so seamlessly woven into non-Western and preindustrial cultures that it was not even distinguished as a separate entity, let alone regarded as an object for study, has been a commonplace among Western scholars of religion for some decades.2 From this point of view, which can be broadly characterized as postmodernist and postcolonialist, the concept of religion (...) "is not a native category... it is a category imposed from outside... it is the other... colonialists who are solely responsible for the content of the term."3 This is a somewhat reductionistic and Eurocentric perspective that ignores the universal human capacity to empathically understand other belief systems.One counterexample to this school of thought is found in the works of three eighteenth-century religious historians, all of whom were learned monks in the Gelukpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism: Gombojab (Mgon po Skyabs, late seventeenth century–after 1766),4 Sumba Khembo (Sum pa Mkhan po Yes shes dpal 'byor, 1704–1776), and Tuken (Thu'u Bkwan Blo bzang Chos kyi Nyi ma, 1737– 1802), authors of The History of Buddhism in China, The Auspicious Wish-Fulfilling Tree,5 and The Crystal Mirror,6 respectively. These scholars had clear conceptions of their own and other religious systems (Tib.: chos lugs), and compared to earlier Tibetan accounts they present relatively tolerant evaluations of other religious philosophies—for example, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and the Literati Tradition (Ru jiao, "Confucianism")—while asserting the superiority of the Gelukpa form of Tibetan Buddhism.7As a case in point, we will see how they describe and evaluate Christianity, a religion that was quite foreign to them and that they appear to have understood only imperfectly. Earlier Tibetan Buddhist religious histories, of which the best-known are the Blue Annals of 'Gos Lotsawa and Bu ston's "History of the Dharma," are immensely valuable sources, but they are more parochial in their range of interest than those of the eighteenth-century Tibeto-Mongol scholars.8 For the earlier historians Indo-Tibetan Buddhism was the only religious system worth serious consideration, and Chinese Buddhism, Indian non-Buddhist religious philosophies, Bon, [End Page 173] and Islam were dealt with in a polemical or (especially in the case of Islam) a frankly hostile fashion. Something changed in the eighteenth century that produced works closer to modern comparative religion than to medieval heresiography.A major motive for this shift was surely the triumph of the Manchu Qing dynasty, which by the mid-eighteenth century had incorporated Tibet and Mongolia definitively into its sphere. Thus, the horizon of the Tibeto-Mongol intelligentsia widened to include the vast Manchu empire, whose leadership in its turn was becoming increasingly aware of other Asian societies and of the European colonial powers. I believe it is significant that Sumba Khembo, Tuken, and Gombojab were all of Mongol ethnicity, the first two from Amdo and the last from Mongolia; they were able to combine an encyclopedic mastery of Tibetan Buddhist texts and ritual with the greater objectivity available to people stemming from the geographical and cultural periphery of that tradition. All three of them were exposed to the cosmopolitan world of imperial Beijing, where they had ample opportunity to meet followers of non-Buddhist religions of a wide range of ethnicities.9By the mid-eighteenth century there were four Catholic churches in Beijing, serving thousands of Chinese Christian converts. Dozens of European priests were employed by the imperial court as well.10 The prevailing syncretic view of the three major Chinese religious philosophies (sanjiao)—Buddhism, Daoism, and the Literati Tradition—as being mutually complementary,11 prevailed in the capital. This is the view that is approvingly cited by Tuken: "there are three great traditions (lugs srol) which clarify the ultimate nature of things, the Literati Tradition, Daoism, and Buddhism."12In turning to these scholars' treatment of Christianity, we find the earliest notice of this religion in Gombojab's History of Buddhism in China,13 written around the mid-1730s.14 Gombojab renders the name of Jesus in its traditional Chinese form of Yesu; he is called the World... (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is, while discussing in detail Helmut Rüßmann's theory of judicial factfinding, to demonstrate how probability theory can be used in dealing with a situation where the court has not obtained full evidence, but probability assumptions are possible with regard to circumstantial evidence. After giving a brief overview of provisions of German law which include the concept of probability, elementary features of probability calculus and statistical inference are outlined. The focus of the discussion of Rüßmann's theory (...) is on evaluating testimony and on combining the impact of several pieces of evidence which bear on the same event or proposition; the relevant concepts of Ekelöf, Schreiber, Rüßmann and Dempster are analyzed and then compared with a new proposal. The paper concludes that alternative approaches to probability need not be invoked;,classical' probability calculus seems to best cope with the questions courts are confronted with in situations such as discussed in the paper. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology attempts both to familiarize readers with the directions in which the scholarship of this discipline has gone and to pursue the discussion into hitherto under-examined areas. Philosophical theology is aimed primarily at theoretical understanding of the nature and attributes of God and of God's relationship to the world and its inhabitants. During the twentieth century, much of the philosophical community (both in the Anglo-American analytic tradition and in Continental circles) had grave doubts about our (...) ability to attain any such understanding. In recent years the analytic tradition in particular has moved beyond the biases that placed obstacles in the way of the pursuing questions located at the interface of philosophy and religion. Written by some of the leading scholars in the field, the articles in the book are grouped into five sections. In the first section, articles focus on the authority of scripture and tradition, on the nature and mechanisms of divine revelation, on the relation between religion and science, and on theology and mystery. The next section focuses on philosophical problems connected with the central divine attributes: aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. In the third section, articles explore theories of divine action and divine providence, questions about petitionary prayer, problems about divine authority and God's relationship to morality and moral standards, and various formulations of and responses to the problem of evil. The fourth section examines philosophical problems that arise in connection with such central Christian doctrines as the trinity, the incarnation, the atonement, original sin, resurrection, and the Eucharist. Finally, the fifth section introduces readers to current work in Jewish, Islamic, and Chinese philosophical theology. (shrink)

Edmund Burke is considered the father of conservatism. With his ‘Reflections on the French Revolution’ (1790), Burke presented a work that was already controversial at the time of its publication. In Burke’s understanding, people and their social institutions are historical beings that are subject to change but unchanging in the face of all change. The central concept in Burke’s argument is heritage, which encompasses both collective, historical memory and social organisation, and specifically refers to constitutional traditions. Society is hierarchically structured (...) and forms an organic unit based on a necessary balance between the principles of continuity and regeneration. According to Burke, the state is the coagulated historical rationality of people who must be taken at least as seriously as contemporaries in their efforts to shape a good order. With contributions by Michael Becker, Norbert Campagna, Oliver Hidalgo, Jürgen Kamm, Skadi Siiri Krause, Thomas Lau, Ulrich Niggemann, Henning Ottmann, Volker Reinhardt and Rüdiger Voigt. (shrink)

In this article the following criticisms of the essentialist conception of general term rigidity presented in the previous papers are considered and responded: the identity of designation conception of rigidity can provide us with a better alternative account for general term rigidity, and the essentialist conception fails to meet the condition of extensional adequacy, both because it over -and undergeneralizes. Against, it is claimed that the proposed definition of general term rigidity cannot feature in lost rigidity arguments against description theories (...) because it is circular, and then fails to do the primary work that rigidity is supposed to do, namely, distinguishing terms that are covered by a description theory from those that are not. As regards, after insisting that the essentialist view need not be commited to the condition of extensional adequacy, both charges of over- and undergeneralization are addressed: while the argumentation aimed at showing that some examples are cases of overgeneralization is rejected, the cases of undergeneralization are admitted to be still in need of a better explanation than the one given in Devitt. En este artículo se analizan y responden las siguientes objeciones a la concepción esencialista de la rigidez para términos generales contenidas en los artículos precedentes: la concepción de la rigidez como identidad de designación puede proporcionarnos una definición más adecuada del carácter rígido de los términos generales, y la concepción esencialista no puede cumplir con la condición de adecuación extensional, tanto debido a que sobregeneraliza como a que subgeneraliza. Contra, se sostiene que la definición alternativa propuesta no puede ser utilizada en argumentos basados en la pérdida de rigidez contra las teorías descriptivistas porque es circular; por consiguiente, fracasa en alcanzar el objetivo principal que se adscribe a la noción de rigidez, a saber, distinguir las expresiones que pueden ser explicadas en términos descriptivos de aquéllas para las cuales ello no es posible. En lo que concierne a, tras insistir en que la concepción esencialista no tiene por qué comprometerse con el requisito de adecuación extensional, se consideran las dos acusaciones mencionadas: mientras que se rechaza la argumentación tendiente a mostrar que ciertos ejemplos son casos de sobregeneralización, se acepta que algunos casos de subgeneralización requerirían de una explicación más adecuada que la presentada en Devitt. (shrink)

El presente ensayo está compuesto de manera tal, que presenta un interesante bosquejo del pensamiento existencial kierkegaardiano. Ello desde varios flancos que componen entre sí una excelente introducción al desarrollo intelectual de Kierkegaard; a saber, la singular influencia de su vida en su pensamiento que caracteriza la relación que el pensador tiene con el mundo y consigo mismo; la posición de la filosofía de Kierkegaard que está determinada profundamente por su relación con sus antecesores inmediatos; los lineamientos de su obra (...) literaria, y finalmente la decisiva relación que atraviesa su obra entre pensar-creer y filosofía- teología. (shrink)

In work culminating in Know How (2009), Jason Stanley argues, against Gilbert Ryle, that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. In How Propaganda Works (2015), Stanley portrays this work as undermining a “flawed ideology” supporting elitist valuations of intellectual work and workers. However, the link between Stanley’s two philosophical projects is weak. Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that lacks the political consequences foreseen by Stanley. Versions of “intellectualism” have as much potential to align with hierarchical political systems as do versions (...) of “anti-intellectualism.” Consequently, the debate about knowledge-how and knowledge-that comes apart from Stanley’s more recent concerns about flawed ideologies.En un trabajo que encuentra su culminación en Know How (2009), Jason Stanely argumenta, en contra de Gilbert Ryle, que el saber-cómo es una especie del saber-qué. En How Propaganda Works (2015), Stanley presenta su trabajo como debilitador de una “falsa ideología” que respalda valoraciones elitistas del trabajo intelectual y los trabajadores intelectuales. Sin embargo, la conexión entre los dos proyectos filosóficos de Stanley es débil. La distinción de Ryle entre saber-cómo y saber-qué no tiene las consecuencias políticas previstas por Stanley. Algunas versiones del “intelectualismo” tienen el mismo potencial para alinearse con sistemas políticos jerárquico que algunas versiones del “anti-intelectualismo”. En consecuencia, el debate en torno a las nociones de saber-cómo y saber-qué no tiene incidencia sobre la preocupación más reciente de Stanley acerca de las ideologías falsas. (shrink)

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...) guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad. (shrink)

What is the relation between small-scale collaborative plans and the execution of those plans within interactive contexts? I argue here that joint attention has a key role in explaining how shared plans and shared intentions are executed in interactive contexts. Within singular action, attention plays the functional role of enabling intentional action to be guided by a prior intention. Within interactive joint action, it is joint attention, I argue, that plays a similar functional role of enabling the agents to act (...) in a collaborative way such that their actions are rationally guided by a prior shared intention. This understanding of joint attention – as having a key functional role of enabling the rational guidance of joint intentional action by a prior shared intention – allows for an alternative understanding of the kind of minimal cooperation that infants can engage in. On this understanding, infants’ capacity to engage in joint actions is already an incipient capacity to engage in rational and intentional joint actions, albeit a capacity that is necessarily scaffolded by an adult rational co-partner. (shrink)