Ethics and Information Technology 16 (3):219-225 (2014)

Authors
Michael Madary
University of the Pacific
Abstract
This article offers an analysis of intentionality for virtual objects and explores some of the ethical implications of this analysis. The main example which serves as a motivation for the article is the case of a Chinese gamer who, in 2005, committed murder in retaliation for the theft of a virtual object, the theft of his virtual dragon sabre. The intentional analysis reveals that the way in which we experience virtual objects shares a structural similarity with the way in which we experience physical objects. Both virtual and physical objects are accessible through action and intersubjectively available. The final part of the article introduces three ethical points based on the intentional analysis. First, virtual objects can have the same ethical significance as physical objects. Second, it will be important to consider empirical results on the factors which influence one’s subjective level of immersion in the virtual world. Finally, the intentional analysis of virtual objects suggests specific questions for future research.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10676-014-9347-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,091
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Totality and Infinity.Emmanuel Levinas - 1961/1969 - Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem.John L. Pollock - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):237–309.
Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects.Dale Jacquette - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):1-19.
Realistic Virtual Reality and Perception.John Dilworth - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):23-42.
Meinongian Objects.David W. Smith - 1975 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):43-71.
Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
The Invisible Dragon: Essays on Beauty.Dave Hickey - 2009 - University of Chicago Press.
Independent Intentional Objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
Świat wirtualny jako nowy przedmiot filozofii przyrody.Anna Latawiec - 2006 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 54 (2):119-131.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-06-28

Total views
24 ( #473,453 of 2,506,374 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,997 of 2,506,374 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes