Abstract

The purpose of this paper is, while discussing in detail Helmut Rüßmann's theory of judicial factfinding, to demonstrate how probability theory can be used in dealing with a situation where the court has not obtained full evidence, but probability assumptions are possible with regard to circumstantial evidence. After giving a brief overview of provisions of German law which include the concept of probability, elementary features of probability calculus and statistical inference are outlined. The focus of the discussion of Rüßmann's theory is on evaluating testimony and on combining the impact of several pieces of evidence which bear on the same event or proposition; the relevant concepts of Ekelöf, Schreiber, Rüßmann and Dempster are analyzed and then compared with a new proposal. The paper concludes that alternative approaches to probability need not be invoked;,classical' probability calculus seems to best cope with the questions courts are confronted with in situations such as discussed in the paper