The role of academic satisfaction on persistence and successful academic behavior has been the focus of research for decades. Nevertheless, driven by positive educational psychology, subjective well-being has been highlighted as another central feature in the academic path of students. Studies aimed at identifying the variables that contribute to explain different aspects of academic performance have been widely investigated, although studies aimed at identifying the determinants of subjective well-being are still limited. The present paper examined the contribution of AS judgments (...) on subjective well-being. To this end, it was hypothesized that SWB levels depend on the balance between positive/negative emotions and life satisfaction judgments. Furthermore, it was stipulated that AS has an indirect contribution on SWB, through life satisfaction, whereas the balance of emotions influences both AS judgments and life satisfaction. Using an analysis strategy based on structural equation modeling, the results indicated that the model fitted satisfactorily, explaining 32% of the variance of SWB. Particularly, it was observed that AS judgments contributed to life satisfaction judgments. Although no direct contribution of AS on SWB was reported, a total contribution partially mediated by life satisfaction judgments was revealed. These findings support the importance of academic satisfaction judgments, not only because of their importance in academic terms, but also because of their impact on university students’ subjective well-being and health. (shrink)

Fear to contamination is an easy-to-provoke, intense, hard-to-control, and extraordinarily persistent fear. A worsening of preexisting psychiatric disorders was observed during the COVID-19 outbreak, and several studies suggest that those with obsessive–compulsive disorder may be more affected than any other group of people. In the face of worsening OCD symptoms, there is a need for mental health professionals to provide the support needed not only to treat patients who still report symptoms, but also to improve relapse prevention. In this line, (...) it is recommended to improve alternative strategies such as online consultations and digital psychiatry. The aim of this study is to develop augmented reality stimuli that are clinically relevant for patients with cleaning OCD and assess their efficiency to obtain emotionally significant responses. Four AR stimuli were developed: a plastic bag full of garbage, a piece of bread with mold, a dirty sports shoe, and a piece of rotten meat. All stimuli were shown to a clinical group and a control group. Relevant results were the design of the AR stimuli. These stimuli were validated with the statistical difference in perceived anxiety in the meat stimuli between the clinical and control groups. Nevertheless, when looking at effect sizes, all stimuli present effect sizes from small to large, with both shoe and bread between small and medium effect sizes. These results are a valuable support for the clinical use of these AR stimuli in the treatment of cleaning OCD. (shrink)

Frictions between work and family life have increased during the COVID-19 pandemic, causing negative consequences on the mental health and quality of life of workers. Without validated instruments, it is not possible to determine the impact of Work-Family and Family-Work conflict. To date, no studies have been conducted to provide evidence of the validity and reliability of The Survey Work-Home Interaction Nijmegen in the population of Argentine workers. The SWING was administered to 611 Argentine workers of both sexes aged between (...) 18 and 70 years selected from a non-probabilistic accidental sampling. The confirmatory factor analysis showed satisfactory fit indices of the original four-factor model. The level of reliability was acceptable. The relationships of the subscale scores with the engagement and burnout variables were as expected according to previous studies. Having an instrument adequately adapted to the population of Argentine workers facilitates the development of studies aimed at evaluating the role of W-F or F-W interactions and their implications for health and productivity. (shrink)

Due to the rapid advance of the pandemic caused by COVID-19, several countries perceived that human and material resources would be insufficient to meet the demand of infected patients. The aim of this study is to analyze the knowledge of health professionals working in the pandemic about the application of ethical criteria in decision-making in situations of resource scarcity. This is a cross-sectional, descriptive, and quantitative survey study, conducted from June to December 2020, with health professionals working in the COVID-19 (...) pandemic in Brazil. We applied a questionnaire to assess the professionals’ knowledge about ethical criteria in decision-making in the allocation of scarce resources during the pandemic, containing 14 questions and possible score from 0 to 70, which was developed by researchers from documents and protocols validated by organizations from various countries, available in the first months of the pandemic, a sociodemographic characterization questionnaire and a self-assessment questionnaire regarding knowledge about bioethics. A total of 197 health professionals participated in the study, 37.6% of whom were nurses and 22.8% of whom were physicians, working in the Family Health Unit (28.4%) with a degree at the level of specialization (46.2%). Moreover, (9.5%) of nurses, (18.2%) of dental surgeons and (24.4%) of physicians reported that they have no prior knowledge about bioethics. Physicians and hospital workers scored higher on the knowledge assessment questionnaire. The mean score of the participants was 45.4 (SD = 7.2). Investments in training and professional education in the field of health focused on Bioethics are necessary, considering models and ethical theories that help professionals, managers and society to better position themselves in the face of pandemic contexts. (shrink)

Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory holds that we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type––which Wright calls “cornerstones”––that enables us to acquire justification for believing other propositions––those that we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. Entitlement theory is meant by Wright to deliver a forceful response to the sceptic who argues that we cannot justify ordinary beliefs. I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described (...) in more detail. I suggest that it is dubious that we are strategically entitled to accept cornerstones. After this, I focus on entitlement in general. I contend that, in important cases, non-evidential justification for accepting cornerstones cannot secure evidential justification for believing ordinary propositions. My argument rests on a probabilistic regimentation of the so-called “leaching problem”. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on transmission and failure of transmission of warrant. We identify three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for transmission of warrant, and we show that their satisfaction grounds a number of interesting epistemic phenomena that have not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. We then scrutinise Wright’s analysis of transmission failure and improve on extant readings of it. Nonetheless, we present a Bayesian counterexample that shows that Wright’s analysis is partially incoherent with our analysis of (...) warrant transmission and prima facie defective. We conclude exploring three alternative lines of reply: developing a more satisfactory account of transmission failure, which we outline; dismissing the Bayesian counterexample by rejecting some of its assumptions; reinterpreting Wright’s analysis to make it immune to the counterexample. (shrink)

I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.

In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification (...) of a belief: the direct way and the indirect way. We identify a straightforward reason for claiming that the justification contributed indirectly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. Then we show that the same reason doesn’t extend to the claim that the justification contributed directly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. As is the view that seemings or appearances contribute justification directly, we infer that Bergmann’s contention that his dilemma applies to is unmotivated. In the final part, we suggest that our line of response to Bergmann can be used to shield other types of internalist justification from Bergmann’s objection. We also propose that seeming-grounded justification can be combined with justification of one of these types to form the basis of a promising version of internalist foundationalism. (shrink)

Crispin Wright has given an explanation of how a first time warrant can fall short of transmitting across a known entailment. Formal epistemologists have struggled to turn Wright’s informal explanation into cogent Bayesian reasoning. In this paper, I analyse two Bayesian models of Wright’s account respectively proposed by Samir Okasha and Jake Chandler. I argue that both formalizations are unsatisfactory for different reasons, and I lay down a third Bayesian model that appears to me to capture the valid kernel of (...) Wright’s explanation. After this, I consider a recent development in Wright’s account of transmission failure. Wright suggests that his condition sufficient for transmission failure of first time warrant also suffices for transmission failure of supplementary warrant. I propose an interpretation of Wright’s suggestion that shield it from objections. I then lay down a fourth Bayesian framework that provides a simplified model of the unified explanation of transmission failure envisaged by Wright. (shrink)

According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.

Kristen Ghodsee continue avec cet ouvrage la récupération de l’héritage historique de l’activisme international des femmes du bloc de l’Est, thème qu’elle avait lancé en 2015 avec The Left Side of History: World War II and the Unfulfilled Promise of Communism in Eastern Europe. Elle y ajoute un nouveau volet : l’expérience de l’Afrique postcoloniale et la lutte de ses militantes politiques pour les droits des femmes pendant la Décennie des Nations Unies pour la femme, 1975‑1985. K. Ghodsee co...

According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our rational credences. (...) If this were true, the rational acceptability of dogmatism would be seriously questionable. I respond that these objections don’t get off the ground because they assume that our experiences and our introspective beliefs that we have experiences have the same evidential force, whereas the dogmatist is uncommitted to this assumption. I also consider the question whether dogmatism has an antisceptical bite. I suggest that the answer turns on whether or not the Bayesian can determine the priors of hypotheses and conjectures on the grounds of their extra-empirical virtues. If the Bayesian can do so, the thesis that dogmatism has an antisceptical bite is probably false. (shrink)

John Hardwig has championed the thesis (NE) that evidence that an expert EXP has evidence for a proposition P, constituted by EXP’s testimony that P, is not evidence for P itself, where evidence for P is generally characterized as anything that counts towards establishing the truth of P. In this paper, I first show that (NE) yields tensions within Hardwig’s overall view of epistemic reliance on experts and makes it imply unpalatable consequences. Then, I use Shogenji-Roche’s theorem of transitivity of (...) incremental confirmation to show that (NE) is false if a natural Bayesian formalization of the above notion of evidence is implemented. I concede that Hardwig could resist my Bayesian objection if he re-interpreted (NE) as a more precise thesis that only applies to community-focused evidence. I argue, however, that this precisification, while diminishing the philosophical relevance of (NE), wouldn’t settle the tensions internal to Hardwig’s views. (shrink)

Transmission of justification across inference is a valuable and indeed ubiquitous epistemic phenomenon in everyday life and science. It is thanks to the phenomenon of epistemic transmission that inferential reasoning is a means for substantiating predictions of future events and, more generally, for expanding the sphere of our justified beliefs or reinforcing the justification of beliefs that we already entertain. However, transmission of justification is not without exceptions. As a few epistemologists have come to realise, more or less trivial forms (...) of circularity can prevent justification from transmitting from p to q even if one has justification for p and one is aware of the inferential link from p to q. In interesting cases this happens because one can acquire justification for p only if one has independent justification for q. In this case the justification for q cannot depend on the justification for p and the inferential link from p to q, as genuine transmission would require. The phenomenon of transmission failure seems to shed light on philosophical puzzles, such as Moore's proof of a material world and McKinsey's paradox, and it plays a central role in various philosophical debates. For this reason it is being granted continued and increasing attention. (shrink)

There is a hidden history of Europe, which is far earlier than the Indo-European history of public konwledge and education. Archaeological, mythological and linguistic evidence point to a matrilineal society, which honoured the place of women, was based on a partnership between women and men, and lived in accord with its natural environment. I find in this early history a cause of hope for Europe’s present and future. If Europeans can learn from this diverse and non-militaristic distant past, which has (...) been repressed but not destroyed, there is hope that we can develop models of society based on partnership rather than dominance. (shrink)

Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a (...) “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic has appeared, that is “ n -opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m ” ( m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper, by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”, “deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra), whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional very regular solid). (shrink)

What is considered ugly, grotesque or unpleasant by the fashion world? The first collection presented by Rei Kawakubo in Paris was classified as offensive to Western aesthetic standards, for it questioned the French ideal of beauty and elegance. Through silhouettes covered in frayed, perforated and monochromatic fabrics, Kawakubo disrupted the established notion of the beautiful body, stripping it of the clichés of femininity, explicit sexuality and glamour. Under the lens of Vilém Flusser’s philosophy, the Japanese fashion designer created the new, (...) the beautiful, that which is capable of expanding the parameters of the real. (shrink)

This paper sets forth the fundamental aspects of the conception of history supported by Machiavelli in the context of his political thought. It attempts to identify the assumptions in which it is grounded, and, at the same time, to extract its consequences. At this point, it becomes manifest a contradiction in the theoretical postulates adopted by Machiavelli, that makes possible two opposing interpretations about history. In the light of this antinomy, the article provides sufficient but not conclusive reasons for take (...) side for one of the alternatives. (shrink)

I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in the absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.

Habermas pensa a questão da individuação e da socialização a partir dos estudos de George Hebert Mead, que, na sua concepção, foi o primeiro a refletir substancialmente sobre um modelo de eu produzido socialmente. Mead oferece todo subsídio teórico para o desenvolvimento de uma teoria da evolução humana que envolve o processo de individuação e de socialização. Pelo paradigma de intercompreensão, ou seja, da relação intersubjetiva de indivíduos que se socializam por meio da comunicação e se reconhecem mutuamente, Mead permite (...) a mudança de paradigma da consciência de si, da autorreferência de um sujeito que age isoladamente para o indivíduo que processa trocas sociais mediante a linguagem. Portanto, um dos principais componentes da teoria de Mead, em que Habermas busca contribuição para sua Teoria da Ação Comunicativa, é o processo de constituição do "eu", sua identidade. Mead acredita ser a individuação representada como um processo que é linguisticamente mediador da socialização e da construção de uma história de vida, na qual os sujeitos são conscientes de si. É esse meio linguístico estabelecido entre os sujeitos e o meio do entendimento intrassubjetivo e histórico vital que possibilita a formação de uma identidade de sujeitos socializados. É o reconhecimento intersubjetivo e autoentendimento mediado intersubjetivamente que propicia a formação da identidade. Esse quadro conceitual será fundamental a Habermas, na sua acepção de eu pós-convencional. Habermas discusses the question of individualization and socialization on the basis of the studies of George Herbert Mead, who, in Habermas' view, was the first to reflect substantially on a model of the socially produced "I". Mead offers a theoretical basis for the development of a theory of human evolution that involves the process of individualization and socialization. Through the paradigm of mutual understanding, that is, the intersubjective relationship of individuals who are socialized through communication and mutual recognition, Mead allows for a change in the paradigm of self-consciousness, from the self-reference of a subject who acts in isolation to the individual who processes social exchanges through the language. Therefore, one of the major components of Mead's theory in which Habermas seeks a contribution for his theory of communicative action, is the process of constitution of the "I," the subject's identity. Mead believes that individualization is represented as a process that is linguistically the mediator of socialization and of the construction of a life story in which subjects are aware of themselves. It is this linguistic means, established between the subjects and their means of intra-subjective understanding and their life histories, that allows the formation of an identity of socialized subjects. It is the intersubjective recognition and intersubjectively mediated self-understanding that enables identity formation. This conceptual framework will be central to Habermas in his concept of the self post-conventional "I". (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increase in environmental awareness in the United States, leading to steady growth in environmentally conscious consumerism. Looking specifically at green home marketing, understanding the consumer behavior of the next generation of homebuyers, Generation Z (GenZ), is important for environmental and business reasons. This study surveyed 116 university students to explore the influence of specific barriers and types of motivation (intrinsic, instrumental, and non-normative) on their perceptions of green homes. Our findings suggest certain barriers (...) have more influence on GenZ consumers than others, with the perceived lack of choice in selecting Green Home Features (GHFs) as the top barrier, followed by a lack of information about GHFs, and then the perceived effort to analyze GHFs. Furthermore, for GenZ consumers, intrinsic and non-normative motivations seem to significantly affect their willingness to buy green homes, whereas instrumental motivation does not. Our findings expand on previous studies on green consumer behavior to provide a new benchmark for understanding GenZ’s consumer behavior, specifically towards green homes. Our results can be used by marketers and policymakers to study future home trends, attract more potential buyers to green homes, and help create a sustainable environment for future generations. (shrink)

We focus on issues of learning assessment from the point of view of an investigation of philosophical elements in teaching. We contend that assessment of concept possession at school based on ordinary multiple-choice tests might be ineffective because it overlooks aspects of human rationality illuminated by Robert Brandom’s inferentialism––the view that conceptual content largely coincides with the inferential role of linguistic expressions used in public discourse. More particularly, we argue that multiple-choice tests at schools might fail to accurately assess the (...) possession of a concept or the lack of it, for they only check the written outputs of the pupils who take them, without detecting the inferences actually endorsed or used by them. We suggest that school tests would acquire reliability if they enabled pupils to make the reasons of their answers or the inferences they use explicit, so as to contribute to what Brandom calls the game of giving and asking for reasons. We explore the possibility to put this suggestion into practice by deploying two-tier multiple-choice tests. (shrink)

This is the introduction to Moretti, Luca and Nikolaj Pedersen (eds), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti.

Resumen: En el presente artículo buscaremos analizar los diversos tratamientos que Walter Benjamin ha realizado a lo largo de su obra acerca de la crítica como temática eminentemente filosófica. Para ello abordaremos, en primer lugar, su acercamiento a la poesía del Romanticismo alemán, luego a la poesía barroca y, finalmente, a la obra de Baudelaire con el objetivo de justificar que una comprensión acabada de la crítica implica necesariamente para el filósofo alemán recuperar la actualización como clave de lectura de (...) la historia. En efecto, si actualizar presupone para Benjamin la asunción de la no coincidencia del tiempo consigo mismo, esto es, la supervivencia del pasado en el presente y el potencial significante de sus emergencias, buscaremos mostrar cómo la noción de crítica benjaminiana descansa en ese diferencial temporal y encuentra allí su fuente de sentido.: In this article we intend to analyze the different considerations that Walter Benjamin carried out in his work on the problem of critique as an eminently philosophical subject. To do this, we will address, first, his approach to German romantic poetry, then baroque poetry and, finally, Baudelaire’s work, in order to explain how a full comprehension of critique means, for the German philosopher, to recover the idea of “actualization” as a key for reading History. In fact, if the actualization presupposes, for Benjamin, the assumption of the non-coincidence of time with itself, that is, the survival of the past within the present and its potentiality to signify, we try to show how Benjamin’s notion of criticism rests on that temporal difference and finds there its source of meaning. (shrink)

Dummett has recently presented his most mature and sophisticated version of justificationism, i.e. the view that meaning and truth are to be analysed in terms of justifiability. In this paper, I argue that this conception does not resolve a difficulty that also affected Dummett’s earlier version of justificationism: the problem that large tracts of the past continuously vanish as their traces in the present dissipate. Since Dummett’s justificationism is essentially based on the assumption that the speaker has limited (i.e. non-idealized) (...) cognitive powers, no further refinement of this position is likely to settle the problem of the vanishing past. (shrink)

En la consideración de numerosos asuntos y respecto de muy variadas exposiciones, el uso de expresiones como "filosófica" sugiere que debemos remitirnos a procederes, preguntas o exigencias especiales. Rabossi propone un modo de caracterizar el sentido con que usamos esas expresiones y, sobre esa base, concluye que la filosofía tal como se la practica desde hace doscientos años pretende ser una disciplina profesional pero no puede serlo debido a la índole de la preceptiva que la constituye. En este artículo se (...) examinan sus argumentos y se sostiene que, aunque no parecen suficientes para la conclusión a la que apuntan, hay razones para modificarlos de cierto modo que conducen a ese resultado. Whenever expressions like "X is philosophical" appear in different questions and assorted statements, the reference to special kinds of actions, questions or demands are suggested by these uses. Rabossi propounds a way for characterizing the sense of our using such expressions and, based on it, he states that philosophy, as it is accomplished from the last two centuries up to now, pretends to be a professional discipline but she cannot to be as such because the nature of its precepts. Rabossi's arguments are examined and it is maintained that although they do not seem to be sufficient for the pursued conclusion, there are reasons to modify them such a way to come to that conclusion. (shrink)

RESUMODesde sempre, o homem foi perseguido pelo desejo de imortalidade. Encontramos nas mais diferentes tradições culturais reflexões sobre a possibilidade da longevidade humana. Do ponto de vista filosófico, localizamos na obra de Francis Bacon a primeira sistematização moderna sobre o tema. O pensador inglês acredita que, diferentemente dos antigos, teria descoberto um método "para introduzir espíritos jovens em um corpo velho" e conjecturou na sua importante História da vida e da mortecenários possíveis para a regeneração física do homem. Nesse sentido, (...) introduziu a possibilidade de o homem exercer o do­mínio sobre a natureza, império esse não só praticado sobre a natureza externa, mas também sobre si próprio e, no limite, sobre o próprio corpo humano. Assim, Bacon teria aberto as portas para o sonho moderno de introdução de técnicas cada vez mais numerosas e eficazes de "melho­ramento" dos indivíduos. Devemos prolongar a vida humana? Quais os "custos" desse prolongamento? A partir de então tais questões estão colocadas e permanecem mais atuais do que nunca. ABSTRACTHuman beings have always been captivated by the desire for immortality. Thus, in many different cultural traditions we find reflections on the possibility of human longevity. From a philosophical point of view, we locate in Francis Bacon´s work the first modern systematic development of the issue. The English­ philosopher believes that, unlike the ancients, he discovered a method "to introduce young spirits into an old body" and, in his important History of Life and Death, conjectured scenarios for the physical regeneration of human beings. In line with this, he introduced the possibility of human beings exercising dominion over nature, where this domination is practiced not only on external nature, but also on themselves, indeed, on their own bodies. Bacon opened the door to the modern dream of increasingly numerous and effective techniques for the "improvement" of individuals: Must we extend human life? What are the "costs" of this extension? Since Bacon such questions have been raised, and now they remain more relevant than ever. (shrink)

This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has (...) some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices. This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its antisceptical bite is more limited than expected. These difficulties could be surmounted if phenomenal conservatism were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. The book appeals to scholars and postgraduates in the field of epistemology and philosophy of mind who are interested in the rational roles of appearances. (shrink)

What is algorithmic thought? It is not possible to address this question without first reflecting on how the Universal Turing Machine transformed symbolic logic and brought to a halt the universality of mathematical formalism and the biocentric speciation of thought. The article draws on Sylvia Wynter’s discussion of the sociogenic principle to argue that both neurocognitive and formal models of automated cognition constitute the epistemological explanations of the origin of the human and of human sapience. Wynter’s argument will be related (...) to Gilbert Simondon’s reflections on ‘technical mentality’ to consider how socio-techno-genic assemblages can challenge the biocentricism and the formalism of modern epistemology. This article turns to ludic logic as one possible example of techno-semiotic languages as a speculative overturning of sociogenic programming. Algorithmic rules become technique-signs coinciding not with classic formalism but with interactive localities without re-originating the universality of colonial and patriarchal cosmogony. (shrink)

This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, (...) and mathematics. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti. (shrink)

Summary The study, carried out in a Greek provincial town, focuses on the cultural meaning of university education and of participation in the extremely competitive entrance examinations to university. In spite of graduate unemployment, in relation to the labour market a university degree is seen as giving more possibilities. Also, the transition to university and the degree that follows are rewarded by the community with prestige and status. Moreover, gaining admission is also important in itself in relation to the individual's (...) wish to achieve something with herlhis own strength. Finally, taking part in the examinations is seen as being of the utmost importance in relation to the local values. Regardless of the outcome, it allows the participants to realize a particular set of values among which the ?duty to struggle? seems to occupy, for historical reasons, a central place. (shrink)

Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same (...) problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates. (shrink)

The general tendency or attitude that Dreier 2004 calls creeping minimalism is ramping up in contemporary analytic philosophy. Those who entertain this attitude will take for granted a framework of deflationary or minimal notions – principally semantical1 and ontological – by means of which to analyse problems in different philosophical fields – e.g. theory of truth, metaethics, philosophy of language, the debate on realism and antirealism, etc. Let us call sweeping minimalist the philosopher affected by creeping minimalism. The framework of (...) minimal notions that the sweeping minimalist takes for granted encompasses, for instance, the concept of truth, reference, proposition, fact, individual, and property. Minimal notions are characterized in terms of general platitudinous principles expressed by schemata like the following (cf.: 26): ‘S’ is true if and only if S; ‘S’ is true if and only if ‘S’ corresponds to the facts; a has the property of being P if and only if a is P. Where ‘S’ and ‘a is P’ stand for sentences satisfying superficial constraints of truth-aptitude (i.e. sentences in declarative form subject to communally acknowledged standards of proper use), and.. (shrink)

This essay is an occasion to discuss the critical trajectories of a now common field of enquiry concerned with the impact of biomediatic technologies on politics and culture. Thacker's book The Global Genome importantly sits between debates about biopower as the governance of life and biopolitics as the transformation of what life can be. In particular, the book advances the hypothesis that as information produces `life itself', so it has become central to a political economy of excess and surplus value. (...) In other words, information does not dematerialize biology. Bioinformatics and biotech informationalize the living and rematerialize biology. As biotech becomes central to biopower, the global genome comes to reigning profit, labour, racism, biocolonialism, biosecurity, and bioart. However, Thacker's reliance on a bio-ontology of life grounding all relations of power leaves no space for process-events to break the chain of life's perpetual reproduction. (shrink)

We refer to hospitalized convicted hunger strikers in Padua Hospital who decided to fast for specific reasons, often demanding, to be heard by the judge, to complain about the existing custodial situation or to claim unjust treatment. The medical ethics of hunger strikers are debated because the use of force feeding by physicians is widely condemned as unethical, but courts, in Italy, sometimes order to transfer the convicted person to hospital and oblige healthcare practitioners to perform forcible feeding. This can (...) engender a profound insecurity for the physicians taking action on the one hand, while preventing patients from fully availing themselves of this principle of self-determination on the other. Physicians are mainly concerned about how to manage this situation and they may request ethical consultation. When it comes to managing hospitalized hunger strikers, the ethics consultant may be able to facilitate the relationship between physicians and hunger strikers, enhance the latter’s trust in the former, ensuring that strikers are aware of the risks associated with their fasting, and helping them to arrive of their own free will at the right decision concerning their behavior and their demands. (shrink)

Åsa Burman has recently introduced the important notion of telic power and differentiated it from deontic power in an attempt to build a bridge between ideal and non-ideal social ontology. We find Burman’s project promising but we argue that more is to be done to make it entirely successful. First, there is a palpable tension between Burman’s claim that telic power can be ontologically independent of deontic power and her examples, which suggests that these forms of power share the same (...) basis. Second, it is not completely clear how telic power helps non-ideal social ontologists explain oppression, since Burman thinks that both forms of power are transparent to social agents. We offer solutions to both problems. First, we question the thesis that telic power can exist without deontic power. Burman contends that this is possible because some social roles involving telic power can exist independently of institutions, which are––in her opinion––the source of deontic power. Against Burman, we suggest that all social roles involve deontic power, whether or not they are institutional. Second, we argue that while the exercise of deontic power requires a mutual recognition of the social roles of the interacting agents and, therefore, an acceptance of the associated norms, the exercise of telic power does not require acceptance of the relevant norms. This is why invoking telic power is useful in explaining how oppression and injustice can arise. Lastly, we suggest that the relation between teleological normativity and telic power has not been fully clarified by Burman and requires a deeper analysis. (shrink)

O plano ampliado e reconfigurado dos fluxos de informação na contemporaneidade sugerem novas condições para que a ação da leitura e da interpretação possa ser estabelecida. Com o objetivo de refletir sobre as implicações que fazem parte destas ações desenvolvemos um exame dialético parcial sobre três obras - Ser e Tempo, de M. Heidegger, Investigações Lógicas, Sexta Investigação: Elementos de uma Elucidação Fenomenológica do Conhecimento, de E. Husserl, e Investigações Filosóficas, de L. Wittgenstein - que, embora não tenham tido o (...) objetivo direto de analisar a leitura e a interpretação, parecem oferecer elementos para refletirmos sobre estes fenômenos na contemporaneidade. Ao final, nos posicionamos a favor da interpretação enquanto uma ação social a priori e discorremos, sinteticamente, sobre a configuração dos atuais sistemas de informação, considerando tal condição. ABOUT THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF INTERPRETATION: REFLECTIONS FROM HEIDEGGER, HUSSERL AND WITTGENSTEIN AbstractThe expanded and reconfigured plan of information's flow in contemporary can suggest new conditions for the action of interpretation be established. In order to reflect on the implications of this action be part of interpreting process, we have developed a partial dialectical examination of three works - Being and time, of M. Heidegger, Logical Investigations, Sixth Research: Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge, of E. Husserl, and Philosophical Investigations, of L. Wittgenstein - which, although these works had not the direct interest to address the phenomenon of interpretation, seem to offer the necessary elements to reflect on this phenomenon in the nowadays. In the end, we position ourselves in favor of interpretation while social phenomenon placed a priori, and commented above, briefly, about the configuration of current information systems, considering that condition. (shrink)

Se busca rastrear la imagen que Platón tiene de Heráclito y articularla con la estructura argumentativa del Cratilo, para comprender las necesidades textuales a las que responde la doctrina del flujo perpetuo, es decir, la discusión sobre la corrección (ὀρθότης) del nombre. Gracias a la inclusión del testimonio heraclíteo, resulta posible rastrear la presunta consolidación de la tesis sobre los nombres primarios y los secundarios como el eje de la separación entre dos planos de realidad (uno estable y uno móvil) (...) y de la teoría de las Ideas -es decir, como la base de la epistemología platónica presente en los diálogos de madurez-. The article seeks to trace the image Plato has of Heraclitus and connect it with the argumentative structure of the Cratylus in order to understand the textual needs that give rise to the doctrine of perpetual flux, that is, the discussion regarding the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names. The inclusion of Heraclitus's testimony makes it possible to trace the alleged consolidation of the thesis regarding primary and secondary names as the axis of separation between two levels of reality (one stable, the other, changing) and the theory of Ideas -that is, as the basis of Plato's epistemology as set forth in the late dialogues-. (shrink)

One type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of metaphysically “heavyweight or “cornerstone” proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably believed. Crispin Wright has argued that we can concede that our acceptance of these propositions is evidentially risky and still remain rationally entitled to those of our ordinary knowledge claims that are seemingly threatened by that concession. A problem for Wright’s proposal is the so-called Leaching (...) worry: if we are merely rationally entitled to accept the cornerstones without evidence, how can we achieve evidence-based knowledge of the multitude of quotidian propositions that we think we know, which require the cornerstones to be true? This paper presents a rigorous, novel explication of this worry within a Bayesian framework, and offers the Entitlement theorist two distinct responses. (shrink)

Some Carrollian posthumous manuscripts reveal, in addition to his famous ‘logical diagrams’, two mysterious ‘logical charts’. The first chart, a strange network making out of fourteen logical sentences a large 2D ‘triangle’ containing three smaller ones, has been shown equivalent—modulo the rediscovery of a fourth smaller triangle implicit in Carroll's global picture—to a 3D tetrahedron, the four triangular faces of which are the 3+1 Carrollian complex triangles. As it happens, such an until now very mysterious 3D logical shape—slightly deformed—has been (...) rediscovered, independently from Carroll and much later, by a logician , a mathematician and a linguist studying the geometry of the ‘opposition relations’, that is, the mathematical generalisations of the ‘logical square’. We show that inside what is called equivalently ‘n-opposition theory’, ‘oppositional geometry’ or ‘logical geometry’, Carroll's first chart corresponds exactly, duly reshap.. (shrink)

Crispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to (...) acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright’s responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzzi’s argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright cannot answer Moruzzi’s challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the architecture of perceptual justification. (shrink)

En el presente artículo sostenemos que el abordaje benjaminiano del problema de la melancolía en El origen del drama barroco alemán (1928) pone en juego la posibilidad de acceder a la estructura profunda del mundo material, mediante el establecimiento de una singular relación entre el sujeto melancólico y la naturaleza caída. Pues, si como el propio Benjamin afirma, todo sentimiento es la resultante de un objeto o de cierta conformación material que opera como su causa, la melancolía, por su parte, (...) es aquel sentimiento surgido del lamento profundo de la naturaleza revelado por medio del lenguaje, capaz de contemplar la tristeza que la constituye y el dolor que le genera la imposibilidad de redención. In this paper we argue that Walter Benjamin's approach to the problem of melancholy in The origin of German tragic drama (1928) brings an access to the deep structure of the material world through the establishment of a unique relationship between the melancholic human being and fallen nature. Therefore, if, as Benjamin says, every feeling is the result of an object or some material conformation that operates as its cause, melancholy, for its part, is that feeling emerged from the deep regret of nature revealed by the means of a language able to contemplate the sadness which constitutes it and the pain that generates the impossibility of redemption. (shrink)