Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (4):801-816 (2017)

Authors
Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen
Alessia Marabini
University of Aberdeen
Abstract
We focus on issues of learning assessment from the point of view of an investigation of philosophical elements in teaching. We contend that assessment of concept possession at school based on ordinary multiple-choice tests might be ineffective because it overlooks aspects of human rationality illuminated by Robert Brandom’s inferentialism––the view that conceptual content largely coincides with the inferential role of linguistic expressions used in public discourse. More particularly, we argue that multiple-choice tests at schools might fail to accurately assess the possession of a concept or the lack of it, for they only check the written outputs of the pupils who take them, without detecting the inferences actually endorsed or used by them. We suggest that school tests would acquire reliability if they enabled pupils to make the reasons of their answers or the inferences they use explicit, so as to contribute to what Brandom calls the game of giving and asking for reasons. We explore the possibility to put this suggestion into practice by deploying two-tier multiple-choice tests.
Keywords Inferentialism  concept possession  multiple-choice tests  two-tier multiple-choice tests  material inference  Robert Brandom  school tests
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Reprint years 2017, 2019
DOI 10.1111/1467-9752.12265
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References found in this work BETA

Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
The Concept of Logical Consequence.John Etchemendy - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Analyticity Reconsidered.Paul Boghossian - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):360-391.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Problem for Cognitive Load Theory—the Distinctively Human Life‐Form.Jan Derry - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (1):5-22.
Bringing Inferentialism to Science Education.Edward Causton - 2019 - Science & Education 28 (1-2):25-43.

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