Eschewing talk about a strong or weak will, I view the will of the dieter to be essentially identical to that of the normal eater, and say they differ only in the luck of their circumstances. However, I adopt a compatibilist approach to the will, generally, such that the dieter, despite having unlucky circumstances, is responsible for her efforts to lose weight. I base this on Hook's view that a person does not know what she can do before doing it, (...) and that she can "redetermine the direction of events" through effort. But a model of "redetermining" the will in which this is a conscious activity is insufficient to address the dieter's problem. I advocate consideration of another dimension of experience, based on the psychoanalytic theory of D.W. Winnicott, in which creative insight arises from the unconscious true self. I suggest that creative insight bypasses the will to radically change the dieter's perspective in a way that conscious strategies alone cannot achieve. I conclude that freedom is possible on the basis of conscious willing and in tapping the unconscious true self. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to help clarify the debate about whether human morality is continuous or discontinuous with nonhuman animal behavior by contrasting partiality and impartiality as moral terms. The problem for evolutionary ethicists, who derive ethics from human evolutionary history, is that only partiality, the practice of extending care and moral consideration to one’s in-group, can be accounted for by natural selection and therefore shown to be continuous with nonhuman animal behavior. Impartiality, the ideal of applying moral (...) standards equally to all humans, on the other hand, cannot be accounted for by natural selection. A conceptual gap, or saltatory leap, thus opens up between behaviors classified morally as partial or impartial, pointing to a conclusion of discontinuity in explaining the origin of morality. Frans de Waal’s 2006 book Primates and Philosophers, How Morality Evolved, takes up this issue, with de Waal arguing for the evolutionary position, continuity, even while upholding impartiality as the highest form of morality. His opponents are “veneer theorists,” who view morality, generally, as a uniquely human construction, required in order to overcome base and selfish desires. De Waal entertains critical responses to his discussion by several thinkers, and I consider that of Peter Singer. I also look to the neuropsychological research of Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt, as does de Waal, for help with the apparent evolutionary gap between partial and impartial moral beliefs but do not find a solution. Finally, I suggest other ways of rescuing the continuity thesis. (shrink)

Are animals and humans different in kind or only different in degree when it comes to the mental springs of behavior? The source of this question is Charles Darwin's 1871 The Descent of Man, in which he argued for a difference in degree between animals and humans in mental abilities, rather than a difference in kind. Darwin's opponents in the ensuing debate were theologians and scientific traditionalists who insisted upon human specialness when it came to the mind,even if evolution held (...) sway for explaining the body. In this paper I take up the same question, which has not gone away. Representing the continuity thesis is Donald R. Griffin, a zoologist who founded the field of cognitive ethology in the 1980s, and voicing the discontinuity thesis is Raymond Tallis, a neuroscientist and self-described humanist. Tallis's apparent mission is to protect human dignity from the onslaught of writing and research by evolutionary psychologists and sociobiologists, who claim to be demonstrating the evolutionary basis for all human mental capabilities, including higher reasoning and ethics. To raise humans up, Tallis lowers animals down, making disparaging remarks like, "Chimps are chumps." I defend the chimps by finding serious flaws in Tallis's reasoning. Tallis locates the crux ofthe cognitive difference between humans and nonhumans in the linguistic concept of intentionality. I present and counter his charge of a difference in kind by relying on empirical evidence provided by Griffin and others, and on my logical analysis of Tallis's claims. The paper has 3 sections: introduction, first point of argument, second point of argument, and concluding note. (shrink)

Background The first COVID-19 wave started in February 2020 in France. The influx of patients requiring emergency care and high-level technicity led healthcare professionals to fear saturation of available care. In that context, the multidisciplinary Ethics- Support Cell (EST) was created to help medical teams consider the decisions that could potentially be sources of ethical dilemmas. Objectives The primary objective was to prospectively collect information on requests for EST assistance from 23 March to 9 May 2020. The secondary aim was (...) to describe the Cell’s functions during that period. Research design This observational, real-time study of requests for Cell consultations concerned ethical dilemmas arising during a public health crisis. The EST created a grid to collect relevant information (clinical, patient’s/designated representative’s preferences and ethical principles strained by the situation), thereby assuring that each EST asked the same questions, in the same order. Participants and research context Only our university hospital’s clinicians could request EST intervention. Ethical considerations The hospital Research Ethics Committee approved this study (no. CER-2020-107). The patient, his/her family, or designated representative was informed of this ethics consultation and most met with EST members, which enabled them to express their preferences and/or opposition. Findings/results 33 requests (patients’ mean age: 80.8 years; 29 had COVID-19: 24 with dyspnea, 30 with comorbidities). 17 Emergency Department solicitations concerned ICU admission, without reference to resource constraints; others addressed therapeutic proportionality dilemmas. Discussion Intervention-request motives concerned limited resources and treatment intensity. Management revolved around three axes: the treatment option most appropriate for the patient, the feasibility of implementation, and dignified care for the patient. Conclusions COVID-19 crisis forced hospitals to envisage prioritization of ICU access. Established decision-making criteria and protocols do not enable healthcare professionals to escape ethical dilemmas. That acknowledgement highlights ethical risks, enhances the added-value of nursing and encourages all players to be vigilant to pursue collective deliberations to achieve clear and transparent decisions. (shrink)

Engineers encounter difficult ethical problems in their practice and in research. In many ways, these problems are like design problems: they are complex, often ill-defined; resolving them involves an iterative process of analysis and synthesis; and there can be more than one acceptable solution. This book offers a real-world, problem-centered approach to engineering ethics, using a rich collection of open-ended scenarios and case studies to develop skill in recognizing and addressing ethical issues.

Le livre de Caroline Petit, Galien de Pergame ou la rhétorique de la Providence, constitue la première étude d’ensemble du rôle de la rhétorique dans l’œuvre de Galien, aux sources du discours médical et scientifique, et de l’autobiographie intellectuelle. Caroline Petit’s Galien de Pergame ou la rhétorique de la Providence is the first comprehensive study of the role of rhetoric in Galen’s oeuvre, a cornerstone of medical and scientific discourse and of intellectual autobiography in the West.

Retraçant sont itinéraire philosophique dans Beau Voyage, quelques mois avant sa mort, Maurice Pradines (1874-1958) résume sa philosophie de la sensation par cet adage: "Nihil est in sensu quod non prius fuerit in intellectu". Pour l'auteur de la Philosophie de la sensation, la sensation est, en effet, originairement intelligente: elle n'a de légitimité biologique qu'en tant qu'elle donne quelque chose à comprendre. Renvoyant dos-à-dos le sensualisme (qui construit l'intelligence sur une sensation denué d'esprit) et le rationalisme (qui prétend trouver l'esprit (...) dans une raison transcendante), Pradines inscrit l'intentionalité au cœur de la physiologie de la sensation. Percevoir, pour un vivant, c'est d'abord percevoir quelque chose qui intéresse la vie, à savoir un danger à écarter ou un objet à conquérir. Aussi n'est-il guère surprenant que le sens ultime de la sensation soit l'espace: elle est le signe d'une distance à déployer ou, au contraire, à réduire. Les phénomènes psychiques ne peuvent être des données immédiates puisqu'ils font sens dans la stricte mesure où l'espace les élabore en même temps qu'il se construit. Les fondements d'une psychologie conséquente peuvent, dès lors, être posés. Elle consistera à saisir la genèse de l'esprit à partir du sens biologique de la sensation, c'est-à-dire d'une spatialité pensée elle-même comme "genèse première". (shrink)

Inspired by Voltaire's advice that a text needs to be concise to have real influence, this anthology contains fiery extracts by forty eighteenth-century authors, from the most famous philosophers of the age to those whose brilliant writings are less well-known. These passages are immensely diverse in style and topic, but all have in common a passionate commitment to equality, freedom, and tolerance. Each text resonates powerfully with the issues our world faces today. Tolerance was first published by the Société française (...) d'étude du dix-huitième siècle (the French Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies) in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo assassinations in January 2015 as an act of solidarity and as a response to the surge of interest in Enlightenment values. With the support of the British Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, it has now been translated by over 100 students and tutors of French at Oxford University."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is (...) more intimate then if you just have some concept or other of that property. To grasp a property is to understand what having that property essentially consists in. (shrink)

Le « Bulletin bibliographique de philosophie politique et sociale » est réalisé pour la revue Philosophique par une équipe de rédactrices et de rédacteurs. Il est coordonné par Caroline Guibet Lafaye (CNRS) et Fabien Ferri (université de Franche-Comté) au sein du Centre de Documentation et de Bibliographie Philosophiques de l’université de Franche-Comté (UR 2274 CDBP – Logiques de l’agir), et propose de brèves recensions d’ouvrages récemment parus, réparties dans diverses rubriques thématique...

Everyone involved with the care and welfare of children and young adults is confronted with the issue of bullying. Bullying behaviors create an uncomfortable, threatening, and hostile environment that make it difficult for children to learn. 101 Facts about Bullying breaks down what the research says about bullying and its effects, offering ideas for what can and should be done to minimize or reduce it. Kevorkian systematically discusses topics ranging from relational bullying to cyber bullying to media and video violence (...) to the legal ramifications of bullying, debunking myth and uncloaking the facts about bullying and its prevention. (shrink)

Zahavi’s book has added greatly to our understanding of some of the difficult issues surrounding the notion of empathy. In this note, however, I argue that by overlooking some essential features of empathy, Zahavi’s account unnecessarily limits its scope. In particular, I argue that Zahavi’s account, by characterizing empathy as an immediate, direct perceptual access to the other’s experiences, overlooks its normative dimension.

Climate change and decarbonization raise complex justice questions that researchers and policymakers must address. The distributions of greenhouse gas emissions rights and mitigation efforts have dominated justice discourses within scenario research, an integrative element of the IPCC. However, the space of justice considerations is much larger. At present, there is no consistent approach to comprehensively incorporate and examine justice considerations. Here we propose a conceptual framework grounded in philosophical theory for this purpose. We apply this framework to climate mitigation scenarios (...) literature as proof of concept, enabling a more holistic and multidimensional investigation of justice. We identify areas of future research, including new metrics of service provisioning essential for human well-being. [Can be freely read by clicking the ReadCube link below.]. (shrink)

Up Against Foucault offers both a feminist critique of Foucauldian theories as well as an attempt to reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable perspectives. Feminists are often "up against Foucault" because he questions key conclusions in feminism regarding the nature of gender relations, and men's possession of power. This book, however, fills the gap in literature about Foucault by showing how his theories of sexuality and power relations are often applicable to the everyday realities of women's lives. Drawing upon their diverse backgrounds (...) in social theory and philosophy, the contributors discuss the ways in which Foucault provokes feminists into questioning their grasp of power relations, and examines the implications of his decision to overlook categories of gender in his discussion of sexuality and power relations. They also show that in spite of his lack of interest in gender, Foucault's ways of understanding the control of women and female sexuality ultimately have much to offer feminism. (shrink)

If, as many suppose, pornography changes people, a question arises as to how.1 One answer to this question offers a grand and noble vision. Inspired by the idea that pornography is speech, and inspired by a certain liberal ideal about the point of speech in political life, some theorists say that pornography contributes to that liberal ideal: pornography, even at its most violent and misogynistic, and even at its most harmful, is political speech that aims to express certain views about (...) the good life, 2aims to persuade its consumers of a certain political point of view—and to some extent succeeds in persuading them. Ronald Dworkin suggests that the pornographer contributes to the ‘moral environment, by expressing his political or social convictions or tastes or prejudices informally’, that pornography ‘seeks to deliver’ a ‘message’ , that it reflects the ‘opinion’ that ‘women are submissive, or enjoy being dominated, or should be treated as if they did’, that it is comparable to speech ‘advocating that women occupy inferior roles’.3 Pornography on this view is political speech that aims to persuade its listeners of the truth of certain ideas about women, and of course ‘the government must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas’.4 Another answer offers a vision that is not grand and noble, but thoroughly reductive. Pornography is not politically persuasive speech, but speech that works by a process of psychological conditioning. This view seems common enough in the social science literature. Consider, for example, this description of an early experiment, from a time that pre-dates contemporary political debate. (shrink)

Le « Bulletin bibliographique de philosophie politique et sociale » est réalisé pour la revue Philosophique par une équipe de rédactrices et de rédacteurs. Il est coordonné par Caroline Guibet Lafaye (CNRS) et Fabien Ferri (Université de Franche-Comté) au sein de Centre de Documentation et de Bibliographie Philosophiques de l’Université de Franche-Comté (UR 2274 CDBP–Logiques de l’Agir), et propose de brèves recensions d’ouvrages récemment parus, réparties dans diverses rubriques thématiques....

Caroline New is an energetic activist who has interpolated critical realist ideas into the front-line of political activism. In this wide-ranging interview, she begins by reflecting on her life and how she became a realist and her account is illustrated with personal anecdotes recalling memories of well-known philosophers and activists from the time. She discusses how her position set her apart from other feminists and she examines the interacting threads of longstanding debates on the political left, as well as (...) longstanding debates within critical realist circles, such as the relative importance of quantitative methods in social research and the scope for agency as a source of intentional change. Finally she brings some of her ideas to bear on contemporary issues. This engaging interview notably provides some of the social context in which critical realism developed, while also pointing towards its future potential. (shrink)

Caroline New is an energetic activist who has interpolated critical realist ideas into the front-line of political activism. In this wide-ranging interview, she begins by reflecting on her life and how she became a realist and her account is illustrated with personal anecdotes recalling memories of well-known philosophers and activists from the time. She discusses how her position set her apart from other feminists and she examines the interacting threads of longstanding debates on the political left, as well as (...) longstanding debates within critical realist circles, such as the relative importance of quantitative methods in social research and the scope for agency as a source of intentional change. Finally she brings some of her ideas to bear on contemporary issues. This engaging interview notably provides some of the social context in which critical realism developed, while also pointing towards its future potential. (shrink)

In this article, I argue for the notion of what I term ‘uncanny water’ as a conceptual tool for reading contemporary oceanic fictions. The uncanny’s affective capacity to destabilise epistemological and ontological certainties makes it a particularly potent literary tool for challenging the nature/culture binary. I argue that fictions which actively defamiliarise the ocean can be used to redress the anthropocentric privilege found in hitherto narratives of the oceanic that were predicated upon mastery and control, and that uncanny moments of (...) displacement and uncertainty can illuminate human/oceanic interconnections and foster a sense of responsibility and compassion towards the oceans. I identify resonances between the uncanny’s continuing referentiality and the notion that feminist transcorporeality interrelates the subject into networks of materiality which extend across time and space in unknowable ways. Both transcorporeality and the uncanny work against the conceit of the individual through the dissolution of boundaries, and, crucially, both require a suspension of assumptions of the self as whole, discrete and impermeable. To demonstrate this, I read the uncanny waters of contemporary fictions from the Northern Atlantic Littoral (Atlantic Canada and the westernmost parts of the UK). The littoral position of these spaces makes them ideally placed to negotiate the borders between habitable and unhabitable spaces, and the limitations of knowledge that run alongside this. I assert that iterations of uncanny water offer a transoceanic dialogue which shifts constructions of subjectivity away from national and terrestrial boundaries to one more akin to the fluid and relational dialectics of transcorporeality. (shrink)

A cause is proportional to its effect when, roughly speaking, it is at the right level of detail. There is a lively debate about whether proportionality is a necessary condition for causation. One of the main arguments against a proportionality constraint on causation is that many ordinary and seemingly perfectly acceptable causal claims cite causes that are not proportional to their effects. In this paper, I suggest that proponents of a proportionality constraint can respond to this objection by developing an (...) idea that is present in Yablo’s early work on proportionality, but which has strangely been ignored by both Yablo and others in the subsequent debate. My suggestion is that proportionality—and, indeed, causation itself—is relative to a domain of events. At the metaphysical level, this means that the causal relation has an extra relatum—namely, a domain of events. At the level of language, it introduces a new way in which causal claims are context-sensitive: what is expressed by a causal claim depends on the contextually relevant domain of events. As I argue, this suggestion allows us to accommodate the truth of ordinary causal claims while extending the explanatory benefits of a proportionality constraint. (shrink)

In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism it will be argued (...) that this does not imply that person should be understood as a phased sortal concept. It will be argued that Animalism rests upon a prior conception of person, and that this implies that person must be understood as a basic substance sortal concept through which we have to individuate ourselves and others. It is further argued that this, together with the insights of Animalism, implies that persons, by necessity, are beings of a biological nature. (shrink)

In Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation, Iris Marion Young describes the lived bodily experience of women who have “chosen” their pregnancies. In this essay, Lundquist underscores the need for a more inclusive phenomenology of pregnancy. Drawing on sources in literature, psychology, and phenomenology, she offers descriptions of the cryptic phenomena of rejected and denied pregnancy, indicating the vast range of pregnancy experience and illustrating substantial phenomenological differences between “chosen” and unwanted pregnancies.

Research in the U. S. on fair trade consumption is sparse. Therefore, little is known as to what motivates U. S. consumers to buy fair trade products. This study sought to determine which values are salient to American fair trade consumption. The data were gathered via a Web-based version of the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) and were gleaned from actual consumers who purchase fair trade products from a range of Internet-based fair trade retailers. This study established that indeed there are (...) significant interactions between personal values and fair trade consumption and that demographics proved to be useless in creating a profile of the American fair trade consumer. (shrink)

Plus qu'un ouvrage concernant les rapports ombrageux et controversés de l'art et de la pathologie, ce recueil est d'abord une rencontre, un creuset entre des champs, la clinique et la théorie qui, pour s'y confronter, excèdent les limites du " prêt-à-penser ". C'est pourquoi ici les divergences de méthodes et de perspectives entre des approches phénoménologique et psychanalytique ne dressent pas de strictes délimitations, mais font résonner des dissonances capables de laisser penser l'écart entre l'art et la pathologie comme établi (...) sur une entr'appartenance plus essentielle, ne livrant rien de son secret à celui qui s'en tient à des distinctions de principe. Encore faut-il entendre pathologie en son sens grec, au sens où la rencontre avec le monde ouvre, dans le réel, une brèche incolmatable dont seul l'art peut authentiquement rendre compte et dans laquelle la psychose s'engouffre si aucune mise en œuvre ne vient l'endiguer ou la ressourcer. " Aussi ne faut-il pas s'étonner que penser l'art et penser la folie puissent converger dans la mesure où ni l'un ni l'autre ne sont conceptualisables. Finalement, penser l'art ou penser la folie, c'est avoir ouverture à eux, à travers les œuvres, à travers les êtres malades et cela n'est possible précisément que dans une rencontre. Qu'est-ce qu'une rencontre? C'est cette situation qui n'a pas d'antécédent, qui n'a pas d'espace ni de temps qui puisse la précéder. L'épiphanie de quelqu'un dans le regard d'un autre implique nécessairement l'autophanie de celui-ci. L'échec de la rencontre, récusant tout passage lucide à l'ouvert, rejette le thérapeute sur sa facticité. C'est pour se dérober à l'épreuve sans partage de cette absence de soi, que la psychiatrie médicale, scientifico-médicale fait l'impasse sur la présence de l'autre, en objectivant tout ce qui touche à l'homme, en faisant de lui un cas particulier de cette objectivation universelle qui est la caractéristique de la culture de notre époque. ". (shrink)

Die in diesem Band enthaltenen Essays befassen sich mit drei ethischen Themenbereichen: ethische Begründungsfragen, das Verhältnis von Rationalität und Moral und Probleme der angewandten Ethik. Nida-Rümelin vertritt eine kohärentistische Ethikkonzeption, die sich sowohl vom Utilitarismus (Konsequentialismus) absetzt als auch einen überzogenen Rationalismus deontologischer Prägung vermeidet. Dieser Band enthält auch eine ausführliche Dokumentation der aktuellen Debatte über Nida-Rümelins Thesen zu gegenwärtigen Fragen der Ethik.

Enthält: Beiträge des Workshops Rational Choice, der im Rahmen des 1. Analyomen-Kongresses vom 9.-12.10.1991 in Saarbrücken stattfand.

Viewing animals as a disposable resource is by no means novel, but does milking the cow for all its worth now represent a previously unimaginable level of exploitation? New technology has intensified milk production fourfold over the last 50 years, rendering the cow vulnerable to various and frequent clinical interventions deemed necessary to meet the demands for dairy products. A major question is whether or not the veterinary code of practice fits, or is in ethical tension, with the administration of (...) ‘efficient’ techniques, such as artificial insemination, to enhance reproduction levels among cattle? Vets perform these interventions and their ‘success’ is measured by the maximisation of milk production, requiring perpetually pregnant cows. Our empirical research on 33 farm vets explores how their professional ethical code promising to protect the welfare of the animal ‘above all else’, is increasingly in conflict with, and subordinate to, the financial demands of clients. Since vets cannot stand outside of the productive power–knowledge relations that have intensified the consumption of animal bodily parts and secretions, we argue that a process of adiaphorization’ occurs, whereby humans become morally indifferent to cruel practices deemed necessary to our consumerist ways of life. However, this indifference reflects and reinforces a taken-for-granted anthropocentrism among vets, animal owners and the population generally. We suggest that posthumanist ideas may offer new insights for the study of human–animal relations in organisations that transcend the coercive and negative impact of discourses that deny any alternative to prevailing farm/veterinary practices. Our study has major implications in relation to climate warming and zoonotic diseases, both partly derived from our unethical relationship to animals, that are increasingly threatening our, and their, lives. (shrink)

This paper builds on existing research investigating CSR and ethical consumption within luxury contexts, and makes several contributions to the literature. First, it addresses existing knowledge gaps by exploring the ways in which consumers perform ethical luxury purchases of fine jewellery through interpretive research. Second, the paper is the first to examine such issues of consumer ethics by extending the application of theories of practice to a luxury product context, and by building on Magaudda’s :15–36, 2011) circuit of practice framework. (...) This is significant in that, to date, consumer research using practice theories has focused mainly on routine and habitual practices. Our findings and discussion provide an analysis of intentional and less intentional ethical consumer performances within the interconnected nexus of activities of consumers’ fine jewellery consumption practice, where meanings, understandings and intelligibility of social phenomena are worked through the various activities that shape such a practice. Finally, the paper concludes with significant managerial and policy-related implications, as our extended circuit of practice analysis conveys that if ethics and sustainability dimensions are to be embedded in fine jewellery consumption practice, they must first be made an intrinsic part of the nexus of the social and material environment of trading and consumption places. (shrink)

O objetivo deste estudo é analisar as considerações acerca da alma presentes no Kitab al-nafs, com especial atenção à discussão levantada na seção I.1, a qual trata da substancialidade da alma. Deste modo, o fio condutor será a busca pela definição da alma tendo em vista a sua relação com o corpo de modo a apontar a insuficiência de defini-la como faculdade, forma e perfeição dada a independência do corpo. Iniciarei com a primeira constatação da existência da alma para poder, (...) em seguida, abordar as definições propostas em I.1 e os raciocínios avicenianos que apontam como, em todos os casos, o corpo também é pressuposto. Assim, poder-se-à discutir o que significa classificá-la na categoria de substância, quais as implicações desta definição na relação com o corpo e como esta definição está diretamente vinculada à primeira versão do experimento mental do homem suspenso no ar apresentada no final do K. al-nafs I.1. (shrink)

Psychologists say a measure has construct validity when it, in fact, measures the construct it is intended to measure. Construct validity is both an important notion in psychological research methods and the source of much confusion and debate among psychologists. I argue that this confusion arises, in part, because of a failure to distinguish between construct validity, a feature of measures relative to a construct, and construct legitimacy, a feature of the construct itself. I propose a prescriptive account of construct (...) validity on the basis of this distinction, then provide evidence for my account through two examples from research psychology. (shrink)

It is widely held that our beliefs can be epistemically faultless despite being morally flawed. Theories of moral encroachment challenge this, holding that moral considerations bear on the epistemic status of our attitudes. According to attitude-based theories of moral encroachment, morality encroaches upon the epistemic standing of our attitudes on the grounds that we can morally injure others with our epistemic practices. In this paper, I aim to show that current attitude-based theories have asymmetric mechanisms: moral features only make it (...) harder for attitudes to secure epistemic merits. I argue that, if attitudes can incur moral injury, failure to form attitudes can too. To make sense of this, I contend, attitude-based accounts require symmetric mechanisms, allowing that moral considerations make it both harder and easier for attitudes to attain epistemic merits. I maintain that, once we recognize this, attitude-based encroachment views must soon concede that they sometimes demand we believe against the evidence. (shrink)

In Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation, Iris Marion Young describes the lived bodily experience of women who have “chosen” their pregnancies. In this essay, Lundquist underscores the need for a more inclusive phenomenology of pregnancy. Drawing on sources in literature, psychology, and phenomenology, she offers descriptions of the cryptic phenomena of rejected and denied pregnancy, indicating the vast range of pregnancy experience and illustrating substantial phenomenological differences between “chosen” and unwanted pregnancies.

There is a disagreement among contemporary commentators about Avicena's view of the theoretical intellect in "Kitāb alnafs". Is its activity performed by an internal sense helped by the intellect, or is it a activity proper of the intellect independently of material forms? Some passages of V.5 and V.6 suggest that both elements are necessary to the knowledge: unifying the multiplicity and multiplying the unity; in others words, it is not enough that the intellect conceptualizes the minor and major terms of (...) the syllogism, it also needs to intuit the middle term. (shrink)