Grasping phenomenal properties

In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is more intimate then if you just have some concept or other of that property. To grasp a property is to understand what having that property essentially consists in.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Distributional Properties.Josh Parsons - 2004 - In Frank Jackson & Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Clarendon Press.
Can the property Boom last?Fraser MacBride - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):225–246.
A Mistaken Sense in Consciousness.Chienchih Chi - 2004 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 11 (2):11-15.
About Property Identity.Arnold Cusmariu - 1978 - Auslegung 5 (3):139-146.
Property evaluation types.Alessandro Giordani & Luca Mari - 2012 - Measurement 45 (3):437-452.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
124 (#137,909)

6 months
1 (#1,149,473)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Martine Nida-Rümelin
Université de Fribourg

Citations of this work

Why Mary Left Her Room.Michaela M. McSweeney - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
Acquaintance and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16-43.

View all 41 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references