In Lewin et al. 359–386) the authors proved that certain systems of annotated logics are algebraizable in the sense of Block and Rigozzi 396). Later in Lewin et al. the study of the associated quasi-varieties of annotated algebras is initiated. In this paper we continue the study of the these classes of algebras, in particular, we report some recent results about the free annotated algebras.

Annotated logics were introduced by V.S. Subrahmanian as logical foundations for computer programming. One of the difficulties of these systems from the logical point of view is that they are not structural, i.e., their consequence relations are not closed under substitutions. In this paper we give systems of annotated logics that are equivalent to those of Subrahmanian in the sense that everything provable in one type of system has a translation that is provable in the other. Moreover these new systems (...) are structural. We prove that these systems are weakly congruential, namely, they have an infinite system of congruence 1-formulas. Moreover, we prove that an annotated logic is algebraizable (i.e., it has a finite system of congruence formulas,) if and only if the lattice of annotation constants is finite. (shrink)

We introduce a family of matrices that define logics in which paraconsistency and/or paracompleteness occurs only at the level of literals, that is, formulas that are propositional letters or their iterated negations. We give a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic defined by the class of all these matrices, we give conditions for the maximality of these logics and we study in detail several relevant examples.

In this paper a first order theory for the logics defined through literal paraconsistent-paracomplete matrices is developed. These logics are intended to model situations in which the ground level information may be contradictory or incomplete, but it is treated within a classical framework. This means that literal formulas, i.e. atomic formulas and their iterated negations, may behave poorly specially regarding their negations, but more complex formulas, i.e. formulas that include a binary connective are well behaved. This situation may and does (...) appear for instance in data bases. (shrink)

We prove that there are two involutions defined by monadic terms that characterize Monadic Algebras. We further prove that the variety of Monadic Algebras is the smallest variety of Interior Algebras where these involutions give rise to an interpretation from the variety of Bounded Distributive Lattices into it.

In [3], O. C. García and W. Taylor make an in depth study of the lattice of interpretability types of varieties first introduced by W. Neumann [5]. In this lattice several varieties are identified so in order to distinguish them and understand the fine structure of the lattice, we propose the study of the interpretations between them, in particular, how many there are and what these are. We prove, among other things, that there are eight interpretations from the variety of (...) Monadic algebras into itself. (shrink)

We study the algebraizability of the logics constructed using literal-paraconsistent and literal-paracomplete matrices described by Lewin and Mikenberg in [11], proving that they are all algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi in [3] but not finitely algebraizable. A characterization of the finitely algebraizable logics defined by LPP-matrices is given.We also make an algebraic study of the equivalent algebraic semantics of the logics associated to the matrices ℳ32,2, ℳ32,1, ℳ31,1, ℳ31,3, and ℳ4 appearing in [11] proving that they (...) are not varieties and finding the free algebra over one generator. (shrink)

In this paper we expand previous results obtained in [2] about the study of categorical equivalence between the category IRL 0 of integral residuated lattices with bottom, which generalize MV-algebras and a category whose objects are called c-differential residuated lattices. The equivalence is given by a functor ${{\mathsf{K}^\bullet}}$ , motivated by an old construction due to J. Kalman, which was studied by Cignoli in [3] in the context of Heyting and Nelson algebras. These results are then specialized to the case (...) of MV-algebras and the corresponding category ${MV^{\bullet}}$ of monadic MV-algebras induced by “Kalman’s functor” ${\mathsf{K}^\bullet}$ . Moreover, we extend the construction to ℓ-groups introducing the new category of monadic ℓ-groups together with a functor ${\Gamma ^\sharp}$ , that is “parallel” to the well known functor ${\Gamma}$ between ℓ and MV-algebras. (shrink)

We introduce a deductive system Bal which models the logic of balance of opposing forces or of balance between conflicting evidence or influences. ‘‘Truth values’’ are interpreted as deviations from a state of equilibrium, so in this sense, the theorems of Bal are to be interpreted as balanced statements, for which reason there is only one distinguished truth value, namely the one that represents equilibrium. The main results are that the system Bal is algebraizable in the sense of [5] and (...) its equivalent algebraic semantics BAL is definitionally equivalent to the variety of abelian lattice ordered groups, that is, the categories of the algebras in BAL and of ℓ–groups are isomorphic (see [10], Ch.4, 4). We also prove the deduction theorem for Bal and we study different kinds of semantic consequence associated to Bal. Finally, we prove the co-NP-completeness of the tautology problem of Bal. (shrink)

This handbook presents a comprehensive introduction to the core areas of philosophy of education combined with an up-to-date selection of the central themes. It includes 95 newly commissioned articles that focus on and advance key arguments; each essay incorporates essential background material serving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic, examining the status quo of the discipline with respect to the topic, and discussing the possible futures of the field. The book provides a state-of-the-art overview of philosophy (...) of education, covering a range of topics: Voices from the present and the past deals with 36 major figures that philosophers of education rely on; Schools of thought addresses 14 stances including Eastern, Indigenous, and African philosophies of education as well as religiously inspired philosophies of education such as Jewish and Islamic; Revisiting enduring educational debates scrutinizes 25 issues heavily debated in the past and the present, for example care and justice, democracy, and the curriculum; New areas and developments addresses 17 emerging issues that have garnered considerable attention like neuroscience, videogames, and radicalization. The collection is relevant for lecturers teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of education as well as for colleagues in teacher training. Moreover, it helps junior researchers in philosophy of education to situate the problems they are addressing within the wider field of philosophy of education and offers a valuable update for experienced scholars dealing with issues in the sub-discipline. Combined with different conceptions of the purpose of philosophy, it discusses various aspects, using diverse perspectives to do so. Contributing Editors: Section 1: Voices from the Present and the Past: Nuraan Davids Section 2: Schools of Thought: Christiane Thompson and Joris Vlieghe Section 3: Revisiting Enduring Debates: Ann Chinnery, Naomi Hodgson, and Viktor Johansson Section 4: New Areas and Developments: Kai Horsthemke, Dirk Willem Postma, and Claudia Ruitenberg. (shrink)

In this paper we make an algebraic study of the variety of MV*-algebras introduced by C. C. Chang as an algebraic counterpart for a logic with positive and negative truth values.We build the algebraic theory of MV*-algebras within its own limits using a concept of ideal and of prime ideal that are very naturally related to the corresponding concepts in l-groups. The main results are a subdirect representation theorem, a completeness theorem, a study of simple and semisimple algebras, and a (...) characterization of the ideal of infinitesimals as an l-group. In the last section we develop a detailed proof a the one-dimensional theorem of McNaughton, that is, the free MV*-algebra in one generator is the algebra of McNaughton functions over [−1,1]. In contrast with the rest of the paper, this last result is based on work done for MV-algebras. (shrink)

The discussion on ethical issues, it is said, should not be confined to experts but should be extended to patients and local communities, because of the real need to engage stakeholders and non‐stakeholders alike not only in carrying out any biomedical research project, but also in the drafting and legislation of bioethics instruments. Several local and inter‐country consultations have already been conducted in furtherance of this goal, but there is much left to be desired in them. The consultations may have (...) helped in articulating local principles, but not in making the instruments embody these principles. As such, instruments turn incompossible, i.e. the principles and actions they legitimate are not performable. In an ethnographic study conducted in the Philippines, for example, paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Declaration of Helsinki and CIOMS guidelines 8 and 15 are construed as not only contradictory to one another but also to local principles. This problem can be solved by taking deliberate steps to ensure that consultations are grounded in ethnographic data about local principles, which the instruments would embody. A steering committee can be of help in gathering ethnographic data, in conducting consultations at the local level, and in providing a venue for discourse on various bioethical issues. (shrink)

The Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment series, previously known as SVEC (Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century), has published over 500 peer-reviewed scholarly volumes since 1955 as part of the Voltaire Foundation at the University of Oxford. International in focus, Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment volumes cover wide-ranging aspects of the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment, from gender studies to political theory, and from economics to visual arts and music, and are published in English or French.

We obtain in this paper a representation of the formulae of extensions ofL by generalized quantifiers through functors between categories of first-order structures and partial isomorphisms. The main tool in the proofs is the back-and-forth technique. As a corollary we obtain the Caicedo's version of Fraïssés theorem characterizing elementary equivalence for such languages. We also discuss informally some geometrical interpretations of our results.

We study the matrices, reduced matrices and algebras associated to the systems SAT of structural annotated logics. In previous papers, these systems were proven algebraizable in the finitary case and the class of matrices analyzed here was proven to be a matrix semantics for them.We prove that the equivalent algebraic semantics associated with the systems SAT are proper quasivarieties, we describe the reduced matrices, the subdirectly irreducible algebras and we give a general decomposition theorem. As a consequence we obtain a (...) decision procedure for these logics. (shrink)

For Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, secondary literature on Kant, Fichte, and Hegel is not philosophy in the proper sense. It is best to think the relation between the history of philosophy, philosophy, and its future in terms of a set of virtues that should be binding both for the historians of philosophy and philosophers.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 335-342 [Access article in PDF] "Dispersing the Cogito: A Response to Vivian's Rhetorical Self" Philip Lewin Bradford Vivian ("The Threshold of the Self," Philosophy and Rhetoric 33. 4: 303-18), in seeking to disrupt the cogito, claims that acts of creative self-constitution by a "rhetorical self" become possible as subjectivity is dispersed across subject positions. However, the apparent ability of the rhetorical self to (...) freely choose which positions it will inhabit, as well as its apparent capacity to undergo subjectification without being marked by its habitation of those positions, seem to reintroduce several of the cogito's essential features.Vivian argues that "there is a historicity to our being and its expression, to our subjectivity and its elaboration" (303). His essay provides a clear and cogent account of how subjectivity might arise as the result of a series of rhetorical acts whose audience is the self. One's self, then, is a local and ongoing aesthetic formation, continually becoming and coming into being; to the extent that the aesthetic nature of this process is produced by persuading one's self to adopt some styles of life over others, then this process is a thoroughly persuasive phenomenon. The aesthetic composition molded by this continually renewed persuasion might best be described as the rhetorical self. (312; emphasis in original) Vivian clears away a good deal of the underbrush that often prevents us from getting a hold on the problematics of selfhood and subjectivity. I find much that is praiseworthy in the essay, particulary its explication of the contingent and shifting nature of the processes through which the self is formed and reformed. But there is a key theoretical elision in Vivian's argument that does much to restore the legitimacy of the Cartesian cogito that he is at pains to disrupt. The result is a model of self that revises Cartesianism by dispersing subjectivity among various subject positions, [End Page 335] but that, in a number of other important ways, preserves essential features of the cogito, as though each fragment of the dispersed cogito were itself a complete mini-cogito.Vivian's account elides the rhetorical process of self-formation. In a typical passage at the end of the essay, he comments, "In order to compose and cultivate one's being in the world, one must persuade one's self to choose and orchestrate certain styles of life from among those available into an entire aesthetics of being" (316-17). The questions this claim provokes are: How does this process of self-persuasion actually take place? What aspect or agency of psyche is doing the persuading? To conceive of the self as Vivian does--a self "conceived as a form--a rhetorical form--that exists only in its continual aesthetic creation, in its indefinite becoming" (304)--suggests a kind of autonomy and self-transparency in self-formation that has discouragingly Cartesian overtones.The terms with which Vivian has chosen to work, namely, subjectivity and the rhetorical self, do not address these issues of self-persuasion. Instead, they serve to mask them. Subjectivity, for Vivian, refers to the positions the self finds itself assuming within discursive regimes, positions whose formation entails moments both of self-persuasion and of subjection to existing social exigency. Subjectivity (so conceived) has the property of being an effect of multiple acts of subjectification, of voluntary acquiescence to preexisting subject positions. "Discourse creates subjects by first creating subject positions from which to speak" (313). The subject is not original, but rather follows from "an entire 'assemblage' of subject positions that are the willful creation of no one, but are instead formed by the complex operations of discourse" (313). The theoretical difficulty with this way of accounting for subjectivity lies in its elision of agency; how shall we make sense of the rhetorical self? More specifically, how does a necessary immersion into discursive practices couple with rhetorical acts of self-persuasion? What motivates self-persuasion? Are all the factors involved in self-persuasion fully conscious and under voluntary control? If not, how are we... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 335-342 [Access article in PDF] "Dispersing the Cogito: A Response to Vivian's Rhetorical Self" Philip Lewin Bradford Vivian ("The Threshold of the Self," Philosophy and Rhetoric 33. 4: 303-18), in seeking to disrupt the cogito, claims that acts of creative self-constitution by a "rhetorical self" become possible as subjectivity is dispersed across subject positions. However, the apparent ability of the rhetorical self to (...) freely choose which positions it will inhabit, as well as its apparent capacity to undergo subjectification without being marked by its habitation of those positions, seem to reintroduce several of the cogito's essential features.Vivian argues that "there is a historicity to our being and its expression, to our subjectivity and its elaboration" (303). His essay provides a clear and cogent account of how subjectivity might arise as the result of a series of rhetorical acts whose audience is the self. One's self, then, is a local and ongoing aesthetic formation, continually becoming and coming into being; to the extent that the aesthetic nature of this process is produced by persuading one's self to adopt some styles of life over others, then this process is a thoroughly persuasive phenomenon. The aesthetic composition molded by this continually renewed persuasion might best be described as the rhetorical self. (312; emphasis in original) Vivian clears away a good deal of the underbrush that often prevents us from getting a hold on the problematics of selfhood and subjectivity. I find much that is praiseworthy in the essay, particulary its explication of the contingent and shifting nature of the processes through which the self is formed and reformed. But there is a key theoretical elision in Vivian's argument that does much to restore the legitimacy of the Cartesian cogito that he is at pains to disrupt. The result is a model of self that revises Cartesianism by dispersing subjectivity among various subject positions, [End Page 335] but that, in a number of other important ways, preserves essential features of the cogito, as though each fragment of the dispersed cogito were itself a complete mini-cogito.Vivian's account elides the rhetorical process of self-formation. In a typical passage at the end of the essay, he comments, "In order to compose and cultivate one's being in the world, one must persuade one's self to choose and orchestrate certain styles of life from among those available into an entire aesthetics of being" (316-17). The questions this claim provokes are: How does this process of self-persuasion actually take place? What aspect or agency of psyche is doing the persuading? To conceive of the self as Vivian does--a self "conceived as a form--a rhetorical form--that exists only in its continual aesthetic creation, in its indefinite becoming" (304)--suggests a kind of autonomy and self-transparency in self-formation that has discouragingly Cartesian overtones.The terms with which Vivian has chosen to work, namely, subjectivity and the rhetorical self, do not address these issues of self-persuasion. Instead, they serve to mask them. Subjectivity, for Vivian, refers to the positions the self finds itself assuming within discursive regimes, positions whose formation entails moments both of self-persuasion and of subjection to existing social exigency. Subjectivity (so conceived) has the property of being an effect of multiple acts of subjectification, of voluntary acquiescence to preexisting subject positions. "Discourse creates subjects by first creating subject positions from which to speak" (313). The subject is not original, but rather follows from "an entire 'assemblage' of subject positions that are the willful creation of no one, but are instead formed by the complex operations of discourse" (313). The theoretical difficulty with this way of accounting for subjectivity lies in its elision of agency; how shall we make sense of the rhetorical self? More specifically, how does a necessary immersion into discursive practices couple with rhetorical acts of self-persuasion? What motivates self-persuasion? Are all the factors involved in self-persuasion fully conscious and under voluntary control? If not, how are we... (shrink)

This communication sought to redress the loss of the skill of making marks while reading by reporting a consolidated and reflective summation that drew on over four decades' worth of experience with approximately 500 undergraduate and 200 graduate students of Production Engineering at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. It identified the fundamentals and rationale of making marginalia while reading, with particular attention to their role in the preservation of insights and in furthering discovery, pointing to the need to (...) develop emotional as well as intellectual signifiers to allow readers to capture and recall their understanding of the texts they read and the significance of their marks. This supported the framing of relevant issues in the passage from reading and marking on paper to digital books, pointing towards approaches that would allow better understanding of the shortcomings of this medium for making marks while reading. (shrink)

At a time when firms signal their commitment to CSR through online communication, news sources may convey conflicting information, causing stakeholders to perceive firm hypocrisy. Here, we test the effects of conflicting CSR information that conveys inconsistent outcomes (results-based hypocrisy) and ulterior motives (motive-based hypocrisy) on hypocrisy perceptions expressed in social media posts, which we conceptualize as countersignals that reach a broad audience of stakeholders. Across six studies, we find that (1) conflicting CSR information from internal (firm) and external (news) (...) sources elicits hypocrisy perceptions regardless of whether the CSR information reflects inconsistencies in results or motives, (2) individuals respond to conflicting CSR information with countersignals accusing firms of hypocrisy expressed in social media posts, (3) hypocrisy perceptions are linked to other damaging stakeholder consequences, including behavior (divestment, boycotting, lower employment interest), affect (moral outrage), and cognition (moral condemnation), and (4) firms with higher credibility are more likely to experience adverse effects of conflicting CSR information. These findings advance theory regarding the effects of conflicting CSR information as it relates to the role of credibility and different forms of hypocrisy. Importantly, damaging social media posts and stakeholder backlash can arise from hypocrisy perceptions associated with inconsistent CSR results as well as inconsistent motives, and strong firm credibility only makes a firm more vulnerable to this backlash. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é analisar o conceito de liberdade presente na obra de Rousseau e fornecer argumentos para questionar a imagem do homem natural como um ser livre, de modo a sustentar a tese de que a liberdade somente se torna possível com a saída do estado de natureza descrito no Discurso sobre as origens da desigualdade . Assim, o autor pretende mostrar que o surgimento da consciência e da racionalidade é indispensável para que o homem consiga desenvolver suas (...) faculdades virtuais e seja capaz de criar para si padrões de comportamento diferentes do instinto natural, um processo que ocorre graças à vida em sociedade. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend that the historiographical category of eclecticism is a correct way to describe the epistemology and the exegetical activity of the Anonymous commentator on Plato’s Theaetetus. In addition, I show that the interpretation of the platonic philosophy presented in this text not only presupposes an eclectic philosophical attitude, but also offers a conscious defense of a positive and philosophically relevant form of eclecticism. By eclecticism, I understand a method of inquiry based on the deliberate use of (...) hypotheses and arguments from different philosophical traditions. My claim is that Anon. intends to lay ground of his way of doing philosophy by attributing it to Plato and the platonic tradition. In doing so, Anon. provides us with a positive understanding of eclecticism as a legitimate methodology of philosophical investigation. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é duplo: primeiramente, tecer alguns comentários sobre o uso feito pelo filósofo da ocorrência de fenômenos da natureza como fatores explicativos para mudanças profundas ocorridas no comportamento humano, um recurso argumentativo presente nas duas narrativas hipotéticas; em seguida, abordar as razões que Rousseau fornece para que esses acontecimentos deixem de ser simples fatos naturais e se tornem verdadeiras catástrofes para o ser humano, as quais podem ser encontradas, por exemplo, na Carta a Voltaire sobre a Providência.

O propósito deste artigo é o de evidenciar de que forma a afirmação de ser ser-para-a-morte de Heidegger pode ser entendido como condição de possibilidade para a responsabilização do desejo conforme formulado pela psicanálise lacaniana. Primeiro, descreve-se a estrutura do Dasein heideggeriano, bem como seus existenciais. Em seguida, analisa-se o uso e o sentido da noção de desejo em Lacan. Tanto numa existência autêntica, quanto num final de análise, onde o sujeito sabe lidar com suas perdas, diante da angústia, ele (...) assume um papel de protagonista de sua existência e consegue se responsabilizar pelo seu desejo. A análise, nesse sentido, serve como uma ferramenta que possibilita o sujeito lidar com este sofrimento decorrente da falta, deste nada que falou Heidegger. Evidentemente que a análise não objetiva eliminar esta falta ontológica, mas tão somente desconstruir os fantasmas que o sujeito construiu para afastar o que lhe é mais próprio, constitutivo de sua estrutura ontológica, qual seja, sua finitude. Portanto, tanto para Heidegger, por meio da afirmação da angústia frente à morte, quanto para Lacan, onde o sujeito assumiu a tragédia de sua existência – no final de análise –, é a afirmação da finitude que possibilita a responsabilização do desejo, de ser autêntico ou, se preferir, sujeito. (shrink)

Uma concepção de cosmopolitismo, de base eurocêntrica, é questionada por pensadores como K. A. Appiah, Walter Mignolo, Silviano Santiago entre outros, para buscar possíveis ressemantizações do termo no contexto contemporâneo, marcado pela globalização, pelo multiculturalismo e pela expansão das novas tecnologias de comunicação. Considerando esse confronto de noções de cosmopolitismo, indaga-se como se deu a interpretação do Brasil no início do século XX, quando recrudesceram as tensões entre cosmopolitismo e nacionalismo. Busca-se, por outro lado, confrontar tais interpretações com as que (...) surgem no início do século XXI, quando a nação vai deixando de ser o centro de um sistema de significação, em tempo heterogêneo e de globalização, em que se pode falar em “cosmopolitismo do pobre” (cosmopolitismo do subalterno), como formulou Silviano Santiago. (shrink)

Às voltas com a questão do sujeito: da transparência à encarnação Resumo: O propósito deste artigo é mostrar a limitação do sujeito cartesiano no que diz respeito ao fenômeno da existência. Concebido como transparente a si mesmo, este sujeito não abarca as contingências do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt), pois se a verdade somente pode ser acessada por meio do pensamento, a dimensão do que escapa à representação não é contemplada. Na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, buscaremos pensar um sujeito que, diferente de (...) Descartes, não reduz o mundo ao cogito, mas assume sua inessencialidade, sua incompletude. Por fim, veremos emergir um sujeito que somente se sustenta na medida em que afirma o non-sens que lhe atravessa. Palavras-chave: Merleau-Ponty; Carnalidade; Sujeito; Non-sens. Facing the issue of the subject: from transparency to incarnation Abstract: The purpose of this article is to show the limitation of the Cartesian subject with regard to the phenomenon of existence. Conceived as transparent to himself, this subject does not include the contingencies of the life world (Lebenswelt), because if the truth can only be accessed through thought, the dimension of what escapes representation is not contemplated. In Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, we will try to think of a subject who, unlike Descartes, does not reduce the world to the cogito, but assumes its inessentiality, its incompleteness. Finally, we will see a subject emerge that can only be sustained insofar as it affirms the non-sens that crosses it. Key-words: Merleau-Ponty; Carnality; Subject; Non-sens. Face à l'enjeu du sujet: de la transparence à l'incarnation Résumé: Le but de cet article est montrer la limitation du sujet cartésien par rapport au phénomène de l'existence. Conçu comme transparent pour lui-même, ce sujet ne comprend pas les contingences du monde de la vie (Lebenswelt), car si la vérité ne peut être atteinte que par la pensée, la dimension de ce qui échappe à la représentation n'est pas envisagée. Dans la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty, nous allons essayer de penser à un sujet qui, contrairement à Descartes, ne réduit pas le monde à un cogito, mais assume son inessentialité, son incomplétude. Enfin, nous verrons émerger un sujet qui ne se soutient que dans la mesure où il affirme le non-sens qui le traverse. Mots-clés: Merleau-Ponty; Carnalité; Sujet; Non-sens. Data de registro: 06/12/2019 Data de aceite: 16/12/2020. (shrink)

This article is a belated contribution to a Common Knowledge symposium on the “unanticipated conceptual practice” of “anthropological philosophy.” The basic argument is that the groundwork for this emerging approach, associated foremost with Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's book Métaphysiques cannibales of 2009, was laid in the 1970s by the controversial French anthropologists Pierre and Hélène Clastres. It is argued that the Clastres took the intellectual practices of Guarani shamans and prophets as analogous to the those of ancient Greek philosophers but (...) also as sharply critical of the principles that underlay early Western metaphysics. (shrink)

The article examines Kant's notion of conceptual extension in order to determine a conception of predication that could integrate, in a coherent fashion, basic theoretical commitments of general logic as he conceived it and the central tenets of his transcendental logic. After a brief overview of the several characterizations of thatnotion in the Kantian corpus, I distinguish three interpretative models concerning it in the literature. Such models are criticized and their prospects of integrating Kant's commitments in a fully satisfactory way (...) are rejected. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of Kant's notion of conceptual extension, which respects the criteria of adequacy that guided the examination of the former models. It points, on its turn, to a revaluation of Kant's notion of conceptual content. (shrink)

In this study the influence of irrational beliefs and perfectionism on the emergence of competitive anxiety was investigated. While previous studies indicate that higher irrational beliefs predict greater competitive anxiety, in the present study it is hypothesized that this relationship is mediated by perfectionism. A serial atemporal multiple mediation analysis revealed that both adaptive and maladaptive perfectionism were significant partial mediators between irrational beliefs and competitive anxiety. The total score and all four subscale scores on irrational beliefs had both direct (...) and indirect effects on cognitive competitive anxiety, the latter effects mediated by both forms of perfectionism. Depreciation beliefs had a direct effect, and demandingness and awfulizing had indirect effects, on somatic competitive anxiety when both forms of perfectionism were entered as mediators. These findings suggest that both irrational beliefs and perfectionism influence the emergence of competitive anxiety, therefore rational emotive behavioral therapy with a focus upon perfectionism may be an effective means of reducing competitive anxiety in athletes. (shrink)

Resumo: Percepção sensorial: até hoje um grande mistério filosófico. O presente trabalho divide-se em duas partes. A primeira sintetiza a crítica ao modelo representacionista intracerebral predominante, e enuncia um argumento que prepara o terreno para a segunda parte do trabalho. Nesta, a teoria pragmatista da percepção é equiparada à de Aristóteles, em De Anima. Eis, grosso modo, o argumento: percepção resulta de fatores causais da natureza inerentes à transação organismo ambiente; tais fatores não podem ser encontrados entre os elementos ontológicos (...) revelados na própria percepção; logo a estrutura ontológica revelada na percepção não reflete a total complexidade da transação real organismo ambiente. Esta conclusão é crucial para entender a teoria pragmatista-aristotélica da percepção; passagem da fase sujeito-no-mundo para a fase mundo-no-sujeito, via recepção imaterial de formas - estabelecimento de campo anteceptivo consciente de potencialidades de ação subentendidas em tais formas. Pragmatismo como naturalismo esclarecido: a percepção é a versão histórico-natural mais evoluída do mesmo mecanismo chave-e-fechadura próprio da detecção de formas inerente a interações ontológicas elementares - biológicas e mesmo físico-químicas. Mas em vez de detecção-na-ação nomológica/biológico automática: detecção consciente, em aberto, de possibilidades de ação livre inscritas no ambiente do precipiente.: Even today, sensorial perception is a great philosophic mystery. This work is divided in two parts: The first synthesizes and criticizes the prevailing cerebral representationism model and enunciates an argument that prepares the field to second one. In this second part the pragmatism perceptions theory is compared to Aristotle's De Anima. Here is, in a general way, the argument: perception is the result of nature's cause factors intrinsic to organism environment transaction; these factors cannot be encountered among revealed ontological elements of this same perception; therefore the ontological structure reveled by perception doesn't reflect the totality of the organism-environment's transaction complexity. This conclusion is vital to understand the Aristotelian-pragmatic perception theory: the subject-on-world's transposition to world-on-subject phase, via "immaterial reception of forms"- establishment of the anteceptive field conscious of the action potentialities in such way. Pragmatism naturalism cleared up: the perception is a natural-historic evolved version of this same key-and-locker mechanism proper to form detection intrinsic of elementary ontological, biologic and even physical-chemical interaction. But instead of detection in the automatic nomological/biological action: conscious detection, opened, of free actions possibilities inserted in the percipient environment. (shrink)

A associação de Rousseau às fontes filosóficas da democracia não constitui algo livre de discussões. O próprio autor preferia a qualificação de “republicano” em vez de “democrata”, e no Contrato Social apontou sérias dificuldades para a existência da democracia como uma forma de governo, ainda que suas teses sobre a soberania popular reverberem princípios tipicamente ligados às constituições democráticas. Diante disso, Kevin Inston questionou que os democratas radicais contemporâneos tenham negligenciado a contribuição do filósofo genebrino, e por isto buscou mostrar (...) o quanto ela continua sendo relevante para enfrentar os desafios políticos da atualidade. Todavia, em que medida se sustentam os esforços de Inston para compatibilizar a teoria política rousseauniana com a democracia contemporânea? Não terá o comentador subestimado ou ignorado elementos cruciais que tornam tal convergência problemática? O objetivo deste artigo é tentar fornecer algumas respostas para tais perguntas. (shrink)

The author seeks to understand the meaning and goals of the New Evangelization in a diachronic way as they were exposed mainly by the last popes John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis and how to relate it to the current Brazilian context that needs urgently new methods of evangelization.

In modern man’s life, everything changes at an ever increasing speed, as Zygmunt Bauman describes, leaving neither little nor space to think about the importance of salvation in his life. On the other hand, every man has a restlessness that makes him search, at least implicitly, for the things related to his salvation. Despite it, this search for salvation, besides important for each human person, is also important for the entire society. Analyzing the notion of salvation in the Scriptures as (...) well as in the Church’s Magisterium, it is not something closed on the individual, but it goes through the help of our neighbor, mainly those who are most in need. The study and deepening of the Church’s Social Doctrine is closely linked to the notion of salvation, not only to deal with it in an abstract and theoretical way, but in concrete actions in our daily life, in order to transmit today’s man the Church teachings and help him about how to remove life’s problems through the combined action of everyone’s searching for common good and for fighting social, political and environmental injustices. (shrink)

Resumo: As reflexões desenvolvidas ao longo do presente artigo se apresentam como desdobramento do texto3 de Alfredo Pereira Jr., mais especificamente sobre a noção de Eu sentiente e do conceito de “projeção”, desde a psicanálise freudiana. Num primeiro momento, analisa-se de que forma Merleau-Ponty, em contraste com as filosofias empirista e racionalista, reformula a noção da subjetividade, num plano fenomenológico e ontológico. O Eu se define não mais por uma sorte de pensamento, ou por uma causalidade de leis físicas e (...) químicas, mas pelo entrelaçamento na carnalidade do mundo. Em seguida, investiga-se a noção de projeção em Freud, a fim de evidenciar como tal conceito ocupa a função de “proteção” para o Eu. A projeção limita o “lugar” necessário para que o Eu possa se desenvolver, conforme mecanismo de defesa. Por fim, sustenta-se que a noção de Eu merleau-pontyano e a projeção freudiana convergem, na medida em que ambas só podem ser pensadas como experiências dentro de um mundo de relações que ocorrem por uma dimensão inconsciente, aproximando-se, assim, com a proposta de Pereira Jr..: This article takes as its starting point a text by Alfredo Pereira Jr. which discusses Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the sentient Self and the concept of “projection” in Freudian psychoanalysis. First we analyze how Merleau-Ponty, in contrast to empiricist and rationalist philosophies, reformulates the notion of subjectivity on a phenomenological and ontological plane. The Self is no longer defined by a kind of thought or by the causality of physical and chemical laws, but by its entanglement in the carnality of the world. Second, the notion of projection in Freud is investigated in order to show how this concept occupies the function of “protection” for the Self. Projection limits the necessary “place” for the Self to develop. Finally, it is argued that Freud’s concept of projection and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the Self converge, since both can only be thought of as experiences within a world of relations that occur in an unconscious dimension; it is in this sense that our proposal is similar to that of Pereira Jr. (shrink)

O objetivo desse artigo é mostrar como a questão da intersubjetividade é pensada por Merleau-Ponty em termos de percepção do outro. Todavia, para que isso seja possível, se faz necessário, primeiramente, contrapor as concepções clássicas da percepção, as quais trataram o fenômeno da percepção ora como um ato da consciência, ora como uma mera ferramenta do corpo. Para Merleau-Ponty, inversamente, a percepção é para nós a fonte da inteligibilidade, é ela a condição de possibilidade para a estruturação do conhecimento. Ademais, (...) para que a existência do outro não se reduza à uma mera projeção do meu pensamento, se faz necessário que concebamos a subjetividade não mais em termos cartesianos, como uma substância, que constrói o exterior com o seu poder de julgar. Mas sim como uma subjetividade corpórea, enraizada no mundo, e que a consciência deixe de ter o estatuto de constituição do objeto e passe a ser consciência perceptiva. Somente assim, portanto, outrem poderá figurar-se em minha percepção, porquanto minha percepção nunca esgota o percebido. (shrink)