It has been commonplace to maintain of the phenomenon that occurred during classical times, the change from relying on myth to trusting in reason: (1) that the emergence of philosophy from myth was marked by an abrupt discontinuity; (2) that mythical thinking was left behind once philosophy was invented or discovered; and (3) that the ancient Greeks were the agents of this miracle. This paper suggests that the so-called “Greek miracle” was, in fact, a miracle manqué and, more importantly, that (...) close examination of this failed miracle offers valuable insight into the philosophical crisis facing the world today. (shrink)

Action theory has given rise to some perplexing puzzles in the past half century. The most prominent one can be summarized as follows: What distinguishes intentional from unintentional acts? Thanks to the ingenuity of philosophers and their thought experiments, we know better than to assume that the difference lies in the mere presence of an intention, or in its causal efficacy in generating the action. The intention might be present and may also cause the intended behavior, yet the behavior may (...) not be an intentional action; it may not be an action at all. The classic example is that of the nervous nephew who intends to kill his uncle to inherit his estate, and whose intention makes him so nervous as to drive recklessly, thereby running over a pedestrian... who happens to be his very uncle. The intention to kill is present and it causes the killing, yet the killing is not an intentional action. Rather, what appears to distinguish intentional from non-intentional action is voluntary control of the proper sort, and what distinguishes action from non-action is behavior caused in a particular manner. But spelling out the sort and specifying the manner have proven vexing tasks. (shrink)

A sequel to a successful 1999 book from an author well known for her cutting edge work on dynamic systems theory.

AS IS WELL KNOWN, one of Kant's major concerns was the reconciliation of Newtonian science and metaphysics, a preoccupation made particularly acute by the need to provide a satisfactory explanation of organisms. It is in light of his claim that only the mechanistic principles of Newton's physics can provide scientific knowledge that the role to be played by purposiveness becomes problematic. Purpose appears to resist mechanistic explanation and is therefore a major impediment to unifying science under one set of principles. (...) Kant concludes that although organisms cannot be explained mechanistically, the impossibility is due to a limitation of reason. By appealing to the critical turn Kant thus avoids an antinomy between mechanism and finality while allowing that it is possible for mechanism and finality to be reconciled in the supersensible. This reconciliation, unfortunately, we will never know. (shrink)

The overwhelming majority of action theories have relied on a Humean model of causality and of explanation; even those theories that explicitly reject aspects of that model uncritically adopt others. The atomistic presuppositions embodied in the model are unable to account for either the dynamic and fabric-like nature of action or the features of control and meaning present therein. It is these atomistic presuppositions that give rise to the “Gettier-like vexations” that are common counterexamples in action theory. The Humean requirement (...) that cause and effect be only contingently connected and generalizable into a covering law is also discussed with respect to the explanation of action.Representatives of the three major approaches to the problem of action: causal (including intentional, volitional, as well as agent causation and reasons-as-causes theories), behaviorist, so-called “contextual”, and teleological theories are examined. (shrink)

The overwhelming majority of action theories have relied on a Humean model of causality and of explanation; even those theories that explicitly reject aspects of that model uncritically adopt others. The atomistic presuppositions embodied in the model are unable to account for either the dynamic and fabric-like nature of action or the features of control and meaning present therein. It is these atomistic presuppositions that give rise to the “Gettier-like vexations” that are common counterexamples in action theory. The Humean requirement (...) that cause and effect be only contingently connected and generalizable into a covering law is also discussed with respect to the explanation of action.Representatives of the three major approaches to the problem of action: causal (including intentional, volitional, as well as agent causation and reasons-as-causes theories), behaviorist, so-called “contextual”, and teleological theories are examined. (shrink)

John Searle articulates a general theory of how mind, language, and society “hang together” in a coherent whole. He begins with some assumptions regarding “basic metaphysics,” defending “external realism” even as he refuses to provide a justification for it on the grounds that “any attempt at justification presupposes what it attempts to justify”.

Pols addresses the mind-body problem by a creative development of the views on agency and direct knowing expressed in his earlier Meditation on a Prisoner, The Acts of Our Being, and Radical Realism. A long introductory chapter outlines four major theses of the present book. Dominant modern doctrines about knowing conceal the mind’s power to know the real directly. Dominant modern doctrines about causality—especially the received scientific doctrine of causality—hide the distinctive mode of causality the mind deploys within and upon (...) the physical infrastructure that supports it. Reflexive attention on the part of mind to the full concreteness of its own functions—Pols calls this “attending to mind itself”—can overcome these doctrinal barriers and reveal the true causal status of mind. A rational agent is the apex being of a hierarchy of causality: although causally supported by its infrastructure, it is also causally effective in that infrastructure. (shrink)

After a brief summary of Alvin Goldman’s theory of the “level-generation” of complex act-tokens from basic acts, it is argued that if the occurrent want which causes the basic act becomes deactivated in medias res, or during the interval between the basic act and the generated events, the latter do not qualify as actions proper. A discussion follows of Steven Davis’s at tempts to provide a counterexample to GoIdman’s theory by suggesting an example in which the Goldman conditions are met (...) and yet intuition tells us that the generated event is not an action. After concluding that Davis’s counterexamples are men of straw, a series of legitimately generated events which terminate in non-action is offered. (shrink)

After a brief summary of Alvin Goldman’s theory of the “level-generation” of complex act-tokens from basic acts, it is argued that if the occurrent want which causes the basic act becomes deactivated in medias res, or during the interval between the basic act and the generated events, the latter do not qualify as actions proper. A discussion follows of Steven Davis’s at tempts to provide a counterexample to GoIdman’s theory by suggesting an example in which the Goldman conditions are met (...) and yet intuition tells us that the generated event is not an action. After concluding that Davis’s counterexamples are men of straw, a series of legitimately generated events which terminate in non-action is offered. (shrink)

Vattimo rethinks ontology at a time when modernity's concept of Being has been uprooted along with any faith in history as a unitary process characterized by progressive reappropriations of its own origins. Having dissolved the ground of the new, the end of modernity sees Being reduced to exchange value, the new for the sake of the new, which in turn science and technology make routine. The impasse is a radical one, for modernity cannot be left behind by offering a truer (...) foundation, since "overcoming" and "foundation" themselves are concepts central to modernity. The first section of the book consists in an account of this condition. (shrink)

Classical philosophy of science ran out of gas because it lacked a subject matter all along. It belongs "subsumed under a unified social science which in its search for regularities and causal mechanisms will provide the basis for science policy".

The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency -- the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources (...) while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action ; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action -oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesús H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

There are potentialities to be harnessed in a fusion between elements of Alicia Juarrero’s views and a Polanyian framework. In this brief response piece, I address the latent Polanyian dimensions of Juarrero’s ontic approach to dynamical systems.

Alicia Juarrero's Dynamics in action is an attempt to bring dynamical systems theory to bear on action theory. Juarrero claims that the vocabulary and examples from dynamical systems theory can help us resolve some pressing problems in action theory, including the problems of extended action and disrupted causal chains. In the process, Juarrero calls for a return to an Aristotelean plurality of causes and a serious scrutiny of modern Humean/positivist science as she sees it. Although her book has some inaccuracies (...) and fails to convince the skeptical reader, it provides an alternative point of view from which to launch further studies. (shrink)

Michael Polanyi argues that in the case of both organisms and machines the functionality of the higher level imposes boundary conditions that harness the operations of lower level components in the service of the higher level, systemic whole. Given the science of his day, however, Polanyi understands this shaping of boundary conditions in terms of the operation of an external agency. The essay argues that the science of nonlinear, far from equilibrium thermodynamics in general, and the phenomenon of autocatalysis in (...) particular, explains how the endogenous closure of context-sensitive dynamic constraints shapes their boundary conditions such that self-organized, causally effective properties emerge. (shrink)

(1993). Two conceptual problems for the theory of Evolution: Causality and the explanation of emergence. World Futures: Vol. 38, Theoretical Achievements and Practical Applications of General Evolutionary Theory, pp. 123-129.

One of Hume's most well-known works and a masterpiece of philosophy, A Treatise of Human Nature is indubitably worth taking the time to read.

While there are numerous doubts, controversies and lack of consensus on alternative definitions of human death, it is argued that it is more ethical to allow people to choose either cessation of cardio-respiratory function or loss of entire brain function as the definition of death based on their own views. This paper presents the law of organ transplantation in Japan, which allows people to decide whether brain death can be used to determine their death in agreement with their family. Arguably, (...) Japan could become a unique example of individual choice in the definition of death if the law is revised to allow individuals choose definition of death independently of their family. It suggests that such an approach is one of the reasonable policy options a country can adopt for legislation on issues related to the definition of death. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an extraordinarily original thinker, whose influence on twentieth-century thinking far outside the bounds of philosophy alone. In this engaging Introduction, A.C. Grayling makes Wittgenstein's thought accessible to the general reader by explaining the nature and impact of Wittgenstein's views. He describes both his early and later philosophy, the differences and connections between them, and gives a fresh assessment of Wittgenstein's continuing influence on contemporary thought.

Background: The magnitude of bullying and harassment among psychiatrists is reportedly high, yet no peer-review published studies addressing this issue could be found. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a pilot study to assess the degree of the problem, the types of bullying/harassment and to provide some insights into the situation.Methods and Principal Findings: Following multiple focus group meetings, a yes/no response type questionnaire was developed to assess the degree and type of bullying and harassment experienced by psychiatrists. Over a (...) 3-month period the questionnaire was administered to a random sample of 60 psychiatrists. 57 out of the 60 psychiatrists reported harassment and bullying. Frequencies of the following response variables are presented in descending order: rumours 40% ; defamation 20% ; passing remarks 20% ; false accusations 15% ; threats 13.3% ; verbal abuse 13.3% ; unjustified complaints 13.3% ; promotion blocked 13.3% ; humiliation 13% ; bad reference given 10% ; credentials questioned 8.3% ; physical attacks 5% ; termination 5% ; derogatory remarks 1.7% and 1.7% were subjected to personal work. As a result of being subjected to harassment, 66.7% of the psychiatrists did not take any action, whereas 33.3% confronted the person they believed responsible. Asked whether the bullying and harassment caused distress, 18.3% of the psychiatrists did not report any effect, 30% reported mild distress, 40% moderate distress and severe distress was reported by 11.7%.Conclusions: It was concluded that the magnitude of bullying and harassment among psychiatrists may be quite high, as evidenced by this pilot study. There is a need for extensive systematic studies on this subject and to establish strategies to prevent and address this issue at a national and regulatory level. (shrink)