Robin Barrow has been one of the leading philosophers of education for more than forty years. This book is a critical but appreciative examination of his work by some of the leading philosophers of education at work today, with responses from Professor Barrow. It will focus on his work on curriculum, the analytic tradition in philosophy, education and schooling, and his use of Greek philosophy to enrich current debates in the subject. This work will be of interest to all those (...) who have been influenced by his contributions to educational and philosophical debate. (shrink)

We begin by examining the widespread scepticism about the value of empirical educational research that is found within sections of the philosophy of education community. We argue that this scepticism, in its strongest form, is incoherent as it suggests that there are no educational facts susceptible of discovery. On the other hand, if there are such facts, then commonsense is not an adequate way of accessing them, due to its own contested and variable nature. We go on to examine the (...) claim that teaching is a moral enterprise whose successful pursuit demands the grasp of moral concepts and their implications. We show that while this is the case, it is a necessary, not a sufficient condition for successful teaching, which also requires a grasp of facts that are relevant to effective teaching and learning. Finally we examine some protocols for educational research. (shrink)

Michael Hand's interesting analysis of the concept of intelligence crucially depends upon three assumptions: firstly, that there is an ordinary use of the term which, when applied to an individual is perfectly general and not context dependent. Secondly, that this use is best cashed in terms of aptitude. Thirdly, that the aptitude in question is to be explained in terms of theorizing. I shall argue in what follows that the first assumption may be true, but, if it is true, this (...) presents a problem for Hand's analysis and not a path to a solution. That the second assumption is false but, even if it were true, it would sit badly with assumption one. And, finally, that the third assumption runs into too many difficulties to be acceptable. (shrink)

Continuing the debate on assessment, we argue that Andrew Davis' use of examples fails to address issues in the assessibility of specific items of knowledge, and show that one of his examples supports our view rather than his. We argue that John White's preferred replacement of assessment by monitoring, based on teachers' personal knowledge of their pupils, confuses personal and professional knowledge, oversimplifies the teacher's role and does not address the need for objectivity. Finally we argue that neither White (...) nor Davis grasps the relationship between assessment and the need for wider forms of accountability for public education systems. (shrink)

Continuing the debate on assessment, we argue that Andrew Davis' use of examples fails to address issues in the assessibility of specific items of knowledge, and show that one of his examples supports our view rather than his. We argue that John White's preferred replacement of assessment by monitoring, based on teachers' personal knowledge of their pupils, confuses personal and professional knowledge, oversimplifies the teacher's role and does not address the need for objectivity. Finally we argue that neither White (...) nor Davis grasps the relationship between assessment and the need for wider forms of accountability for public education systems. (shrink)

The authors attempt to outline a notion of high culture and its role within education, following a broad modern tradition springing from Matthew Arnold. The book is written with a concern for clarity and argument that is not always found within that tradition, and the authors reject the elitist conclusions of many who have followed the tradition, such as Eliot, Leavis, Bantock and Scruton.

This new edition of _Philosophy of Education: The Key Concepts_ is an easy to use A-Z guide summarizing all the key terms, ideas and issues central to the study of educational theory today. Fully updated, the book is cross-referenced throughout and contains pointers to further reading, as well as new entries on such topics as: Citizenship and Civic Education Liberalism Capability Well-being Patriotism Globalisation Open-mindedness Creationism and Intelligent Design. Comprehensive and authoritative this highly accessible guide provides all that a student, (...) teacher or policy-maker needs to know about the latest thinking on education in the 21st century.'. (shrink)

The justifications that are usually offered - in England - for teaching the arts are either in terms of the development of "creativity" or the possibility of self expression, or, in terms of moral and social education. I examine both types of claim and reject them. In their place I offer justifications in terms of intrinsic value and enculturisation.

Assessment is at the heart of teaching as it provides a necessary condition for judging success or failure. It is also necessary to ensure that providers of education are accountable to users and providers of resources. Inferential hazard is an inescapable part of any assessment procedure but cannot be an argument against assessment as such. Rich knowledge may be the aim of education but it does not follow that it is the aim of every stage of education. Teaching to tests (...) is the most natural way of ensuring that teaching matches assessment. Failure to assess places public education in jeopardy. (shrink)

Peters is best known for ‘Ethics and Education’, (1966) an attempt, using analytical methods, to provide a universal canonical account of the nature of education. This corresponded closely with the prevailing conception of liberal education of the time. Despite the acclaim with which this work was received, Peters became increasingly dissatisfied with his early views of education and in a series of papers written between 1973 and 1982, he retreated slowly from the view that one could construct a universal canonical (...) account of education and even from the view that this could be possible for liberal education. As his views changed, his philosophical methods developed as well, moving from the Moorean essentialist analysis of 1966, through a more Strawsonian connective analysis in the mid 1970s to a position based on W.B. Gallie's account of essentially contested concepts in the early 1980s. Parallel to and connected with this changing philosophical methodology came a distinction between an overarching concept of education and particular conceptions of education related to different societies and their values. (shrink)

Assessment is at the heart of teaching as it provides a necessary condition for judging success or failure. It is also necessary to ensure that providers of education are accountable to users and providers of resources. Inferential hazard is an inescapable part of any assessment procedure but cannot be an argument against assessment as such. Rich knowledge may be the aim of education but it does not follow that it is the aim of every stage of education. Teaching to tests (...) is the most natural way of ensuring that teaching matches assessment. Failure to assess places public education in jeopardy. (shrink)

This paper defends certain of Andrew Davis’s arguments on assessment from critique by John Gingell and Christopher Winch. It emphasises the role of personal acquaintance in assessing ‘rich’ understanding, criticises Antony Flew’s claim that assessment is a necessary part of teaching, and rejects the argument that public assessment is necessary for purposes of accountability. It also suggests that parents’ monitoring of their young children’s progress could act as a yardstick, suitably modified, for what might be done in formal (...) education. The conclusion raises problems about the assessment of moral development and about the justifiability of leaving assessment under political rather than professional control. (shrink)

This paper defends certain of Andrew Davis's arguments on assessment from critique by John Gingell and Christopher Winch. It emphasises the role of personal acquaintance in assessing `rich' understanding, criticises Antony Flew's claim that assessment is a necessary part of teaching, and rejects the argument that public assessment is necessary for purposes of accountability. It also suggests that parents' monitoring of their young children's progress could act as a yardstick, suitably modified, for what might be done in formal (...) education. The conclusion raises problems about the assessment of moral development and about the justifiability of leaving assessment under political rather than professional control. (shrink)

This review essay provides a critical assessment of Christopher Winch and John Gingell's Philosophy & Educational Policy: A Critical Introduction. This book presents a powerful and stimulating challenge to conventional and sloppy thinking about a wide range of issues confronting anyone who is seriously concerned with schooling in the 21st century. While each chapter merits an essay in response, this article can merely highlight the virtues of the book as well as the respects in which a number of (...) claims remain unpersuasive. There is found to be a noticeable difference between the odd and even numbered chapters, betraying perhaps the difference in authorship and suggesting insufficient discussion between the authors as to their overall content. Chapters 3, 5 and 9 are, for the most part, outstandingly good and should inject a note of caution into policy makers' all too frequent desire for change. The extent to which the authors favour democratic decision‐making on educational matters is shown, however, to be far from clear. (shrink)

This superb collection by the eminent physicist and critic John Ziman, opens with an album of portraits of scientists--Albert Einstein, Freeman Dyson, Lev Landau, Mark Azbel, Andrei Sakharov. Ziman takes readers into the world of the contemporary scientist, showing how discoveries are made and how claims are tested. He then travels into the minds of scientists as they are drawn into competing directions. Here Ziman exposes the path of discovery, which is strewn with complex human needs, governmental restrictions, the (...) desire for profits, and the exercise of technical virtuosity. (shrink)

In this book John Ziman seeks the answers to crucial questions facing scientists who need to change the direction of their careers.

Kant’s philosophy of science takes on sharp contour in terms of his interaction with the practicing life scientists of his day, particularly Johann Blumenbach and the latter’s student, Christoph Girtanner, who in 1796 attempted to synthesize the ideas of Kant and Blumenbach. Indeed, Kant’s engagement with the life sciences played a far more substantial role in his transcendental philosophy than has been recognized hitherto. The theory of epigenesis, especially in light of Kant’s famous analogy in the first Critique, posed crucial (...) questions regarding the ‘looseness of fit’ between the constitutive and the regulative in Kant’s theory of empirical law. A detailed examination of Kant’s struggle with epigenesis between 1784 and 1790 demonstrates his grave reservations about its hylozoist implications, leading to his even stronger insistence on the discrimination of constitutive from regulative uses of reason. The continuing relevance of these issues for Kant’s philosophy of science is clear from the work of Buchdahl and its contemporary reception. (shrink)

The essays in this volume blend historical and philosophical reflection with concern for contemporary political problems. They show that the causes and motivations of civil religion are a permanent fixture of the human condition, though some of its manifestations and proximate causes have shifted in an age of multiculturalism, religious toleration, and secularization.

While previous studies of Dewey's work have taken either a historical or topical focus, Shook offers an innovative, organic approach to understanding Dewey and eloquently shows that Dewey's instrumentalism grew seamlessly out of his idealism. He argues that most current scholarship operates under a mistaken impression of Dewey's early philosophical positions.

Practical wisdom and judgment, rather than seen as ‘things’ hidden inside the mind, are best talked of, we suggest, as emerging developmentally within an unceasing flow of activities, in which practitioners are inextricably immersed. Following a performative line of thinking, we argue that when practitioners (namely, individuals immersed in a practice, experiencing their tasks through the emotions, standards of excellence and moral values the practice engenders or enacts) face a bewildering situation in which they do not know, initially at least, (...) how to proceed, the judgment they exercise emerges out of seeking to establish a new orientation to their puzzling surroundings. They do so through actively trying to be in touch with their felt emotions and moral sensibilities, while attempting to articulate linguistically the feelings experienced in order to get a clearer view of relevant aspects of the situation at hand. Coming to a judgment involves moving around within a landscape of possibilities, and in so doing, being spontaneously responsive to the consequences of each move, and assessing which one (or combination of moves) seems best in resolving the initial tension aroused in one’s initial confusion. (shrink)

Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...) example is normative practical reasoning of the form 'I ought to φ, so I'll φ', where 'I ought to φ' expresses a normative belief and 'I'll φ' an intention. This has at least some characteristics of reasoning, but there are also grounds for doubting that it is genuine reasoning. One objection is that it seems inappropriate to derive an intention to φ from a belief that you ought to φ, rather than a belief that you ought to intend to φ. Another is that you may not be able to go through this putative process of reasoning, and this inability might disqualify it from being reasoning. A third objection is that it violates the Humean doctrine that reason alone cannot motivate any action of the will. This paper investigates these objections. (shrink)

The conflict between Kant and the medical faculty was far more complex and substantial than is indicated in the section of his famous Conflict of the Faculties addressing this matter. In this essay I will consider not only what Kant, as a philoso­pher, thought of medicine as a faculty, but what medicine as a faculty thought of Kant as a philosopher.

This chapter contains sections titled: Schiller's Humanism, Personalism, and Pragmatism Pragmatism and France Pragmatism in Italy Germany and Pragmatism Other European Philosophers and Pragmatism.

Designed to fill a large gap in American philosophy scholarship, this bibliography covers the first four decades of the pragmatic movement. It references most of the philosophical works by the twelve major figures of pragmatism: Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, George H. Mead, F.C.S. Schiller, Giovanni Papini, Giovanni Vailati, Guiseppe Prezzolini, Mario Calderoni, A.W. Moore, John E. Boodin, and C.I. Lewis. It also includes writings of dozens of minor pragmatic writers, along with those by commentators and (...) critics of pragmatism. It encompasses literature not only concerning pragmatism as an alliance of philosophical theories of meaning, inquiry, belief, knowledge, logic, truth, ontology, value, and morality, but also as an intellectual and cultural force impacting art, literature, education, the social and natural sciences, religion, and politics. This bibliography contains 2,794 main entries and more than 2,000 additional references, organized by year of publication. 2,101 of the references include annotation. Its international scope is focused on writings in English, French, German, and Italian, though many other languages are also represented. Peter H. Hare contributed the Guest Preface. The introduction contains an historical orientation to pragmatism and guides to recent studies of pragmatic figures. This work is extensively cross-referenced, and it has exhaustive and lengthy author and subject indexes. (shrink)

In “Causality and Determination,” Anscombe rejects the two received opinions on the nature of causality in the modern philosophical tradition. She rejects the Humean conception of universal generalization based on the constant conjunction in experience of cause and effect, and she also rejects the notion that causality entails a necessary connection between cause and effect. As an alternative, she suggests that the core notion of causality is one of the derivativeness of the effect from the cause. Her consideration of causality (...) ranges generally over all types of causality, but I believe that the most significant implication of her position is in application to the causality of human action. In this paper, I will articulate what I take to be that position. (shrink)

Empires and nation-states are not opposed or distinct forms of polity but closely linked forms. Pre-modern empire existed without any contrasting form of polity we might call a nation-state. Rather, they contrasted with non-national state forms such as city-states, small kingdoms and mobile, nomadic polities. These in turn were in constant interaction with any neighbouring empire or empires, perhaps becoming the core of an empire themselves, perhaps taking over all or part of an existing empire, perhaps maintaining some autonomy by (...) virtue of remoteness or lack of attractiveness, perhaps by balancing opposed empires against each other. Empires did not have a national core, and non-empires were not national. By contrast, modern empires have always had a clearly designated nation-state core and a physically separate set of non-national peripheries. This has been crucial to ensuring that when formal empire is ended, both the imperial core and the former colonies are defined as nation-states. But ex-imperial nation-states and ex-colonial nation-states are really two kinds of states. Much contemporary confusion about the prospect for a world order of nation-states revolves round the failure to make that basic distinction. (shrink)

In “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” Robert Brandom reads my “Knowledge and the Internal” as sketching a position that, when properly elaborated, opens into his own social‐perspectival conception of knowledge (and of objectivity in general). But this depends on taking me to hold that there cannot be justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false. And that is exactly what I argued against in “Knowledge and the Internal.” Seeing that (...) P constitutes falsehood‐excluding justification for believing that P. That should seem common sense, but it is made unavailable by the inferentialist conception of justification that Brandom takes for granted. So far from realizing my aims, Brandom's social‐perspectival conception of knowledge is squarely in the target area of my argument in “Knowledge and the Internal,” which I restate here so as to bring that out. (shrink)

Herder's Naturalist Aesthetics, by ZuckertRachel. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. 276.

In his Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology, Hilary Kornblith presents an argument for the justification of induction that is bold, brilliant, and plausible, but radically incomplete. In the development of this position, Kornblith relies heavily on the philosophical work of Richard Boyd as well as on some empirical psychological studies. As Kornblith sees it, the philosophical position entailed by his proposed solution to the problem is a thoroughgoing, realistic, scientific materialism. I will argue that (...) the brand of realism that Kornblith’s solution to the problem of induction presupposes is inexplicable within the context of the non-reductive materialism that he espouses. Although Kornblith provides us with valuable elements for a solution to the problem of induction, it needs to be supplemented with something like a renovated Aristotelian notion of form in order for the solution to be plausible. (shrink)

Double effect reasoning is central to Catholic moral theology. It is the principle which enables it to maintain absolute moral standards while effectively handling morally difficult choices which entail bringing about some evil as well as the good. DER has been focused on the way in which it applies to human agents and their relation to bringing about evil as well as the good. According to DER, only the good can be brought about intentionally; evil can only be brought about (...) as the side effect of the good. It will be argued that DER also applies to God’s choices. It is our best resource for understanding God’s relation to evil in the world He creates. (shrink)