We all ‘know’ that public opinion came to prominence in the political vocabulary of the late eighteenth century. It may be that this dates its rise a bit late, but it is not relevant to argue the matter here. My concern is rather that we be equally aware of the purposes for which people made use of the concept. Here I wish to consider various possible contexts for speaking or writing of public opinion, or ‘opinion’, as it was usually called (...) prior to the mid-eighteenth century. It may be possible to define, more fully than heretofore, the work that the expression did in eighteenth-century thought. As contemporary students of public opinion have been learning, an answer to this question may not even be wholly irrelevant to the task of specifying the nature of public opinion in our own time. (shrink)

This book examines the concept of public interest against the background of English politics from the Civil War to the coming of the Hanoverians. These years witnessed both the rise of the modern notion of the public interest as a part of ordinary political language and the growth of a social philosophy of individualism. The new ideas challenged the _status quo_, based on order, reason of state and national power, in the name of legitimate self-interest and respect for the rights (...) of the private person. In presenting a complex set of ideas in their historical context, the author examines both abstract philosophies and the issues of the day as recorded in press, pulpit and law courts. A chapter devoted to economic thought includes a re-assessment of the social assumptions of mercantilism. (shrink)

The political system adopted by Restoration France seemed to call for opposition, and possibly even parties, on the model of Britain. The French, however, remained deeply divided by the Revolution, such that the civilities of parliamentary government developed only with difficulty. Reflecting the distrust inherited from the Revolution, deputies favoured a secret ballot for votes in the chambers and this alone made it easy to disguise political loyalties or to change them. Those who resisted the British model emphasized the virtues (...) of political choices that responded only to one's conscience and sense of honour. On that basis, party seemed inconsistent both with French individualism and with a sense of delicacy. Supporting the claims for indig- enous political mores were perceptions of British politics that exaggerated the discipline of their parties. Though party bonds in France remained very loose — and understanding of the logic of parliamentary government less than perfect — those now deemed the important political thinkers of the time were, in the main, admirers of the politics of party. (shrink)

This book purports to explore the possibilities of utilizing the insights of psychoanalysis in the explanations of history. The essays are mainly derivative explorations or reviews of Freud's Totem and Taboo and Erikson's Young Man Luther. Not much philosophy, little inspiration, and much jargon.--J. A. W.

This book is a fine introduction to the traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. The author succeeds in presenting difficult material accurately, clearly, and concisely. Though the problems are shown to have deep historical roots, the answers are generally in modern terms with frequent and useful allusions to contemporary philosophers and relevant research in psychology, anthropology, and biology. Perhaps the importance of this book lies in the fact that while the author does not understate the difficulty and complexity of (...) the problems, he considers the answers crucial in man's quest for self-knowledge and shows his readers how to approach philosophical self-examination. Beginning with the general philosophical problem of mind-body, he proceeds to particular analyses of perception, motivation, emotion, imagination, and memory where there is more interaction between philosophy and empirical science. Finally, he ends the book with a study of the problems of self-knowledge, taking into account the material that has preceded. For those interested in pursuing the subject, an interesting bibliography could be compiled from the notes and supplementary bibliography that follow the text.--J. A. W. (shrink)

The book is equally divided into three parts, treating respectively Godfrey's metaphysics of essence and existence, his metaphysics of substance and accident, and his metaphysics of matter and form. The basic theme running throughout Godfrey's metaphysics is seen to be his understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of potency and act.

The themes explored include political liberty, "legal tyranny," defences of influence in government, recognition of the Opposition, and the development of organic categories of political analysis - the latter in a chapter that explodes the association often presumed between organicism and conservative modes of thought. A chapter on the "Fourth Estate" examines the gradual process of legitimation of "interests," culminating in the influence of the press. Central to the account of new political forces and their recognition is the idea of (...) public opinion, which evolved during this period from the notion of public spirit. Chapters on the classical legacy of the century and on the High-Tories examine two backward-looking aspects of the political cultrure. Tracing the persistent influence of High-Toryism, Gunn questions the conventional wisdom about eighteenth-century ideological consensus in general and Whig solidarity in particular. He demonstrates that theories of government from the seventeenth century survived to a degree not previously admitted by modern scholarship. (shrink)

Replete with summary introductions, cross-references, bibliographies, biographies, and study aids, this volume is mainly intended as a textbook. The first half explores the nature and warrant of the metaphysical enterprise. A broad selection is presented, most of the authors maintaining that metaphysics is not deductive, nor finally provable, nor scientific, but probably self-reflexive in some way. The second half deals with metaphysical issues. Here the Catholic point of view comes through clearly--the majority of the articles are by contemporary Catholic thinkers. (...) Obviously a devoted and thorough attempt to present metaphysics with particular modern reference, the excerpts and editor's prose, bold both in sweep and claim, unfortunately fail to show why metaphysics is either systematic or interesting.--J. A. W. (shrink)

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v. 1. Nicomachean ethics. Politics. The Athenian Constitution. Rhetoric. On Poetics.--v. 2. Logic.--v. 3. Physics. Metaphysics. On the soul. Short physical treaties.--v. 4. On the heavens. On generation and corruption. Meteorology. Biological treatises.

What should we make of the intuitions marshaled on behalf of the existence of supererogatory actions, or actions that are “good but not required”? Are they trustworthy or dissembling? This question is important considering the great respect many writers give to them. The attitude of Daniel Guevara is not unusual: "My discussion relies upon the intuition that certain acts, such as those described by Urmson, are supererogatory, indeed, that they are paradigms…I shall proceed on the assumption that a theory is (...) discredited if in fact it makes supererogation impossible." There is thus a widespread attitude that the supererogatory status of certain acts should be taken to be one of those elements out of which a moral theoryshould be constructed, something like one of Rawls’s “considered moral judgments” or “considered convictions of justice.” The comparison with Rawls’ methodology is sometimes quite explicit. My purpose is to throw this conviction – that the supererogatory status of these actions can be accepted with a confidence not too much less than that with which we accept that slavery is wrong – into doubt. Whether there is a category of the supererogatory acts is a matter for another paper; personally I see no conceptual incoherence but merely doubt that it is instantiated very often. My goal shall be rather narrow: to cast doubt upon the reputation of the intuitions. First I shall describe my conclusion abstractly, and why I think the intuitions are much less indubitable than supposed. Then I shall discuss a few common examples of supererogatory acts and show how my account explains them. Finally I shall consider how most important intuitions of supererogatory status – those associated with extreme self-sacrifice – might be integrated into my overall account. (shrink)

Amyloid-beta peptide plaque in the brain is the primary diagnostic criterion of Alzheimer's disease . The physiological role of Abeta are poorly understood. We have previously determined an Abeta interacting domain in the promoters of AD-associated genes . This AbetaID interacts in a DNA sequence-specific manner with Abeta. We now demonstrate novel Abeta activity as a possible transcription factor. Herein, we detected Abeta-chromatin interaction in cell culture by ChIP assay. We observed that human neuroblastoma cells treated with FITC conjugated Abeta1-40 (...) localized Abeta to the nucleus in the presence of H2O2-mediated oxidative stress. Furthermore, primary rat fetal cerebrocortical cultures were transfected with APP and BACE1 promoter-luciferase fusions, and rat PC12 cultures were transfected with polymorphic APP promoter-CAT fusion clones. Transfected cells were treated with different Abeta peptides and/or H2O2. Abeta treatment of cell cultures produced a DNA sequence-specific response in cells transfected with polymorphic APP clones. Our results suggest the Abeta peptide may regulate its own production through feedback on its precursor protein and BACE1, leading to amyloidogenesis in AD. (shrink)

This is a commentary on an article from "dialogue", march 1972: "first philosophy: metaphysics or epistemology?" by kenneth dorter. epistemologies from the time of descartes which have largely replaced ontology emphasize the human conditions for knowing, and where an ontology is lacking supply a knowledge by description with no objective world to describe. the humanism which refuses to go beyond mankind to learn about man elects to follow a path to extinction, and insofar as we hold to an egocentric viewpoint (...) in "first philosophy", a truly objective science of ontology has taken flight. (shrink)

In a recent re-assessment of the medical aspects of the Plague of Athens which is, to date, the most scholarly and comprehensive, Poole and Holladay have emphasized the tendency of many infectious diseases markedly to decline in virulence over decades and centuries and, sometimes, significantly to change their clinical manifestations. In the light of modern medicine they consider four possibilities: The Plague was a disease which still exists today. This they regard as improbable, It still exists in some remote place (...) or places unknown to medical science. This is discussed and dismissed, It became extinct, It was caused by an agent which nowadays causes a significantly different clinical syndrome. They conclude as follows: ‘The truth, we suggest, almost certainly lies in possibility or . But we can see no way of choosing between them. On either view the question: “What was the Athenian Plague?” is in principle unanswerable if the questioner is wanting to attach to the Plagsie the name of some modern disease or diseases’. (shrink)

The present study applies a new method for investigating dynamic unconscious processes. The method consists of selection of words from patient interview and test protocols that in the clinicians' judgments capture the patients' conscious symptom experience and the hypothetical unconscious conflict related to the symptom, subliminal and supraliminal presentation of these words, signal analysis of event-related potentials obtained to the word presentations. Eight phobics and three patients suffering from pathological grief reactions served as subjects. A time-frequency ERP analysis revealed that (...) subjects' ERPs classified the unconscious conflict words better subliminally than supraliminally, while the reverse was true for the conscious symptom words = 2.82, p = .011). The relationship between frequency and latency revealed a similar mirror image pattern for the unconscious conflict and conscious symptom words . This method demonstrated that objective, brain-based evidence for unconscious conflict can be obtained. (shrink)

Legal and moral reasoning share much methodology, and they address similar problems. This volume charts two shared problems: the relation between theory, principles and particular judgments; and the role of facts and factual assertions in normative settings. The relation between 'theory' and 'practice' and between 'principle' and 'particular judgment' has become the subject of much debate in moral philosophy. In the ongoing debate, some moral philosophers refer to legal philosophy for a support of their views on the primacy of 'practice' (...) over 'theory'. According to them, legal philosophy should have a more balanced view in that relation. In the contributions to Part One this claim is critically analysed. The role of the facts is underestimated in discussions on legal reasoning and legal theory, as well as moral reasoning and ethical theory. Factual statements enter into moral and legal discussions not only because they link the conclusion with a rule. They also play a role as background assumptions in supporting a theory. Its focus on the role of facts in normative reasoning makes this book of special interest to scholars of legal and moral argumentation. (shrink)