Philosophical counselling is practice aimed at alleviating suffering though the application of a range of philosophical skill and methods. Presupposing that critical investigation of one's values and assumptions will be sufficient to bring about a meaningful transformation is presumptuous – both of the force of rationality, and the breadth of philosophy's application. Self knowledge is a precursor to transformation, but not solely responsible for it. This appears to call the foundation of philosophical counseling into question. The ancient notion of epimelia (...) heautou (care of self) attends to this concern. Care of self is a call to form a relationship of self with self. This is not a process of coming to know ourselves through reflection and analysis alone, but entails an active involvement with our very formation. I will argue that care of self is exemplar of philosophical counseling, in that it contributes to the understanding and practice of philosophical counseling in a way that significantly enriches it. (shrink)

Professor Geoffrey Lewis Lewis was a pioneer in Turkish Studies in Britain and an internationally admired scholar in the field. In considering the body of his work as a whole, two consistent themes emerge, two driving forces behind it: first, a deep, continuing fascination with language, and now especially with Turkish; and second, a rooted and constantly developing love of Turkey and its people and a concomitant desire to bring its language, history, and culture to the attention of the English-speaking (...) world by a variety of means, all of them grounded in a thorough scholarly engagement with his subject. (shrink)

Though remembered chiefly as author of the Declaration of Independence and the president under whom the Louisiana Purchase was effected, Thomas Jefferson was a true revolutionary in the way he thought about the size and reach of government, which Americans who were full citizens and the role of education in the new country. In his new book, Kevin Gutzman gives readers a new view of Jefferson--a revolutionary who effected radical change in a growing country. Jefferson's philosophy about the size and (...) power of the federal system almost completely undergirded the Jeffersonian Republican Party. His forceful advocacy of religious freedom was not far behind, as were attempts to incorporate Native Americans into American society. His establishment of the University of Virginia might be one of the most important markers of the man's abilities and character. He was not without flaws. While he argued for the assimilation of Native Americans into society, he did not assume the same for Africans being held in slavery while--at the same time--insisting that slavery should cease to exist. Many still accuse Jefferson of hypocrisy on the ground that he both held that "all men are created equal" and held men as slaves. Jefferson's true character, though, is more complex than that as Kevin Gutzman shows in his new book about Jefferson, a revolutionary whose accomplishments went far beyond the drafting of the Declaration of Independence. (shrink)

In view of the Cultural Conflicts the world needs today tolerance. The present article entitled “Cultural Conflicts and Global peace” envisages deep concern about the cultural conflicts. We are dismayed at the gradual emergence of intolerance, deceit and violence in society and nation at large. The existence and the gradual strengthening of the dark forces have led to different kinds of conflicts in society and marginalization of poor nations. The future of both peace and civilization depends upon understanding and co-operation (...) among the political, spiritual and intellectual leaders of the world's major civilizations. In the twenty-first century, clashes of civilizations pose threat to global peace. An international order based on moral values is the safeguard against world conflicts. (shrink)

We make a brief review of the Kramers escape rate theory for the probabilistic motion of a particle in a potential well U(x), and under the influence of classical fluctuation forces. The Kramers theory is extended in order to take into account the action of the thermal and zero-point random electromagnetic fields on a charged particle. The result is physically relevant because we get a non-null escape rate over the potential barrier at low temperatures (T → 0). It is found (...) that, even if the mean energy is much smaller than the barrier height, the classical particle can escape from the potential well due to the action of the zero-point fluctuating fields. These stochastic effects can be used to give a classical interpretation to some quantum tunneling phenomena. Relevant experimental data are used to illustrate the theoretical results. (shrink)

We consider the simple case of a nonrelativistic charged harmonic oscillator in one dimension, to investigate how to take into account the radiation reaction and vacuum fluctuation forces within the Schrödinger equation. The effects of both zero-point and thermal classical electromagnetic vacuum fields, characteristic of stochastic electrodynamics, are separately considered. Our study confirms that the zero-point electromagnetic fluctuations are dynamically related to the momentum operator p=−i ℏ ∂/∂ x used in the Schrödinger equation.

The traditional view was that a concept must be immediate if anything is, i.e., it must be something possessed directly by my mind. To deny this seems to be saying "I think but I don't have ideas." This is of course what the proponents of the linguistic philosophy are in effect saying, and perhaps for them it is all right. Professor Price has argued ingeniously against the whole linguistic position: against the possibility of a purely linguistic solution to the problem. (...) Yet whether we follow Price or the language philosophers we are forced into a rather puzzling situation. One likes to say that one has ideas, thoughts, concepts, but there is a serious question as to whether we can ever actually cognize such entities. Indeed Price introspects and does not find them. Most of us--including our linguistic colleagues--would be quick to agree. A thought cannot be introspected like an image. There just does not seem to be anything there. As thinkers of thoughts, we are looking inward toward nothing; we are indeed living examples of "hollow men." So it is that we are faced with a dilemma. Either we say we think but do not really have ideas, or we must somehow show that such concepts are actually immediate after all. Neither alternative seems the least bit welcome. The latter seems utterly impossible. (shrink)

The survival of a unique set of drawings, complemented by a contemporary description and a sale catalogue, enable us to ‘reconstruct’ the cabinet of Bonnier de la Mosson , a miscellaneous collection formed in Paris c. 1740. A brief assessment is offered of the status of such cabinets in the growth and diffusion of science in ancien régime France. We also point to a link with the decorative arts: in a study of such a subject the intellectual and aesthetic dimensions (...) must be treated as a unity if we are fully to evoke the context of the cabinet in the age of the rococo. Only the modern ‘discipline’-oriented viewpoint forces a separation between the history of science and the history of art. (shrink)

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 gives statutory force to the common law principle that all adults are assumed to have capacity to make decisions unless proven otherwise. In accord with best practice, this principle places the evidential burden on researchers rather than participants and requires researchers to take account of short-term and transient understandings common among some research populations. The aim of this paper is to explore some of the implications of the MCA 2005 for researchers working with 'vulnerable' populations (...) in health and social care settings. The Cyclical Consent Model is described and offered as a process by which researchers might develop good practice when engaged in research involving vulnerable people. (shrink)

During the last twelvemonth we have been engaged in finally preparing for press the first volume of our text of Livy in the Bibliotheca Classica Oxoniensis, and we now desire to submit beforehand to the judgement of scholars some of the chief alterations in the current text that we have been led to adopt. It will be seen that some proportion of them consist of little more than a defence of the MS tradition; and where we have proposed changes of (...) our own, we have, we believe, rigorously confined ourselves not merely to such suggestions as can be readily reconciled with the reading of at least one good manuscript, but to such as provide in each case a tenable explanation of the origin of all the variants in all the MSS that we have consulted. In several difficult places we have become persuaded that corruption has arisen through slight and accountable dislocations of order, and in a still larger number from the incorporation of marginal or interlinear glosses not differing in character from those which still appear in great numbers in all the MSS of the 9th to the 12th centuries, but which have not forced their way into the text. A typical example will be found in our note on V. 2. 8. (shrink)

The main thesis of this excellent little book is that "contrary to widespread misapprehensions, two formally different kinds of utilitarianism, simple and general, and along with the latter one kind of rule-utilitarianism, are extensionally equivalent; that is, analogous principles of the various kinds necessarily yield equivalent judgments in all cases; or, in other words, it makes no difference in theory whether the simple or generalization test is applied to acts or—within limits—whether an appeal is made to rules grounded in utility." (...) The "misapprehension" is dispelled in the particularly valuable third chapter, "Extensional Equivalence," by means of an a priori causal analysis of action situations and an exacting consideration of action descriptions. Furthermore, Lyons argues that other rule-utilitarian theories not extensionally equivalent to the simple utilitarianism of tradition differ from it in the wrong ways. As a result of these two findings the author holds that "any appeal to generalization or to rules consequently fails to escape the force of traditional arguments against utilitarianism." Utilitarian readers who accept Lyons' argument and particularly his interspersed but incisive criticisms of the works of Broad, Harrison, Singer, Harrod, Brandt, and Rawls, are likely to feel that it is best to go back to Mill! But in his final chapter Lyons' analysis of promising and fairness throws doubt on the adequacy of any purely utilitarian moral theory. However this may be, to read Lyons' book is to follow a precise and rigorous intellect, free of current dogmas about value statements, while it threads its way through a maze of conceptual complexities toward substantive philosophic conclusions.—R. B. C. (shrink)

This book is a translation of a work which in the original French appeared in two volumes in 1953. It is a tour de force by a man who is philosophically very close to Merleau-Ponty, and who has a deep appreciation for a wide spectrum of works of art. The book has four parts: the first distinguishes the "aesthetic object" from the "work of art"; the second is an analysis of types of works of art, especially music and painting; the (...) third is an analysis of aesthetic perception; and the fourth is a Kantian critique of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

In the aftermath of shocking workplace scandals, people are often baffled when individuals within the organization were aware of clear-cut wrongdoing yet did not inform authorities. The current research suggests that moral concern for the suffering that a transgressor might face if a crime were reported is an under-recognized, powerful force that shapes whistleblowing in organizations, particularly when transgressors are fellow members of a highly entitative group. Two experiments show that group entitativity heightens concern about possible consequences that the transgressor (...) would face if a crime were to be reported, and that this concern reduces the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing in organizations to authorities. Further, the studies identify a mechanism through which concern about the transgressor is heightened in highly entitative groups: potential reporters perceive that the transgressor felt remorse for their crime. Thus, when fellow members of highly entitative organizations commit crimes, people are more likely to imagine that these transgressors felt anxiety or guilt about their actions, and this prompts greater concern for transgressors in ways that encourage people to let them “off the hook.” We discuss the implications of these findings for how reporting to authorities can be encouraged within highly entitative organizations. (shrink)

The ability of the medical profession to sustain life, or more appropriately, to prolong dying, in patients with terminal illness, creates a most complex and controversial situation for all involved: the patient, if mentally alert; the patient's family; and the medical care team including physicians, nurses and attendants. This situation is especially complex in large acute care hospitals where medical and nursing students, residents and house officers receive advanced medical training. A major problem, prolonging the dying of the terminally ill, (...) with its medical, legal, ethical and economic complexities now confronts American society. The problem is particularly acute in teaching hospitals, in which one finds a disproportionate number of terminally ill patients. The ability to work at these questions as a community rather than as adversaries will determine much about the ability of the health care system to respect the dignity and autonomy of those who seek aid and comfort when faced with serious illness and impending death. Better communication between the physicians, health care providers, the lawyers and ethicists must be developed in order to solve these problems. Over the next ten years society and our elected representatives will be making very demanding decisions about the use of the health dollar. One possible way to prevent increasing costs is to reach significant agreement on the proper care of the dying. Proper care for the dying is being considered, discussed, and evaluated by very thoughtful people. It is not governments which should decide who is to live or who is to die. There is the serious problem of the 'slippery slope' to euthanasia by omission if cost containment becomes the major force in formulating policy on the proper care of the dying. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and LogicMark C. R. SmithRichard Tieszen. After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xi + 245. Cloth, $75.00.Tieszen’s new book offers a synthesis and extension of his longstanding project of bringing the method of Husserl’s phenomenology to bear on fundamental questions—both epistemological and ontological—in the philosophy of mathematics. Gödel held Husserl’s philosophy (...) in high regard, and thought that it offered the most promising avenue for an adequate understanding of the foundations of mathematical thought and practice, but Gödel himself did not give a full systematic statement of how phenomenology might carry out that project. Tieszen takes up the task in this book, which is structured around two main guiding themes. The first is to locate the sources of Gödel’s philosophical views—principally [End Page 303] in Plato, Leibniz, and of course Husserl, along with Kant as a sort of backcloth—and the second is to argue that from these materials, a promising rationalism in mathematics and logic can be consistently articulated. Along the way we also encounter a good many of Gödel’s arguments against an array of reductive positions, Hilbert’s formalism and Carnap’s “logical syntax” project among them, as well as arguments against the prospects of a mechanical or purely computational understanding of the human mind. Many of the arguments (both negative and positive) stem from a reflection on the consequences of Gödel’s landmark incompleteness results of 1931.The core of Tieszen’s positive proposals comes in chapters 4, 5, and 6: here is where we meet with “constituted Platonism,” Tieszen’s name for the rationalist, realist synthesis of Husserl’s method and Gödel’s mathematical insights. Methodologically, the starting point is the actual practice of mathematics as a human undertaking, and its conditions of possibility. At the most general level, it is characteristic of thought to be intentional, that is, to be (or try to be) about something, to have a target, to be a bearer of meaning. So it goes for thought about items in sensory awareness, about fictional objects, or about mathematical subject-matter. Concerning the latter, what we encounter in mathematical experience are frequently “phenomena that resist our will, so that we are ‘forced’ in certain directions” (170); what accounts for this resistance to our will are invariants, which have the further characteristics of repeatability—both for a single subject, and among many subjects—and availability for convergence (221), which, I take it, means availability as structures or concepts upon which many independent rational investigators will come to rest. Thinking mathematical thoughts is quite unlike thinking thoughts about fictional items, because fictions are indefinitely plastic in the face of human will. It is also unlike thought about sensory items, in that the intentional objects at issue are not available to outer sense; but from another angle it is more like thought about real material items than imaginary beings, because our mathematical thoughts are exposed to the possibility of error or misrepresentation in various ways. (An elementary example: most people think that 1 is distinct from 0.9999... repeating: this is a misrepresentation, because they are in fact identical.)The phenomenology of mathematical practice is such that we assay various conjectures and proposals about invariants already given to consciousness by previous practice, and discover what further invariant structures or concepts are revealed as necessary constraints upon the various possibilities that we can experimentally float for ourselves. Sometimes our conjectures or intentions are fulfilled, sometimes they are frustrated; but it is the very fact of fulfillment and frustration which points us to a Platonic reality. It is not the noumenal realm of the “naive” Platonist, in Tieszen’s phrase, but nevertheless an objective reality marked off “on the basis of what stabilizes or becomes invariant in our experience, on the basis of what has a history and a sedimentation that permits of further elaboration, development, constraints, surprises, and so on” (101). In something like this way, human reason and consciousness “constitute the meaning of being” of mathematical objects... (shrink)

Shortages of new therapeutics to treat coronavirus disease (COVID-19) have forced clinicians, public health officials, and health systems to grapple with difficult questions about how to fairly allocate potentially life-saving treatments when there are not enough for all patients in need (1). Shortages have occurred with remdesivir, tocilizumab, monoclonal antibodies, and the oral antiviral Paxlovid (2) -/- Ensuring equitable allocation is especially important in light of the disproportionate burden experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic by disadvantaged groups, including Black, Hispanic/Latino and (...) Indigenous communities, individuals with certain disabilities, and low-income persons. However, many health systems have resorted to first-come, first-served approaches to allocation, which tend to disadvantage individuals with barriers in access to care (3). There is mounting evidence of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in access to medications for COVID-19 (4, 5). -/- One potential method to promote equitable allocation is to use a weighted lottery, which is an allocation strategy that gives all eligible patients a chance to receive the scarce treatment while also allowing the assignment of higher or lower chances according to other ethical considerations (6). We sought to assess the feasibility of implementing a weighted lottery to allocate scarce COVID-19 medications in a large U.S. health system and to determine whether the weighted lottery promotes equitable allocation. (shrink)

We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is (...) a formal understanding of rationales, a partial taxonomy, and a foundation for computer programs that represent and reason with rationales.The five kinds of rationales are as follows: (c)ompression and (s)pecialization, which yield rules, and (d)isputation, which yields a decision. These are modeled as potentially changing the focus of the dispute. Then there are (f)it, a rationale for rules, and (r)esolution, a rationale for decisions. These cannot be modeled as simply; they force disputation to a meta-level, at least temporarily. (shrink)

I argue that the distinction which is current in much writing on medical ethics between autonomous and non-autonomous patients cannot cope comfortably with weak-willed (incontinent) patients. I describe a case involving a patient who refuses a blood transfusion even though he or she agrees that it would be in his or her best interests. The case is discussed in the light of the treatment of autonomy by B Brody and R Gillon. These writers appear to force us to treat an (...) incontinent patient either as autonomous, just like a rational agent whose decisions are in accordance with his beliefs or as non-autonomous, like comatose patients or children. Though neither is entirely satisfactory I opt for describing such patients as autonomous but point out that in cases like this the principle of respect for autonomy does not give a determinate answer about how the patient ought to be treated. (shrink)

I argue that the distinction which is current in much writing on medical ethics between autonomous and non-autonomous patients cannot cope comfortably with weak-willed patients. I describe a case involving a patient who refuses a blood transfusion even though he or she agrees that it would be in his or her best interests. The case is discussed in the light of the treatment of autonomy by B Brody and R Gillon. These writers appear to force us to treat an incontinent (...) patient either as autonomous, just like a rational agent whose decisions are in accordance with his beliefs or as non-autonomous, like comatose patients or children. Though neither is entirely satisfactory I opt for describing such patients as autonomous but point out that in cases like this the principle of respect for autonomy does not give a determinate answer about how the patient ought to be treated. (shrink)

Negation has occupied a unique place in the history of ideas. Negation as opposed to truth-conditional affirmation has been very much present in Indian and Western thought from very early times. R. S. Bhatnagar of happy memory (1933–2019) in his “Many Splendoured Negation” (Bhatnagar in J Indian Counc Philos Res XXII(3):83–906, 2006) had shown many a facet that could be construed in “negation”. This paper is an attempt to revisit the notion of negation that R. S. Bhatnagar brought to light (...) and to further the germane thought that he had outlined in his concise exposé. Though Bhatnagar had stated that there could be negative and positive functions of negations, a vigilant reading of his article shows that the primary import of Bhatnagar is to examine the positive function of negation. According to R. S. Bhatnagar, even death, which could be the negative in its most feared form, the reality of which, has the positive effect on the soul force in its commitment to live well and die well. R. S. Bhatnagar’s engagement with negation is not complete unless one takes into consideration “negation” as an integral part of philosophizing in India, whether it is the Buddhist tradition or any other tradition. One encounters the philosophical “exercise” on negation enormously in Buddhist thought. The first part of the paper is a brief discussion on the views of Bhatnagar in his essay mentioned with the author’s considerable add-on, while the second part brings home the Buddhist facet and paradigm of negation, the missing link in Bhatnagar. The third part of the paper is an unveilment of the cogitation of R. S. Bhatnagar on “death” in terms of negation. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉJe réponds à l'affirmation de Dunn selon laquelle les jugements esthétiques doivent être normatifs pour Kant. Pour ce faire, je clarifie ma position : je ne soutiens nullement que la force du sentiment de plaisir implique que les autres doivent être d'accord avec mon jugement; c'est plutôt la nature désintéressée du sentiment qui est la base de l'accord; je m'oppose à la proposition selon laquelle le système kantien, dans son ensemble, nécessite les jugements normatifs de goût; et je m'oppose à (...) l'affirmation selon laquelle toute opération d'une faculté en accord avec un principe est normative. (shrink)

The object of this article is to set forth certain evidence that emerges from a study of three of Plutarch's Lives, the Titus, the Paullus, and the Cato Maior, evidence which indicates that these Lives are based upon a definite type of biographical composition, and to suggest its possible origin and date. Since E. Meyer's article on the Cimon of Nepos and Plutarch, biographical sources have generally been assumed for the Greek Lives, and there has been a tendency to make (...) the same assumption for the Roman Lives also, without, however, setting forth the evidence that might justify it. Uxkull Gyllenband maintained that biographies of Greeks and Romans, the sources of Plutarch, were written in the second century b.c., but he gives no evidence for his contention, which is indeed refuted by the observations of Jacoby. Mühl argued with some force that Plutarch's source for the Marcellus was a biography. There is good reason to doubt his conclusion that Plutarch has used a biography of Poseidonius; but the arguments advanced by Klotz for the thesis that the source was the annalist Valerius Antias are still less convincing. Liedmeier postulates a biographical source for the Paullus, but without doing more than asserting the general improbability that Plutarch here used a multiplicity of sources. It seems therefore desirable to collect such evidence as there is of a biographical source in these three Roman Lives of the second century b.c., and it is with such an attempt rather than with a priori considerations that I am here concerned. (shrink)

Athenaeus preserves an intriguing description by the otherwise unknown writerMoschion of a giant grain-ship, the Syracusia, built by Hiero II of Syracuse in thelater third century B.C.1 The account is extremely circumstantial. Besides a fulldescription of the ship's layout, Moschion gives such details as the name of thearchitect , the size of the construction-force , the construction time , details of the launching arrangements devised byArchimedes, and even the procedure for judging crimes committed on board.

Athenaeus preserves an intriguing description by the otherwise unknown writerMoschion of a giant grain-ship, the Syracusia, built by Hiero II of Syracuse in thelater third century B.C.1 The account is extremely circumstantial. Besides a fulldescription of the ship's layout, Moschion gives such details as the name of thearchitect, the size of the construction-force, the construction time, details of the launching arrangements devised byArchimedes, and even the procedure for judging crimes committed on board.

1. HUME’S ARGUMENT, FLEW CORRECTLY EXPLAINS, IS NOT THAT MIRACLES CANNOT HAPPEN, BUT THAT THERE MUST BE A CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THEY DO. 2. (I) FLEW FURTHER APPEALS TO THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF HISTORICAL AS OPPOSED TO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE. BUT ONE’S ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE MUST DEPEND ON WHETHER THE CONCEPT IS POSSIBLE. (II) FLEW CLAIMS THAT HUME CAN BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT WHAT IS ALLOWED TO BE A LOGICAL POSSIBILITY SHOULD YET BE DISMISSED AS (...) IMPOSSIBLE IN FACT. BUT THIS DISTINCTION CANNOT BE APPLIED IN ADVANCE OF AN OCCURRENCE, WITHOUT BEGGING THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IT IS INDEED POSSIBLE OR NOT. 3. PACE HUME AND FLEW, ENTERTAINING THE CONCEPT IS NOT INCOHERENT. FOR (I) THE RELEVANT "LAW OF NATURE" CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE, THOUGH NOT IN FACT SO; (II) ONE MAY CONCEIVE OF AN "UNCAUSED" EVENT, ONCE ONE SUPPOSES THAT IN MOST OTHER CASES THE UNIVERSE IS UNIFORM. THUS IT COULD BE RATIONAL TO JUDGE THAT A MIRACLE HAD OCCURRED, SINCE THIS WOULD NOT CAL. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

1 In 1954 Karl Popper published an article attempting to show that the identification of the quantitative concept degree of confirmation with the quantitative concept degree of probability is a serious error. The error was presumably committed by J. M. Keynes, H. Reichen bach and R. Carnap. 2 It was Popper's intention then, to expose the error and to introduce an explicatum for the prescientific concept of degree of confirmation. A few months later Y. Bar-Hillel published an article attempting to (...) show that no serious error had been committed (particularly by Carnap) and that the problem introduced by Popper was simply a "verbal one. "3 Popper replied immediately that "Dr. Bar-Hillel forces me [Popper] now to criticize Carnap's theory further," and he [Popper] introduced further objections which, if accepted, destroy Carnap's theory. 4 About eight years after this exchange took place I was in graduate school at the University of Chicago in search of a topic for a doctoral dissertation. An investigation of the issues involved in this exchange seemed to be ideal for me because I had (and still have) a great ad miration for the work of both Carnap and Popper. A thoroughly revised and I hope improved account of that investigation appears in the first five chapters of this book. Put very briefly, what I found were four main points of contention. (shrink)

The sense of touch informs us of the physical properties of our surroundings and is a critical aspect of communication. Before touches are perceived, mechanical signals are transmitted quickly and reliably from the skin's surface to mechano‐electrical transduction channels embedded within specialized sensory neurons. We are just beginning to understand how soft tissues participate in force transmission and how they are deformed. Here, we review empirical and theoretical studies of single molecules and molecular ensembles thought to be involved in mechanotransmission (...) and apply the concepts emerging from this work to the sense of touch. We focus on the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans as a well‐studied model for touch sensation in which mechanics can be studied on the molecular, cellular, and systems level. Finally, we conclude that force transmission is an emergent property of macromolecular cellular structures that mutually stabilize one another. (shrink)