"El resultado de este trabajo de reflexión es lo que se encontrará consignado en las páginas de esta obra, trabajo realizado con entera buena fe, sin gran aparato de erudición y de acuerdo con un plan más bien positivo que crítico. Si, en definitiva, los valores tradicionales salen del análisis confirmados, poco importará al autor no haber “aportado nada nuevo”. Los grandes principios de la civilización humana y cristiana no son nuevos. Tampoco son viejos. Se contentan con ser siempre verdaderos, (...) a pesar de sus enemigos decididos, que oponen doctrina a doctrina; y a pesar también de los relativismos de toda especie, que se figuran que la ciencia digna de este nombre excluye necesariamente la doctrina". Jean Dabin. (shrink)

"El resultado de este trabajo de reflexión es lo que se encontrará consignado en las páginas de esta obra, trabajo realizado con entera buena fe, sin gran aparato de erudición y de acuerdo con un plan más bien positivo que crítico. Si, en definitiva, los valores tradicionales salen del análisis confirmados, poco importará al autor no haber “aportado nada nuevo”. Los grandes principios de la civilización humana y cristiana no son nuevos. Tampoco son viejos. Se contentan con ser siempre verdaderos, (...) a pesar de sus enemigos decididos, que oponen doctrina a doctrina; y a pesar también de los relativismos de toda especie, que se figuran que la ciencia digna de este nombre excluye necesariamente la doctrina". Jean Dabin. (shrink)

Il est impossible de construire le droit sans {la notion de droit subjectif}, parce qu'elle est la traduction immédiate, sans voile ni détour, de cette réalité élémentaire que, si les hommes sont soumis à une règle sociale, qui est d'ailleurs là pour eux et pour leur bien, ils sont néanmoins des êtres individuels. La société et la règle sociale ne suppriment pas le droit subjectif. Le mouvement est double. D'une part, le droit subjectif au sens moral, qui est antérieur à (...) la société, passe dans la règle sociale garantie: il s'agit des " droits de l'homme ", devenus, grâce à cette mutation, droits subjectifs juridiques. D'autre part, en exécution de sa mission de coordination et d'harmonie, la règle sociale est amenée à établir de toutes pièces des droits subjectifs purement juridiques, qui n'ont de fondement qu'en elle. Mais, de toute façon, le sens de l'intervention de la règle, le résultat auquel elle tend est bien la collation de droits; on n'a pas affaire seulement à des individus investis par cette règle de prérogatives à eux propres et dont ils sont reconnus les maîtres. Du droit objectif sort un droit subjectif. (shrink)

I. Théorie générale de la technique juridique.--II. La technique du conceptualisme juridique.--III. Les procédés les plus caractéristques du conceptualisme juridique: les présomptions et les fictions.

Ha parecido imposible, en especial, trazar una distinción suficiente entre el Derecho y las otras reglas de conducta humana sin subrayar el lazo esencial que une las dos nociones de derecho y de sociedad: el Derecho es una regla social. Esto no quiere decir que no podría haber Derecho fuera del Estado, y a fortiori fuera de la ley. El Estado, en el sentido de sociedad civil, no es la única sociedad. Pero en la esfera temporal es la sociedad suprema, (...) y su regla es la regla suprema. Tampoco quiere decir esto que se niegue el concepto de un derecho internacional; pero debe pensarse que no habrá un derecho internacional, en el verdadero y pleno significado de la palabra «Derecho», en tanto que no exista una sociedad internacional, más o menos universal, orgánicamente constituida. Por otra parte, se ha querido examinar con más detenimiento —a fin de eliminar equívocos que renacen sin cesar— las relaciones entre la noción de Derecho y las nociones de derecho natural y de justicia. Demasiado a menudo se confunden los planos y los puntos de vista. Y se comete un error al colocar el orden jurídico positivo, o la ley civil (como se designa aquí el Derecho) como prolongación directa y exclusiva del derecho natural y de la justicia. (shrink)

Bathos - remarque -- Pt. 1. Le champ de bataille -- Pt. 2. Kant et ses juges -- Pt. 3. Traité de bathologie.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

_The VaKE Handbook: Theory and Practice of Values and Knowledge Education_ presents a theoretical model and many examples in various fields of education and training for the realization of the principle "Values without knowledge are blind, while knowledge without values is irresponsible".

One of the most perceptive and ambidextrous social commentators of our day, Augustinian scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain furnishes in ever fresh ways through her writings a bridge between the ancient and the modern, between politics and ethics, between timeless moral wisdom and cultural sensitivity. To read Elshtain seriously is to take the study of culture as well as the "permanent things" seriously. But Elshtain is no mere moralist. Neither is she content solely to dwell in the domain of the (...) theoretical. For it is Elshtain the citizen - the creatively engaged and contributing citizen - whom the reader encounters on virtually every page of her writings. But reader beware: Elshtain does not shy away from controversy. At the same time, she is anything but a controversialist. In the essay that follows, several prominent themes that emerge from Elstain's writings - civic responsibility, justice, gender, and war - are considered afresh. Whether one agrees with her positions or not, one is forced to confess in the end that she cares deeply about the common good. And this alone makes her required reading for any engaged citizen of the republic. (shrink)

This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...) intentional, I argue against the currently popular view that it is a form of perception-like receptivity to value. I instead propose that emotional feeling is a specific type of response to value, an affective ‘position-taking’. This alternative conceives of emotional feeling as intimately related to our cares and concerns. While situating itself within the analytic-philosophical debate on emotion, the discussion crucially draws on ideas from the early phenomenological tradition in an attempt to think past the theoretical strictures of many contemporary approaches to this subject. The result is a new view of emotional feeling as a thoroughly personal form of engagement with value. (shrink)

Pendant le déroulement de cette journée doctorale consacrée à l’espace, je ne cessais pas d’être sollicité par une constatation toute simple, venue du fait même de cette rencontre : s’il y a, bien évidemment, d’autres thèmes sur lesquels peuvent se retrouver ou se recouper plusieurs recherches, il n’y en a peut-être pas beaucoup qui présentent autant que l’« espace » une sorte de force ou de prégnance qui renvoie, d’emblée, à la configuration d’une époque. À travers la diversité des questions...

Theory from the south -- On personhood : a perspective from Africa -- Liberalism, policulturalism, and ideology : thoughts on citizenship and difference -- Nations with/out borders : the brave neo world and the problem of belonging -- Postcolonial politics and discourses of democracy : an anthropological take on African political modernities -- History on trial : memory, evidence, and the forensic production of the past -- Alien-nation : zombies, immigrants, and millennial capitalism -- Beyond bare life : AIDS, (bio)politics, (...) and the neo world order. (shrink)

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on (...) some trials. Participants expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants’ intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive and the preconstuctive aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does. (shrink)

In this short, dense essay, Jean Cavaillès evaluates philosophical efforts to determine the origin - logical or ontological - of scientific thought, arguing that, rather than seeking to found science in original intentional acts, a priori meanings, or foundational logical relations, any adequate theory must involve a history of the concept. Cavaillès insists on a historical epistemology that is conceptual rather than phenomenological, and a logic that is dialectical rather than transcendental. His famous call (cited by Foucault) to abandon (...) "a philosophy of consciousness" for "a philosophy of the concept" was crucial in displacing the focus of philosophical enquiry from aprioristic foundations toward structural historical shifts in the conceptual fabric. This new translation of Cavaillès's final work, written in 1942 during his imprisonment for Resistance activities, presents an opportunity to reencounter an original and lucid thinker. Cavaillès's subtle adjudication between positivistic claims that science has no need of philosophy, and philosophers' obstinate disregard for actual scientific events, speaks to a dilemma that remains pertinent for us today. His affirmation of the authority of scientific thinking combined with his commitment to conceptual creation yields a radical defense of the freedom of thought and the possibility of the new. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that emotions are characteristically passive. As we ordinarily think of them, emotions are ways in which we are acted upon, that is, moved or affected by aspects of our environment. Moreover, we have no voluntary control over whether we feel them. In this paper, I call attention to a much-neglected respect in which emotions are active, which is no less central to our pretheoretical concept of them. That is, in having emotions, we are engaged with the (...) world insofar as we respond to aspects of our environment. In this context, to say that an emotion is a response to x is tantamount to saying that x is a reason for which we have it. Elaborating this claim in light of a historically prominent conception of the active/passive distinction, I will argue that emotions are a form of spontaneity in virtue of their responsive character and contrast in this respect with perceptions, which are fundamentally receptive. While this proposal is prima facie opposed to the ordinary image of emotions as passive, I will show that it actually allows us to make proper sense of it. (shrink)

Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...) relevance of these efforts to the fate of the Husserlian tradition. Indeed, it covers a wide array of perspectives on these questions, ranging from tentative demonstrations of the cognitively misleading character of Husserl's ideas, inasmuch as they would incarnate the same foundational errors as cognitivism, to diametrically opposed views arguing that the naturalist bent of contemporary cognitive science is ill-conceived, and that only the brand of transcendentalism defended by Husserl can provide it with adequate foundations. (shrink)

Jean-Marc Coicaud's article begins by stressing the contemporary importance and the current trend of political apology. Recent political apologies offered in Australia and Canada to their indigenous populations form a significant part of this story. He then analyzes a number of intriguing paradoxes at the core of the dynamics of apology. These paradoxes give meaning to apology but also make the very idea of apology extremely challenging. They have to do with the relationships of apology with time, law and (...) the unforgivable. The most intriguing of these paradoxes concerns apology and the unforgivable. Indeed, the greater the wrong, the more valuable the apology. But, then, the more difficult it becomes to issue and to accept an apology. This latter paradox is namely examined in the context of mass crimes, taken from Europe, Africa and Asia. As a whole these paradoxes are all the more intriguing considering what apology in a political context aims to accomplish, for the actor who issues the apology, for the one who receives it, for their relationship, and for the social environment in which this takes place. Jean-Marc Coicaud concludes his article by outlining what the rise of apology means for contemporary political culture. (shrink)

he article focuses on the contemporary social movements and new identities as well as the new theoretical paradigms to explain these developments. It is reported that the social movements like feminist, ecological, and local-autonomy movements started in the Europe in the 1970's. The participants in these movements, it is said, did not view themselves in terms of a socioeconomic class. Class background does not determine the collective identities of the actors of these socio-political movements. Different social philosophers and thinkers like (...) Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim and their ideas are also discussed. (shrink)

Political theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain brings Augustine's thought into the contemporary political arena and the result is a book about one of the world's most complex thinkers.

Recently, the ethical rather than just the economic resonance of entrepreneurship has attracted attention with researchers highlighting entrepreneurship and ethics as interwoven processes of value creation and management. Recognising that traditional normative perspectives on ethics are limited in application in entrepreneurial contexts, this stream of research has theorised entrepreneurship and ethics as the pragmatic production of useful effects through the alignment of public—private values. In this article, we critique this view and use Kant's concept of reflective judgement as discussed in (...) his Critique of the Power of Judgement to theorise ethical entrepreneurial practice as the capacity to routinely break free from current conventions through the imaginative creation and use of self-legislating maxims. Through an analysis of the narratives of 12 entrepreneurs, we suggest there are three dimensions to reflective judgement in entrepreneurial contexts: (1) Social Performance; (2) Public Challenge and; (3) Personal Autonomy. Whilst the entrepreneurs were alive to the importance of commercial return, their narratives demonstrated further concern for, and commitment to, standards that they rationally and imaginatively felt as being appropriate. In our discussion, we integrate the findings into existing theoretical categories from entrepreneurship studies to better appreciate ethics within the context of value creation. (shrink)

Comme l’indique l’auteur lui‑même, ce livre vient conclure une série de quatre publications à caractère monographique, illustrant chacune son programme de « psychanalyse sociohistorique ». Il s’agit des Stigmates de l’hystérique et la peau de son évêque. Laurentine Billoquet (1862-1936), Paris, Anthropos, 1993 ; Une inconnue célèbre. Madeleine Lebouc / Pauline Lair Lamotte (1853‑1918), même éditeur, 1993 ; L’Autobiographie d’un paranoïaque. L’abbé Berry (1878‑1947) et le roman de Billy « Intr...