Moral psychology studies the features of cognition, judgement, perception and emotion that make human beings capable of moral action. Perspectives from feminist and race theory immensely enrich moral psychology. Writers who take these perspectives ask questions about mind, feeling, and action in contexts of social difference and unequal power and opportunity. These essays by a distinguished international cast of philosophers explore moral psychology as it connects to social life, scientific studies, and literature.

In this paper, we consider how the four key team emergent states for team learning identified by Bell, Kozlowski and Blawath (2012), namely psychological safety, goal orientation, cohesion, and efficacy, operate as a system that produces the team’s learning climate (TLC). Using the language of systems dynamics, we conceptualize TLC as a stock that rises and falls as a joint function of the psychological safety, goal orientation, cohesion, and efficacy that exists in the team. The systems approach highlights aspects of (...) TLC management that are traditionally overlooked, such as the simultaneous influence of and feedback between the four team emergent states and the inertia that TLC can have as a result. The management of TLC becomes an issue of controlling the system rather than each state as an independent force, especially because changing one part of the system will also affect other parts in sometimes unintended and undesirable ways. Thus the value is to offer a systems view on the leadership function of team monitoring with regards to team emergent states, which we term team state monitoring. This view offers promising avenues for future research as well as practical wisdom. It can help leaders remember that TLC represents an equilibrium that needs balance, in addition to pointing to the various ways in which they can influence such equilibrium. (shrink)

This paper examines one approach to the ethics of companion animals, which emerges from the dominant historical tradition and is increasingly familiar in everyday life as well as in work on companion animals in the social sciences. I label it the “utilization with welfare-safeguards” model, or, more gently worded, “seeking benefits while ensuring welfare.” Some of the “benefits” considered are complex ones (like guiding the sight impaired) and others simpler (like reducing stress or providing affection). I explore several problems involved (...) in this approach (including the sometimes jarring inappropriateness of “benefit” terminology). I then offer an alternative account where the primary moral obligation toward companion animals is to develop, nurture, respect, and protect the loving relationship between them and their human companions, since thriving in such a relationship, I claim, has become part of their evolved telos (to use Bernard Rollin’s term)or evolved nature. This priority naturally leads to ensuring welfare, but the highly pro-active approach involved takes the obligation beyond standard welfare provision and “TLC” (“tender loving care”). Some implications of this position are explored. (shrink)

In recent decades governments around the world have been increasingly concerned about terrorism and have introduced new laws and policies in an attempt to combat it. I examine here the weakest link in chains of security management: what I call the realm of “the informal,” where neither law nor formal policy is at work, but where stereotypes, traditional sayings and jokes, social ideals often promoted by mass media, etiquette requirements certainly are. This realm is so dangerous precisely because of its (...) deceptively innocuous appearance. First, I explain the kinds of things that function in the informal realm, revealing that it is more extensive than might first appear. Secondly, I describe three real-life examples where some informal factor plays a vital role in a catastrophic outcome, to show that such seemingly trivial matters can acquire tremendous practical significance in critical situations. My focus is on the influence of some informal factor on individuals who are in no way trying to threaten security, but rather intend to maintain or enhance it. Their roles call for that commitment. Finally I consider one of the three examples more carefully and illustratively, to demonstrate some of the key points raised. Currently, thinking about the dangers informal factors pose is routinely reactive (rather than proactive), often prompted by a catastrophe that has already occurred, but this means we miss some of what could be learned from the catastrophe. We need a far more proactive approach to those factors in the informal sphere and we need a much stronger focus on individuals who are responsible for and committed to maintaining security. Otherwise threats to security will remain are more serious than is typically acknowledged. (shrink)

The one sphere of life where a claimed right to privacy is most sympathetically received is in the inner realm of the mind. I will look briefly at Joseph Tussman’s claim that a government is not only entitled but morally required to be concerned with and involved in the minds of the nation’s citizens. I then further explore reasons why the realm of the mind matters not only morally but politically. There are consequentialist reasons, but more interestingly there are non-consequentialist (...) reasons on the basis of which I introduce the concept of “authentic social justice.” In particular, there are relevant insights to be gainedby reflecting on forms of oppression that are subtle but serious in nature, forms that involve neither violence nor the use of law. (shrink)

This volume of Social Philosophy Today contains a selection of papers presented at the 31st International Social Philosophy Conference (2014), an annual event sponsored by the North American Society for Social Philosophy. The theme of the conference was "Power, Protest, and the Future of Democracy". This volume invites wider discussion of the issues explored at the conference.

Paradigm cases of national power usually focus on material assets: military or economic power, natural resources etc. This article, though, considers a less "material" kind of national power: "relationship power" and "interactive power" that nations have when accorded a high prestige ranking. This is a more subtle type of power than that attached to material assets. But it is highly effective, even though trivialized and overlooked in international debate. This form of power can be more dangerous than it appears. And (...) obvious solutions to these dangers are doomed to fail even if seriously attempted . This paper examines how national status is acquired. It draws attention to some oversimplifications . It considers the connection between national status and interactive power, and shows how this skews the process and steers outcomes in international debate, to the detriment of international justice. (shrink)

It is a commonsense view held by many citizens in democratic nations that whether or not a society is socially just depends on the nature of these major institutions and their functioning. On this view, social justice is so to with what philosophers have referred to as “realized, rather than abstract, institutions,” rather than, say, individual character or actions. I will examine one sensible sounding argument in support of this view, which I will call “The Effects Argument.” It is deceptively (...) simple in appearance and based on the claim that major social institutions have profound effects on the lives of individuals, effects that are far more significant and far-reaching than those typically brought about by individual action. Because of this vast potential, securing social justice means focusing on such major social institutions and on how they function. In short, social justice is the business and responsibility of those major institutions. Examining this argument, however, provides support for a wider vision of what is involved in achieving social justice and raises concern about the diminishing role of the individual in much of contemporary writings on social justice. Paradoxically, citizens in democratic states are especially in danger of expecting major social institutions to carry a loadthey cannot successfully bear. (shrink)

It is a commonsense view held by many citizens in democratic nations that whether or not a society is socially just depends on the nature of these major institutions and their functioning. On this view, social justice is so to with what philosophers have referred to as “realized, rather than abstract, institutions,” rather than, say, individual character or actions. I will examine one sensible sounding argument in support of this view, which I will call “The Effects Argument.” It is deceptively (...) simple in appearance and based on the claim that major social institutions have profound effects on the lives of individuals, effects that are far more significant and far-reaching than those typically brought about by individual action. Because of this vast potential, securing social justice means focusing on such major social institutions and on how they function. In short, social justice is the business and responsibility of those major institutions. Examining this argument, however, provides support for a wider vision of what is involved in achieving social justice and raises concern about the diminishing role of the individual in much of contemporary writings on social justice. Paradoxically, citizens in democratic states are especially in danger of expecting major social institutions to carry a loadthey cannot successfully bear. (shrink)