À Denis Fisette1Dans sa préface à Methods of Logic, Quine écrivait que « si les objets physiques n’existaient pas, ils auraient dû être inventés. Ils sont indispensables à titre de communs dénominateurs publics de l’expérience sensible privée ». La plus mauvaise lecture qu’on puisse faire de ces lignes serait d’en conclure, de façon très platement réaliste, que, puisque les objets existent, nous n’avons...

Dans l?histoire récente de l?art, l?idée du ready-made fut un artifice assez efficace pour montrer que n?importe quel objet déjà manufacturé pouvait être érigé en ?uvre d?art, pourvu qu?on le conçoive et le nomme comme telle. C?était en somme délibérément minimiser toutes les qualités imparties à la matérialité d?un objet d?art pour mieux laisser apparaître la conceptualisation dont procède sa genèse. Je soutiens pour ma part que, dans l?histoire de la philosophie, la théorie du ready-made a en quelque sorte toujours (...) fonctionné en sens inverse : majorant la matérialité du donné, elle n?a contribué qu?à forclore sa constitution conceptuelle. Ce qu?il faut entendre par théorie du ready-made en philosophie me semble être une assez bonne façon de traduire le réalisme ontologique : c?est l?idée selon laquelle les objets et le monde en général nous seraient donnés tout faits, c?est identiquement l?idée que leur constitution serait naturelle au sens où c?est la nature qui, indépendamment de nous, aurait fait les chiens, les chats, la lune, le soleil, les ondes et les électrons. Cette conception que Putnam a appelé celle d? « un monde tout fait » ( a ready made world ) 1 est un mythe et il s?agit d?un mythe d?autant plus tenace qu?il tire ses origines du sens commun et de sa propre « physique » spontanée. Que le sens commun se nourrisse constamment du mythe d?un donné tout. (shrink)

Le projet phénoménologique, tel qu'il fut conçu par Edmund Husserl, se définit d'abord par le souci constant de dégager l'expérience intuitive au fondement de toute connaissance. Mais qu'est-ce que l'intuition originairement donatrice? Quel est le sens fondamental de l'empirie phénoménologique? Seule la réduction de tous les préjugés qui grèvent l'acception traditionnelle de l'intuition permet de redéployer son sens et corrélativement la consistance véritable du champ phénoménal. Mais si la réduction constitue donc la méthode d'un redéploiement de notre relation primordiale au (...) monde, elle est aussi la voie tout au long de laquelle le phénomène manifeste une profondeur toujours accrue et qui n'est pas dépourvue d'ambiguïté. Qu'en est-il en définitive de notre évidence du monde? Cet ouvrage tente d'apporter quelques éclaircissements à cette question dont l'urgence est encore soulignée par la forclusion dont la frappe aujourd'hui le relativisme ambiant. (shrink)

In the year 1894, Husserl had not been already contaminated by Bolzano’s realism. It was then that he conceived a theory of assumptions in order to “save an existence” for mathematical objects. Here we would like to explore this theory and show in what way it represented a convincing alternative to realistic ontology and its counterpart: the correspondence theory of truth. However, as soon as he designed it, Husserl shoved away all the implications for his theory of assumptions, and merely (...) abandoned it. We would also like to consider the wrong reasons for this renouncement, which undoubtedly have to do with the dichotomy between signification and perception in his elaboration of phenomenology. (shrink)

Afin de « sauver une existence » pour les objets dont il est question dans les représentations mathématiques, le jeune Husserl invente en 1894 une théorie des assomptions. Notre but est d’explorer cette théorie pour montrer en quoi elle constituait une alternative probante par rapport à l’ontologie réaliste et à la conception correspondantiste de la vérité. De celles-ci, pourtant, Husserl ne parviendra pas à se départir à l’époque, comme en témoigne la dichotomie qu’il opère entre la signification et la perception, (...) et c’est pourquoi il ne saura non plus tirer parti de sa propre théorie des assomptions. Elle semble pourtant refaire surface à la fin de son oeuvre, suite à la rupture avec le réalisme que marque précisément l’introduction du concept de sens ou de noème de perception.In the year 1894, Husserl introduces a theory of assumptions with the aim of « saving an existence » for the objects in mathematical representations. We want to examine this theory in order to show why it constituted a convincing alternative to a realist ontology and a correspondance conception of truth. Yet, during this period, Husserl remained attached to those positions, as the dichotomy between meaning and perception shows. It is also the reason why he does not manage to benefit from his discovery of assumptions. However, this topic seems to reappear in the last work of Husserl, following his breaking with realism, which is precisely corroborated by the emergence of the concept of a perceptual meaning or noema. (shrink)

Quel rôle faut-il attribuer aux sensations, dans le cadre d’une philosophie pour laquelle les objets sont ontologiquement dépendants du pouvoir conceptuel ou sémantique de l’esprit? J’ai choisi de traiter ce problème à partir de la phénoménologie transcendantale de Husserl, car elle me semble assez bien cadrer avec la position philosophique constructiviste que j’envisage ici. Certains passages caractéristiques...

The impressive variation amongst biological individuals generates many complexities in addressing the simple-sounding question what is a biological individual? A distinction between evolutionary and physiological individuals is useful in thinking about biological individuals, as is attention to the kinds of groups, such as superorganisms and species, that have sometimes been thought of as biological individuals. More fully understanding the conceptual space that biological individuals occupy also involves considering a range of other concepts, such as life, reproduction, and agency. There has (...) been a focus in some recent discussions by both philosophers and biologists on how evolutionary individuals are created and regulated, as well as continuing work on the evolution of individuality. (shrink)

This paper offers an overview of "the species problem", arguing for a view of species as homeostatic property cluster kinds, positioning the resulting form of realism about species as an alternative to the claim that species are individuals and pluralistic views of species. It draws on taxonomic practice in the neurosciences, especially of neural crest cells and retinal ganglion cells, to motivate both the rejection of the species-as-individuals thesis and species pluralism.

This paper explores the relationship between eugenics, disability, and dehumanization, with a focus on forms of eugenics beyond Nazi eugenics.

Are interpersonal comparisons of desire possible? Can we give an account of how facts about desires are grounded, that underpins such comparisons? This paper supposes the answer to the first question is yes, and provides an account of the nature of desire that explains how this is so. The account is a modification of the interpretationist metaphysics of representation that the author has recently been developing. The modification is to allow phenomenological affective valence into the “base facts” on which correct (...) interpretation is grounded. To use this extra resource within that theory to vindicate interpersonal comparisons, we will need to appeal rational connections between level of valence and level of desire, which this paper sets out and examines. (shrink)

Drawing on a passage from Ramsey's Truth and Probability, we formulate a simple, plausible constraint on evaluating the accuracy of credences: the Calibration Test. We show that any additive, continuous accuracy measure that passes the Calibration Test will be strictly proper. Strictly proper accuracy measures are known to support the touchstone results of accuracy-first epistemology, for example vindications of probabilism and conditionalization. We show that our use of Calibration is an improvement on previous such appeals by showing how it answers (...) or sidesteps problems that have been raised for previous work in this area. (shrink)

In the good old days, when general philosophy of science ruled the Earth, a simple division was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues specific to particular kinds of science: that between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Over the last 20 years, philosophical studies shaped around this dichotomy have given way to those organized by more fine-grained categories, corresponding to specific disciplines, as the literatures on the philosophy of physics, biology, economics and psychology--to take the most prominent four (...) examples--have blossomed. In general terms, work in each of these areas has become increasingly enmeshed with that in the corresponding science itself, increasingly naturalistic (in at least one sense of that term), and in my view, increasingly interesting. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

My aim is to propose affectivity as a criterion for personal identity. My proposal is to be taken in its weak version: affectivity as _only one_ of the criteria for personal identity. I start by arguing for affectivity being a better candidate as a criterion for personal identity than thinking. Next, I focus on synchronic vs. diachronic and on ontic vs. epistemic distinctions (my proposal will concern diachronic ontic personal identity) and consider the realm of affectivity in its temporal dimension. (...) In my argument, I rely on the genuineness of affectivity and I exploit chiefly long- or everlasting feelings (or emotions) and those which involve the feeling subject more rather than less. I conclude by stating that genuine long-lasting feelings (or emotions) are constitutive of diachronic ontic personal identity. (shrink)

The paper offers an analysis of Protagoras’ fr. DK 80 B 1 and rejects the traditional reading of Protagoras as relativist. By considering the ipsissima verba that Protagoras makes use of in his passage, it is argued that alternative interpretations are possible, of which epistemological reism and psychological individualism are proposed. On a more general level, it is discussed to what extent Protagoras’ fragment contains descriptive rather than normative claim.

Kenneth Burke, arguably the most important American literary theorist of the twentieth century, helped define the theoretical terrain for contemporary literary and cultural studies. His perspectives were literary and linguistic, but his influences ranged across history, philosophy, and the social sciences. In this important and original study Robert Wess traces the trajectory of Burke's long career and situates his work in relation to postmodernity. His study is both an examination of contemporary theories of rhetoric, ideology, and the subject, and (...) an explanation of why Burke failed to complete his Motives trilogy. Burke's own critique of the 'isolated unique individual' led him to question the possibility of unique individuation, a strategy which anticipated important elements of postmodern concepts of subjectivity. Robert Wess's study is both a timely and judicious exposition of Burke's massive oeuvre, and a crucial intervention in current debates on rhetoric and human agency. (shrink)

Se resume en esta obra el vasto y complejo sistema teórico-jurídico de Hans Kelsen, el jurista más grande de nuestro siglo. La doctrina de Kelsen y en particular su Teoría Pura del Derecho han conocido muchas vicisitudes y ataques debidos más a prejuicios políticos y racistas que a una verdadera confrontación con sus tesis. El autor enfatiza en el hecho de que la doctrina jurídica de Kelsen no es una teoría terminada y archivada sino en permanente desarrollo, una teoría a (...) cuya ulterior construcción están convocados todos los juristas. (shrink)

Doing Greek Philosophy conveys a vivid sense of dynamism and continuity of the Greek philosophical tradition and illustrates how interaction between Greek philosophers creates and sustains that tradition. It concentrates on a set of inter-related challenges and problems that emerged early in the tradition and moves on to the subsequent reactions to them.

Der Wandel der kulturellen Verhältnisse führt zu einer Zuspitzung des Verhältnisses von Gesellschaft und Rechtssystem. In diesem Prozess gestaltet New Political Ecology (NPE) Umwelt und Rechtssystem und ist zugleich evolutiv ausgerichtet. NPE erfährt Evolution in der Zeit als Überfluss und in eigenartiger Vernetzung als knappes Gut. Diese Verbindung basiert auf Zusammenhängen, die bisher noch nicht systematisch bearbeitet worden sind. Dabei geht es ganz wesentlich auch um das Verhältnis von Staat und moderner Risikogesellschaft. Wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt erweist sich vor diesem Hintergrund selbst (...) als ein evolutiver Prozess. (shrink)

El profesor Robert Walter, el más eminente representante de la Teoría Pura del Derecho en nuestro tiempo, estudia en "Hans Kelsen, la Teoría Pura del Derecho y el problema de la justicia" y "Normas y enunciados sobre normas", los dos textos que componen esta obra, los puntos centrales del pensamiento filosófico y jurídico de Hans Kelsen.