L’auteur s’est attachée à l’écriture singulière de G. Duby dans le domaine de l’histoire des femmes, et tout particulièrement dans les trois volumes des Dames du XIIe siècle. G. Duby y témoigne en effet d’une vigilance toute particulière à l’égard de l’expression, en centrant son discours sur un « JE » qui assume les risques d’affronter des documents toujours masculins, pour y débusquer ce qu’il appelle « des ombres insaisissables », les femmes de l’époque féodale. Parfaite maîtrise des ressources de (...) la langue, syntaxe souple et inventive, mais aussi forte conscience des effets de la voix : cette langue est bien celle de l’affect tout comme celle d’un imagier. L’historiographe du féminin use d’une écriture subjective et dramatisée, où le point de vue de la narration désigne toujours la relation passionnée du locuteur avec les témoignages qu’il interroge. À quoi contribuent les alternances des perspectives temporelles et la constance de champs métaphoriques : capture, rapt, butin, girons périlleux ou fertiles... Martèlements et ellipses font de cette écriture un discours véhément et convaincant, le plus personnel que l’historien ait jamais mis en oeuvre. (shrink)

L’auteur s’est attachée à l’écriture singulière de G. Duby dans le domaine de l’histoire des femmes, et tout particulièrement dans les trois volumes des Dames du XIIe siècle. G. Duby y témoigne en effet d’une vigilance toute particulière à l’égard de l’expression, en centrant son discours sur un « JE » qui assume les risques d’affronter des documents toujours masculins, pour y débusquer ce qu’il appelle « des ombres insaisissables », les femmes de l’époque féodale. Parfaite maîtrise des ressources de (...) la langue, syntaxe souple et inventive, mais aussi forte conscience des effets de la voix : cette langue est bien celle de l’affect tout comme celle d’un imagier. L’historiographe du féminin use d’une écriture subjective et dramatisée, où le point de vue de la narration désigne toujours la relation passionnée du locuteur avec les témoignages qu’il interroge. À quoi contribuent les alternances des perspectives temporelles et la constance de champs métaphoriques : capture, rapt, butin, girons périlleux ou fertiles... Martèlements et ellipses font de cette écriture un discours véhément et convaincant, le plus personnel que l’historien ait jamais mis en oeuvre. (shrink)

À la fin du XVIe siècle, Christine de Pizan apparaît comme la première « intellectuelle » du monde occidental. Écrivaine consciente des bienfaits de l’éducation que lui a donnée son père, elle refuse de s’enfermer dans sa chambre de travail et s’engage dans un espace public jusqu’alors réservé aux hommes. À la jonction du Privé et du Public,elle prend le risque d’une longue marche vers un monde meilleur : le champ du savoir à ses yeux doit être mis au service (...) d’une parole efficace pour la cité des hommes. (shrink)

Une œuvre majeure de Christine de Pizan vient de faire l'objet d'une édition : Le Livre de l'Advision Christine dont Liliane Dulac et Christine Reno ont établi le texte, précédé d'une longue et précieuse introduction. Événement éditorial de premier ordre, l'édition antérieure (en 1932) ne pouvant satisfaire aux exigences des médiévistes et plus largement de ceux qui s'intéressent à la voix des femmes au Moyen Âge. Dans le parcours de l'écrivaine, l'Advision, œuvre de maturité, associe...

La dernière œuvre de Georges Duby se dispose en une trilogie consacrée à une synthèse dont l'objet est particulièrement difficile à cerner pour la période féodale : les « dames », ces figures féminines que l'historien devine avec peine au travers des chroniques lignagères, des correspondances, des textes normatifs, de la littérature romanesque et lyrique que G. Duby convoque également comme témoignage. Les documents sont animés d'une même interrogation : il s'agit dans le t. I de quelq..

La dernière œuvre de Georges Duby se dispose en une trilogie consacrée à une synthèse dont l'objet est particulièrement difficile à cerner pour la période féodale : les « dames », ces figures féminines que l'historien devine avec peine au travers des chroniques lignagères, des correspondances, des textes normatifs, de la littérature romanesque et lyrique que G. Duby convoque également comme témoignage. Les documents sont animés d'une même interrogation : il s'agit dans le t. I de quelq...

Danielle Régnier-Bohler a dirigé une œuvre collective d’une grande originalité et d’une réelle importance en offrant au grand public comme aux médiévistes, pour la première fois, une anthologie de la littérature féminine du Moyen Âge fort ample et agrémentée d’études réalisées par les meilleurs spécialistes. Au-delà des genres littéraires, des frontières linguistiques et des siècles, comme son nom l’indique, cette belle œuvre a pour premier désir de rendre leur voix aux femmes ; ces femmes si...

_Axel Honneth: Critical Essays_ brings together critical interpretations of the work of Axel Honneth, from his earliest to his most recent writings, together with a comprehensive reply by Honneth that provides significant insights and clarifications into his project overall.

his volume investigates Proclus' own thought and his wide-ranging influence within late Neoplatonic, Alexandrine and Byzantinian philosophy and theology. It further explores how Procline metaphysics and doctrines of causality influence and transition into Arabic and Islamic thought, up until Richard Hooker in England, Spinoza in Holland and Pico in Italy. John Dillon provides a helpful overview of Proclus' thought, Harold Tarrant discusses Proclus' influence within Alexandrian philosophy and Tzvi Langermann presents ground breaking work on the Jewish reception of Proclus, focusing (...) on the work of Joseph Solomon Delmedigo (1591-1655), while Stephen Gersh presents a comprehensive synopsis of Proclus' reception throughout Christendom. The volume also presents works from notable scholars like Helen Lang, Sarah Wear and Crystal Addey and has a considerable strength in its presentation of Pseudo-Dionysius, Proclus' transmission and development in Arabic philosophy and the problem of the eternity of the world. It will be important for anyone interested in the development and transition of ideas from the late ancient world onwards. (shrink)

This volume examines the many ways in which violence, domination, and oppression manifest themselves. This examination opens the way to creative suggestions for overcoming injustice. The authors in this volume also describe the features of a just community and inspire readers to implement peaceful transformation.

There are two distinct approaches to Bayesian modelling in cognitive science. Black-box approaches use Bayesian theory to model the relationship between the inputs and outputs of a cognitive system without reference to the mediating causal processes; while mechanistic approaches make claims about the neural mechanisms which generate the outputs from the inputs. This paper concerns the relationship between these two approaches. We argue that the dominant trend in the philosophical literature, which characterizes the relationship between black-box and mechanistic approaches to (...) Bayesian cognitive science in terms of the dichotomy between instrumentalism and realism, is misguided. We propose that the two distinctions are orthogonal: black-box and mechanistic approaches to Bayesian modelling can each be given either an instrumentalist or a realist interpretation. We argue that the current tendency to conflate black-box approaches with instrumentalism and mechanistic approaches with realism stems from unwarranted assumptions about the nature of scientific explanation, the ontological commitments of scientific theories, and the role of abstraction and idealization in scientific models. We challenge each of these assumptions to reframe the debates over Bayesian modelling in cognitive science. (shrink)

The growth of positive psychology has birthed debate on the nature of what “positive” really means. Conceptualizations of positive attributes vary across psychological perspectives, and it appears these definitional differences stem from standards for “positive” espoused by three normative ethical frameworks: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. When definitions of “positive” do not align with one of these ethical schools, it appears researchers rely on preference to distinguish positive attributes. In either case, issues arise when researchers do not make their theoretical (...) alignment explicit, leading to value-laden, often subjective criteria being smuggled into science as a description of what is positive. To foster a deeper critical understanding of the different approaches, we examine how these conceptual definitions of positive attributes (mis)align with their ethical traditions or fail to align with an ethical school. (shrink)

With regard to the theme “Reason in context,” the following stimulates a discussion on both Plato’s Socrates and the culpability of ignorance. By focusingon Plato’s Lysis, Alcibiades I, Philebus, and the Laws, I debunk the typical interpretation of Socratic moral intellectualism by evidencing that though there are various forms of ignorance in the Platonic dialogues, only one leads to shame-worthy error. Furthermore, in this endeavour to understand the “hierarchy” of ignorance in Plato, I take an unusual path and jump from (...) Antiquity to the Renaissance by connecting Plato’s Socrates to Erasmus’s Folly. By comparing these characters I show how both only condemn double ignorance, i.e., ignorance of ignorance joined with the pretence to knowledge. Ultimately, by analyzing this particularly heinous form of ignorance, I question whether in all periods and circumstances feigned wisdom more than “mere ignorance” leads to shame and disrepute. (shrink)

Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject or modify (...) motivational internalism. Instead of attempting to diagnose the motivational failure of the amoral agent or restrict the internalist thesis in the face of these examples, I argue that we should critically examine the assumptions that underlie the challenge. Such an examination reveals that the examples smuggle in substantive assumptions that the internalist has no reason to accept. This argument has two important implications for the debate in moral motivation: first, it reveals that the motivational externalist needs a new argumentative strategy; and second, it shows that there is nothing especially problematic about a formulation of the thesis that captures the core internalist intuition that first-person moral judgements are necessarily accompanied by motivation. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide autonomy-based reasons in favour of limitarianism. Limitarianism affirms it is of primary moral importance that no one gets too much. The paper challenges the standard assumption that having more material resources always increases autonomy. It expounds five mechanisms through which having too much material wealth might undermine autonomy. If these hypotheses are true, a theory of justice guided by a concern for autonomy will support a limitarian distribution of wealth. Finally, the paper discusses two issues (...) autonomy-based limitarianism would raise. First, insofar as coercion invades autonomy, do autonomy-based reasons legitimate coercive measures to secure a limitarian distribution of wealth? Second, is a limitarian ethos consistent with the incentive to produce enough wealth to secure distributive justice? (shrink)

The most enlightening examination to date of the developments of Frege's thinking about his logic, this book introduces a new kind of logical language, one that ...

Most regulations and guidelines require that potential research participants be told a great deal of information during the consent process. Many of these documents, and most of the scholars who consider the consent process, assume that all this information must be disclosed because it must all be understood. However, a wide range of studies surveying apparently competent participants in clinical trials around the world show that many do not understand key aspects of what they have been told. The standard view (...) of the conditions for valid consent therefore implies that these people have failed to give valid consent to research participation. In this paper we argue that the standard view is false. The primary function of the requirement that researchers disclose information about a study is the avoidance of illegitimate control over someone’s consent decision, which is a form of fraud.We derive the content and manner of appropriate disclosure by analysing the ways in which the manipulation of information can invalidate consent. Our analysis shows that the informational requirements for valid consent are conceptually distinct and thus unlikely to have identical contents. This implies that consent can be valid when not everything that ought to be disclosed by the person asking for consent is understood by the person who proffers it. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines the question of whether recognition relations are based on trust. Theorists of recognition have acknowledged the ways in which recognition relations make us vulnerable to others but have largely neglected the underlying ‘webs of trust’ in which such relations are embedded. In this paper, I consider the ways in which the theories of recognition developed by Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, not only point to our mutual vulnerability but also implicitly rely upon mutual relations of trust. (...) The paper first offers a novel examination of the relation between recognition, vulnerability and trust in Habermas’ account of communicative action with the aim of arguing that such a consideration helps to elucidate important features of recognition. My claim is that a consideration of the dynamics of recognition and vulnerability in language-use, leads to an acknowledgment of the forms of trust that not only underpin communicative action, but recognition more generally. I conclude by considering the elements that are underplayed in Habermas’ account by turning to an examination of Axel Honneth’s alternative affective theory of recognition, specifically considering the interrelation between vulnerability and recognition. In doing so, I also turn to a consideration of the kind of trust that must be assumed in Honneth’s account of mutual recognition and point to a recognitive notion of trust. (shrink)

Images of vulnerability have populated the philosophical landscape from Hobbes to Hegel, Levinas to Foucault, often designating a sense of corporeal susceptibility to injury, or of being threatened or wounded and therefore have been predominantly associated with violence, finitude, or mortality. More recently, feminist theorists such as Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero have begun to rethink corporeal vulnerability as a critical or ethical category, one based on our primary interdependence and intercorporeality. However, many contemporary theorists continue to associate vulnerability with (...) violence and finitude rather than providing an account of the normative theory that might underpin vulnerability as a critical category. In this article, I explore an alternative notion of vulnerability in relation to both a theory of power and a normative account that draws on recognition theory. My aim in this article is twofold: first, to examine the complexity of vulnerability and how it relates to forms of recognition; second, to outline how the notion of vulnerability can operate as the basis for critiquing objectionable forms of vulnerability. This is to consider vulnerability not only as an ethical or ontological question but as a political one, and shifts arguments about its abuse and entanglement with power and violence to the public political sphere. (shrink)

Résumé: Ce chapitre porte sur les théories de la justice distributive entre générations. La première partie discute trois défis à la possibilité même de parler d’obligations de justice intergénérationnelle : le problème de la non-existence, le problème de la non-identité, la conclusion répugnante. La deuxième partie discute la justification et la définition des obligations de justice à l’égard des générations futures, à partir de trois théories : le suffisantisme, le welfarisme, le principe de juste épargne de Rawls. Cette discussion conclut (...) que : (i) la version la plus plausible du suffisantisme prôné par le célèbre rapport Brundtland est un suffisantisme multiniveaux, qui permet de prioriser la satisfaction des besoins de base des différentes générations tout en reconnaissant l’importance de garantir les aspirations dans un second temps. (ii) Le problème de la malléabilité des préférences futures semble de prime abord une objection décisive contre le welfarisme intergénérationnel : même si nous leur léguions très peu de ressources et un environnement dégradé, nous pourrions apprendre aux générations suivantes à adapter leurs préférences à cette situation. Nous montrons que le welfarisme peut répondre à cette objection. (iii) Une interprétation à la fois suffisantiste et limitiste du principe de juste épargne rawlsien est proposée : l’épargne intergénérationnelle est requise jusqu’à ce que le capital accumulé suffise à maintenir les institutions justes ; sous la forme de croissance des richesses matérielles, l’épargne intergénérationnelle est prohibée au-delà d’une certaine limite car elle érode le sens de la justice. La troisième partie aborde la question de la mise en œuvre de la justice intergénérationnelle en contexte non-idéal. -/- Abstract This chapter is about distributive justice between generations. The first part discusses three challenges to the meaningfulness of talking about obligations of intergenerational justice: the non-existence problem, the non-identity problem, the repugnant conclusion. The second part discusses the justification and definition of justice obligations towards future generations, according to three theories: sufficientarianism, welfarism, Rawls’s just savings principle. This discussion reaches three conclusions. (i) The most plausible version of Brundtland’s sufficientarianism is multilevels sufficientarianism, which enables us to prioritize meeting the basic needs of each generation over the fulfilment of their aspirations, without denying the importance of realizing these aspirations once needs are being met. (ii) At a first glance, the fact that future preferences are malleable seems a problem for intergenereational welfarism and a decisive objection against it. Even if we bequeathed very little resources and a degraded environment to the next generation, we could teach them to adapt their preferences to this situation. We argue that welfarism can answer this objection. (iii) We propose an interpretation of Rawls’s just savings principle that is both sufficientarian and limitarian. Intergenerational savings are required until enough capital is accumulated to maintain just institutions over time. Intergenerational savings in the form of material wealth growth is prohibited beyond a certain limit because it erodes the sense of justice. The third part addresses how to implement intergenerational justice in a non-ideal context. (shrink)

Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus . But (...) succumbing to the first temptation places one under a burden to justify what is motivationally exceptional about moral beliefs and succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practicality intuition that cognitivist motivational internalism is suppose to capture. In this paper, I offer a way of defending cognitivist motivational internalism, which does not require accepting that there is anything motivationally unusual about moral beliefs. I argue that no belief satisfies the Humean constraint: all beliefs are capable of motivating without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger est sans aucun doute l'un des penseurs majeurs du XXe siècle, si ce n'est le penseur du XXe siècle, au sens où sa pensée permet d'entrer en intelligence avec notre temps, ouvrant par là une voie profondément méditante vers ce qui vient à nous. Mais l'oeuvre de ce philosophe a aussi la réputation d'être difficile d'accès, en raison précisément de l'originalité de son travail. Comme il le disait lui-même de ses travaux : "Ils ne sont pas des oeuvres (...) mais des chemins". Pour s'engager sur la bonne voie, un guide est de toute évidence bienvenu. Danielle Moyse se charge ici de nous accompagner en se gardant bien de nous servir un exposé magistral ; elle nous invite plutôt, par le récit de son propre chemin, à l'écoute d'une parole philosophique inouïe. S'étant particulièrement attachée aux questions éthiques relatives au handicap, au dépistage prénatal et à l'euthanasie, elle éclaire pour nous des problèmes devenus aujourd'hui cruciaux et qui trouvent dans l'oeuvre de Heidegger un espace où la méditation est essentielle. (shrink)

Tom Dougherty argues that culpably deceiving another person into sex is seriously wrong no matter what the content about which she is deceived. We argue that his explanation of why deception invalidates consent has extremely implausible implications. Though we reject Dougherty’s explanation, we defend his verdict about deception and consent to sex. We argue that he goes awry by conflating the disclosure requirement for consent and the understanding requirement. When these are distinguished, we can identify how deceptive disclosure invalidates consent. (...) This alternative explanation also allows for a response to Neil Manson’s recent criticisms of Dougherty’s argument. (shrink)

Este estudo teve como objetivo estimar a Qualidade de Vida (QV) em pacientes com transtorno depressivo maior antes e após tratamento antidepressivo eficaz. Participaram do estudo 26 indivíduos (18 a 65 anos) com episódio agudo de Transtorno Depressivo Maior, segundo critérios do DSM-IV. A duração do..

It is widely agreed that the view of informed consent found in the regulations and guidelines struggles to keep pace with the ever-advancing enterprise of human subjects research. Over the last 10 years, there have been serious attempts to rethink informed consent so that it conforms to our considered judgments about cases where we are confident valid consent has been given. These arguments are influenced by an argument from Gopal Sreenivasan, which apparently shows that a potential participant9s consent to research (...) participation can be perfectly valid even if she fails to understand the risk-benefit profile of the study. I argue that Sreenivasan9s argument fails. The set of clinical trials that is supposed to be ethical in the face of this kind of ignorance is empty. However, I argue that his argument is nonetheless instructive in allowing us to identify three important but neglected areas for future conceptual research on informed consent. I close by arguing that research on these identified questions promises to yield a defensible view of consent, lessen the burden of ambiguity on researchers attempting to obtain consent to research participation, and facilitate socially valuable research. (shrink)

Trials with highly unfavourable risk–benefit ratios for participants, like HIV cure trials, raise questions about the quality of the consent of research participants. Why, it may be asked, would a person with HIV who is doing well on antiretroviral therapy be willing to jeopardise his health by enrolling in such a trial? We distinguish three concerns: first, how information is communicated to potential participants; second, participants’ motivations for enrolling in potentially high risk research with no prospect of direct benefit; and (...) third, participants’ understanding of the details of the trials in which they enrol. We argue that the communication concern is relevant to the validity of informed consent and the quality of decision making, that the motivation concern does not identify a genuine problem with either the validity of consent or the quality of decision making and that the understanding concern may not be relevant to the validity of consent but is relevant to the quality of decision making. In doing so, we derive guidance points for researchers recruiting and enrolling participants into their HIV cure trials, as well as the research ethics committees reviewing proposed studies. (shrink)

Comment un Grec de l'Antiquité voyait-il la Terre et plus généralement le monde? On peut dire sans grand risque d'erreur que depuis Homère jusqu'au début de notre ère, l'image la plus répandue était celle d'une galette plate coiffée d'un hémisphère céleste, avec probablement en dessous d'elle un hémisphère symétrique. Existait-il quelque chose au-delà de cette sphère idéale? Peu de gens se posaient la question. Quant à la Terre elle-même, on savait à peu près qu'elle comportait trois continents, mais on préfèrait (...) la voir - pour des raisons politiques mais aussi logiquement satisfaisantes - partagée harmonieusement entre deux continents seulement, l'Europe et l'Asie. Cette image était-elle aussi celle du monde savant? Certains de nos contemporains seront sans doute surpris d'apprendre que, bien avant Magellan, Aristote écrit au IVe siècle avant notre ère que "La Terre est assurément sphérique" ; et l'idée qu'on puisse atteindre l'Inde en naviguant vers l'ouest depuis les colonnes d'Héraclès [Gibraltar] ne lui semble pas incroyable. Toutefois, l'accord ne régnait pas entre les "philosophes". Certains prédécesseurs d'Aristote avaient de la Terre une tout autre image, parfois bien déconcertante ; et on sera sans doute étonné de voir qu'après lui, en dépit de remarquables progrès scientifiques, les géographes grecs et romains ne jugeaient habitable qu'un petit espace de l'hémisphère nord (en y intégrant l'Afrique! ), et dessinaient en conséquence d'étranges cartes du monde. L'étude menée ici fait découvrir parallèlement chez les Grecs deux représentations du monde : celle des savants, assez facile à retrouver d'après leurs écrits, et celle du peuple, moins étudiée, qui se lit pourtant clairement en filigrane dans les oeuvres littéraires, et parfois aussi dans les oeuvres figurées. (shrink)

Poor ethical decision–making costs industry billions of dollars a year and damages the images of corporations. Thus, by answering the question ‘Why do individuals behave as they do when confronted with ethical issues?’ ethical theory can provide businesses with a means to create a more ethical climate and a more successful operation. This study tested the Ethical Decision–Making Model with accountability (Beu & Buckley 2001), which uses theory that suggests that ethical behavior is influenced by the individual, the issue, social (...) relationships (accountability), and the organization in which the employee is embedded (Brass, Butterfield & Skaggs 1988; Frink & Klimoski 1998). The results showed that individuals’ thought processes (cognitive moral development), personalities (locus of control, hostility and aggression, Machiavellianism), and gender influence how they respond to ethical dilemmas, as well as the salience of the moral issue (moral intensity) and the environmental context (work/school). (shrink)