The purpose of this thesis is not to present exhaustively the ethical doctrine of Plato, but to disclose one specific aspect in the development of his ethical thought. We shall attempt to show that Plato realized the necessity for a metaphysical foundation for his ethical theory. The search itself will begin in the early or Socratic dialogues, continue through such major works of the middle period as Phaedo and Symposium, and culminate in a definite resolution of the problem through the (...) doctrine of the Republic. The exposition will be developed in three stages: (1) an indication of the ways in which the need for a "metaphysical foundation of morals" is expressed or implied in the early dialogues; (2) an account of the development of Plato's metaphysical theory in dialogues of the middle period; and (3) the argument that this metaphysic was for Plato the completion and foundation of his ethical theory. (shrink)

Stated briefly, the problem of this thesis centers around Jonathan Edwards' interpretation and meaning of freedom of the will and the contrast of this to the meaning employed by St. Thomas. Jonathan Edwards was a defender of the doctrines of John Calvin. His work, The Freedom of the Will, is directed to a defense of two particular Calvinistic doctrines, primarily the absolute sovereignty of the divine will and secondarily the predestination of man, by showing that freedom of the will is (...) no~ incompatible with this absolute sovereignty and predestination. However, in the presentation of his defense, the author feels that the solutions to the conflicts and problems which necessarily arise in the discussion of such a difficult topic present considerable variation to views held by St. Thomas. It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze the solutions to these conflicts and problems and to indicate any differences that may be discovered between Edwards' interpretation of the freedom of the will and that of St. Thomas. It should be.noted that the original work of Jonathan Edwards bore the title: A careful and strict Enquiry into The modern prevailing Notions Of That FREEDOM OF WILL, Which is supposed to be essential To Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise Blame. Since that time, the title has been considerably shortened so that the work has come to be known simply as the Freedom of the Will, and is often referred to, for brevity, simply as the Inquiry. Edwards' work was written in 1754 and first published in that ea.me year in Boston by S. Kneeland. The text used in this paper is one edited by Paul Ramsey from this original edition. One precautionary warning must be given. Because of the several changes that occur in a language over a long period of time, some one hundred to two hundred years in this case, the reader will note what appear to be errors in grammar, spelling and punctuation, not only in the works of Edwards himself, but also in related writing by subsequent authors. No attempt has been made by the author of this present work, to change any such "apparent" errors. Excerpts used have been quoted as they appeared in the works cited. Any structural changes that may have been made in the writings of Edwards were the doings of those who edited them. In view of the brevity of such a work as this in contrast to the profundity and depth of the man, Jonathan Edwards, whose Freedom of the Will is the fulcrum of this paper, no consideration can be given to the personality behind the writings. Consequently, any criticisms or refutations that may occur are to be referred only to what Edwards said, as expressed in his writings and in the reviews of others, and in no way are to be interpreted as a defamation of his character. Jonathan Edwards was an upright man of firm belief and constant devotion and dedication to his cause. The present work is not a character analysis or investigation. It seeks only to illuminate what the man said and to view this in the ever-awing light of truth. (shrink)

My dissertation consists of two main Parts. Part I draws from Edmund Husserl’s notion of the “historical a priori” and from seminal decolonial thinker Anibal Quijano’s formulation of “coloniality” to offer a framework for what I call the “coloniality of history.” Chapter 1 draws from Husserl’s and from contemporary analyses of the “historical a priori” as a historical horizon of conceivability for subject and truth formation. Chapter 2 brings this phenomenological analysis to interpret Quijano’s formulation of “coloniality” as a historical (...) horizon of conceivability and to offer a framework for what I call the “coloniality of history.” This framework shows that historical ideals introduced during colonization continue to structure the ways in which colonized peoples relate to the past, present, and future. Part II applies the framework of the coloniality of history to interpret developmentalist conceptions of history which served to justify colonial enterprises in Latin America, and to delineate the limits and possibilities of the liberation project called mestizaje. Chapter 3 argues that developmentalist conceptions of history situated colonized peoples within a double bind: between an uncivilized indigenous past and a civilized European future. I characterize this historical situation as nepantla, an indigenous concept that captures the existential situation of being in-between worlds of meaning. Chapter 4 analyzes the liberation project of mestizaje in the work of mid-20th century Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea. I argue that Zea’s conception of mestizaje traces the Latin American identity to its indigenous past, thereby continuing to relegate indigenous peoples as the past rather than the present of Latin America. Chapter 5 turns to Gloria Anzaldúa’s formulation of mestizaje. I argue that Anzaldúa articulates nepantla in an embodied way, and that she articulates mestizaje as the juxtaposition of historical meanings which aims to generate a new conception of the colonized body. (shrink)

I examine the problem of how settler colonial countries such as Canada have defined what places are as well as how their meaning and importance is both generated and maintained. It is my thesis that settler understandings of place, specifically the way emotion and affect have served to reify settled place, are a foundational part of the structure of the settler colonial state and of the settler self. I track the ways in which settled senses of attachment to place are (...) a mechanism of settler colonialism bent on elimination and disspossesion. That is, affective and emotional elements give fundamental structure to those senses of belonging and attachment from within a colonial structure and are themselves often occluded by forms of settled ignorance to the function of place-making. Further, this dissertation employs an ameliorative conceptual analysis of settler affects, specifically focusing on developing an account of the role of what I am calling emplaced affects play in the maintenance of the settler colonial state and on-going land theft from Indigenous peoples. I show that emotional responses to challenges of settler emplacement are not benign but political sites that exemplify both settler ignorance and settler privilege. The problem this research traces is thus not a definition of what place is, but, rather, how settler emotional attachments to place function politically to both structure place and ‘placed-identities.’ I argue that settler place-attachments are thus a crucial prong of the settler colonial system thus speaking to a lacuna in the philosophical literature on the function of affect in the maintenance of settler colonialism in Canada. The latter chapters of the dissertation examine two affective responses to challenges these place-attachments. Settled place-making and myths, once challenged, can result in affective responses such as settler fear and shame. I argue that these emotional tending-to of Canadian identity and land are evidence of the emotional mechanisms through which settler populations keep settler identity and place operational. The dissertation closes by thinking about the political and emotional commitments required by settler peoples who wish to disengage in both in the project of settler place-making and the affective re-making of settled identity ultimately arguing to begin to form the end of settler futures in the form of settler abolitionism. (shrink)

The task of mystical theology, as presented in this dissertation, is ultimately to lay the foundations for fostering the emergence of a more differentiated theology of mysticism as foundational to the whole of theology and religious practice. Such a differentiated theology of mysticism is grounded in self-transcending and self-authenticating persons whose Spirit-filled hearts of flesh transvalue all other values and ground the transformation of their conscious intentionality. As Bernard Lonergan has shown, such transformation is normative for all genuine human activity. (...) The first three chapters present Joseph Marechal's study of the psychology of the mystics and offer a critique of his cognitional theory as it relates to his understanding of mysticism. Initially, presentation is made of Marechal's orientation to the study of mystical psychology in the empirical sciences. It is shown that the mystical experience, as a grace-filled experience, does not provide adequate data for the empirical sciences or a metaphysical analysis. Development of the cognitive, ontological categories of Marechal's analysis shows how they provide for him the conditions for the possibility of a mystical experience and mystical knowledge. In his analysis of the dynamism of the intellect, Marechal speaks of an intuitive element through which he maintains that metaphysics opens upon theology, the queen of all sciences. The inchoate intuition of his cognitive analysis is grounded in his interpretation of a more general faculty psychology. Its developmental process in the psychospiritual life of the mystic culminates in the intellectual intuition of the mystic's experience of ecstasy. It is in this intellectual intuition that the discursive and intuitive modes of knowledge reach their synthesis. In the fourth chapter this writer presupposes a knowledge of Bernard Lonergan's writings and draws upon his generalized empirical method and intentionality analysis of the subject as context for an on-going critique and corrective to Marechal's ontological categories. In conclusion, it is the impassioned subject who best exemplifies the mystical subject of Joseph Marechal's study of the psychology of the mystics and Bernard Lonergan's self-transcending and self-authenticating subject. (shrink)

This dissertation deals with the work of a man who was destined to play a leading role in the philosophical movement known as Neo-Scholasticism. His name is perhaps not so familiar and inspiring as that of Cardinal Mercier, but his sphere of influence is sufficiently extensive, especially in his native land, to warrant my attempt at a comprehensive presentation and interpretation of his works. It may come as a surprise that this thesis should be written in America rather than in (...) Germany where Clemens Baeumker had a great number of students and friends. Yet the ex­planation is not difficult to find. Letters which I received from those who kept in close contact with Professor Baeumker during his life are enthusiastic about his permanent contribu­tions to the cause of the Catholic revival in philosophy which followed the issuing of the encyclical Aeterni Patris in 1879. All my correspondents assert, however, that the times have become very unfavorable for the full appreciation of scholars such as Baeumker was. They welcome, therefore, my plan to give a biographical, historical and critical account of this pioneer and champion of Christian philosophy. In a spirit of gratitude to Catholic America they wish me success in my enterprise. Indeed, I must confess that without their generous su1port I should never have ventured to attempt this dissertation. First, biographical material had to be gathered, most of it coming from private sources hitherto unavailable Then I had to engage in an historical investigation of Baeumker's major and minor works. In doing so it was necessary for me to give English translations which would render as faithfully as possible both the antiquarian nature of the text and Baeumker's heavy style. Here lies, I admit, my greatest weakness Baeumker is above all a master of research in ancient and medieval philoso­phy. Method and content in these broad fields require the combined knowledge and skill of the philologist, the historian and the philosopher. Since I cannot lay claim to such multiple expertness, I must beg my examiners to have patience with me whenever my English proves faulty, particularly as I am a new­ comer to the language as well as to the country. This dissertation aims at depicting and evaluating the achievements of Baeumker as he traced new paths for the progress of Neo-Scholasticism. It is true that he did so chiefly by means of compendious historical treatises which often lead us along the hidden by-ways of medieval thought. His purpose, however, is clear; he wished to show the vast number and the actuality of its problems. Baeumker was never content with mere archaeological explorations but always intent upon demonstrating the organic relationship of the past and the present. Thus he revealed himself also as a systematic thinker who never lost sight of main issues. We certainly are indebted to Professor Grabmann for stress­ing the systematic aspect of his predecessor's work, an aspect to which several critics here and abroad have raised objections I shall make it a special point to state explicitly that the historian and the systematizer belong together in Baeumker as well as in Gilson or Maritain. This is not done to join an is­sue but simply to make a relevant comparison in the spirit of true scholarship. (shrink)

It is often the case in philosophy that a term used to address a problem in the thought of the original philosopher itself becomes the name of a problem. There is hardly any better illustration of this unique, albeit common, characteristic of philosophical discourse than the term noema which Edmund Husserl uses to explicate his theory of COGNITIVE intentionality. Since its introduction by the German philosopher, the term has been the subject of conflicting interpretations by renowned scholars. The purpose of (...) this dissertation is to undertake a philosophical confrontation of two such interpretations, the Gestalt interpretation as formulated by Aron Gurwitsch and the analytic interpretation as articulated by the Frege scholars, David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre. These interpretations are so pivotal in the history of the controversy regarding the noema that numerous monographs have been, and are still being, written about them. In view of this great number of studies, the question arises as to why one should add a further work to the list. What fruit could it yield to study anew noema interpretations about which so much work has been done? Is such an endeavor not doomed, from the very outset, to result in a mere repetition of what has already been found and explicated? I think, however, that such an enterprise is nevertheless worth pursuing, for what matters in a genuinely philosophical study is that something be brought forth about the matter to be thought (Sache des Denkens). I have no interest here in merely drawing up a catalogue of common traits and points of difference between Gurwitsch and his opponents, Smith and McIntyre. For such a procedure would amount to no more than a curiosity, an idle comparison which bears no fruit. What interests me instead is the Sache, the matter which presents itself for thought, which in the case of these thinkers, is the problem of the meaning and role of the noema in Husserl's theory of intentionality.... (shrink)

Long before I began to study philosophy seriously, the personality and life of both Saint Augustine and René Descartes exerted a fascination upon me. Augustine and Descartes--each stands at the headwaters of his age. Augustine, rhetorician, convert, priest, bishop, in whose life and thought in the last days of the Roman Empire one can already discern the foundations of the Middle Ages. Descartes, gentleman of the Renaissance, tempted by Scepticism and Libertinism, fired by the ambition to reconstitute the whole field (...) of human knowledge, in whose writings and life of seclusion one can see the beginnings of what we call modern philosophy. The one is the soul of the medieval period, the other of the modern; they are strikingly different in life and personality, yet the philosophy of each is strangely similar... (shrink)

In this dissertation I advance a Jaspersian account of the formation and possession of irrational attitudes. This account stands in opposition to two competing views – externalism and internalism with respect to rational and irrational attitudes. According to externalism, a subject’s attitudes are irrational when they fail to satisfy standards or criteria independent of the subject, such as laws of logic, methods for evidence acquisition, and rules of decision theory. According to internalism, a subject’s attitudes are irrational when they are (...) not supported by reasons selected by the subject. In this dissertation, I take Donald Davidson’s theory of rational and irrational attitudes to be a case of externalism and John Searle’s theory of rational and irrational attitudes to be a case of internalism. While articulating and identifying the merits of externalism and internalism with respect to rational or irrational attitudes, I argue that each account ends up in difficulties: Davidson’s externalism cannot account for the experience of freedom, an individual’s subjectivity, and is unable to avoid an infinite regress of rules; Searle’s internalism struggles to avoid solipsism and an infinite regress of reasons. Karl Jaspers’ account of rational and irrational attitude formation, I argue, avoids the pitfalls of Davidson’s and Searle’s views while preserving the merits of each. On Jaspers’ account, a subject possesses rational attitudes insofar as that subject holds those attitudes to be always open to revision while, at the same time, using those attitudes to bring unity to all manner of phenomena and other attitudes. Irrationality, by contrast, occurs, on the Jaspersian view, when a subject holds onto attitudes with complete and absolute resolution and interprets all else according to these attitudes. Having defined a Jaspersian account of rational and irrational attitudes, I show how it accounts for the irrationality of delusional beliefs and the irrationality of certain worldviews. On Jaspers’ view, I argue, delusions and worldviews are irrational insofar as they are held with absolute conviction, are unamenable to modification, and are used to understand all available evidence, views, and opinions. (shrink)

The epistemological issue of disagreement comprises several related problems which arise in relation to disagreeing with another person. The central questions at issue are: (1) Can a body of evidence confer rationality on opposed propositions? (2) What is the relevance of unshareable evidence to disagreement? (3) What are one’s epistemic responsibilities in the context of disagreement? I consider several arguments from the recent disagreement literature which suggest that reasonable disagreements between people who have shared their evidence and are epistemic peers--i.e., (...) they are equally informed about the disputed issue, and are roughly equal with respect to intelligence, thoughtfulness, carefulness, alertness, and so on--are not possible. I also consider several arguments which suggest that one may rationally persist in one’s views in spite of peer disagreement. In the course of considering these arguments, I discuss the role of “evidential seemings,” seemings of the form “It seems to one that evidence E supports proposition p”; their analogous relationship to perceptual seemings; and how such seemings might be outweighed by higher-order evidence provided by peer disagreement.I propose that the most difficult and interesting aspect of the peer disagreement problem is prolonged disagreement with a recognized epistemic peer, which may undermine one’s evidential seemings in the form of Parity: in the context of peer disagreement, both parties may be aware that things would seem just the same to them as they do if in fact the other party were correct and they were mistaken. This presents a localized skeptical problem that affects what one should believe in the context of such a disagreement, because prolonged peer disagreement puts one’s own evidential seemings into conflict. I propose and discuss three possible solutions to the Parity Problem, one inspired by David Hume, and two inspired by Immanuel Kant: (1) Practical considerations stemming from the underdetermination of one’s views by the available evidence as well as one’s larger epistemic goals can justify maintaining one’s view. Alternatively, judgments that someone else is an epistemic peer may be classified as either (2) empty regulative theoretical judgments (a Kantian category), or (3) non-theoretic judgments (analogous to judgments about taste). In either case, rational disagreement under Parity is possible. (shrink)

This dissertation engages the questions and methodologies of phenomenology, the philosophy of culture, the philosophy of music and ethnomusicology in order to investigate the significance of music in human life. The systematic orientation of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms provides the overarching framework that positions the approach in chapter one. Following Cassirer, art in general and music in particular are not regarded as enjoyable yet dispensable pastimes, but rather as fundamental ways of experiencing the world as intuitive forms and (...) sensations. Establishing the ontological significance of music entails unpacking the sui generis experience of time, space and subjectivity that characterize the musical experience.Phenomenology, in particular the thought of Alfred Schütz, provides a point of departure for thinking more concretely about the musical experience. The turn to phenomenology is motivated both by its systematic consanguinuity [sic] with Cassirer’s project as well as its insistent focus on the details of lived experience. However, bolstered by what is argued to be a more holistic description of the musical experience gleaned from the work of ethnomusicologists, Schütz’s phenomenological account of the music is challenged on a number of key issues such as music’s ontological status and the tendency to equate “music” with “musical works.”Despite the blind spots of his writings on music, Schütz’s phenomenology of the social world proves to be a useful framework for thinking about the multiplicity of ways in which music is experienced as meaningful and how the equivocality of the concept of musical meaning brings the social nature of the musical experience into view. Sociality also figures into a discussion of improvisation, an important theme that has only relatively recently begun to receive philosophical attention. Arguing that an adequate philosophical treatment of music must account for both the variety of musical cultures as well as the variety of musical practices, a consideration of improvisation helps philosophy think outside of the work-paradigm that was critiqued in chapter two. (shrink)

This dissertation focuses on an exploration of the use of parables in the works of Soren Kierkegaard. While some work has been done on Kierkegaard’s poetic style, very little attention has been paid to his metaphors, despite their prevalent use in his works. Much of the scholarship instead treats his parables as mere examples of philosophical concepts. In this work, I argue that Kierkegaard’s parables function primarily to cause the reader to see him or herself truly. The parables work like (...) mirrors, reflecting our true selves back onto ourself. In this way, the parables prompt Kierkegaard’s readers to overcome the illusion of Christendom and to instead recognize the requirements that authentic Christianity places upon them. My dissertation begins with an examination of the purpose that Kierkegaard saw for his authorship. By focusing on his later works, I argue that Kierkegaard primarily wanted to bring the religious forward in his readers. He thought that in order to accomplish this he needed to start with works describing the life that he thought most of his readers lived, a life of pleasure seeking, and to slowly move them towards the religious. I then present Kierkegaard’s view of what Christianity essentially consists of, subjectivity, and of the style of communication that is tied to subjectivity. Kierkegaard claims that when communicating subjective truths that we must employ an indirect style. I go on to argue that parables very much fit into this style and that they work to cause tension on the part of the reader. The reader of the parable must choose between various competing interpretations that the parable presents, and in choosing how to interpret the parable, the reader reveals and discloses him or herself. I follow this up with an examination of a number of parables from different works of Kierkegaard, showing how they function in this manner. I end by arguing that Kierkegaard’s parables are designed to function like mirrors, revealing ourselves to us. (shrink)

Scholars have largely read Aquinas’ critique of Averroes on the issue of will and moral responsibility in a positive light. They tend to accept Aquinas’ account of Averroes’ theory and its shortcomings, failing to read Averroes’ theory in its own right or take a critical eye to Aquinas’ understanding of Averroes. This dissertation will provide that critical eye by addressing four key issues associated with the location and function of the will: (A) the nature of the Intellects as both separate (...) and “in the soul,” (B) the notion that the Intellects are “form for us,” (C) the relationship between the individual human being and the intelligibles in act, and (D) the location and function of the will. In addressing these four issues several questions will be raised and answered. First, it will be necessary to examine whether Aristotle, on whom both medieval thinkers rely for their disparate understandings of will and intellect, has a faculty of will in his system and what role the intellect plays in moral decision making. Next, we must determine what Averroes and Aquinas positions are on these issues and how they relate to that of Aristotle. Finally, the two philosophers must be brought into dialogue with one another as we determine the strength and cogency of Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes’ view of the will and the intellects. Is it coherent? Through the course of this examination it will be demonstrated that Aristotle did not have a faculty of will in his philosophy and that the understanding of will attributed to him by Averroes and Aquinas actually has its roots in Stoic, Neoplatonist, and Peripatetic philosophy. It will also be demonstrated that, despite the view of many contemporary scholars of Aquinas, Aquinas’ particular critiques of Averroes regarding the will are not tenable. Despite this, we will see that the nature of the intellects and, more importantly, the intelligibles in act is central to moral agency for Averroes; here, Aquinas’ criticisms are more convincing. (shrink)

Cerium dioxide, Ce02, one of the more abundant of the rare earth oxides, ls mined In only a few locals. One place ls the Union of South Africa which possesses massive monazite deposits from which Ce02 is refined. Commercially, this oxide finds use as a glass polish and catalyst, while the cerium metal, Ce, ls used as a coloring agent In glass. In solid state research, however, Ce02 has received attention due to its large departures from stoichiometry in the fluorite (...) phase and its high temperature semi-conductive nature which is controlled by this stoichiometry. This wide range of variable composition has permitted the measurement of many very sensitive and less defect sensitive properties of the compound. Correlation of the properties of electrical conductivity, weight change, and oxygen dissociation pressure has been attempted In an effort to elucidate the defect behavior of Ce02. But unanimous agreement concerning the exact nature of the characteristic nonstoichiometric defect in Ce02 has not been achieved. Opinion appears divided equally between the cerium Interstitial and oxygen vacancy as the responsible defect. Earliest studies of Ce02, conducted approximately thirty years ago, can be used to point up one of the basic problems that has accompanied rare earth research. That is, that alI rare earths, since they have similar outer electron configurations, have similar chemical characteristics with each other, and hence are not easily obtained In a state of high purity. Subsequently, with Increased purity In materials, refinements In the observed behavior of the more defect sensitive properties of Ce02 have been noted. Ce02 of 99.999% purity (with - respect to other rare earths and 99.9% overall purity) has been prepared in Iimited quantity for laboratory use. This degree of purity has permitted observation of the electrical behavior of Ce02 above 800°C where impurity defects at this low concentration are of second order as compared to nonstoichiometric defects. The previous problem highIights the possible use of control led impurity doping to alter and regulate the electrical behavior of Ce02. The ensuing pages wiII present a study of electrical conductivity of Ce02 with controlled impurity doping as an experimental parameter. A discussion of the selection of appropriate dopants for this study is included. Doping as a method to test stoichiometric defect models wiII be considered. The technique used for this study was the preparation of sintered bars of high purity Ce02 with controlled additions of several different dopants. The specific property investigated was electrical -conductivity which is very sensitive to both nonstoichiometric and impurity defects. Conductivity measurements employing a four probe D.C. method were ' conducted under equilibrium conditions by varying specimen temperature • in various oxygen partial pressures at one atmosphere total pressure. The results of these experiments have been used to provide insight into the nature of the impurity defect and its interaction with the nonstoichiometric defect. Analysis and modeling of the experimental data yield the fol lowing quantities: I. Activation energy of the nonstoichiometric defect charge carrier as a function of dopant concentration. 2. Activation energy of the Impurity defect charge carrier as a function of dopant concentration. 3. The magnitude and temperature dependence of the impurity defect charge carrier mobility. 4. The magnitude and temperature dependence of the impurity defect diffusion coefficient. 5. Equilibrium relationships between nonstolchiometric defect concentrations and the amount of dopant added. 6. Equilibrium relationships between impurity defect concentration and the amount of dopant added. (shrink)

The Mechanism of the generation of microwave and millimeter wave oscillations by an n-type GaAs bulk effect oscillator is investigated. A Simplified model of domain dynamics within the sample is developed. Based on this model, the microwave performance of a bulk effect device is evaluated, as a function of carrier concentration, sample bias voltage an sample length. The graphical analysis resulting from the model indicates a dynamic velocity-field characteristic which differs from the static velocity-field characteristic. The model is employed to (...) indicate the possibility of a variety of modes of operation of a given device, including a mode of domain suppression which allows frequencies to be generated which greatly exceed the Gunn transit time frequency. Finally, experimental results are presented which correlate and verify the theoretically indicated distinct modes of operation of given bulk effect device. These modes of oscillation are semi-quantitatively discussed, in terms of the results of the simplified model of domain dynamics. (shrink)

It was about two years ago, while taking a graduate course in American philosophy, that I first became interested in the philosophy of Josiah Royce. At the time two factors in his thought particularly intrigued me. The first was Royce's claim that the notion of community was his main metaphysical tenet; the second was his close association with the two American pragmatists, Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Regarding the first factor, I was struck by the fact that a philosopher (...) who died in 1916 should emphasize a topic of such contemporary significance not only in philosophy but also in fields such as sociology, psychology and theology. Regarding the second, I was curious as to whether the pragmatism of Peirce and James might have influenced Royce during the course of their professional and personal contacts. Similarly, I wondered whether the idealism of Royce might have affected the thought of Peirce and James. To have appeased my curiosity in regard to all three thinkers, however, would have required three dissertations. In the interest of efficiency, I selected one. In researching the writings of Royce I had necessarily to find my way to the Houghton Library and to the Archives of Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where the unpublished manuscripts of Royce are preserved. Since Volumes 1 through 52 are fro the most part the manuscripts of Royce's published books and articles, my time at Harvard was spent mostly on Volumes 53 through 98. While I found no startling divergence from Royce's published positions in the unpublished material, I was able, by researching the latter, to discover certain texts more suited tot the purpose of my dissertation. On one point in particular (the social aspect of the knowing process), I found a great deal more material in the unpublished writings than in the published works. On the whole, the access to both published and unpublished sources lent more cogency to basic evaluations of the thought of Royce. In pursuing the topic which titles this dissertation I have also explored Royce's notion of community to the extent of having become greatly appreciative of the contemporary relevance of his philosophy. As a result the present resurgence of interest in the works Royce seems more than justified. I delight that some of the vital insights of this American thinker are being shared today to a greater extent than ever before. (shrink)

The purpose of this dissertation will be to examine the finite God theories of William James and Edgar Sheffield Brightman in an effort to discover the basic philosophical roots of these positions. The theisms we are studying diverge radically from the more orthodox conception of God as an infinite Being. Our study will attempt to throw light upon the basis of this divergence. In the process of accomplishing this task, the similar nature of the philosophical roots of the positions of (...) James and Brightman will likewise be clarified. (shrink)

The study examines the end or purpose of the acts of the virtue of religion within Thomas Aquinas' ethics of human action. What is the end of religious worship? Is it God, or is it the worshippers themselves? On the one hand, one would presume that God cannot be the end of religion because, from the perspective of Classical Theism (of which Aquinas is a main proponent), God cannot benefit from the activity of creatures. But on the other hand, if (...) the worshipper is the end of religious acts, would not worship be a self-centered or an egotistic act? The standard Thomistic account of the problem, first laid out by Cajetan and later adopted by countless followers, is that God is the finis cuius ("the aim toward which") of the acts of the virtue of religion, whereas the religious worshipper is the finis quo (the beneficiary) of the acts. I argue that this solution, which is based on a single text of Aquinas (ST II-II.81.7c), is insufficient. After examining Aquinas' theory of action (the doctrine of object, end, and circumstances presented in ST I-II.18), I show how the object of a particular human act can be interpreted as the finis operis (the end of the agent's act). Utilizing this principle of the identity between the object and the finis operis, I argue that the finis operis of religion can be summed up as a threefold sequence of ends: the honor, reverence, and glory of God. As a result, the ultimate beneficiary of acts of religious worship is neither God nor the individual worshipper, but rather the totality of the universe, encapsulated by Aquinas in his notion of divine "glory," that is, the extrinsic manifestation of God's intrinsic goodness within the universe. (shrink)

A: The Significance of the Term, Structure. The significance of the term, structure as it is used in this dissertation needs explanation. Ordinarily, its meaning is that of placing things together to constitute a particular whole. For example, we speak of the structure of a building or of an organism, but the meaning of the term in its application to the human act is essentially different from its significance in relation to a house or an organism...

The woes of the contemporary American worker, alienated due to excessively Taylorized work and diminished participation in decision-making, as well as the predicted strains in a future workworld call for some vision to alleviate the alienation and to guide manpower planning at a value level. The distinctness and uniqueness of contemporary work constantly confront the worker, researcher of work, and the counselor, but insights into and the values of work in a theological perspective are rarely encountered in workplaces, schools, churches, (...) or families. No literature is available on the implications for counseling in a theology of work. This study, then, applies Bernard Lonergan's cognitional theory in an interdisciplinary, subject specialization approach so as to arrive at an insightful and value-laden theology of work. The experiences, understandings, judgments, and choices of history, economics, psychology, sociology, philosophy, and theology concerning work have been garnered from representative authors for insights to be internalized as values, From these insights and values were drawn implications for counseling. From this interdisciplinary effort emerged a theological definition of work, mimetic of the Trinity and based on human nature: work is human, consubstantiating, creative, redemptive, and inquiring activity, imaging the Creative Father, the Redeeming Son, and the Inquiring Spirit and striving for a more human world, society, and humankind to be returned to the Father, Son, and Spirit in the endtime. Human work, therefore, can be regarded as individual, personal, social, natural, divinely and humanly participative, consubstantiating, physical, emotional, intellectual, will-involved, spiritual, recompensed or non-recompensed, self and/or group sustaining and fulfilling, freeing yet limiting, eleemosynary, service, production, and/or information- oriented, self and other respecting, afflicted, associated with worship and leisure, technologically evolving, social consciousness and energy-raising, responsible, and Christian activity. Each of these represents a theological insight into and value of work... (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to compare the main effects and interactions of a standard program of physical education, a program of movement education and no planned program of physical education upon the level of physical fitness, self-concept; knowledge of physical activity and time spent in purposeful activity of third grade children. The study was conducted in a school in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Seventy-three students served as subjects. The study was of 16 weeks duration, Three upper primary (grade three) classes (...) were randomly assigned, as intact units; to one of the three programs. Following pretests of self-concept, knowledge of activity and physical fitness, measured by the Piers-Harris Children's Self Concept Scale, a modified version of the AAHPER Cooperative Physical Education Test, Form J+A and The CARPER Fitness-Performance Test respectively, classes assigned to the standard program of physical education and the program of movement education received thirteen weeks of instruction (26 thirty minute lessons) while the class assigned to the control condition received no instruction, The two study programs were taught by different instructors. During this experimental stage, subjects of the two study programs were observed and timed during three randomly selected lessons each to determine the amount of time spent in teacher-directed or teacher-guided activity during the observed lessons. The standard program of physical education consisted of basic locomotor, gymnastic, ball handling, dance and rope jumping skills taught by means of teacher-directed explanation, demonstration, practice and application to low organized games, The program of movement education consisted of teacher-guided student exploration of selected elements of movement organized into themes of force absorption, force production, pathways in space and contrasts in movement. At the conclusion of the experimental stage all members of all classes were given the same tests performed as pretests and in the same sequence and manner... (shrink)

In order to present a more balanced ecclesiology, theologians have found it necessary to return to "the biblical and traditional theme of communion (koinonia)." Research into the early Christian use of the word has thrown a good deal of light on the nature of the unity of the Church and, in particular, on the conditions required in order that Christians may celebrate together the Lord's Supper. It was with this latter problem in mind that the late Werner Elert undertook a (...) patristic study of the relationship between altar fellowship and church fellowship. As he began his research into the theory and practices of Church fellowship, Elert found a rather surprising lack of materials... (shrink)

This study is the investigation of a literary field singularly void of previous contributions. Except for brief remarks here and there is critical works and Miss Dunbar's chapter defining symbolism, I have discovered no material dealing directly with this subject. An exclusive and exhaustive investigation into the subject of religious symbolism has not been made in any period of English literature. That is why the delving into a very short period with the aim of clarifying the subject of symbolism seemed (...) worth while. The basis for this study is the poetry, not including dramatic poetry, of the Catholic poets from Newman to Alice Meynell. The great number of De Vere's and Field's plays prohibited an investigation including these and determined my decision to base my conclusions exclusively on the other poetical contributions of these Catholic poets. (shrink)

The purpose of this dissertation is to serve as a stepping stone to a larger philosophy of the Catholic university. Its thesis argues that Catholic universities have lost their way by means of faith, identity, and ethical crises, and in order to recover these we must return to the primordial student-teacher relationship embedded in a Catholic philosophical anthropology. Beginning in the mid-20th century, with roots at the turn of the century, Catholic universities took a decided secular move away from their (...) theological roots beginning with Fr. Theodore Hesburgh’s reimagining of the Catholic university as a corporate entity. As a result, they began to embrace competition with non-Catholic schools in the areas of power and prestige, instead of forming citizens of good character and faith. This idea directly contrasts with Pope St. John Paul II’s Ex Corde Ecclesiae wherein Catholic universities are centers of faith and reason whilst encouraging the building up of laity in the Christian life. Contra both, I argue for a third way between them in order to break up the limiting dichotomy. To do this, I borrow the base intersubjective ethic from Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and pair it with the theocentric humanistic pedagogy of French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain. I argue Levinas gets at what is central to a Catholic philosophical anthropology in treating the Other, the one who is not me, as one with dignity and so initiated into dialogue. This may sound like a plea to welcome anti-Catholic sentiment simply because it is different, but it is actually a step in recovery towards authentic Catholic education because of the need to re-welcome its own intellectual tradition. To that end, Maritain’s understanding of the student-teacher relationship embodies this ethic such that students are able to voice whatever they please—including Catholic theology—without fear of reprisal and learn wherever their souls lead. So, too, Catholic professors are able to teach virtually anything they please whilst, ultimately, leading students to forming their minds. I conclude by placing my project in the context of all higher education. (shrink)

Whenever students have asked me what I think about a particular issue or philosopher, I intentionally commit the common fallacy of appeal to authority. I say, "You know what St. Augustine said? He said that no one should be so foolish as to go to school to learn what the teacher thinks." Though I say it in jest, there is much seriousness to it. It strikes at the heart of Platonic education, that one merely acts as an occasion for another (...) to learn something for him or herself. Education for Plato is not a matter of transferring 'knowledge' from one person to another. The students may be dissatisfied with such a response, but they get the point: their education has its origin and character in themselves and is their responsibility. The teacher can act only as an occasion for the student to learn and the teacher's merit must be judged on that account. The best interpretations act as occasions for the reader to gain insight into a particular issue or work. They do not solve the questions ultimately. As Rilke tells us, we must learn to love the questions themselves before we can hope to give even a somewhat adequate answer. This work stems from a love of the questions Plato poses, ones both timeless and inviting. So at best, the reason for yet another work on the Republic of Plato is to act as an occasion for the reader to gain some measure of insight. At least, it would invite the reader to re-examine the Republic itself in light of her own opinions and those presented here. That would be much. At worst, it does neither. So should one read this work and be moved to pick up the Republic, I will have done something worthwhile. Teachers and commentaries can act as occasions, but they in no way measure up to friends, especially those with whom we converse about ultimate questions on how best to live. I owe a debt of intellectual gratitude to two such individuals. One is John Laumakis, a former fellow graduate student at Marquette University. He is among the best of people I have met, a man of great character and intellectual keenness. During the formation of this dissertation, a work that ultimately shows that Plato develops a theory of moral virtue which anticipates Aristotle's, John is the one who first brought it to my attention that the famous 'function argument' of Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 can be found at the end of Republic Book I. This led me to wonder about other similarities between the two great thinkers with respect to ethics, much of which is presented in the following. We became friends on account of my admiration for his philosophical acumen, and developed from there a mutual liking and respect which is not often found between two people... (shrink)

The ontological proof is the argument for the existence of God in which we begin with our idea of God and, from this, argue for God's reality. There are two reasons this argument is important in Hegel's works. First, Hegel holds that of all of the arguments for the existence of God, the ontological proof alone is the true one, capable of attaining the speculative perspective in which thought and Being are recognized as united. Second, the ontological proof encapsulates the (...) self-expressive movement of God, in which God articulates himself and then comes to know himself in this expression, which dominates Hegel's divine ontology. Given its importance in Hegel's thought, it is not surprising that Hegel addresses the ontological proof, both the formulations presented by his predecessors and his own articulation of the proof, in many of his works. In this chapter, we shall briefly look at Anselm's version of the argument. We shall then discuss Kant's influential critique of the ontological proof as it has been presented in the history of philosophy. Next, we shall examine Hegel's rejection of Kant's criticism of the ontological argument. Finally, we shall investigate Hegel's criticisms of the ontological proof, which will prepare us for a discussion of Hegel's own version of the proof... (shrink)

The title of this dissertation is a question: Is there a future to Marxist humanism? The work itself is an affirmative answer. The motive behind asking this question is the perennial debate surrounding the relevance of Marxism as a school of social and political thought. There are aspects of Marxism that are, arguably, no longer tenable, yet there are others that are more relevant today than ever. It is the argument of the following dissertation that Marxist humanism is of continued (...) relevance as both an analytical tool as well as a fertile ground for a political project of emancipation. However, the notion of a uniquely "Marxist humanism" is problematic. The fact that it is "Marxist" might lead to the confusion that it is thus based solely on the teachings of Karl Marx. Although his works provide the groundwork to the present project, it is the spirit and not necessarily the letter of Marxism that motivates the following discussion. That is, Marx's humanist project can continue without necessarily relying on his more questionable doctrines. The spirit of Marxist humanism lies in its demand for human well-being through mutual recognition achieved within an appropriately amenable social space wherein economic relations form the foundation to other equally as important intersubjective relationships. Marxist humanism is concerned primarily with the promotion of human values, namely, the alleviation of suffering and the promotion of human flourishing through a systemic change in the structure of society, beginning with economics but encompassing all areas of interpersonality... (shrink)

This dissertation is an investigation into the ground of moral objectivity. My preliminary claim is that in order to be objective, moral properties must be real properties. The following question is, what kind of properties are moral properties? A number of recent philosophers have argued that moral properties are natural properties. ''Natural" in this context means " open to investigation and discovery by the senses or by empirical science." The natural properties proposed in the recent literature are connected to the (...) property of human well-being. The main project of my dissertation is to show that natural properties are not adequate as the foundation for moral objectivity, because there is no necessary connection between any natural properties and moral properties. Another answer to the question of what kind of properties moral properties are is that they are supernatural properties. "Supernatural" in this context means "not open to investigation and discovery by the senses, or by empirical science." It is my argument that a singular supernatural being who created the world and has particular ideas about what sorts of people/actions/states of affairs are good and bad or right and wrong is the only sufficient ground for moral objectivity. Given such a being, moral properties will be real and objective. They will also be moral properties, since the originator of these properties confers value on them. Using and expanding on work in Divine Command Theory, especially that of Robert M. Adams, my original contribution to this discussion is to propose that moral properties are relational properties. The relationship is between persons, actions, states of affairs, etc., in the physical world, and the ideas, desires, character, or commands of the supernatural being. An important limitation of my dissertation project is that I do not consider any practical issues such as "How do we know whether God exists?", "How would God communicate the content of morality to us?", or "What is God like?" These are important and worthwhile questions, but are not a part of my present investigation. (shrink)

To explain subjective consciousness in physical terms, one must first describewhat is subjective about consciousness. But such descriptions are experience-based or depend on authors’ intuitions. This is troubling because there are no empirical reasons to fix on any one description of subjectivity, and authors seem to have very different notions of what subjectivity is. Further, if subjectivity is to be physicalized somehow, it seems to need to be one type of physical thing and not many different sorts of physical things. (...) Taking a cue from the philosophy of science, I argue for a different methodology,one that mitigates these a priori troubles, by treating theories as models. Models are ways of working out explanations for empirically underdetermined, problematic phenomena. This allows a pluralistic and integrative approach to the literature. I offer a modified version of scientific realism as an alternative to empirically unwarranted atomistic metaphysical claims. I then develop a different methodology that avoids the difficulties in the firstplace. If there is no good reason to choose one description, I locate what is common to all the descriptions. There is a particular relativity to qualia and a particular nominal perspective to awareness more generally. If subjectivity is not just one physical aspect of the brain, it seems that any certain neurological evidence is also too specific. I argue instead that the problematic particularities of subjective consciousness can be understood in the more general, non-problematic particularities of biological organisms. From these non-controversial grounds, certain explanatory paths are generated. Iargue for a dispositional view of qualia, one that retains both biological-functional evidences and neurological variation. This allows a more reasonable “moderate relativity” about qualia. I argue for a dispositional view of a subjective perspective more generally, one that includes the neuro-mechanisms of awareness but does more. Consciousness is private so as to generate novel meanings, variable organism to organism. The actual aware perspective just is these non-conscious mental contents, which constitute the differences in how creatures “see the world”. Further, one’s perspective results in phenomenal valence, liking or disliking as a novel aspect of “what it is like”. (shrink)

Does a white philosopher have anything of value to offer to the philosophy of race and racism? If this philosophical subfield must embrace subjective experience, why should we value the perspective of white philosophers whose racial identity is often occluded by racial normativity and who lack substantive experiences of being on the receiving end of racism? Further, if we should be committed to experience, in what sense can the philosophy of race and racism be “objective”? What should that word mean?Tackling (...) this question first, “objective” should at least mean general, that the ideas of the literature can be coherently integrated. An objective take on racism brings together a plurality of perspectives. What’s wrong with just a plurality of satellite ideas? It implies a fragmented approach to ameliorating racism, where different specialists have different recommendations. How can racism, generally, be lessened? If major views of racism are unifiable, then we have a general method to ameliorate racism. This project might appear tone-deaf: a white philosopher unifying things by reducing ideas to some central notion. But this unity isn’t about reducing things but rather integrating them in a way that respects difference. Yet, there’s a reason we should be interested in the white perspective. Whites can speak about racism from a participatory perspective. If whites are knowledgeable, and believe themselves to have no implicit bias, they may suppose they’re “beyond” racism or no longer at risk for perpetuating it. I explore this idea in a psychologically realistic way via my notion of overlooking, where ameliorating racism from the white perspective is an ongoing project. I end by considering how racism is applicable to other philosophical ideas beyond its typical or circumscribed purview. Here, I re-frame responsibility, arguing that we needn’t be forced to choose between responsibility models divided into individual versus social camps. We ought to instead think of responsibility in terms of power, which provides a realistic lens by which persons and groups are held to account. In being more generally convincing, it might actually get folks to take responsibility where they might not otherwise—theory in service of praxis. (shrink)

This work investigates and defends the human capacity to know the truth without a god's-eye-view. In short. it hopes to offer a small voice of assistance to those struggling for what Fred Lawrence and Hugo Meynell have called the "New Enlightenment", i.e., to clarify, justify and apply rational norms in a way which takes seriously postmodern objections to modernity while retaining critical realism as a theory of truth. To this end, I study the thought of Bernard Lonergan, SJ, and Richard (...) Rorty on the possibility of knowing. I argue that while Lonergan and Rorty share similar criticisms of the philosophical tradition's dependence on intuitionism, Rorty's subsequent attempt to jettison the correspondence theory of truth is unsatisfactory given the success of Lonergan's critical realism. In addition to this larger hypothesis, several particular implications are drawn: Both Rorty and Lonergan are correct in rejecting intuitionism; Rorty commits a false dichotomy by assuming that either we have the certainty of intuitionism or there is no truth as correspondence; Rorty is in what Lonergan calls a counter-position, for Rorty's explicit statements about the impossibility of Truth contradict the performance of his own intellect; Lonergan is capable of answering Rorty's objections and better satisfies Rorty's demands to recognize our historicity while allowing conversation than Rorty is himself capable. After explaining the historical problem of the God's-Eye-View is the first chapter and subsequently developing the thought of each thinker in the next two, the remaining chapters engage in a debate between the two thinkers centered around five questions, ultimately finding Lonergan's responses stronger: 1. Does Rorty suffer from Cartesian anxiety, the fear that if there are not absolutely certain foundations then Truth is not possible? Does Lonergan avoid this fear? 2. Can Lonergan's understanding of cognitional theory demonstrate that Rorty's statements about knowledge and truth performatively contradict how he presents his case? If we pay less attention to what Rorty says and more to how he says it. will we see that Rorty acts exactly as Lonergan predicts? 3. Can Lonergan survive Rorty's critique? Lonergan's theory depends on the dynamism of the human intellect and our pure, disinterested desire to know Being. Rorty argues that such a desire does not exist-not truth but power is the goal of inquiry. Has Lonergan remained in the classical consciousness, assuming a reason purer than possible? 4. Can Lonergan survive the linguistic turn on which Rorty depends? Some commentators argue that Lonergan has not come to terms with the linguistic turn and thus remains trapped in the world of the transcendental subject with its improper notions of meaning, language, communication and thought. 5. Rorty argues that the end of epistemology leads to a hermeneutic situation where we no longer seek the truth but attempt to keep the conversation going and grow in self-enlargement. But, given the normative standards inherent in the Transcendental Method, can Lonergan provide more adequate notions of epistemic progress, and provide a more adequate motivation for ongoing conversation and thus co-opt Rorty's own position? (shrink)

The focus of this dissertation is the principle of alternate possibilities, a fundamental principle of much libertarian or incompatibilist theory on the perennial problem of reconciling freedom and determinism. The essence of this principle has been employed in some form by various thinkers since at least the time of the Stoics, but I borrow the term from Harry Frankfurt, who named the principle in his seminal article, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility''. Since it would be a quite daunting task to (...) follow the use of this principle throughout its history, I will limit myself for the most part to how it has figured in the contemporary debate following Frankfurt's article... (shrink)

It is part of the received history of Western civilization that David Hume, the famous Scottish philosopher and historian, is an unavowed opponent of all things religious. He is a dismantler of theistic proofs, a disbeliever in the life to come and miracles, and a railer against all forms of religious practices, like prayer and worship. But above all, Hume is reputed to be a champion of secularism and skepticism, since he has conclusively shown that belief in God is a (...) vestige from an earlier, unsophisticated age... (shrink)

The Timaeus is one of Plato's more bewildering dialogues. Until recently, each time I worked with the Timaeus, I became more: and more perplexed about how to approach it. The likely story of the Timaeus incorporates so many aspects of ancient Greek thought into itself that parsing it out is impossible without working through the broad history of ancient Greek thought. Writing my dissertation on the Timaeus has allowed me to do just that. Each chapter has been an entrance to (...) a new avenue of thought which has led me closer to understanding the nature of Plato's project. Because the Timaeus deals with some of the most fundamental philosophical issues, including the origin of the universe and human nature, I have had the chance to grapple with such issues on my way to an understanding of Plato's dialogue. I have been fascinated, challenged, and humbled by this project. The process of writing it has given me numerous ideas for future projects. It has been a rewarding experience for me. It is my hope that the product of my efforts will be rewarding for my readers as well. (shrink)

This dissertation is meant as an investigation into the ground of the principle of sufficient reason. To me, there is almost no meatier a philosophical topic than the principle of sufficient reason and the prospect of the unconditioned. I have come to love modern philosophy by first studying Nietzsche. My interest in modern philosophy and especially Hume grew out of a love for phenomenology, philosophy of technology and art. Only after studying Nietzsche was I able to understand the monumental significance (...) of Hume. (shrink)

This dissertation begins with an exploration of the method John Rawls uses to justify his choice situation, the original position, and his conception of justice, justice as fairness. The method consists of three criteria that Rawls' theory of justice is able to meet, leading him to declare the original position, and the conception of justice be derives from it, philosophically most favored. Once this method of justification has been explicated, a method of evaluating theories of justice that meet the criteria (...) for justification will be established. The primary purpose of this dissertation is to apply this method of justification to Jean-Jacques Rousseau' s social contract theory and comparatively evaluate it against Rawls' theory of justice. The results of this application show that Rousseau's contracting situation and conception of justice are able to meet the three criteria of Rawls' method. This shows that Rousseau's theory is justified in exactly the same manner as Rawls' theory of justice. The two theories are then evaluated, and it is argued that Rousseau's social contract theory must be declared philosophically most favored. (shrink)

Mill has traditionally been seen as the archetypal liberal philosopher based on his promotion of the ''sovereign" self. Liberal in the classical sense denoted one who stood for the primacy of individual freedom over against the masses. In nineteenth century Europe, the term often stood for freedom from church and state authority, the reduction of the power of royalty and aristocracy, capitalism, and the development of the individual as free as possible from the interference of others. In expressing bis own (...) view of the individual's right to liberty, Mill says, "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Again, Mill reiterates that be would "authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control only in respect to those actions of each which concern the interest of other people. So the individual has freedom to do what he wants, so long as it doesn't adversely affect others. In attempting to pinpoint Mill's liberalism. he is widely quoted as saying, "Over himself over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign, and this quote, taken in context, accurately portrays the great importance which Mill places on individual autonomy, or self-rule... (shrink)

Two themes stand in stark contrast in contemporary culture. The first is the accidental nature of physical existence and the second is the fervent, even desperate search by people to find a meaning to their lives. The developments of the natural sciences and the long list of natural and man-made horrors of the twentieth century have all contributed to the sense that the events of life are no more than a matter of chance, a random unraveling of things that happen (...) for no particular reason and that go toward no particular end. By contrast, and likely as a consequence of that sense of the triviality of daily life, people have committed themselves zealously, even fanatically, to various causes, cults and mystical beliefs for which they become fully willing to dedicate their lives and even their deaths. These commitments carry with them the odd feature of polarizing the communities in which they arc found, resulting in, and even feeding off of, a hatred for opposing factions. For a reflective person, that polarizing feature raises serious questions about the validity of the cause or the beliefs. If human existence is to have meaning, that is, if my concrete existence is to be found to be related to an absolute in terms of which I have worth or significance, that meaning has to be valid for every person, for every human existence. If I am to have inherent worth, it must be a worth that is assignable, not to any particular group or doctrine, but rather it must be assignable to every human being. If, to refer to the founding document of the United States, I am to have inalienable rights, it must be because every human being has inalienable rights... (shrink)

The human person is the focal point of contemporary concern. This first sentence from Andre Ligneul's Teilhard and Personalism touches on the very nature of the present status of the evolutionary object called man--the human person. To be a person is to be the ever evolving organism that represents the present pinnacle of evolutionary success on the planet Earth. The human person will be the focus of this research project. Through the many writings of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, but most (...) specifically The Phenomenon of Man, an attempt will be made to define the process that is the human person. A further goal is to set this process in the present context of social evolution occurring in the United States. Special emphasis will be placed on some educational implications that Teilhard's process may have for the United States and the world... (shrink)

For roughly the past fifty years, Christian theologians have mainly understood the task of encountering and understanding religious others in terms of one or more types of theologies of religion: attempts to explain how God allows for, creates, relates to, and/or participates in the situation of religious diversity. These theologies typically take God as their starting point, and then extrapolate their perspectives on the Divine Nature onto the human condition. When confronted with the actual data of the lives and experiences (...) of diverse religious people, this type of theological approach has come up short. There have been various attempts to articulate theologies from the "bottom up," that is, beginning with the givens of the human situation and extrapolating these data into interpretations of Divine messages, Divine relationships with humans, or other sorts of Divine-human interactions resulting in the de facto religious diversity, but taking the human aspect of religion as primary has largely been the province of the social sciences. In the past two decades, theologians have increasingly adopted social science methodologies as a means of overcoming the impasse they have encountered in theologies of religions. This is the origin, aim, and means of the types of theologies I discuss here under their given name: comparative theologies. It is the purpose of this project to show the ways in which two of the first and most active comparative theologians, James Fredericks and Francis X. Clooney, have enjoyed success in pointing a way beyond the theologies of religions impasse, but that their methodologies, as currently employed, are incomplete if they are to finally succeed in moving theological conversations forward. l argue that since these theologies begin with the situation of human diversity, a fuller articulation of what it means to be human is among the first elements necessary for comparative theologies to move upward and onward. Articulating such an anthropological context requires a more robust conceptual language. l will make a case that the philosopher Charles Taylor provides just such a language, and that his work is fitting and helpful to the projects of these comparative theologians on a number of levels. Taylor's own anthropological reflections start from the same place: a need to articulate an understanding that more fully encompasses the actual situational data of human lives. He also addresses many of Clooney and Fredericks' theological concerns: pointing out the disposition towards religiosity that seems to be universal to human beings and the unique possibilities particular religious traditions present by virtue of their historicity. Along with the comparative theologians, Taylor argues in favor of the importance of particular religious orientations. The depth and detail of his conceptual language reveals a more structured means of proceeding, a means better suited to addressing not only the particular situations of interreligious encounters, but also to mediating between them while embracing and celebrating their unique characteristics. Comparative theologians hint at more than simply a promising direction in theologies of religions. Their methods indicate a way of understanding religion that can potentially move beyond tolerance, acceptance, and understanding. Taylor's language enhances and expands the methodological and, ultimately, spiritual reach of these theologies. I offer this project as a demonstration of some of the possibilities a conversation between Taylor, Fredericks, and Clooney holds for theologies of religions. (shrink)

It is not possible to provide a layman's rendering of Peirce and Whitehead for all possible audiences within the short scope of this work. This work will take for granted some basic acquaintance with Peirce's and Whitehead's philosophy. Consequently, this is directed to the audience of Peircean and Whiteheadian students or, more generally, students of American philosophy. Second, chapters one through four in particular will take advantage of previous scholarship. l particularly note the work of Donna Orange in her PhD (...) dissertation entitled "The Development of Peirce's Theism" (1980) and John Cobb's ''Whitehead's Doctrine of God," chapter four of his A Christian Natural Theology (1965). However, in both cases, I have felt the necessity to adapt their work for the focus of this work. Third, in the spirit of objective enquiry I want to briefly express my beginning perspectives. l come to this study through my interest in process philosophy and theology which began in the early 1990's after hearing a presentation by Robert Mesle (Professor at Graceland University and author of Process Theology: A Basic Introduction) on process thought and which led to the study of Whitehead at Claremont University in 1997 under the direction of David Griffin. It was evident in those Claremont classes that there were differences of opinion within the process camp between scholarship more closely aligned with either Whitehead or Hartshorne and their followers. Although my studies have kept me closer to Whitehead, this has not been any sort of devotion that ignores the conceptual flaws of his system. I worked for a religious institution for nineteen years. I am therefore, very interested in an understandable and plausible conception of God, which also keeps in balance a honest agnostic questioning. Whether this pursuit ultimately aligns me closer with Whitehead, Peirce, or someone else is of no matter. (shrink)

This dissertation is concerned with the viability of the idea of liberal public reason. This idea belongs to the realm of contemporary political philosophy and is a term which seems to have few direct correlates in the history of philosophy, though it has a few namesakes and several analogues. "Public Reason'' may be contrasted obviously with "private reason"- a concept as dubious no doubt as that of the idea of a private language. But this contrast is not what is here (...) meant. Here the concept of public reason may be thought of as an account of the moral practical reasoning appropriate to democratic citizenship in the public sphere. This account of the moral practical reason" particular to the role of government officials and of citizens is made through delimiting those moral concepts suitable for public deliberation and through the imposition of duties to reason from a "public" point of view rather than self interest. Naturally, this idea of public reason is analogous to many previous theories on the nature of right. Some of the more obvious examples are the use of the natural law by jurists of the Roman Republic such as Cicero, the idea of the "common good'' which is to be found in political theorists of the late medieval republics of Italy, or the use of natural rights language by the founders of the American Constitution... (shrink)

For St. Thomas Aquinas, moral theory is a practical discipline. It is primarily concerned with free acts by which Christians, cooperating with divine grace, make their way to God. The topic of virtue assumes center stage in Thomistic moral theology precisely because it is virtue which enables the justified to perform good acts consistently so as to reach their final end. the face-to-face vision of God...

It has been suggested by Mr. William Barrett in Aristotle's Analysis of Movement, that the whole theory of the Prime Mover of Aristotle is exceedingly complex and should be re-interpreted today and clothed in a new habit. If this is necessary for the argument in the Physics, the first proof of the existence of God in the Contra Gentiles may also need to be re-stated for the twentieth century. The fundamental principles of both arguments are the same and St. Thomas (...) explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Aristotle. This study is preliminary to any re-interpretation of the argument from motion The purpose here is to analyze the proof from motion as it is stated by St. Thomas in the Contra Gentiles, to weigh the basic objections that have been urged against it by subsequent critics, and to discover whether or not their criticisms have invalidated the argument. (shrink)

In this dissertation I consider Alvin Plantingaics religious epistemology. Throughout his academic career Plantinga has contested what has been called the "evidentialist objection to belief in God" - the claim that belief in God must be based on propositional evidence or valid argumentation to be rational, justified, or warranted. In his early forays into the field of religious epistemology, Plantinga's developed his argument in terms of the epistemic properties of rationality and justification, both of which were constructed deontologically. Plantinga's mature (...) religious epistemology, on the other hand, focuses on the epistemic property of warrant - that which distinguishes knowledge from merely true belief. While Plantinga's epistemological convictions have evolved, what unites his early and mature religious epistemologies is a common set of theological convictions in my evaluation of Plantinga's religious epistemology I undertake two tasks. First, I seek to locate Plantinga's thought in the context of his theological assumptions, his previous work on religious epistemology, and in the context of the current debate over how knowledge and warrant should be characterized. Secondly, I analyze and evaluate fundamental aspects of his religious epistemology: his account of epistemic warrant, his construal of the task of religious epistemology, and the success of his claims regarding the epistemic status of belief in God. I conclude with a two-pronged evaluation of Plantinga's religious epistemology in which l consider the following questions: (1) Do beliefs about the Christian God formed as described by Plantinga in fact possess warrant? and (2) Does his description of the formation of warranted beliefs about the Christian God reflect the way such beliefs are actually formed? I offered reasons to think that a negative answer should be given to both of these questions. (shrink)

There is always some justification for bringing a forgotten writer to the attention of a country all too forgetful of the names that once were familiar through the length and breadth of the land. Not infrequently the obscurity into which such a writer has fallen is not entirely deserved and often some forgotten gem of truth is once again unearthed. Truth is not the monopoly of the famous; in the most unsuspected corner it is sometimes found. And in the hidden (...) tomes of Brownson's works we have discovered several valuable ideas which have well repaid us for our efforts in bringing them to light. That other truths lie still hidden in those self same volumes we confidently believe, and we urge that others also look through Brownson's works in search of them, seeing what we have missed and hearing with ears at tuned to what for us was silence. (shrink)

The name of William James is most often associated with his pragmatic theory of truth or with his contributions to psychology. This is not surprising. His two volume work, The Principles of Psychology is a classic in its field. And many of his philosophical writings, especially Pragmatism, give a clear and forceful presentation of the theory of truth that bears that name. But there is another facet of his philosophic thought, not unrelated to his theory of truth, to which much (...) less attention has been paid but toward which James mind turned often. And that is the subject of God. It is with this aspect of James thought that this thesis will be primarily concerned. (shrink)

The problem of the unity of man in Plotinus' philosophy is not one easily settled for the reason that it is difficult to establish the effects of the workings of Soul in the realm of the material. If a man's soul in particular does not operate on this lower level, then man cannot be said to be a unified creature. On the other hand, if man's soul does operate on this level, sink itself into mater, then we cannot consider man (...) to be a spiritual creature. Both of these positions represent difficulties for Plotinus' philosophy. In the philosophy of Plotinus much of the discussion concerning this important problem is couched in terms relative to an analysis of guilt. In considering the analysis of guilt in Plotinus' philosophy, we hopt to throw some light on the more basic and important problem of the unity of man... (shrink)

Philosophy in the 19th century experienced a ‘turn from idealism,’ when idealist philosophies were largely abandoned for materialist ones. Scientific naturalism is now considered by many analytic philosophers to be the new orthodoxy, largely in part due to the success of the scientific method. The New Atheists, such as Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, claim it is Darwin in particular who deserves much of the credit for repudiating the traditional Mind-first world view. Some, like Alvin Plantinga and Michael Behe, maintain (...) the opposite, that evolution casts doubt on naturalism and supports theism. This dissertation seeks to determine just what exactly the logical implications of evolutionary theory are. Is evolution incompatible with theism? Does the acceptance of evolution necessarily entail naturalism and preclude theism? Is it possible, as naturalism maintains, that everything can be reduced to physical processes, or are there too many recalcitrant phenomena that defy reduction? Answering these involves a detailed analysis of the concepts, ‘evolution,’ ‘naturalism,’ and ‘theism.’ Just what exactly does accepting evolutionary theory entail? How is it different from Darwinism? Is evolution guided or unguided? What is naturalism? There are many different types of metaphysical naturalists: eliminative materialists, physicalists, and emergent property dualists. What is the relationship between metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism? Theism affirms a creator God who sustains all being, who is transcendent and yet immanent. So if theism posits a God who is active in the world, does this mean that scientific investigation may at times have to admit supernatural explanations when natural ones fail? My general conclusion is a type of mitigated skepticism – that given evolution, neither naturalism nor theism logically follows. As to whether evolution is guided or unguided, the only correct position is ‘undetermined.’ In this instance metaphysical positions may fill in the gaps in knowledge by projection, but cannot fulfill the necessary and sufficient conditions required for knowledge. Metaphysical naturalism and theism are worldviews that an individual adopts as the most overall coherent explanation of the wide variety of experiences, intuitions, and reflections on their life. Whether evolution offers evidence for one and against the other is often based upon one’s prior metaphysical assumptions, since all facts are theory laden. The underdetermination of theory allows for multiple theories to cover the same phenomena, with each offering an epistemically adequate explanation. However, numerous recalcitrant anomalies which defy scientific explanation and reduction present problems for the strict naturalist. While neither naturalism nor theism can be determined to be objectively true, one can offer reasons for choosing one or the other on the basis of overall coherence. (shrink)

Western philosophy has asserted that in order to be a person, one must be rational. This idea was not challenged until the nineteenth century. One school to challenge this notion was phenomenology, which asserted that what made one a person was their ability to empathize. While the founder of the school, Edmund Husserl, did not assert that the ability to decipher nonverbal cues was necessary in order to empathize, several of his followers did. This emphasis on deciphering nonverbal cues proved (...) problematic for some populations, especially the Autistic. Autism is a neurological condition which makes it difficult to decipher nonverbal cues. Because of this, Autistic people are accused of lacking empathy. This is especially problematic in the case of women. Scholars such as Simon Baron-Cohen argue that on average, women are more empathetic than men. If one lacks empathy, then one has an extreme male brain. The extreme male brain is called Autism. Hence, even if an Autistic person identifies as female, her femininity is in question due to her having a male brain. If phenomenology argues that the person is shaped by their ability to empathize, then there must be a way to account for the experiences of Autistic women. In order for phenomenology to account for empathy, there must be a theory which can account for breakdowns in empathy, can critique current therapies which force the Autistic person to pass as non-Autistic, and must provide the Autistic woman a path to being authentically herself. One such theory is that proposed by Martin Heidegger. Heidegger argues that being-with-others is vital for one to be a Dasein. Still, Others can press upon Dasein to conform to their standards. The pressure to conform can lead Dasein to forget who she is. In order to be authentic, Dasein must go through the process of anxiety, after which she can become authentically herself. Thus, Heidegger’s theory gives women a path in which they can share their experiences, thus providing necessary insights to philosophy, psychology and sociology. (shrink)

People have become suspicious of authority, including epistemic authorities, i.e., knowledge experts, even on matters individuals are unqualified to adjudicate. This is problematic since most of our knowledge comes from trusting a speaker—whether scholars reading experts, students listening to teachers, children obeying their parents, or pedestrians inquiring of strangers—such that the knowledge transmitted is rarely personally verified. Despite the recent development of social epistemology and theories of testimony, this is not a new problem. Ancient and Medieval philosophers largely took it (...) for granted that most human knowledge primarily comes from listening to a trustworthy speaker whose virtuous character serves to mitigate against the twin concerns of inaccuracy and dishonesty. Thus, unlike contemporary Social Epistemology, few testimonial theories were explicitly laid out despite the crucial role testimony plays throughout a wide range of topics and teachings. To date, the working theory of testimony underpinning the works of medieval philosophers are just now being codified. This is particularly relevant for the Abrahamic faiths since they originate with testimony from God himself. The goal of this dissertation is to explore how the generation and transmission of religious knowledge appears in an exemplary thinker from each faith: Saadya Gaon of Judaism, al-Ghazālī of Islam, and Thomas Aquinas of Christianity. While not contemporaries, these exemplars are theological philosophers who are like-minded in their desire to maintain an orthodox faith while possessing philosophical approaches to truth. Thus, they maintained sophisticated epistemological theories of generation and transmission within their own religious contexts. Cataloguing these medieval testimonial theories reveals a historical incongruity with the current contemporary concept of testimony and its frameworks. Based on the testimonial theories of these three thinkers, I argue for a "transhistorical" concept of testimony that does not presume an evidentialist framework to account for pre-modern theories of testimony which predominantly rely on virtue theoretic frameworks. To test the proposed neutral framework, I offer a virtue epistemological account of testimony in which trust is not an intellectual virtue, but the intellectual aspect of the historic virtue of autonomy. I argue that intellectual autonomy and trust are inversely related in one's interactions with authority. (shrink)

In this dissertation I attempt to clarify Aristotle’s notion of essence. In particular, I focus on the essence of animal substances. When looking at Aristotle’s biological works and works like the Metaphysics it becomes perplexing how the accounts of animal essences in both are to constitute a unified view. In Parts of Animals the emphasis seems to be on definitions of animals that are rich enough to further explanatory aims. It is hard to see how such rich but messy definitions (...) will be amenable to the strategies for a definition’s unity as are given in the Metaphysics. I argue that there is a consistent account of essence to be found. By bringing Aristotle’s discussion on essence from Parts of Animals I into his discussions of definitional unity in Zeta 12 and Eta 6, there emerge resources for dealing with the problems plaguing these two sections from the Metaphysics. The key is recognizing that Aristotelian animal essences are comprised of terms describing the animal parts and their functions in greater and lesser degrees of determinacy. I argue that there is a kind of closure of function among such animal parts, and this is the basis for the unity of a substance mentioned vaguely in Eta 6. The several differences in an animal’s definition reflect this functional closure by exhibiting a kind of explanatory closure. I then build upon recent work concerning the determination relation in Aristotle to show how the several genera and differences contained in the animal essence are a unity. (shrink)

This dissertation puts American philosophers and social reformers, Jane Addams (1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952), in conversation with contemporary social and political philosopher, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006), to argue that an account of deliberative equality must make conceptual space to name the problem of ‘communicatively structured deliberative inequality’. I argue that in order for participatory democracy theory to imagine and construct genuinely inclusive deliberative spaces, it must be grounded in a relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social epistemology. The literature has (...) largely developed deliberative inequality in terms of access (e.g., participation costs) and ‘impoverished capacities’ for political participation (e.g., political-process illiteracy; public debate skills). This literature has failed to appreciate the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality. Individuals who occupy historically stigmatized social groups may participate at a communicatively structured disadvantage in participatory forums not because of their own impoverished capacities, but because of the identity-prejudiced stereotypes of their interlocutors. Chapter 1 situates Young’s communicative democracy in contemporary deliberative democracy literature and shows the inadequacies of liberal individualism, assumed by much of traditional deliberative theory, for naming and addressing the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Chapter 2 draws on literature in feminist and resistance epistemologies as well as the social identity approach within contemporary social psychology theory to flesh out the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Here, I provide a relational ontology of prejudice and examine it’s impact on one’s epistemic and deliberative standing. Chapter 3 draws on the work of Addams and Dewey to develop a relational ontology of political agency as well as the pragmatist feminist epistemology of communicative democracy. Addams and Dewey, like Young, saw exclusion as a serious social and political problem, and they looked to democratic norms and practices as a resource for social justice. Thus, Chapter 4 looks to Addams and Dewey’s writings and Addams’s leadership at Hull House as a resource for communicative democracy, and more particularly, for addressing deliberative inequality and imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to offer a new theory of humor that takes seriously both the universality and power of humor in culture. In the first chapter, I summarize historical and contemporary theories, and show how each either 1) fails to give any definition of humor, 2) fails as a theory of humor, and/or 3) underappreciates, dismisses, or does not consider the power of humor in experience. The second chapter explains the failures of prior theories by understanding the (...) problem in terms of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. These forms of culture are perspectives through which we express and understand our world, and each presents its own unique perspectives through which we can understand ourselves and the world. In the third chapter, I argue that humor is one of these necessary and universal symbolic forms of culture. I argue that confusions in the philosophy of humor stem from approaches to humor that understand it as part of some other symbolic form rather than as a form itself. In the fourth chapter, I argue for the function of humor as that which reveals and exposes epistemic vices –laziness, arrogance, and closed-minded thinking about ourselves and the world. I support this argument by showing not only that all previous theories of humor have within them epistemic revelation as a consistent commonality, but also by showing that this revelation is necessary to the form of humor while it is, at best, accidental to other forms. In my final chapter, I suggest that we ought to approach humor objectively, and that the normativity of the symbolic forms guides us toward such an approach. I offer two objective questions to ask about a given instance of humor: 1) does the humor idealize a liberated end? and 2) does the humor fulfil the cultural function of the symbolic form it represents by disrupting epistemically vicious thinking? If the answer to both of these questions is affirmative, then it is likely that the humor in question is morally praiseworthy. I conclude by offering suggestions for further study. (shrink)

When questioning whether political deception can be ethically warranted, two competing intuitions jump to the fore. First, political deception is a fact of human life, used in the realpolitik of governance. Second, the ethical warrant of truth asserts itself as inexorably and indefatigably preferable to falsehood. Unfortunately, a cursory examination of the history of philosophy reveals a paucity of models to marry these basic intuitions. Some thinkers (e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Kant, Mill, and Rawls) privilege the truth by neglecting the (...) realpolitik, i.e., the truth is inviolate. Others (e.g., Machiavelli, Bentham, and the often infamous caché of 20th century dictators) focus upon the realpolitik to the exclusion of the primacy of the truth. A third group of critical thinkers (e.g., Arendt and Bok) examine the topic but offer no positive, systematic treatment of deception. Lacking are theories which simultaneously recognize that political untruth is often necessary, but that untruth is only justified when a) truth is politically impossible, b) the necessity of untruth is demonstrable, and c) the truth can be replaced with a minimally injurious untruth. Plato offers one such account in the Republic, arguing that deceit must be applied medicinally to the city. However, his account is problematic in detail. One of Plato’s inheritors, the 10th century thinker al-Fārābī, advanced Plato’s theoretical account, arguing that political governance requires restrained political deception. This deception, the expression of philosophical truths through the symbols of religion, meets the criteria mentioned above, being necessary, demonstrably necessary, and minimally injurious. But while al-Fārābī provides a valuable model for what justified political deception could look like, the lengths to which he must go in order to create a viable model for political deception reveals the untenability of the notion of justified political deception writ large. One must orchestrate an entire cosmos around the notion, notably a cosmos that does not match our own. One must adopt very specific conceptions of human nature, association, and happiness, as well as a particular metaphysics and epistemology. For, while al-Fārābī shows that political deception can be justifiable, he also reveals its unjustifiability outside an idealized setting. (shrink)

More than 80 years after his death, Husserl’s voluminous work remains an unexhausted resource for contemporary philosophy. This is true of his later work, but it is also true of his early text, Logical Investigations. Relying and building on work done by numerous scholars and philosophers, especially Dan Zahavi, Walter Hopp, Philipp Berghofer, and Declan Smithies, this dissertation is an attempt to utilize some resources in Logical Investigations in order, first, to help articulate an Husserlian descriptive account of phenomenal consciousness (...) and apply it to the cognitive phenomenology debate in philosophy of mind, and, second, to help show the relevancy of Husserl’s phenomenological epistemology — which is effectively a functional account of phenomenal consciousness — to the debate over the role of phenomenal consciousness in epistemic justification. While these descriptive and functional accounts are not without their problems, they nevertheless provide an important perspective on these contemporary debates. (shrink)

Towards the end of one of Dewey's famous polemical essays, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," published in 1917 in a cooperative volume entitled Creative Intelligence, there occurs this sentence: "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men." Twenty-nine years later, towards the end of his life, he published a collection of his essays with the title, (...) Problems of Men. In an essay prepared for that volume he reiterated the theme that philosophers must be concerned with the problems of men, and, again, in the 1948 Introduction to the reprint of Reconstruction in Philosophy he called for a reconstruction of philosophy that it might contribute to the resolution of tensions among men. The theme is a constant one in Dewey's writings on the nature of philosophy, even where the phrase, "problems of men," is not used. Even a cursory reading of the texts in which Dewey refers to the status and nature of philosophy cannot fail to give the impression that Dewey found the estate of philosophy in poor condition, indeed,k and that only a radical revision of its office and methods would save it. Now, one of the most "philosophic" of the problems of philosophers has been the attempt to present a coherent general interpretation of existence, namely, a metaphysics. It would seem, however, that Dewey, in fact, attempted to articulate a metaphysics, especially in his Cerus Lectures, Experience and Nature. If this is so, does it represent a certain reversion to an approach to philosophy he explicitly condemned?... (shrink)

One of my philosophy professors once remarked on the difficulty of labeling ideas once they are in circulation. A philosopher's ideas, newly developed today, may become common currency as time goes on and eventually lose their label, "These thoughts belong to N ••• •" This observation points at the same time to the truth that even though philosophy is theoretical, it nevertheless exerts a change, in men and in their world. Jonathan Edwards illustrates this element of continuity amidst change. Standing (...) on the threshold or America's intellectual history, he both reflects the ideas of another century and another world, and foreshadows later New England thought. It is the ideas that Edwards reflects in his philosophy of freedom that I propose to examine. In particular, it is the purpose of this thesis to discuss the doctrine or freedom or will as Edwards formulated it in the light or the influence of Calvinism, Arminianism, and Lockean psychology. That they were influencing factors in the formulation of Edwards' doctrine is certain from his own references to them. It is the extent of their influence, in so far as it is possible to determine, and the subsequent development of Edwards' position, that is the concern or this thesis. (shrink)

This dissertation reassesses the complex philosophical relationship between Sartre and psychoanalysis. Most scholarship on this topic focuses on Sartre’s criticisms of the unconscious as anathema both to his conception of the human psyche as devoid of any hidden depths or mental compartments and, correlatively, his account of human freedom. Many philosophers conclude that there is little common ground between Sartrean existentialism and psychoanalytic theory. I argue, on the contrary, that by shifting the emphasis from concerns about the nature of the (...) unconscious to questions about the role of imagination in psychical life, we can see that Sartre and Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory develop strikingly similar accounts of human subjectivity. After establishing the historical background of Sartre’s career-long engagement with psychoanalysis, I demonstrate the proximity of Sartre and Lacan on the nature of unconscious thought. I proceed to develop the claim that there is a homology between the concept of unconscious fantasy in psychoanalysis and the concept of the imaginary in Sartre’s philosophical corpus. Despite the concept of fantasy being one of the more structuralist-inspired aspects of Lacan’s metapsychology, I show that Sartre’s concept of the imaginary is likewise a structural feature of the psyche, one which establishes the coordinates within which the subject engages with the world. For Sartre, Freud, and Lacan fantasies form the core of subjectivity, giving form to the basic patterns of one’s character. Taken together, these three thinkers furnish a nuanced view of fantasy/the imaginary. On the one hand it is determining insofar as it is responsible for many of the psychopathologies met with in psychoanalysis. On the other hand, it is liberating insofar as the agency of the subject is implicated in the formation of fantasy. I thereby show that Sartre does not fit the caricatured picture of a radical voluntarist that is often attributed to him and that psychoanalysis can accommodate a conception of human freedom. (shrink)

In adolescent sex education, the contemporary debate has developed into two camps: the paternalistic view and the liberal view. I argue that both sides of the camp have been too focused on actions and behavior and are assuming a heteronormative background. This dissertation argues that the way to take care of the self is through exercises, techniques, self-discipline, and self-cultivation—what the ancient Greeks called áskēsis. By applying áskēsis to sex education, students will gain the character of taking care of the (...) sexual self and have a robust outlook of themselves via sexuality. After looking at countless syllabi, I reduce three different moral foundations that underlie existing sex education programs. The first are paternalistic sex education programs. However, empirical research shows that gender discrepancies and heteronormativity are presented as inevitable. The second model is what I call liberal-consequentialist sex education, which emphasizes avoiding negative consequences such as unwanted pregnancies and STIs. This model is an improvement since it empowers students with essential knowledge such as anatomy and sexual mechanics. But this model is still limited because it fails to discuss many forms of sexuality and gender while embracing heteronormativity. The third model is what I call liberal-deontological sex education, which teaches sexual consent. While this model definitely improves on the previous two models, there is still something lacking. Most importantly, this model fails to address the gender inequality at the root of the problematic power dynamics. For example, if to receive consent is to garner a yes, then all men have to do is manipulate woman to get that yes. These three models focus on a person’s behavior, but sexuality is much deeper. Therefore, we need another model that implements áskēsis. For simplicity, I analyze áskēsis to three components: the sexual emotions, the sexual mind, and the sexual body. A comprehensive sex education program helps students train the moral sexual character by disciplining whether those components are coming from their authentic character, or if these ideas were simply societal expectations. This model, thereby, helps students question their own social mores and help formulate their sexual subjectivity. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I seek to explain G.W.F. Hegel’s view that human accessible conceptual content can provide knowledge about the nature or essence of things. I call this view “Conceptual Transparency.” It finds its historical antecedent in the views of eighteenth century German rationalists, which were strongly criticized by Immanuel Kant. I argue that Hegel explains Conceptual Transparency in such a way that preserves many implications of German rationalism, but in a form that is largely compatible with Kant’s criticisms of (...) the original rationalist version. After providing background on Hegel’s relationship to the traditional rationalist theory of concepts and Kant’s challenge to it, I claim that Hegel’s central task is to provide a theory of conceptual content that allows a relationship to the objective world without being dependent on the specifically sensory aspect of the world, which Kant’s theory of concepts required. Since many interpreters deny that Hegel’s use of the term “concept” is comparable to other historical philosophers (or our own), I first show that Hegel’s critique of standard conceptions of concepts presupposes an agreement of subject matter. I then show how Hegel’s account of the “formal concept” provides the skeleton for a view of conceptual content that relies on negative relations between terms, rather than a relation to sensibility, to provide content. Hegel’s account of conceptual content is completed when he shows how a universal term is further specified so that it can determine singular objects. This occurs in its adequate form in a teleological process. I argue that Hegel’s account of teleology in the Science of Logic is an attempt to explain how and where Conceptual Transparency obtains. A teleological process is one in which a concept constitutes an object, and this means that a concept is perfectly adequate to express that thing’s nature and not merely to represent it. However, in the final chapter, I show that Hegel’s concept of teleology is meant paradigmatically to illuminate how human purposive processes have constituted a social world that is conceptually accessible to us. In this way, the primary “province” of Hegel’s rationalism is the human constructed world. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I will examine the problem of theological fatalism in St. Augustine and, specifically, whether or not Augustine was philosophically justified in his belief that his views on divine grace and human freedom could be harmonized. As is well-known, beginning with his second response To Simplician (ca. 396) and continuing through his works against the semi-Pelagians (ca. 426-429), Augustine espoused the Pauline doctrine of all-inclusive grace: that the fallen will’s ability to accomplish the good is totally a function (...) of God’s elective grace. What, then, does the fallen will do to work out its own salvation? There is the further issue of how to reconcile Augustine’s rather extreme emphasis on grace in his later works with the more balanced picture we receive in his sermones ad populum, written throughout his forty-year preaching career. In many of these sermons, even those written during the Pelagian controversy, Augustine is careful to leave space for both divine and human initiative in the process of our justification within the totus Christus, or ‘whole Christ.’ How we can understand Augustine in his role as doctor gratiae and as preacher of human freedom will be a major inquiry of this dissertation.The most serious obstacle to moving forward on these problems has been and remains the essentialist interpretation of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology by most commentators. On their interpretation, Augustine thought that there were no real distinctions within the Trinity, with each of the three divine persons and their actions sharing in the absolute unity of the divine essence. Holding this interpretation not only does away with the distinctness of each of the persons, but also requires all of God’s different powers and attributes, including willing and foreknowing, to be coalesced into one another without distinction in the divine essence. God’s foreknowledge is thereby identified with God’s will, which necessarily leads to theological fatalism: God would have to will everything that He foreknows, and God would have to foreknow everything that He wills. Since God is omniscient, He wills everything that will happen, including the future willings of the fallen human will.It cannot be denied that there are texts in the Augustinian corpus that seem to point to a reading of the Trinity as absolutely simple. But this study will endeavor to show that there are also other largely overlooked texts in On the Trinity, the Confessions, and his Commentaries on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (among others) that argue for various distinctions within the Trinity to make sense of the relation between Creator and creature, and the differences between the divine processions of generation/spiration, and the act of creation. These texts will be shown to parallel very closely the position of the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition, which consistently uses the real distinction between God’s essential being and energetic activities (also known as the essence-energy distinction) to avoid the problem of theological fatalism. This rich theological and philosophical tradition, from the time of the fourth-century Greek Fathers to the Byzantine tradition that followed, differs less with Augustine concerning the essentials of Trinitarian theology and its practical implications for solving the problem of making human freedom and divine grace compatible than has been hitherto thought. (shrink)

The purpose of this project is to provide a clear and compelling account of the existence and nature of values within a phenomenological context. Values such as beauty or virtue are certainly a major part of our experiential lives. After all, what would life be worth if we could never describe a painting as beautiful, for example, or a beverage as delicious? Nevertheless, understanding what these values are on their own terms has historically been a rather difficult task. Certainly, they (...) are not ordinary objects that could be seen or heard, touched or tasted, like the physical objects to which they seem to be connected in some mysterious way. In this book, I argue that a phenomenological approach enables us to give a solid account of the role that values play in experience. Working in dialogue with Husserl and other phenomenologists and related thinkers (especially Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann), as well as with recent commentary, I develop my own account of values as lying on the phenomenological “horizons” of experience. This interpretation, I argue, enables us to explain how notions like beauty or deliciousness play such a dramatic role in our everyday lives without committing us to any unwarranted ontological assertions. Throughout this project, I analyze the various structures that govern our valuative experiences in order to develop a rigorous theoretical account of what all these experiences have in common. As part of this task, I investigate the various different types of values (e.g., aesthetic values, moral values, sensual values, etc.), the connection between values and subjectivity, and the link between acts of valuation and acts of the will. My aim in the project is to make clear the basic role that values as such play in the conscious life of the experiencing subject throughout our daily lives. Ultimately, I hope to clarify some of the difficult theoretical issues surrounding our experiences of values in order to clear the way for more specific investigations into particular regions of values (e.g., a phenomenology of aesthetic experience) to be carried out on the basis of this overarching model. (shrink)

Contemporary scholarship has generally focused on two major influences that have shaped Thomas Aquinas’ account of the soul. The first set of scholarship focuses on how doctrinal concerns and the Augustinian and Scholastic traditions defined the central issue that Aquinas faced, viz., explaining how the soul can be treated as an individual substance that has an essential relationship to a body. The second set of scholarship focuses on Aquinas’s employment of Aristotle’s works in his attempt to resolve the issue. Contemporary (...) assessments of Aquinas’s theory of the soul-body relation therefore take Aquinas to be offering a solution that follows directly from Aristotle’s hylomorphism and Aristotle’s remarks about human psychology. However, this provides an incomplete picture of Aquinas’s ontology of soul and its relationship with the body. Aristotle’s remarks about form, the form-matter relationship, the role of intellection in human psychology, and the status of the soul as form in light of its intellectual activity require significant interpretation on the part of the reader. Aquinas often turns to the works of Avicenna and Averroes for guidance in how to read Aristotle. Moreover, Avicenna’s own understanding of Aristotle’s view of the soul is heavily influenced by important conceptual changes to the notion of form in the Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle. Aquinas selectively follows interpretations or adopts principles found in the works of Avicenna and Averroes when presenting his own account of the soul. This is important, because these principles differ in important ways from Aristotle’s own views or from alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s remarks. Consideration of Aquinas’s Arabic/Islamic and Neoplatonic sources is therefore indispensable for a complete account of Aquinas’s conception of the soul as both a subsistent substance and substantial form. (shrink)

As Hegel notes in his long Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the problem of the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies presents a particularly urgent problem to the very discipline of philosophy itself. For, from the viewpoint of what Hegel would refer to as “ordinary consciousness”, the fact that there are so many different philosophies which seem constantly to disagree can only lead to one conclusion: philosophy itself is a futile enterprise. Hegel, perhaps more than any previous philosopher, (...) was sensitive to this charge of futility levelled against philosophy. In response, he provided an explanatory account of the multiplicity of philosophies. This dissertation seeks to explicate Hegel’s effort in this regard. Hegel’s basic argument is that the multiplicity of philosophies is to be explained as expressions of the dialectical and polymorphic development of the mind. The mind advances through stages, each one of which is capable of expressing itself in some determinate philosophy. Insofar as this is the case, however, philosophy can be shown to be not merely a haphazard succession of conflicting viewpoints but rather the manifestation of the mind in its historical development. The chapters of this dissertation each examine crucial elements to Hegel’s overall theory of the development of the mind. They also demonstrate how Hegel thereby explains the very emergence of, and intelligible correlations among, the various philosophies. (shrink)

This dissertation explores Jean Paul Sartre’s and Michel Foucault’s view that subjectivity is socially and historically constituted. Additionally, it explores their corresponding ethical thought and how these viewpoints can be applied to ethical issues in the delivery of healthcare. Sartre and Foucault both hold the view that human beings as subjects are not just participants or spectators in social practices, rather, they become subjects with ontological possibilities through their interaction with these practices. In Chapter One, I trace Sartre’s views on (...) subjectivity in his two major works Being and Nothingness and The Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1, showing how he argues that we are constituted as subjects through a dialectical interaction of consciously intended praxis with the reified results of human affairs, or practico-inert. In Chapter Two, I trace Foucault’s views on the subject through all three periods of his career, and show how he argues that we are constituted as subjects through systems of thought, strategies of power, and practices of the self. I specifically differentiate the views of each philosopher from those of the more traditional moral philosophers Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, who view the subject as self-determining and ahistorical. In Chapter Three, I examine each thinker’s later lectures on ethics, and show that each philosopher presents an outline for an ethical mode of being, which I call “ethical subjectivity.” For both philosophers, ethical subjectivity requires critical historical reflection, ethics as an ongoing task, and innovation. In Chapters Four and Five, I use Sartre’s and Foucault’s views on subjectivity and ethics to analyze two contemporary issues in healthcare ethics: conscience-based refusals and mandatory HPV vaccination. Through discussion of these two issues, I show how focusing on the social, historical, material dimensions of how we become who we are introduces a different starting point for analysis and leads to a unique discussion in contrast to the ethical approaches rooted in the thought of Kant or Mill. (shrink)

This dissertation attempts to preserve the central tenets of a global moral theory called “the capabilities approach” as defended by Martha Nussbaum, but to do so in a way that better realizes its own goals of identifying gender injustices and gaining cross-cultural support by providing an alternative defense of it. Capabilities assess an individual’s well-being based on what she is able to do (actions) and who she is able to be (states of existence). Nussbaum grounds her theory in the intuitive (...) idea that each and every person is worthy of equal respect and dignity. The problem with grounding a theory in a version of intuitionism is that it runs the risk of authoritarian moral reasoning. I argue Nussbaum, in fact, is the final arbiter who decides which intuitions are mistaken, which are not, and how to interpret what people say to fit into her own framework. This method of justifying capabilities is most problematic in cases of social inequality whereby dominant group members do not feel they need to check their intuitions against non-dominant group members, and even if they did, they are not forced to take the non-dominant group’s intuitions seriously. I find capabilities as a global moral theory to be very promising, and I agree with Nussbaum that a list of capabilities is beneficial for identifying people who are not able to live a truly dignified human life. However, I am also sympathetic to the criticism of defending capabilities using a version of intuitionism. So, I offer an alternative method of justifying the capabilities rooted in the discourse ethics tradition. This method seeks all persons that are affected by the outcome to freely and equally share their opinion. This avoids the charge of authoritarian moral reasoning, because (1) it seeks perspectives other than simply one’s own, but unlike traditional ethics, it (2) pays special attention to the ways in which power relations shape dialogue. Ultimately, I hope to have preserved the central tenets of the capabilities approach while better realizing Nussbaum’s commitment to defending a theory that is gender sensitive and has gained cross-cultural support. (shrink)

This dissertation presents an in-depth investigation into the notion of paradox and its significance for Christian existence in the thought of the Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard. The primary aim of the study is to explore and to develop various expressions of paradox in Kierkegaard’s authorship in order to demonstrate the manner by which Kierkegaard employs paradox as a means of challenging his Christendom contemporaries to exist as authentic Christians, and more specifically to enter into the existential state I (...) am identifying in this project as living within the sacred tension. With this aim in mind, I begin with a discussion of Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task in response to his Christendom culture and I provide a broad characterization of the notion of sacred tension as the telos of this task. For the majority of the study I then focus on four different expressions of paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought. These four expressions are: paradox that is associated with the faith of Abraham (as presented in Fear and Trembling), paradox that is associated with the nature of the self and the task of selfhood (as presented in The Sickness unto Death), paradox that is associated with the God-man (as presented in Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Practice in Christianity), and paradox that is associated with Christian love (as presented in Works of Love). In addition to arguing that Kierkegaard employs these expressions of paradox to help usher his contemporaries into a state of sacred tension, I also argue that such sacred tension can be understood in terms of various concrete Christian virtues. In this respect, I claim that Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task is not merely negative or deconstructive in nature, but rather it is infused with the robust positive content associated with Kierkegaard’s particular understanding of Christianity. Viewing Kierkegaard’s thought and writings in this manner helps to reaffirm the significance of the notion of paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought and to highlight the value of the notion of sacred tension for a reassessment of both Kierkegaard’s existentialism and its contemporary implications. (shrink)

The following is a critical and historical account of Aristotelian Essentialism informed by recent work on Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. The semantics of the modal syllogistic are interpreted in a way that is motivated by Aristotle, and also make his validity claims in the Prior Analytics consistent to a higher degree than previously developed interpretative models. In Chapter One, ancient and contemporary objections to the Aristotelian modal syllogistic are discussed. A resolution to apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is proposed and (...) developed out of recent work by Patterson, Rini, and Malink. In particular, I argue that the semantics of negation is distinct in modal context from those of assertoric negative claims. Given my interpretive model of Aristotle’s semantics, in Chapter Two, I provide proofs for each of the mixed apodictic syllogisms, and propose a method of using Venn Diagrams to visualize the validity claims Aristotle makes in the Prior Analytics. Chapter Three explores how Aristotle’s syllogistic fits within Aristotle’s philosophy of science and demonstration, particularly within the context of the Posterior Analytics. Consideration is given to the Aristotelian understanding of the relationship among necessity, explanation, definition, and essence. Chapter Four applies Aristotelian modal logic in contemporary contexts. I contrast Aristotelian modality and essentialism with contemporary modalism based upon the semantics of possible worlds, e.g. Kripke and Putnam. I also develop an account of how Aristotelian modal logic can ground a sortal dependent theory of identity, as discussed by Wiggins. (shrink)

In the aftermath of national or international tragedies, appeals for action such as, “Never Forget” or “Never Again” are ubiquitous. Theodor Adorno makes a similar call in the wake of the Holocaust, proclaiming that all education should be focused on the prevention of another genocide. While most would agree with such a statement, practically how do we respond to such a call, specifically in light of Adorno’s work? Answering this question is at the heart of this project and I argue (...) that imaginative memorials can fulfill Adorno’s criteria for post-Auschwitz education. I first present a theory of moral imagination by relying on contemporary accounts of the theory and then show how it complements Adorno’s work, specifically by offering an explanatory foundation to a number of his claims. I reveal that many of Adorno’s observations about the world are supported by recent advancements in the understanding of imagination and I argue that the combination of contemporary accounts of moral imagination and Adorno’s thought are mutually beneficial. After the two theories have been sufficiently discussed and integrated, I focus on Adorno’s arguments regarding education following Auschwitz. Adorno argues that we should investigate how such a horror could occur, and the people who committed the acts of genocide. Such information will be helpful for the prevention of another Auschwitz because we can attempt to overcome the values and ideas of those who perpetrated genocide. This dissertation is unique and of philosophical importance because it fleshes out Adorno’s discussion of the characteristics that led to the Holocaust and argues for a specific form of education that meets all of the criteria of Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education: memorials that stimulate the visitor’s imagination. In order to make this point, I highlight specific Holocaust memorials that are imaginative and argue for their efficacy. My goal for the project is to actualize Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education initiative through imaginative memorials. (shrink)

This project presents a comparative philosophical approach to understanding key elements in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard by juxtaposing his works with the philosophy and theology of the Eastern Orthodox Church.. The primary aim of the project is to look at three key areas of Kierkegaard’s philosophy that have been either underrepresented or misunderstood in the literature. These three areas are: Kierkegaard’s views on sin and salvation, Kierkegaard’s epistemology, and Kierkegaard’s philosophy of personhood. The dissertation ends with an epilogue that (...) briefly explores a further area where this comparative approach might provide fruitful results, namely Kierkegaard’s views on collective worship. I argue that the revolutionary nature of Kierkegaard’s break with prevalent views in the Western Christian traditions (Protestantism and Roman Catholicism) have not always been fully appreciated due to the fact that he is most often read through the lens of either Western Christianity or the Western philosophical traditions that he came to influence (e.g. existentialism and post-modernism). Viewing Kierkegaard in light of the Eastern Christian tradition offers a new interpretive lens that highlights the extent to which Kierkegaard aimed to break free from standard Western accounts of sin and salvation, knowledge of God, and human personhood. (shrink)

In this dissertation I examine Hume’s secular re-definition and re-evaluation of the traditional Christian understanding of pride and humility as part of his project to establish a fully secular account of ethics and to undermine what he thought to be the harmful aspects of religious morality. Christians traditionally have seen humility, understood as receptivity to God, to be crucial for individual and social flourishing, and pride as the root of individual and social disorder. By contrast, Hume, who conceives of pride (...) and humility immanently in terms of our self-appraisals, sees pride as a key virtue that serves as the ultimate source of moral motivation and deems humility a ‘monkish virtue’ (i.e., a vice). Hume, moreover, sees religious appeals to a transcendent moral source to be a threat to individual flourishing in that they encourage the formation of what he calls ‘artificial lives’ (of which the monkish virtues are an expression) as well as a threat to social concord, insofar as they foster unnecessary religious factions, intolerance, and theologically sanctioned violence. In part to combat this, Hume promotes a wholly secular ethic rooted in common life. I uncover the real points of agreement and disagreement that underlie Hume and traditional Christian conceptions of pride and humility in order to articulate what is essentially at issue between these contrasting perspectives and, ultimately, to identify some of what is gained or lost in Hume’s secularization of ethics. I, thus, explore the reasons that Hume rejects Christian morality and seeks to replace it with a secular one. I then assess whether Hume’s secular perspective has sufficient resources for addressing the biased judgments and rivalries that can arise precisely because of what Hume sees as our natural desire for the ‘passion of pride’ (i.e., for a positive sense of ourselves before others). I conclude both that Hume identifies genuine dangers in attempting to go beyond the human and also that there are genuine dangers in Hume’s attempt to close the window to a transcendent moral source. I, therefore, contend that any adequate view of human flourishing must take account of both these dangers. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the viability of a feminist ethic of flourishing. The possibility of a eudaimonist, or flourishing-based, ethic adapted for the needs of feminist ethics and politics has recently been raised by a number of feminist moral philosophers. However, in these discussions, the degree to which an ethic of flourishing requires a substantive conception of human nature has not been adequately addressed. Flourishing-based ethical theories appear to require a substantive account of the kind of thing whose flourishing is to (...) be promoted, while contemporary academic feminism is characterized by a strong suspicion toward claims about human nature. Chapter one situates this problem in the current literature and reframes feminist anti-essentialist objections to nature claims. Chapter two analyzes three historically influential exemplars of the ethics of flourishing: Aristotle, Hume, and Marx. Employing the analytic categories developed in chapter two, chapters three through five assess the work of Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum, and Lisa Tessman for their adequacy to serve as the basis of a feminist ethic of flourishing. I argue that each has something of value to offer and yet each is problematic when it comes to how they appeal (or fail to appeal) to human nature. The central argument of this dissertation is that, properly understood, a theory of human nature can be a critical resource for a feminist ethic of flourishing. As such, feminist moral philosophers who would condemn oppression, gender-based subordination, and other injustices by appealing to an ideal of flourishing that is being denied or cut off, would benefit from greater attention to the assumptions about human nature that such theories of flourishing entail. On the view defended here, a normative conception of human nature is a necessary methodological element of a flourishing-based ethical theory that illuminates the reasons one has in support of a particular vision of flourishing. While I leave open the question of how such a conception of human nature could be objectively justified, this dissertation argues that a theory of human nature can serve as a normative resource for feminist moral criticism within a flourishing-based ethical framework. (shrink)

The doctrine of the conceptual priority of the perfect (CPP) is the claim that the concept of the perfect is prior to that of the imperfect insofar as possessing the latter presupposes a grasp of the former, but not vice versa. The goals of this study are to provide an account and defense of the Cartesian argument for CPP, to determine the consequences of this priority for the relationship between our concepts of human and divine properties, and to explore its (...) implications for bottom-up accounts of theological concept formation. I argue that the predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in Descartes’ version of CPP are equivalent to “true” or “genuine” and thus function in the same way they would in geometrical examples where the perfection at issue is definitive of the kind and where imperfection constitutes falling short of the kind. I can thus be said to have the idea of a “perfect” circle (of that which is “infinitely” circular, as it were) merely by virtue of having the idea of a circle, yet I cannot apprehend something as imperfect or finite insofar as it resembles but fails to be a circle unless I already possess a concept of the kind in question—a true or perfect circle. CPP thus implies a qualitative distinction between the perfect and imperfect that, when applied to God and creation, is consistent with a theory of analogy. Unlike traditional ‘bottom-up’ theories of analogy, however, CPP entails a ‘top-down’ order of derivation in which concepts of creaturely perfections are derived (via a sort of ‘partial negation’) from concepts of divine ones. The ‘top-down’ order of derivation yields epistemological advantages over the traditional approach, which had always struggled to explain how we can derive analogical concepts of God from creatures. Further, CPP enables its proponents to address the classic anthropomorphism critiques leveled at practitioners of Perfect Being Theology. Though I acknowledge that CPP is not without its own weaknesses, I present a largely sympathetic account of the argument and its relevance for contemporary philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Various factors must be considered in evaluating the cost of education. This study placed primary emphasis on the dropout factor in analyzing the cost of a special type of education, namely, the ministerial training program of The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. Since a sizable number of ministerial students discontinue before graduation, this study was an attempt, in the light of the Synod's position on ministerial training, to determine if the financial investment in the ministerial training which the dropouts received could be (...) justified by commendatory observable attitudes and measureable activities subsequent to their discontinuance. A survey of the 120-year history of the Synod brought its position in reference to the cost of ministerial training into focus. The Synod has sought to provide a high type of ministerial training and has consistently regarded this,as an integral and essential part of its entire program. Therefore, its colleges and seminaries, engaged primarily in training the clergy, have been considered to have a valid claim to its financial support. Through the years the Synod has made a distinction in the distribution of the cost of the training to the ministerial students, the non-ministerial students, and the dropouts, Criteria for the empirical study of evaluating the dropout factor in the cost of the Synod's ministerial training program were established by soliciting the opinions of the chief elected officials of the Synod in reference to the attitudes and activities to be expected of the dropouts. These officials selected five significant areas of attitude and activity, in which the majority of them expected every ministerial dropout to excel at least sixty per cent of the membership of his respective church, if the financial support of the ministerial training received was to be considered justifiable... (shrink)

This dissertation explores and develops an account of the moral obligation to engage in resistance struggles against oppression and it does so by situating oppression squarely within the framework of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. It is argued that when oppression is investigated through the lens of virtue ethics the harmful and damning nature of oppression must be understood as a substantial moral, not merely political, problem. In short, it is shown that oppression acts in a variety of ways as a barrier (...) for the achievement of flourishing for the oppressed. Turning from, and building on, this investigative and largely descriptive analysis of oppression’s substantial harms, this project moves to establish an obligation to resist oppression. Using the conception of v-rules, as advanced by Rosalind Hursthouse, such an obligation is established and then given radical content. In the end, the resistance to oppression which agents must undertake cannot be satisfied through mere dispositional attitudes but include the deployment of active resistance struggles. Our struggle against oppression must be practically informed by organizing principles and the strategies and tactics we enact and must place a premium on efficacy. The overwhelming need for oppression to be actively and effectively combated by the oppressed, given the tremendous moral damage that oppression inflicts, necessitates the use of radical actions. It is through radical and revolutionary actions and movements that oppression can be resisted and, hopefully, destroyed. (shrink)