Este trabalho é parte de um estudo etnográfico em andamento no mestrado em Relações Étnicas e Contemporaneidade, período entre 2015-2017 com crianças da Comunidade Quilombola Barroso, município de Camamu-Bahia. Para construção dos dados foram realizadas pesquisas de campo, análises documentais, leituras de periódicos, livros e pesquisas online. Durante as observações pretendeu-se investigar como se dá o processo de construção identitária das crianças, tendo como objetivos específicos conhecer como os estudantes expressam sua identidade na escola e analisar de que forma as (...) relações estabelecidas na escola influenciam na construção identitária das crianças. Para além da escola, visitamos outros espaços por considerar importante e necessário conhecer como elas se relacionam, direcionando este primeiro olhar para o contexto sócio-histórico, político e cultural da comunidade. Palavras chave: Identidade. Quilombo. Símbolo. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza los patrones de desambiguación de presuposiciones que se pueden considerar anafóricas y son generadas por partículas indexicales. En contraste con teorías recientes sobre la presuposición que privilegian la información lexical proponemos un análisis perspectivo de la presuposición según el cual la inferencia por defecto sobre este tipo de información hace uso de la perspectiva de los hablantes. En dos estudios exploramos el patrón de desambiguación de oraciones que contienen la palabra ‘también’ en contextos donde se usa el (...) indéxico ‘yo’. Los resultados confirman nuestra hipótesis y se discuten a la luz las principales ideas sobre presuposición y anáfora. A partir de estos resultados sugerimos algunas direcciones futuras de investigación. (shrink)

En su comentario a la Isagoge, Duns Escoto se pregunta dónde se halla el universal: ¿en las cosas o en el intelecto? Caracterizando al universal como universal lógico y accidente intencional de la esencia, en su respuesta se articulan la dimensión ontológica y la dimensión semántica del universal: con el intelecto que lo causa y con la cosa que denomina. Analizaremos estas dos relaciones y las implicaciones que se siguen en el orden de la predicación a partir del ejemplo propuesto (...) por Escoto: «hombre es universal». In his Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Scotus asks about the place of inherence of the universal: ¿is it in the things or in the intellect? Being established the universal as logical universal and intentional accident of the essence, in Scotus’s answer the ontological and the semantical dimensions of the universal are articulated: with the intellect which causes it and with the thing it designates. We will analyse both of these relations and their implications in the order of predication taking into account Scotus’s example «man is universal». (shrink)

En este trabajo se estudia la concepción de la filosofía y el método de la exageración propuesto por Günther Anders en su obra en dos volúmenes La obsolescencia del hombre (1956-1980). Si temáticamente el centro de la obra es la preocupación por la posible autodestrucción de la humanidad en la época atómica; Anders también propone una comprensión de la filosofía y de su método como correlato operatorio de dicha posible aniquilación. Esta revisión de la filosofía y su método constituyen la (...) justificación del tratamiento filosófico de la posibilidad de la autodestrucción de la humanidad. (shrink)

This paper first illustrates what kind of ethical issues arise from the new information, communication and automation technology. It then argues that we may embrace the popular idea that technology is ethically neutral or even ambivalent without having to close our eyes to those issues and in fact, that the ethical neutrality of technology makes them all the more urgent. Finally, it suggests that the widely ignored fact of normal responsible behaviour offers a new and fruitful starting point for any (...) future thinking about such issues. (shrink)

Standpoint theorists have long been clear that marginalization does not make better understanding a given. They have been less clear, though, that social dominance does not make ignorance a given. Indeed, many standpoint theorists have implicitly committed themselves to what I call the strong epistemic disadvantage thesis. According to this thesis, there are strong, substantive limits on what the socially dominant can know about oppression that they do not personally experience. I argue that this thesis is not just implausible but (...) politically pernicious; it is an excuse for ignorance and silence that stifles our ability to address many injustices. Moreover, I argue that if we are to avoid lending support to the SEDT while working within a standpoint theory framework, we must hold that the socially dominant can achieve marginalized standpoints. So, we must hold that men can achieve feminist standpoints, that white women (and men) can achieve black feminist standpoints, and so on. (shrink)

IT es una novela de terror publicada en 1986 por el escritor estadounidense Stephen King. La historia sigue a un grupo de siete amigos, el Club de los Perdedores, mientras son aterrorizados por un ente sobrenatural. IT explota los miedos y fobias de sus víctimas para disfrazarse al cazar a sus presas. El principal objetivo de este trabajo es demostrar que el trauma infantil es el principal factor de terror en la novela, esto a través de tres tangentes distintas presentes (...) en la obra: la falta de memoria, la ansiedad excesiva y la inmadurez emocional severa. (shrink)

Viewed this way, the texts yield striking examples of language and notation that are irreducibly ambiguous and productive because they are ambiguous.

Dementia patients in the moderate-late stage of the disease can, and often do, express different preferences than they did at the onset of their condition. The received view in the philosophical literature argues that advance directives which prioritize the patient’s preferences at onset ought to be given decisive moral weight in medical decision-making. Clinical practice, on the other hand, favors giving moral weight to the preferences expressed by dementia patients after onset. The purpose of this article is to show that (...) the received view in the philosophical literature is inadequate and is out of touch with real clinical practice. I argue that having dementia is a cognitive transformative experience and that preference changes which result from this are legitimate and ought to be given moral weight in medical decision-making. This argument ought to encourage us to reduce our confidence in the moral weight of advance directives for dementia patients. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que las Confesiones no solamente pueden ser leídas como una autobiografía, como un itinerario espiritual o como una exhortación divina; sino que, además, puede ser entendida como el despliegue de un pensamiento ávido de trascendencia que posibilita la revitalización de la prudencia como saber moral. Aunque san Agustín no explicita una definición de prudencia en el texto, creo, sin embargo, que es posible construir a partir de su pensamiento una noción de sabiduría que (...) sirva para comprender «el drama interno» que padece el hombre. This article aims to show that the Confessions can be read not ones as an autobiography, a spiritual journey or a divine exhortation; because it also can be understood as the deployment of a hungry thought of transcendence that allows the revitalization of prudence as moral knowledge. Although St. Augustine does not explicitly, a definition of prudence in the text, I think, however, it is possible to build a notion of wisdom on his thinking to help understand man’s «internal drama». (shrink)

Standpoint epistemology has been linked with increasing calls for deference to the socially marginalized. As we understand it, deference involves recognizing someone else as better positioned than we are, either to investigate or to answer some question, and then accepting their judgment as our own. We connect contemporary calls for deference to old objections that standpoint epistemology wrongly reifies differences between groups. We also argue that while deferential epistemic norms present themselves as a solution to longstanding injustices, habitual deference prevents (...) the socially dominant from developing for themselves the skills necessary to expand their capacity for empathy, to deftly probe for evidence, and to ask critical questions. Consequently, we argue that standpoint epistemology must be understood as calling for inclusion, not deference. (shrink)

There is an undeniable tendency to dismiss women’s sexual assault allegations out of hand. However, this tendency is not monolithic—allegations that black men have raped white women are often met with deadly seriousness. I argue that contemporary rape culture is characterized by the interplay between rape myths that minimize rape, and myths that catastrophize rape. Together, these two sets of rape myths distort the epistemic resources that people use when assessing rape allegations. These distortions result in the unjust exoneration of (...) people we cannot conceive of as monstrous, while making it too easy to believe that some marginalized people could be rapists. I also argue that rape myths enable a novel kind of epistemic injustice. This injustice concerns how our assessments of trustworthiness and our assessments of plausibility interact. I argue that rape myths can result in runaway credibility deflations that can explain both why people fail to believe most women, and also why people may unjustly believe false allegations that white women have been raped by black men. (shrink)

An epistemic account of constitutive relevance lists the criteria by which scientists can identify the components of mechanisms in empirical practice. Three prominent claims from Craver form a promising basis for an account. First, constitutive relevance is established by means of interlevel experiments. Second, interlevel experiments are executions of interventions. Third, there is no interlevel causation between a mechanism and its components. Currently, no account on offer respects all three claims. I offer my causal situationist account of constitutive relevance that (...) respects the claims. By situating a part of a mechanism on the causal chain between the mechanism’s input and output, components can be identified with interventions, without the interventions suggesting interlevel causation. The causal situationist account is the only account on offer so far that clearly fits within Craver’s framework. (shrink)

La identidad cultural ha sido abordada desde diferentes disciplinas científicas, se va construyendo desde disímiles ángulos, de aquí que los referentes teóricos para su estudio procedan de diversas áreas del saber. Aunque no es un tema exclusivamente latinoamericano, es justamente América Latina uno de los lugares en que el análisis de esta problemática ha sido más polémico. El artículo presenta los resultados de un diagnóstico del estado de la identidad cultural de los estudiantes de la Preparatoria No.1, de la Universidad (...) Autónoma de Nuevo León, y propone un modelo pedagógico para el desarrollo de este fenómeno. Cultural identity has been studied from different scientific disciplines and considered from various perspectives. The theoretical references of its study come from diverse areas of knowledge. Being not exclusively a Latin American theme, Latin America is exactly one of the places that provide a controversial analysis. This article deals with the results of a study on cultural identity in students registered in the Preparatory n. 1, at the Autonomous University of Nuevo Leon, and presents an educational model for its development. (shrink)

RESUMENEl artículo propone una definición esencial del arte como símbolo. Plantea que la filosofía del arte no puede renunciar a preguntarse qué es lo que hace que algo sea arte, ni contentarse con una respuesta de tipo externalista. Discute en esa línea la definición histórica de N. Carroll. Formula unas condiciones básicas del simbolismo y busca caracterizar lo que hay de específico en el símbolo artístico, lo que lo diferencia de los otros símbolos. Se enfrenta a las críticas al simbolismo (...) que actualmente se dan en ciertas teorías y prácticas artísticas.PALABRAS CLAVEDEFINICIÓN ESENCIALISTA. DEFINICIÓN HISTÓRICA. SIMBOLISMO. REPRESENTACIÓN.ABSTRACTThis article proposes an essential definition of art as symbol. The autor holds that the philosophy of art cannot give up the question about what is it that determines that something is to be considered as art and neither can be satisfied with an answer of an externalist type. This is why the historic definition of N.Caroll is discussed. The author establishes the basic conditions of symbolism and seeks to characterize the specific traits of the artistic symbol, which differentiates it from the other symbols. He faces the critics to symbolism which nowadays can be found in certain theories and artistic practices.KEY WORDSESSENTIALIST DEFINITION, HISTORIC DEFINITION, SYMBOLISM, REPRESENTATION. (shrink)

The ambiguous-cue task is composed of two-choice simultaneous discriminations involving three stimuli: positive (P), ambiguous (A) and negative (N). Two different trial types are presented: PA and NA. The ambiguous cue (A) served as an S- in PA trials, but as an S+ in NA trials. When using this procedure, it is typical to observe a less accurate performance in PA trials than in NA trials. This is called the ambiguous-cue effect. Recently, it was reported in starlings that the ambiguous-cue (...) effect decreases when the stimuli are presented on an angled (120°) panel. The hypothesis is that the angled panel facilitates that the two cues from each discrimination are perceived as a compound, precluding value transfer via a second-order conditioning mechanism. In this experiment, we used pigeons and a flat panel. Nevertheless, our data were quite similar to the previous data in starlings. We conclude that the form of the panel cannot explain the ambiguous-cue effect. Several alternatives to be explored in future experiments are suggested. The riddle of the ambiguous-cue problem still remains unsolved. (shrink)

Childhood has been historically and socially linked to the idea of lack, absence, or incompleteness. This understanding has led to the consequent idea that the adult universe could fill it--complete it with what it is supposedly missing. Historically speaking, the adult exercise of power over children has become generalized and has acquired a strong ally in the educative process. We presume to know so much about children, and we interpret them from the point of view of what we ourselves have (...) been, or from what we imagine we have been been. Our individual experiences are perceived as models for the infant understanding of things. Paradoxically enough, our knowledge about childhood separates us from it. We already know a lot about childhood, we think; there’s nothing more to say. But maybe that’s preferable, for if there is nothing more to say about childhood, the time to learn with children what childhood has to say to us has come. To think childhood only in the space allowed within the margins of our interpretative schemes is to mistrust the possibility that children can or have ever escaped those imposed dimensions. But, what about thinking childhood on or outside those margins? To talk about the childhood invented by the Brazilian poet Manoel de Barros, by his memories and ours, and to search for new concepts of childhood, demands a different approach. Childhood as we have come to understand here makes of teaching--as of reading and writing in general--a poetic experience, full of feelings, emotion and reason. What is proposed here as a project of inquiry is in this case the same as many others, but also profoundly different, and difficult to inaugurate, for here the object—childhood--is altered by the gaze of the inquirer herself, which implicitly changes the character and even the details of the methodology which follow from the gaze. (shrink)

This work seeks to elucidate the possibility of Krisis, Husserl's last work, as a history of philosophy written in a phenomenological key. Our conclusion due to a dialogue between Krisis and Philosophy as Rigorous Science shows a paradox and dependence. The transcendental history is possible only by the way through the historical science of the historians. If, with the criticism to historicism it is possible the transcendental history, this one needs also the factual history for its constitution. If, it is (...) not factual, it depends on the factual to raise itself towards the transcendental and, at the end, conducts to the dissolution of the transcendental due to the undeniable mediation of a preceding tradition. Krisis depends on Philosophy a Rigorous Science, if it is seen as a historical work. (shrink)

The term “infancy” is usually associated with `childhood` and it seems to indicate more clearly a psycho-biologic reality in regard to an individual. In this study we wish to question this identification: to investigate childhood, not in it’s capturable constitution in the institutional context of the family, the school, place of work or even in her conditions of existence referring to ethnicity, gender or cognitive availabilities, but in what it approaches as a devenir. Our way of thinking about the word (...) devenir is made possible because of its semantic strength to emphasize forms of return and of becoming; in other words, the processes of alteration in an existential state, more than a stage of life. (shrink)

The laws of nature have come a long way since the time of Newton: quantum mechanics and relativity have given us good reasons to take seriously the possibility of laws which may be non-local, atemporal, ‘all-at-once,’ retrocausal, or in some other way not well-suited to the standard dynamical time evolution paradigm. Laws of this kind can be accommodated within a Humean approach to lawhood, but many extant non-Humean approaches face significant challenges when we try to apply them to laws outside (...) the time evolution picture. Thus for proponents of non-Humean approaches to lawhood there is a clear need for a novel non-Humean account which is capable of accommodating these sorts of laws. In this paper we propose such an account, characterizing lawhood in terms of constraints, which are understood as a form of modal structure. We demonstrate that our proposed realist account can indeed accommodate a large variety of laws outside the time evolution paradigm, and describe some possible applications to important philosophical problems. (shrink)

Experiments are commonly thought to have epistemic privilege over simulations. Two ideas underpin this belief: first, experiments generate greater inferential power than simulations, and second, simulations cannot surprise us the way experiments can. In this article I argue that neither of these claims is true of experiments versus simulations in general. We should give up the common practice of resting in-principle judgments about the epistemic value of cases of scientific inquiry on whether we classify those cases as experiments or simulations, (...) per se. To the extent that either methodology puts researchers in a privileged epistemic position, this is context sensitive. (shrink)

Deception sometimes results in nonconsensual sex. A recent body of literature diagnoses such violations as invalidating consent: the agreement is not morally transformative, which is why the sexual contact is a rights violation. We pursue a different explanation for the wrongs in question: there is valid consent, but it is not consent to the sex act that happened. Semantic conventions play a key role in distinguishing deceptions that result in nonconsensual sex (like stealth condom removal) from those that don’t (like (...) white lies). Our framework is also applicable to more controversial cases, like those implicated in so-called “gender fraud” complaints. (shrink)

Are we ever morally permitted to do what is morally wrong? It seems intuitive that we are, but evidence for dissociations among judgment of permissibility and wrongness are relatively scarce. Across 4 experiments (N = 1,438), we show that people judge that some behaviors can be morally wrong and permissible. The dissociations arise because these judgments track different morally relevant aspects of everyday moral encounters. Judgments of individual rights predicted permissibility but not wrongness, while character assessment predicted wrongness but not (...) permissibility. These findings suggest a picture in which moral evaluation is granular enough to express reasoning about different types of normative considerations, notably the possibility that people can exercise their rights in morally problematic ways. (shrink)

We argued in a recent issue of this journal that if abortion is restricted,1 then there are parallel obligations for parents to donate body parts to their children. The strength of this obligation to donate is proportional to the strength of the abortion restrictions. If abortion is never permissible, then a parent must always donate any organ if they are a match. If abortion is sometimes permissible and sometimes not, then organ donation is sometimes obligatory and sometimes not. Our argument (...) was based on the following ideas: (a) that a fetus has full moral status, (b) that parents have special obligations to their offspring, fetus or not, and (c) that this special obligation is to protect them. The result is the conclusion that abortion restrictivists cannot also consistently deny that organ donation should be compulsory. (shrink)

Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on the idea that quantum states do not describe an absolute property of a system but rather a relationship between systems. There have recently been some criticisms of RQM pertaining to issues around intersubjectivity. In this article, we show how RQM can address these criticisms by adding a new postulate which requires that all of the information possessed by a certain observer is stored in physical variables of that observer (...) and thus is accessible by measurement to other observers. This makes it possible for observers to reach intersubjective agreement about quantum events that have occurred in the past. We suggest a possible ontology for a version of RQM employing this postulate; this ontology upholds the principle that quantum states are always relational, but it also postulates a set of quantum events that are not strictly relational. We show that the new postulate helps address the preferred basis problem in RQM. (shrink)

Do we see more than we can report? Psychologists and philosophers have been hotly debating this question, in part because both possibilities are supported by suggestive evidence. On one hand, phenomena such as inattentional blindness and change blindness suggest that visual awareness is especially sparse. On the other hand, experiments relating to iconic memory suggest that our in-the-moment awareness of the world is much richer than can be reported. Recent research has attempted to resolve this debate by showing that observers (...) can accurately report the color diversity of a quickly flashed group of letters, even for letters that are unattended. If this ability requires awareness of the individual letters’ colors, then this may count as a clear case of conscious awareness overflowing cognitive access. Here we explored this requirement directly: can we perceive ensemble properties of scenes even without being aware of the relevant individual features? Across several experiments that combined aspects of iconic memory with measures of change blindness, we show that observers can accurately report the color diversity of unattended stimuli, even while their self-reported awareness of the individual elements is coarse or nonexistent — and even while they are completely blind to situations in which each individual element changes color mid-trial throughout the entire experiment. We conclude that awareness of statistical properties may occur in the absence of awareness of individual features, and that such results are fully consistent with sparse visual awareness. (shrink)

Disturbances to one's sense of self, the feeling that one has ‘lost a part of oneself’ or that one ‘no longer feels like oneself,’ are frequently recounted throughout the bereavement literature. Engaging Allan Køster's important contribution to this issue, this article reinforces his suggestion that, by rupturing the existential texture of self-familiarity, bereavement can result in experiences of estrangement that can be meaningfully understood according to the concept of self-alienation. Nevertheless, I suggest that whilst Køster's relational interpretation of alienation as (...) the withdrawal of heteronomy can be applied to the experience of world-collapse in bereavement, what sets bereavement apart from other limit situations is the fact that it involves an intersubjective relation between the living and the dead. In contrast to Køster, therefore, I suggest that the experience of self-alienation that is distinctive to bereavement results from the fact that the bereaved is exposed to, and co-opted by, the absolute alterity of death itself. (shrink)

When a loved one dies, it is common for the bereaved to feel profoundly lonely, disconnected from the world with the sense that they no longer belong. In philosophy, this experience of ‘loss and loneliness’ has been interpreted according to both a loss of possibilities and a loss of the past. But it is unclear how these interpretations apply to the distinctive way in which loss and loneliness manifest in old age. Drawing on the phenomenological analyses of old age given (...) by de Beauvoir and Améry, I consider how the diminishment of the capacity for projection and recollection complicate recent interpretations of loss and loneliness, whilst nevertheless reinforcing the conclusion that in old age subjectivity is necessarily impoverished. Developing a critical stance on de Beauvoir and Améry’s underlying conception of subjectivity, I turn to Levinas in considering whether or not there is a way to reimagine subjectivity such that the estrangement and alienation of older adults might be ameliorated rather than exacerbated. Grounded in the passive body-in-itself rather than the self-transcending capacity of the body-for-itself, I suggest it becomes possible to reconceptualise the experience of loss and loneliness in old age; both in terms of what is lost and what needs to be restored if older adults are to be helped to find themselves at home in the world in the midst of, and indeed because of, manifold loss. (shrink)

Boredom is an affective experience that can involve pervasive feelings of meaninglessness, emptiness, restlessness, frustration, weariness and indifference, as well as the slowing down of time. An increasing focus of research in many disciplines, interest in boredom has been intensified by the recent Covid-19 pandemic, where social distancing measures have induced both a widespread loss of meaning and a significant disturbance of temporal experience. This article explores the philosophical significance of this aversive experience of ‘pandemic boredom.’ Using Heidegger’s work as (...) a unique vantage point, this article draws on survey data collected by researchers in an ongoing project titled ‘Experiences of Social Distancing During the Covid-19 Pandemic’ to give an original phenomenological interpretation of the meaninglessness and monotony of pandemic boredom. On a Heideggerian interpretation, pandemic boredom involves either a situative confrontation with relative meaninglessness that upholds our absorption in the everyday world, or an existential confrontation with absolute meaninglessness that forces us to take up the question of our existence. Arguing that boredom during the pandemic makes this distinction difficult to sustain, I consider some of the ways in which pandemic boredom might be seen to expose and then exceed the distinctive methodological limitations of Heidegger’s philosophical interpretation of boredom. (shrink)