We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the self-help and recovery section of bookstores. At the same time, personal vindictiveness as a rule is seen as irrational and immoral. In many ways, our thinking on these issues is deeply inconsistent; we value forgiveness yet at the same time now use victim-impact statements to argue (...) for harsher penalties for criminals. Do we have a right to hate others for what they have done to us? Providing a nuanced approach to a proper understanding of the place of our strongest emotions in moral, political, and personal life, and using lucid, easily understood prose, this volume is a classic example of philosophical thinking applied to a thorny, everyday problem. (shrink)

This essay considers how we talk in moral terms about crime and punishment using a framework that comes from psychoanalysis. The idea of the human as a metaphysical animal, an animal that thinks and loves, is given a naturalistic explanation in Freudian metapsychology as it was developed by Melanie Klein and Hans Loewald. While the former helps us understand the desire to punish as the enjoyable return of pain for pain, the latter indicates how mature human beings seek to pursue (...) a sense of wholeness. This understanding of moral psychology is applied to thinking about criminal justice where three ethical stances are identified, the vindictive, the vindicative and the validatory. The vindictive and the vindicative represent a compromise formation in law which excludes a broader validatory process aimed at truthful human reconciliation. (shrink)

Achilles is vindictive; he wants to get even with Agamemnon. Being so disposed, he sounds rather like many current crime victims who angrily complain that the American system of criminal justice will not allow them the satisfactions they rightfully seek. These victims often feel that their particular injuries are ignored while the system addresses itself to some abstract injury to the state or to the rule of law itself – a focus that appears to result in wrongdoers being treated with (...) much greater solicitation and respect than their victims receive. If the actual victims are noticed at all, they will likely be told that there is another branch of law – tort law – that has the job of dealing with private injuries and grievances and that, if they pursue this route at their own expense, they might ultimately get some financial compensation for the wrongs done to them. However, just as Achilles felt that mere compensation was inadequate to the kind of injury done to him by Agamemnon, many of these victims will often claim that the injuries they have suffered do not admit of financial compensation. How, they might ask, can a dollar value be set on the humiliation and degradation they have experienced? They might also note that those who injure them tend, unlike Agamemnon, to be judgment-proof – so lacking in resources as to be unable to make any meaningful contribution to any compensation package that the victim may win. (shrink)

Some philosophers think that forgiveness should only be granted in response to the wrongdoer’s repentance, while others think that forgiveness can properly be given unconditionally. In this paper I show that both of these positions are partially correct. In redemptive forgiveness we wipe the wrong from the offender’s moral record. It is wrong to forgive redemptively in the absence of some atonement. Personal forgiveness, on the other hand, is granted when the victim overcomes inappropriate though humanly understandable feelings of hate (...) or vindictive anger towards the wrongdoer and comes to see them as deserving of a certain unconditional respect ’qua’ moral agent. Personal forgiveness is unconditionally admirable. (shrink)

Spite is typically considered a vicious emotion that causes us to engage in petty, vindictive, and sometimes self-destructive behavior. Even though it has this bad reputation, I will argue that spite is a reactive attitude. Spite is emotional defiance of another’s command: to spite you, I will do something exactly because you told me not to. Our liability to feelings of spite presupposes that we recognize others as having practical authority, which is why it qualifies as a reactive attitude. I (...) conclude by offering conditions under which spite can be justified and unjustified. (shrink)

Andocides is generally not considered one of the best orators. To point up his flawed style, scholars have discussed a notoriously vindictive and humorous section in Andocides 1: in 124ff. Andocides describes the profligate lifestyle of his prosecutor, Callias III the Ceryx, the son of Hipponicus II and dadouchos of the Eleusinian Mysteries.

In my dissertation, I explore how emotions operate under conditions of injustice. Specifically, my interest is in how one should deploy their emotions in order to combat patriarchally informed, affective ways of making sense of and responding to the social world. My dissertation consists of the following three papers. In the first paper, “Vindictive Anger,” I argue for two claims. First, that anger is not necessarily made morally worse whenever and to the extent that it involves a desire for payback. (...) Second, that in certain cases, anger’s retributive component is precisely what moralizes the emotion. Victims of sexual violence, I argue, paradigmatically deploy their anger as a way of getting their transgressor or, in some cases, the broader moral community, to more fully understand, through affect, the wrongness of their action. One can see this occur in the anger expressed by Chanel Miller in her victim’s impact statement, read aloud during the case of People v. Turner. When anger functions in this way, I propose, it serves to moralize the emotion. In the second paper, titled “Feminism and Suspect Femininity,” I ask how feminists should feel towards women who conform to suspect norms of appearance, and of hyper-femininity in particular. I present a novel type of empathy – proleptic empathy – which avoids treating women as either pitiful victims or as accomplices deserving of harsh moral criticism. Proleptic empathy requires switching back and forth between two types of imaginings: on the one hand, simulating what it is like to be in the woman’s shoes on the assumption that her suspect behavior stems from her will. On the other, simulating what it is like to be in the woman’s shoes on the assumption that her suspect behavior stems from external cultural influences. In the third paper, “Transitional Moral Contexts,” I address how one should feel towards the perpetrators who figure in the cases that have gone by the language of ‘grey rape’ or ‘bad sex’. These cases are ones that are rife with disagreement, especially amongst members of the moral community, who even disagree over whether they ought to count as cases of ‘sexual assault’ or ‘rape’. My suggestion is that the reason we have such difficulty adjudicating individuals’ responsibility for cases of bad sex is because these are instances of transitional moral contexts where what it is to act morally is in the process of being actively negotiated by the moral community. With this analysis in place, I present reasons for and against deploying shame against those who falter in these cases. (shrink)

Public accusations of corruption leveled against public figures and institutions in Jordan have recently become a prominent feature of public discourse in the country. Informed by positioning theory as an analytical framework, this study focuses on public responses to such accusations through a discourse analysis of two major apologetic statements, or apologiae, issued in Jordan in 2018 and 2019: one by a controversial former royal court chief and minister of planning in response to public accusations of corruption and appropriation of (...) public funds, and the other by the Office of Queen Rania of Jordan in response to accusations of wardrobe extravagance and overspending. The analysis shows that these two apologiae employed discourses that not only positioned the accused as blameless, but also as victims of defamation. Reference to one’s history, such as public service to the nation and one’s accomplishments, was exploited. In contrast, the accusers were explicitly or implicitly positioned as unjust, biased, vindictive, or motivated by hidden agenda. A variety of discursive strategies were deployed, particularly invoking cultural moral orders, resorting to banal nationalism, expressing pride in one’s public service and allegiance to the monarchy, and invoking a constellation of religious, professional and national identities. In the case of the royal apologia, it was implicitly positioned in western discourses, such as invoking feminine ‘corporeal modernity’, to respond to the wardrobe overspending accusations. (shrink)

This investigation explains the causes that triggered the so-called “Caso Almería”. An event that involved the torture and murder of three young men –Luis Cobo Mier, Juan Mañas Morales and Luis Montero García– by civil guards after mistaking them for members of the terrorist organisation Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. In order to prepare it, documentation from different archives, oral testimonies such as that of Lieutenant General Andrés Cassinello Pérez, as well as press reports on this event were used. The conclusion reached (...) is that this was not a case of state terrorism, but rather a vindictive and uncontrolled action by members of the Guardia Civil, linked to the ETA attack on Lieutenant General Joaquín de Valenzuela, and covered up by the commanders of this police force and the government itself. (shrink)

These essays defend Christian, socialist and realist positions against Nietzsche’s critiques. Each essay addresses a problem in Nietzsche’s work. The first deals with perspectivism. On his view, the idea of objectivity disappears, becoming no more than simply a multiplicity of perspectives. The essay shows how Nietzsche’s approach to knowledge commits the epistemic fallacy, i.e. evades questions about truth by collapsing them into questions about knowing. The second essay addresses Nietzsche’s moral psychology in which there is no being behind doing, no (...) agent distinct from her actions. The essay demonstrates how this actualist account of persons is false by showing that the distinction between agent and action is needed for any understanding of moral action. The final essay concerns the history of ideas, rather than philosophical analysis. First, it looks at Nietzsche’s account of slave morality couched in terms of envy. Social justice, however, cannot be understood in this way. A section on class, religion and morality in late antiquity reinforces this with evidence that it was far more likely to find vindictiveness in the master class than the servant. The section on theism and ethics deals with Nietzsche’s notion of ‘eternal recurrence’: the idea that everything that happens will happen again an infinity of times, a notion that sustains an ethic of passive acceptance. The final part decries contemporary attachments to the Nietzschean virtues of pride, self-assertiveness, competitiveness and contempt for the less successful, preferring a Christian path to self-perfection through the pursuit of goals outside ourselves. (shrink)

The Last Judgement, heaven, hell, purgatory, the wrathful God: today, these notions seem to belong to a remote past we have - thank goodness! - left behind. The more remarkable is that, today, prisoners sometimes refer to the representation of God as Judge, as in the proposition ‘Only God can judge me’ you can find as graffito on a cell wall, or tattooed on the body of an inmate. Is this statement born from defiance of the constitutional state, from fundamentalism, (...) or from the fiction of an all-forgiving God? Nowadays, we, modern democrats, have a suspicion towards criminals and fanatics who seem to think that they can get away with an Only God can judge me. Much more common today is the reversal: not a judging God but people assuming judgement over God and over those who persist in referring to God. But the tradition of the ‘theodicee’ shows that this reversed movement of man judging God is not in the least a gesture limited to those outside the religions. In a theodicee, man summons God to appear in front of an imaginary tribunal, only for God to be defended and subsequently acquitted. As Odo Marquard argues, the modern problem of the theodicee – bringing into question God’s justice – in the end favoured atheism. Human autonomy which exonerates God by eliminating him, would imply something like an ‘atheism ad maiorem Dei gloriam’. But when humankind becomes responsible for the creation of its own history, God can no longer be summoned to any tribunal. Now only man can be summoned, and more particularly: humans which may be held accountable for the persistence of evil, responsible for our enduring discontent, obstacles of human progress or annoying remnants of the past. Here we find the beginning of the secularization of the Last Judgement. As Peter Sloterdijk argues, the vindictive God who judges and punishes at the end on times is succeeded by revolutionary groups from the nineteenth century onwards. These not only transform feelings of humiliated anger and powerlessness into those of pride and hope, but also into an effective force of revenge. In short, the theological constellation of rage and eternity has been succeeded by a political-psychological constellation of rage and history. Our representative democracy can be seen as an answer to the dangerous modern tendency to ‘tribunalising’ , because conditions of division and conflict are regarded as normal and lasting, and not as Fremdkörper or indicative of pathology. The Last Judgement becomes indefinitely suspended. However, a certain kind of ‘populism’ holds that unity and homogeneity can very well be made visible and audible’; and nowadays this seems to be accompanied by the longing to give evil, thus a form of negative transcendence, a face and parade it in front of the tribunal of the people. For prisoners, this is bad news. Against its background, the Only God can judge me may yet well up from a different source than that which I had suggested at the beginning of my argument. (shrink)

The subject of this essay is the medieval castle present in Juliusz Siowacki’s literary works. I am interested in the ways оf its presentation, attempting to recall the climate of antiquity and the evolution of the picture of the castle. Therefore, I discuss the image of the castle created in the early works: the poetic novel Hugo (1829), the drama Mindowe (1832), as well as in the later works belonging to the so called mystical period: Wallenrod and Konrad Wallenrod. Helsztyński (...) lies beyond the scope of my interests as its research requires a different perspective. I present in Hugo a stereotypical model of forming architectural space Słowacki draws a very sketchy picture of the castle. He leads the reader into the interiors of a pagan temple and a representative hall with only one decorative element: famous pseudo-classical pillars. The picture of the castle is considerably enriched in Mindowe. First of all, the author enlarges its space. He adds a secret passage and furniture, mentions a treasury and a representative hall. This way he slightly violates the stereotype of an interior subordinated to the tragedy convention. Moreover, I emphasize here the way Słowacki compares the Gothic style to the creations of nature e.g. a hall with pillars is compared to a forest, rose windows to stars, a castle to an eagle’s nest. These comparisions tend to illustrate the architectural style - the Gothic and the atmosphere of Middle Ages. This essay shows that the picture of the castle was conceived in opposition to Mickiewicz’s castle presented in Grażyna and Konrad Wallenrod. The image of the castle in Wallenrod and Konrad Wallenrod varie from the early works. However, the fragmentation of these texts precludes any profound analysis of the problem The poet in Wallenrod associates architectural space with characters' personality: Wallenrod - gloomy Malbork, vindictive Jagiełło - bloody Vilnius, Kiejstut and noble Witold - sunny Troki. In the drama Wallenrod the characters’ “interiors” are somehow reflected in the interiors of the castle. The castle is given different significance in the fragments of Konrad Wallenrod, where it becomes the place of recognition of God’s truths. The pictures of Lithuanian castles is created mainly by stereotypes and poetic imagination hardly ever by descriptions of existing buildings. Słowacki did not manage to show the specific type of the castle in Troki in Hugo, although he was personally acquainted with the castle. The image of the castle in Nowogródek was influenced by the tragedy convention and Mickiewicz’s castle in Grażyna. In the later texts the poet lost his interests in architectural details. He focused on the character’s inside, or as in Konrad Wallenrod, on the importance of the word spoken by the prophet. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 273-295 [Access article in PDF] Billy Budd:Melville's Dilemma Lester H. Hunt I THE CHAIN OF EVENTS NARRATED in Herman Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative)—how Billy is falsely accused of plotting mutiny by his Master-at-Arms, John Claggart, how Billy accidentally kills Claggart and, finally, is executed at the urging of the Captain of the Ship, Edward Fairfax Vere, despite Vere's personal conviction that (...) Billy does not deserve to be killed—is simple enough. The text itself, nonetheless, is troublesomely complex. It is a very difficult work to interpret with both honesty and confidence. Melville unflinchingly represents to us the moral horror of what Captain Vere does to Billy, and yet he also depicts Vere himself with a respect that borders on admiration. The attentive reader experiences a painful cognitive dissonance that can only be soothed by a coherent interpretation, and perhaps by a bit of philosophy.Given the way in which the text of Billy Budd emerged—it was assembled by scholars, long after Melville's death, from a confusing collection of manuscript pages he had left behind when he died—it may well be an unfinished work. It is possible that ill health and death overtook Melville before he had a chance to iron out the inconsistencies that inevitably arise as a book is written, and it is therefore also possible that some of our sense of dissonance is produced by this brute fact. 1 Whether or not this is the case, this book is, according to the view I will present here, at least very close to being coherent. The point of view it represents is actually quite appropriate to an unfinished work, and little damaged by textual indeterminateness. Billy Budd is about the inescapably dilemmatic nature of certain choices. It alleges the impossibility of resolving them in any comfortable way. Melville beckons us to [End Page 273] look through the window of Billy Budd into an abyss of undecidability, and perhaps a text that contains some chaos within itself will better serve as such a window than one that does not.The best way to begin trying to understand how we should take this work is to begin at its very beginning. The very beginning of a story is of course its title, and the title of this story, or more exactly its subtitle, tells quite literally what sort of story it is. It is an "inside" narrative. Of course, this immediately raises the question of what an inside narrative is. Inside what? Are we supposed to contrast it with an outside narrative? And what sort of story would that be?Melville does not leave us entirely without an answer to this question. Billy Budd does contain another story, one that contrasts so sharply with the main narrative that it might well be described as its opposite: it is virtually an inverted version of the book's plot. In an "authorized weekly publication" quoted at some length at the end of the book, the events of Melville's tale are briefly recounted. In this version of the story, apparently the only officially sanctioned one, Billy Budd is depicted as the ringleader of a genuine mutiny, who "vindictively stabbed" Claggart for exposing him. Claggart is motivated only by a "strong patriotic impulse" and Billy Budd by "extreme depravity."This account, Melville tells, us was written "for the most part" sincerely enough, "though the medium, partly rumor, through which the facts must have reached the writer served to deflect and in part falsify them" (1432.27-30). 2 It could be called an "outside" narrative in virtue of the fact that its author was not there and consequently was not in a position to know what actually happened. The most direct way to give literal meaning to the "inside" status of Melville's main narrative is simply to observe that it gives a view from inside the ship, from inside the Bellipotent. It represents things that were known by people who were there, and precisely because they were there.This... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 3-12 [Access article in PDF] Monotheistic Violence David Lochhead Vancouver School ofTheology While Israel was staying at Shittim, the people began to have sexual relations with the women of Moab. They invited the people to the sacrifices of their gods, and the people ate and bowed down to their gods. Thus Israel yoked itself to the Baal of Peor, and the LORD's anger was kindled (...) against Israel. The LORD said to Moses, "Take all the chiefs of the people, and impale them in the sun before the LORD, in order that the fierce anger of the LORD may turn away from Israel." And Moses said to the judges of Israel, "Each of you shall kill any of your people who have yoked themselves to the Baal of Peor." (Num. 25:1-5) This is the first of two stories told in Numbers 25. In the second, an Israelite brings a Midianite woman into the camp as the sentence is being carried out. In response, one of the Israelites, a man named Phinehas, a grandson of Aaron the priest, takes a spear and follows the couple into a tent, where he slaughters them both. God commends this act of butchery with these words: "Phinehas son of Eleazar, son of Aaron the priest, has turned back my wrath from the Israelites by manifesting such zeal among them on my behalf that in my jealousy I did not consume the Israelites. Therefore say, 'I hereby grant him my covenant of peace. It shall be for him and for his descendants after him a covenant of perpetual priesthood, because he was zealous for his God, and made atonement for the Israelites.'" (Num. 25:11-13)The account of these incidents is an unsophisticated one. God is portrayed, in an anthropomorphic way, as violently egocentric. The punishment exacted for offending God is crude and barbaric. This is a god who demands violence and commends violence when it is performed in his cause. This is a god who is intensely competitive toward the other gods and who treats vindictively anyone who has commerce with them.Because of the unsophisticated terms in which this story is told, it is easy enough to dismiss a text like this as a crude expression of ancient Hebrew religion that the Judeo-Christian tradition has long since transcended. I want to take a somewhat different perspective and argue that the violence expressed in this text, albeit in a more subtle and spiritualized way, has persisted in the Christian tradition.The violence of Numbers 25 has the following characteristics. First, it is ordered [End Page 3] and justified in terms of an exclusive loyalty to a single deity. Secondly, it expresses a religious xenophobia. This xenophobia is religious, cultural, and sexual. The transgression of the loyalty to God is attributed to the presence of foreign women. In short, the text is chauvinist and misogynist.It is common to distinguish between henotheism and monotheism. Henotheism is the worship of a single god in distinction from other gods. Henotheism does not deny the existence of other gods. It focuses its attention and devotion on only one of those gods. Thus henotheism might also be described as monolatry--the worship of one god among many. Monotheism, by contrast, acknowledges the existence of only one god.Given this contrast, we can say that Numbers 25 is a henotheistic text. That is, Yahweh, the god who leads the Israelites out of Egypt and toward the Promised Land, acknowledges the reality of the other god--here the Baal of Peor--by the intensity of his anger. The worship of the Moabites is taken very seriously. Those who participate in the Moabite cult actually yoke themselves to this other god. The coincidence of the sexual liaison with Moabite women and the worship of the Moabite god expresses something of the intimacy of the relationship in which the Israelite men are understood to participate. It is the assumed reality of the Moabite deity that makes it necessary for Yahweh to demand that the offenders be impaled in the glaring light of the desert... (shrink)

It is commonly held that the reason we ought to forgive those who wrong or harm us is to overcome the stranglehold that the vindictive passions or negative emotions have over us. On this common account, the driving reason to forgive someone else for the harm they have caused or the wrong they have done to us is to heal oneself. I find this account wrongheaded, as it runs the risk of treating forgiveness as a facile panacea which fails to (...) reliably achieve the emotional benefits for the forgiver that it is meant to. Instead I offer what I call the Threefold View of Forgiveness. In proffering forgiveness, the forgiver must first “soften her heart” by overcoming hostile feelings toward the wrongdoer. But the forgiver must also actively and patiently work toward reconciliation with the wrongdoer. Finally, the forgiver must “wipe clean the slate” of the repentant wrongdoer by removing or suspending the wrong. I argue that the Threefold View of Forgiveness is superior because it is better suited to reliably achieving the psychological benefits we want from forgiveness on account of the social practice of reconciliation that underwrites it. (shrink)

Messianic peacemakers: Intertextual relationships between Zechariah 9-14 and the Gospel of Matthew. This article deals with images of war, violence and peace and with the role of messianic leaders in Deutero-Zechariah and the way in which texts from Zechariah 9–14 have been interpreted in the Gospel of Matthew. The first section describes the lines of meaning in Zechariah 9–14 on the basis of word fields related to violence and universal peace. The second section discusses Deutero-Zechariah’s own position in the development (...) of messianic expectations in Old Testament texts. In the third section, the question is asked how the meaning of texts from Zechariah 9–14 about messianic leaders has been influenced by earlier prophetic texts, and how these texts in their turn have been transformed and updated in the Gospel of Matthew, which contains explicit quotations from Deutero-Zechariah in 21:5; 26:15; 26:31 and 27:9–10. The fourth section summarises some interesting semantic shifts appearing in Matthew’s gospel compared to Deutero-Zechariah. Moreover, some critical comments are presented against the idea defended in some recent studies that there is a sharp tension between Jesus’s role in Matthew as the bringer of a peaceful ethical message, and his violent and vindictive role at the final judgement. At the end of this article, the burning question is raised whether Zechariah’s and Matthew’s messages, both of which are characterised by a certain degree of exclusivity, can play a constructive role in modern multi-religious discussions about common roads leading to global peace. (shrink)

Revenge is a powerful word. It can conjure up the scheming, embittered individual, plotting the downfall of his enemies well beyond reason and morality – or, more seriously, tragic cycles of violence and blood vendettas, spiraling into entrenched civil conflict over generations. Philosophers have argued that the consequences and the moral psychology of revenge mean it is incompatible – even antithetical – to any plausible conception of moral repair. In this paper I challenge that incompatibility by suggesting that, in contexts (...) of unresponsive and imperfect institutional justice, appropriate acts of vengeance may both create accountability and express solidarity, thus contributing to moral repair. Drawing on past work by French (2001) and MacLachlan (2016), as well as two films with feminist avengers as protagonists, Hard Candy (2005) and Promising Young Woman (2021), I sketch an approach to virtuous third-party vengeance as a starting point for broader, more reparative, understandings of legitimate personal interventions after wrongdoing. -/- . (shrink)

Although Hobbes talks about the laws of nature as prescribing the virtues, it is easier to think of them as proscribing the vices. The nine vices that are proscribed by the laws of nature are injustice, ingratitude, greed or inhumanity, vindictiveness , cruelty, incivility or contumely, pride, arrogance, and unfairness . The corresponding virtues that are prescribed by the laws of nature are justice, gratitude, humanity or complaisance, mercy, , civility, humility, , modesty, and equity. The difficulty of coming (...) up with names for some of the virtues, and even for some of the vices, shows that they are not all among the most common moral virtues and vices. Nonetheless, as described by Hobbes, they are genuine moral virtues and vices, traits of character such that all impartial rational persons would favor everyone having the virtues and no one having the vices. All of these virtues are such that they benefit everyone impartially by promoting peace, and are not primarily of benefit to the person having them. This is what makes them moral virtues and distinguishes them from the personal virtues of courage, prudence, and temperance. The laws of nature are the dictates "of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." But the law of nature "dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes;" is also the moral law because "in the means to peace, [it] commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral." Hobbes correctly sees both that peace benefits all persons impartially and that impartiality is essential to morality. His account of the moral virtues correctly makes them traits of character that would be favored by all impartial persons. His argument for the rationality of these moral virtues is that one's self-interest, which for Hobbes is primarily one's long-term preservation, is enhanced by having these virtues. There is no incompatibility between morality and self-interest as long as what is in one's own self-interest is equally in the interest of everyone else. Hobbes sees this point quite clearly and it is at the heart of his justification of the moral virtues. (shrink)

La sexualité préoccupe le Moyen Âge occidental : miroir de la nature peccamineuse de l’homme, elle en révèle le meilleur (tempérance, renoncement) et le pire (appétit, violence). Envisagée dans le seul mariage chrétien, elle est hors de ce cadre adultère, condamnée (juridiquement, judiciairement) et expose les individus à la vindicte populaire. Les lettres de rémission (grâce royale des crimes) des xiv e et xv e siècles témoignent de façon originale de l’impact que le type de conjugalité vécu peut avoir sur (...) les violences sexuelles faites aux femmes. Si les sources sont muettes et absentes sur les violences matrimoniales, isolement, célibat laïc, séparation et adultère exposent les femmes médiévales au viol. Mariée, la femme est appropriée, son corps territorialisé, gardé ; seule ou concubine, elle est mal famée et son corps à prendre. C’est dans ce paradigme que la question du couple et des violences sexuelles se pose alors. (shrink)

La sexualité préoccupe le Moyen Âge occidental : miroir de la nature peccamineuse de l’homme, elle en révèle le meilleur (tempérance, renoncement) et le pire (appétit, violence). Envisagée dans le seul mariage chrétien, elle est hors de ce cadre adultère, condamnée (juridiquement, judiciairement) et expose les individus à la vindicte populaire. Les lettres de rémission (grâce royale des crimes) des xiv e et xv e siècles témoignent de façon originale de l’impact que le type de conjugalité vécu peut avoir sur (...) les violences sexuelles faites aux femmes. Si les sources sont muettes et absentes sur les violences matrimoniales, isolement, célibat laïc, séparation et adultère exposent les femmes médiévales au viol. Mariée, la femme est appropriée, son corps territorialisé, gardé ; seule ou concubine, elle est mal famée et son corps à prendre. C’est dans ce paradigme que la question du couple et des violences sexuelles se pose alors. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Secrecy and Autonomy in Lewis CarrollSusan ShererVictorian novels quiver with morbid secrets and threatening discoveries. Unseen rooms, concealed doors, hidden boxes, masked faces, buried letters, all appear (and disappear) with striking regularity in the fiction of Victorian England. So many of these secret spaces contain children, and especially little girls, little girls in hidden spaces. The young Jane Eyre sits behind a curtain in the hidden window seat, escaping (...) the vindictive wrath of John Reed. Repulsed by her angry brother, Maggie Tulliver flees to the house attic, fantasizing that her family will fear that she has died. Little Dorrit withdraws from the common space of the Marshalsea into her private room above the prison, and Little Nell hides behind trees and walls, silently observing clandestine meetings. Finally the seven-year-old Alice falls down a rabbit-hole into a Wonderland, the dreamspace of her own psyche.Of these images, none can be more embedded in our cultural imagination than the child Alice dropping into the subterranean well of Wonderland. Indeed, of the many celebrated scenes in the Alice narratives, the most memorable, most potent, most quoted is Alice’s initial descent to the bottom of the rabbit-hole. The lastingness of this scene seems even greater when we realize that, although neither Carroll in Alice’s Adventures Underground nor Tenniel in the first edition of Wonderland illustrated the moment with a picture, it still became (along with the Mad Hatter’s tea party) one of the signature images of the Alice stories. Why, we must ask, did the Victorians retain, with a powerful tenacity, this vision of a little girl moving through a tight space toward the hidden world of Wonderland?The answer to this question is not—at least not wholly—that the scene simply represents a child’s metaphorical progress through the [End Page 1] birth canal 1 and that this, in turn, symbolizes some kind of rite of passage, a movement towards some deeper knowledge. For then how do we explain Alice’s conspicuous lack of internal development in both stories? Indeed, for a narrative that thematizes motion, Alice’s psychical growth remains disturbingly static. Throughout both narratives, Alice displays little emotional variation, for when she is not frustrated or anxious, she is, for the most part, vapid or expressionless. In fact, one is immediately struck by her coolness and indifference as she drops through the rabbit-hole. 2 Thus, because scene changes in Wonderland and Looking-Glass rarely betoken any emotional or intellectual modulations, Alice’s falling into Wonderland signals no internal transition.But the image does relocate her body and within this fictive world, location is everything. The scene gestures Alice’s departure, her separation, her movement towards an autonomy of which every child dreams when, in play, retreating to a hidden space. A child’s impulse to hide, to create a secret space, is one of the most compelling of all human wishes, the wish for autonomy and autarchy—“to be cut off from the word and yet owner of the world.” 3 Throughout Victorian literature, the fantasy of autonomy sets children dreaming of far-away worlds and hidden gardens. The young Cathy and Heathcliff flee to the isolated moors, filling the open, empty space with dreams of unrestricted freedom. Little Dorrit envisages the locked garden behind the Marshalsea as an alternative world to the foul prison atmosphere. And what are the Brontës’s Angria and Gondol but disconnected, self-governing realms imagined from the standpoint of childhood powerlessness? The image, then, of Alice’s fall begins to fulfill this powerful wish for autonomy, which culminates, finally, in Alice’s self-coronation at the end of Looking-Glass. Yet it is only within the child’s willing imagination that a secret space can encroach so closely upon autonomy, for as we shall see, secrecy and autonomy are irreconcilable not only in the demanding world of realism, but even in the more elastic world of Carrollian fantasy.IAlice’s descent into Wonderland and her entrance into the Looking-Glass kingdom would seem like ripe metaphors for Carroll to explore the thoughts and fantasies of Alice’s psyche. What could be more... (shrink)

Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or engage in vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are natural incompatibilists, so that convincing them of determinism undermines their belief that they are morally responsible. I suggest a different explanation, and in doing so try to shed some light on the phenomenology of free will. I contend that one aspect of (...) the phenomenology is our impression that maintaining a resolution requires effort—an impression well supported by a range of psychological data. Determinism can easily be interpreted as showing that such effort will be futile: in effect determinism is conflated with fatalism, in a way that is reminiscent of the Lazy argument used against the Stoics. If this interpretation is right, it explains how belief in determinism undermines moral motivation without needing to attribute sophisticated incompatibilist beliefs to subjects; it works by undermining subjects' self-efficacy. It also provides indirect support for the contention that this is one of the sources of the phenomenology of free will. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a broad sketch of the advantages of the debt/atonement approach to punishment. Such an approach is appealing for it can benefit both the victim and the remorseful victimizer. Compared to other theories, it gives a fuller and more unified account of our intuitions about paying debts, doing penance, alleviating guilt, granting forgiveness, and offsetting privileges, pleasures and burdens. The theory also allows us to avoid justifying punishment on the basis of using some (...) people to deter others. And it does all of this while channeling in a positive and productive way the deeply felt vindictive need to "get even." Thus, contrary to the traditional wisdom that justice and revenge are diametrically opposed, providing the former may actually depend upon allowing the latter. (shrink)

Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) is a trending topic that is currently engaging the attention of scholars all over the globe. Much has been said and written about it in terms of its nature, mode of infection, the ethics, the harm and, of course, the best resource allocation and triaging paradigm. While offering theoretical explanation of why we need to make a distinction between harms in and of COVID-19, this paper, at the same time, exposes the harms in and of COVID-19, as well (...) as offer examples of where both forms could be seen, using three spheres of reality, namely economy, education, and reproductive rights (abortion). Whereas it notes that harms in COVID-19 are those harms that are inherent in it and are direct vis-à-vis its victims, the paper observes that harms of COVID-19 are those harms that are causally, but only indirectly related to COVID-19. It concludes that knowledge of the distinction between harms in and of COVID-19 will be of use to the masses across the globe in checkmating the antics of those state actors in their respective jurisdictions who may wish to hide under the guise of combating the spread and menace of COVID-19 to carry out some hidden, selfish and vindictive agenda. (shrink)

Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) is a trending topic that is currently engaging the attention of scholars all over the globe. Much has been said and written about it in terms of its nature, mode of infection, the ethics, the harm and, of course, the best resource allocation and triaging paradigm. While offering theoretical explanation of why we need to make a distinction between harms in and of COVID-19, this paper, at the same time, exposes the harms in and of COVID-19, as well (...) as offer examples of where both forms could be seen, using three spheres of reality, namely economy, education, and reproductive rights (abortion). Whereas it notes that harms in COVID-19 are those harms that are inherent in it and are direct vis-à-vis its victims, the paper observes that harms of COVID-19 are those harms that are causally, but only indirectly related to COVID-19. It concludes that knowledge of the distinction between harms in and of COVID-19 will be of use to the masses across the globe in checkmating the antics of those state actors in their respective jurisdictions who may wish to hide under the guise of combating the spread and menace of COVID-19 to carry out some hidden, selfish and vindictive agenda. (shrink)

Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) is a trending topic that is currently engaging the attention of scholars all over the globe. Much has been said and written about it in terms of its nature, mode of infection, the ethics, the harm and, of course, the best resource allocation and triaging paradigm. While offering theoretical explanation of why we need to make a distinction between harms in and of COVID-19, this paper, at the same time, exposes the harms in and of COVID-19, as well (...) as offer examples of where both forms could be seen, using three spheres of reality, namely economy, education, and reproductive rights (abortion). Whereas it notes that harms in COVID-19 are those harms that are inherent in it and are direct vis-à-vis its victims, the paper observes that harms of COVID-19 are those harms that are causally, but only indirectly related to COVID-19. It concludes that knowledge of the distinction between harms in and of COVID-19 will be of use to the masses across the globe in checkmating the antics of those state actors in their respective jurisdictions who may wish to hide under the guise of combating the spread and menace of COVID-19 to carry out some hidden, selfish and vindictive agenda. (shrink)

Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) is a trending topic that is currently engaging the attention of scholars all over the globe. Much has been said and written about it in terms of its nature, mode of infection, the ethics, the harm and, of course, the best resource allocation and triaging paradigm. While offering theoretical explanation of why we need to make a distinction between harms in and of COVID-19, this paper, at the same time, exposes the harms in and of COVID-19, as well (...) as offer examples of where both forms could be seen, using three spheres of reality, namely economy, education, and reproductive rights (abortion). Whereas it notes that harms in COVID-19 are those harms that are inherent in it and are direct vis-à-vis its victims, the paper observes that harms of COVID-19 are those harms that are causally, but only indirectly related to COVID-19. It concludes that knowledge of the distinction between harms in and of COVID-19 will be of use to the masses across the globe in checkmating the antics of those state actors in their respective jurisdictions who may wish to hide under the guise of combating the spread and menace of COVID-19 to carry out some hidden, selfish and vindictive agenda. (shrink)

Andocides is generally not considered one of the best orators. To point up his flawed style, scholars have discussed a notoriously vindictive and humorous section in Andocides 1: in 124ff. Andocides describes the profligate lifestyle of his prosecutor, Callias III the Ceryx, the son of Hipponicus II and dadouchos of the Eleusinian Mysteries.

The article takes into account the recent magisterium of the Church on capital punishment and dwells on the teachings of John Paul II which the Pope expanded in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae it was the latter document that called for , changes in the typical edition of the Cathechism of the Catholic Church . The author develops his reading of the Encyclical in four sections. He first dwells on human dignity and the primary right to being - understood in the (...) light of the biblical concept of humanity in Genesis and in the New Testament - as the basis for human co-existence. The key concept is the human person as created in the image and likeness of God. That image, though wounded by sin, has been redeemed by Christ and restored to communion with God and with others. It is Christ himself who enables the individual to live according to humanity's ratio essendi, to respect the dignity of others and to foster their inalienable right to be. The author then shows how the Christian understanding of justice is broader than that of'retributive' or 'vindictive' justice; believers can comprehend justice in close union with the commandment of love. The article draws the conclusion that, since the death penalty challenges God's sovereignty on the being of human individuals, it must be contrary to natural law. If capital punishment cannot be a case for vindictive justice, it cannot even be interpreted as legitimate self-defence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 46-58 [Access article in PDF] In Defense of Trimming Eugene Goodheart I In The Education of Henry Adams, Adams disparages a class of English politicians as "trimmers." They are "the political economist, the anti-slavery and doctrinaire class, the followers of Tocqueville, and of John Stuart Mill. As a class, they were timid--and with good reason--and timidity, which is high wisdom in philosophy, sicklies the (...) whole cast of thought in action." 1 Timidity in action, but high wisdom in philosophy. Adams's ambivalent characterization is, relatively speaking, kind to the trimmer, for in the prevailing view he has a reputation for cowardice, lack of integrity, unprincipled behavior. Dante did not know the word, but the "neutrals" (in Sinclair's translation) whom the poet consigns to limbo have been retroactively called trimmers. Virgil regards them as beneath contempt: "Let us not talk of them; but look thou and pass." Sinclair explains why: "These innumerable seekers of safety first, and last, who take no risk either of suffering in a good cause or of scandal in a bad one, are here manifestly, nakedly, that which they were in life, the waste and rubbish of the universe, of no account to the world, unfit for Heaven and barely admitted to Hell. They have no need to die, for they 'never were alive'. They follow still, as they have always done, a meaningless, shifting banner that never stands for anything because it never stands at all, a cause which is no cause but the changing magnet of the day. Their pains are paltry and their tears and blood mere food for worms." 2The dictionary defines trimming as the "modif[ication] of one's attitude in order to stand well with opposite parties; also to accommodate oneself to the mood of the times," and gives 1685 as the date of provenance. By the late nineteenth century trimming becomes opportunism: [End Page 46] "to modify according to expediency." So it was something of a surprise to find a defense of trimming in Macaulay's famous History of England in his eulogy of one of Charles the Second's ministers, Viscount Halifax (Charles Savile). "Halifax," we learn, "was a trimmer on principle. He was also a trimmer by the constitution of his head and his heart." Macaulay sums up Halifax's defense in his essay "The Character of a Trimmer." "Everything good, he said, trims between extremes. The temperate zone trims between the climate in which men are roasted and the climate in which they are frozen. The English Church trims between the Anabaptist madness and the Papist lethargy. The English constitution trims between Turkish despotism and Polish anarchy. Virtue is nothing but a just temper between propensities any one of which, if indulged to excess, becomes vice." Behind trimming lies Aristotle's golden mean.What of the character of the trimmer? Macaulay provides an admirable and admiring portrait of Halifax. "His understanding was keen, sceptical, inexhaustibly fertile in distinctions and objections; his taste refined, his sense of the ludicrous exquisite; his temper placid and forgiving, but fastidious, and by no means prone either to malevolence or to enthusiastic admiration." Charming and agreeable, but where is the integrity or courage, attributes that we associate with character? He had nothing in common with those who fly from extreme to extreme, and regard the party which they have deserted with an animosity far exceeding that of consistent enemies. His place was on the debatable ground between the hostile divisions of the community.... The party to which he at any moment belonged was the party which, at that moment, he liked least, because it was the party of which at that moment he had the nearest view. He was therefore always severe upon his violent associates, and was always in friendly relations with his moderate opponents. Every faction in the day of its insolent and vindictive triumph incurred his censure; and every faction, when vanquished and persecuted, found in him a protector. To his lasting honor it must be mentioned that he attempted to save those victims whose fate... (shrink)

L’agiografia fa parte dei generi letterari nei quali si esprimono con più libertà concezioni teologiche e morali non convenzionali, che ci svelano un Medioevo meno uniforme di come lo si immagina. L’articolo presenta alcuni esempi tratti da testi originari di diverse aree, dal Mediterraneo greco all’Irlanda, dall’epoca tardoantica al basso Medioevo. Di santi come il bretone Macuto, Epifanio di Salamina, i martiri edesseni e svariati abati irlandesi si narrano azioni mosse da permalosità, vendicatività, gelosia, competizione. Ancora nelle storie di santi (...) irlandesi, tra cui Brigida, compare il miracolo dell’eliminazione di un feto indesiderato dal grembo della madre. Il bolognese Procolo è celebrato per aver assassinato a sangue freddo il suo persecutore. La greca Irene è assunta fisicamente in cielo. Nella Navigatio Brendani, infine, la figura di Giuda è oggetto di una pietà del tutto eccezionale. Tutte queste anomalie generano alcune reazioni di censura e mitigazione nella ricezione e trasmissione dei testi, ma fondamentalmente sono accettate e conservate, testimoniando l’apertura e varietà dottrinale ancora possibile in epoca medievale. Hagiography is one of the literary genres in which unconventional theological and moral conceptions are most freely expressed, revealing a less uniform Middle Ages than we imagine. The article presents some examples from texts originating in different areas, from the Greek Mediterranean to Ireland, from late antiquity to the late Middle Ages. Saints such as the Breton Macutus, Epiphanius of Salamis, the Edessenian martyrs and several Irish abbots are described as acting out of touchiness, vindictiveness, jealousy and competition. In the stories of other Irish saints, including Bridget, we read the miracle of the elimination of an unwanted foetus from his mother’s womb. The Bolognese Proculus is celebrated for having cold-bloodedly murdered his persecutor. The Greek Irene is physically assumed into heaven. Finally, in the Navigatio Brendani, the figure of Judas is granted a quite exceptional piety. All these anomalies arouse some reactions of censorship and mitigation in the reception and transmission of these texts, but fundamentally they are accepted and preserved, testifying to the doctrinal openness and variety still possible in medieval times. (shrink)

There is a tension in the Gospel of Matthew between two very different images of God. In the Sermon on the Mount, God is portrayed as being boundlessly gracious and forgiving, while in eight Matthean parables, God is seen as vindictive and punitive. This poses an ethical dilemma: which God is with us and whom should we emulate?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.4 (2001) 41-53 [Access article in PDF] Bad Words Denise Riley Introduction The worst words revivify themselves within us, vampirically. Injurious speech echoes relentlessly, years after the occasion of its utterance, in the mind of the one at whom it was aimed: the bad word, splinterlike, pierces to lodge. In its violently emotional materiality, the word is indeed made flesh and dwells amongst us—often long outstaying its welcome. (...) Old word-scars embody a "knowing it by heart," as if phrases had been hurled like darts into that thickly pulsating organ, but their resonances are not amorous. Where amnesia would help us, we can't forget.This sonorousness of vindictive words might help to characterize how, say, racist speech works on and in its targets. But doesn't such speculation also risk becoming an advocacy for the cultivation of insensitivity on the part of those liable to get hurt—or worse, a criticism of their linguistic vulnerability: "They just shouldn't be so linguistically sensitive"? There's much to be said for studiously practicing indifference. But the old playground chant of "sticks and stones may break my bones, but words can never hurt me" was always notoriously untrue. The success of the tactics of indifference will also depend on the vicissitudes of the words' fate in the world, which is beyond my control. I change, too. As the terrain upon which malevolent accusation falls, I am malleable, while the harsh words themselves undergo their own alterations across time, and so their import for me weakens or intensifies accordingly. At times the impact of violent speech may even be recuperable through its own incantation; the repetition of abusive language may be occasionally "redemptive" through the irony of iteration, which may drain the venom out of the original insult and neutralize it by displaying its idiocy. 1 Yet angry interpellation's very failure to always work as intended (since at particular historical moments, I may be able to parody, to weaken by adopting, to corrode its aim), is also exactly what, at other times, works for it. In any event, interpellation operates with a deep indifference as to where the side of the good may lie, and we can't realistically build an optimistic theory of the eventual recuperability of harm. Here there's no guaranteed rationality, nor any inescapable irrationality. Repetition breeds its own confident mishearing, 2 but its volatile alterations lean towards neither automatic amelioration nor inevitable worsening.This observation, though, leaves us with the still largely uninvestigated forensics of spoken injury. Verbal attacks, in the moment they happen, resemble stoning. Isn't it making heavy weather, then, to ask how they do damage: isn't the answer plain, that they hurt just as stones hurt? At the instant of their impact, so they do. Yet the peculiarity of violent words, as distinct from lumps of rock, is their power to resonate within their target for decades after the occasion on which they were weapons. Perhaps an urge for privacy about being maliciously named may perpetuate the words' remorseless afterlife: [End Page 41] [Begin Page 42] I keep what I was told I was to myself, out of reserve, shame, a wish not to seem mawkish and other not-too-creditable reasons such as guarding the word so it can't slip away to be lost in the broad linguistic flood; yet even if I manage to relinquish this fatal stance of nursing my injury, it may well refuse to let go of me. Why, though, should even the most irrational verbal onslaught lodge in us, and why should it stubbornly resist ejection, and defy its own fading? For an accusation to inhere, must its human target already be burdened with her own prehistory of vulnerability, in the shape of some psychic susceptibility; must it even depend on her anticipating readiness to accept or even embrace the accusation that also horrifies? Maybe, then, there's some fatal attraction from the aggression uttered in the present toward earlier established reverberations within us, so that to grasp this phenomenon, we have to leave a linguistic account and turn instead to a prelinguistic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Secrecy and Autonomy in Lewis CarrollSusan ShererVictorian novels quiver with morbid secrets and threatening discoveries. Unseen rooms, concealed doors, hidden boxes, masked faces, buried letters, all appear (and disappear) with striking regularity in the fiction of Victorian England. So many of these secret spaces contain children, and especially little girls, little girls in hidden spaces. The young Jane Eyre sits behind a curtain in the hidden window seat, escaping (...) the vindictive wrath of John Reed. Repulsed by her angry brother, Maggie Tulliver flees to the house attic, fantasizing that her family will fear that she has died. Little Dorrit withdraws from the common space of the Marshalsea into her private room above the prison, and Little Nell hides behind trees and walls, silently observing clandestine meetings. Finally the seven-year-old Alice falls down a rabbit-hole into a Wonderland, the dreamspace of her own psyche.Of these images, none can be more embedded in our cultural imagination than the child Alice dropping into the subterranean well of Wonderland. Indeed, of the many celebrated scenes in the Alice narratives, the most memorable, most potent, most quoted is Alice’s initial descent to the bottom of the rabbit-hole. The lastingness of this scene seems even greater when we realize that, although neither Carroll in Alice’s Adventures Underground nor Tenniel in the first edition of Wonderland illustrated the moment with a picture, it still became (along with the Mad Hatter’s tea party) one of the signature images of the Alice stories. Why, we must ask, did the Victorians retain, with a powerful tenacity, this vision of a little girl moving through a tight space toward the hidden world of Wonderland?The answer to this question is not—at least not wholly—that the scene simply represents a child’s metaphorical progress through the [End Page 1] birth canal 1 and that this, in turn, symbolizes some kind of rite of passage, a movement towards some deeper knowledge. For then how do we explain Alice’s conspicuous lack of internal development in both stories? Indeed, for a narrative that thematizes motion, Alice’s psychical growth remains disturbingly static. Throughout both narratives, Alice displays little emotional variation, for when she is not frustrated or anxious, she is, for the most part, vapid or expressionless. In fact, one is immediately struck by her coolness and indifference as she drops through the rabbit-hole. 2 Thus, because scene changes in Wonderland and Looking-Glass rarely betoken any emotional or intellectual modulations, Alice’s falling into Wonderland signals no internal transition.But the image does relocate her body and within this fictive world, location is everything. The scene gestures Alice’s departure, her separation, her movement towards an autonomy of which every child dreams when, in play, retreating to a hidden space. A child’s impulse to hide, to create a secret space, is one of the most compelling of all human wishes, the wish for autonomy and autarchy—“to be cut off from the word and yet owner of the world.” 3 Throughout Victorian literature, the fantasy of autonomy sets children dreaming of far-away worlds and hidden gardens. The young Cathy and Heathcliff flee to the isolated moors, filling the open, empty space with dreams of unrestricted freedom. Little Dorrit envisages the locked garden behind the Marshalsea as an alternative world to the foul prison atmosphere. And what are the Brontës’s Angria and Gondol but disconnected, self-governing realms imagined from the standpoint of childhood powerlessness? The image, then, of Alice’s fall begins to fulfill this powerful wish for autonomy, which culminates, finally, in Alice’s self-coronation at the end of Looking-Glass. Yet it is only within the child’s willing imagination that a secret space can encroach so closely upon autonomy, for as we shall see, secrecy and autonomy are irreconcilable not only in the demanding world of realism, but even in the more elastic world of Carrollian fantasy.IAlice’s descent into Wonderland and her entrance into the Looking-Glass kingdom would seem like ripe metaphors for Carroll to explore the thoughts and fantasies of Alice’s psyche. What could be more... (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article develops an Arendtian conception of resentment and shows that resentment as a response to injustice is in fact only possible within a community of persons engaged in moral and recognitive relations. While Arendt is better known for her work on forgiveness—characterized as a creative rather than vindictive response to injury—this article suggests that Arendt provides a unique way of thinking about resentment as essentially a response to another human's subjectivity. But when injury is massive, so beyond the (...) pale that the possibility of face-to-face human interaction is annihilated, the space for resentment is thereby destroyed. Ironically, while the absence of resentment might at first seem to be an unproblematically good thing, Arendt shows us that the loss of resentment actually signals the loss of the properly human realm. (shrink)

G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica is a landmark publication in twentieth-century moral philosophy. Through focusing on the origin and evolution of his main doctrines, this guidebook makes it clear that Moore was an innovator whose provocative take on traditional philosophical problems ignited heated debates among philosophers. Principia Ethica is an important text for those attempting to understand and engage with some major philosophical debates in ethics today. The Routledge Guidebook to Moore's Principia Ethica provides a comprehensive introduction to this historic text, (...) examining key Moorean themes including: ethical non-naturalism the naturalistic fallacy the Open Question Argument moral ontology and epistemology ideal utilitarianism vindictive punishment and organicity moral intuition for epistemic justification in ethics theory of value Ideal for anyone wanting to understand and gain perspective on Moore's seminal work, the book is essential reading for students of moral philosophy, metaethics, normative ethics, philosophical analysis, and related fields. (shrink)

I. Introduction. The debt/atonement model of punishment seeks to reconcile the criminal with his direct victim, as well as the larger community, through restorative mechanisms of restitution and atonement.[i] As a result, it has certain advantages over better known rivals.[ii] Unlike retribution, reform and deterrence, the approach does some good, first and foremost, for the victim of the crime. But it can also benefit the victimizer and indirectly victimized members of the larger community. Competing theories usually profit but one of (...) the three. They also fail to do as well in removing the tension between justice and mercy. Yet even when mercy is not an option, retribution, reform and deterrence can dictate punishments that are intuitively excessive. But the problem isn’t just that of excess. At others times, it seems they will endorse inappropriately lenient responses to crime. I will argue that a properly construed debt/atonement approach, despite its stress on punishment taking the form of restitution, can handle three common objections that it is incapable of providing appropriate punishments. The first is that it cannot justify punishing murder for the dead cannot be compensated. Even if this turns out to be true, surprisingly, it bestows no relative advantage upon rival accounts for if the dead cannot be benefited, then they cannot be harmed, and thus punishing killers who did not harm those they killed will be difficult for any theory to justify. The second objection is that it cannot accommodate our practice of publishing failed attempts where there appears to be no harm when the target didn’t even know the attempt transpired. Ironically, it turns out that only the advocated approach can justify our practice of punishing failed attempts less severely than successes. The third objection is that the theory sometimes advocates making criminals suffer in order to satisfy the vindictive desires of their victims. I’ll argue that so harming criminals is a defensible way to extract the debt payment they owe their victims.. (shrink)

This article shows that Christianity in its perception of eschatological events has early on given up the concept of therapeutic and corrective punishment, turning to the idea of vindictive and retributive punishment. Similarly to other Churches, the Roman Catholic Church in its teachings does not officially support the hope for universal salvation. Pope John Paul II developed his eschatological thinking in a careful way; he did not close the way to further search. The Pope reminded that former councils discarded the (...) theory of apokatastasis (teaching that all creature would be saved), but admitted that “the problem remains”. He attempted at retaining the tension existing between the New Testament statement on the general intention of God to save all humankind and Christ’s words on the “eternal punishment” awaiting people lost through their own egoism and insensitivity to others. In the Pope’s teachings, traditional concepts are interwoven with new accents which correct the false idea of God as the cause of damnation and the creator of eternal hell. Hell is not a punishment imposed by God, but a state of final self-exclusion from communion with God. According to Pope, hell is above all a moral postulate, a requirement of justice in view of terrible human crimes which must not go unpunished. A final punishment is to serve the retention of moral balance in the history of humanity.The author of this article argues that all those in favor of the hope for universal salvation do not, by any means, preach impunity or mandatory amnesty. One has to bear the consequence of one’s evil actions. Moral consciousness is saved. Salvation is not a necessity or a compulsion but a God’s gift that has to be accepted freely. God does not remain entirely helpless in view of human freedom. He can attract it to Himself, purify it and transform it through His patient and boundless love. This can happen only through unimaginable suffering and terrible torment which, in human terms, can be even called eternal, taking whole centuries due to their quality and intensity, as suggested by the very Greek term aiōnios. It is a torment directed at correction and healing, which is prompted by the Greek term kólasis in Christ’s parable on the final judgment. The position of John Paul II betrays his internal split between the hope for universal salvation and the reality of eternal damnation. The studies instigated by the Church’s great minds caused also his anxiety, but as a pope and a teacher he wanted to keep faith with the teachings of councils and the traditional interpretation of biblical texts. The author of the article is convinced that the Christianity of the future will at some pointachieve greater courage in its attitude to eschatological issues. The pedagogics of hope and mercy might then take the place of pedagogics of fear of God and eternal hell. (shrink)

My thesis offers a philosophical and psychological examination of our ability to forgive strangers post-atrocity. Forgiveness is often considered impossible because atrocities involve unforgivable violations of moral values. Viewed through the lens of deconstruction, however, it is precisely where forgiveness seems impossible that it becomes possible, and more importantly, necessary in order to curb the desire for vengeance. Granting this radical understanding of the value of forgiveness---the ability to forgive the unforgivable---what hinders our ability to forgive? My work focuses on (...) public vindictiveness towards Karla Homolka, who was released in 2005, having served her 12-year sentence for her role in the rape and murder of 14-year-old Leslie Mahaffy and 15-year-old Kristen French. My thesis aims to show how reflective engagement with forgiveness can tell us something about ourselves as ethical persons by demonstrating how and why our ongoing resentment towards others is often morally unjustified. (shrink)