Atonement

If belief in the redemptive nature of the life and death of Christ is to be intellectually defensible, Christian philosophers must have an account of it that is not only philosophically coherent, but also morally unobjectionable. Drawing on feminist theology, this paper explores the epistemological and gendered implications of traditional approaches to the atonement; namely, the normalization of submission to violence and the idealization of suffering. Conceiving of redemption as arising out of sacrificial submission to violence has corrupted the shared (...) hermeneutical resources through which Christian communities conceptualize ethical conduct, love, and virtue. Borrowing in part from those who have suggested a moral influence view, like Abelard, this paper argues Christian philosophers pursue a new kind of exemplarist model. That is, perhaps death has no central role in what redeems us, nor sacrificial love, but rather resisting injustice, even when the risks of doing so may be fatal. (shrink)

Faithful persons tend to relate to their religious beliefs as truth claims, particularly inasmuch as their beliefs have soteriological implications for those of different religions. For Christians the particular claims which matter most in this regard are those made by Jesus of Nazareth and his claims are primarily relational in nature. I propose a model in which we understand divine grace from Jesus as being mediated through relational knowledge of him on a compassionately exclusivist basis, including post-mortem. Supporting this model, (...) I draw from Eleonore Stump’s hypothesis in her 2018 Atonement that the crucifixion of Jesus opens the divine psyche to all human psyches sufficiently for salvific mutual indwelling to occur, and from Gavin D’Costa’s conception of the descensus Christi ad inferos as the mechanism for grace’s accessibility post-mortem presented in his 2009 Christianity and World Religions. This model seeks to address ongoing, justified pastoral concern for the soteriological status of non-Christians while still treating Christianity as objectively true. (shrink)

In her impressive Atonement, Eleonore Stump claims that her novel Marian theory of the atonement meets a desideratum for a successful theory that Aquinas's theory does not, namely, showing that Christ's passion and death are essential to the solution to the problem of human sin. Here I suggest reasons to side with Aquinas, who says that Christ's suffering and death are not necessary, but merely a fitting way of solving the problem. If the fittingness of Christ's passion and death is (...) a good enough justification for it, we lose a motivation for adopting the Marian theory over the Thomistic one. (shrink)

The fifth commandment is part of the Ten Commandments that God gave to Moses on Mount Sinai. The Bible is the eternal word of God, so this fifth Law has a meaning that must be understood in the infinite dimension. The Bible gives the principle that if the man fails to do one of the commandments in the Law, then he has failed. There are many interpretations of this Law, but it only comes down to practical, ethical, and moral dimensions (...) because it solely focuses on the relevance of the present. The Bible states that the curse of the Law has been redeemed and fulfilled by Jesus Christ. After the resurrection, Jesus said that in the Torah, the Psalms and the Prophets written about Him. Thus Jesus gave a new concept of interpretation in understanding the Law. This principle is called the historical redemptive approach. The Bible states the culmination of completing all of Jesus' redemptive work is the time of the second coming in the realization of the new heaven and earth. Therefore, how to explain the relevance of the fifth Law in the context of eternity. This research focuses on the understanding of the Fifth Law in the eschatological dimension. (shrink)

Tulisan ini berjudul tinjauan teologis perintah jangan mencuri dalam Keluaran 20: 15 berdasarkan perspektif sejarah penebusan. Tujuan tulisan ini adalah melakukan kajian tentang perintah jangan mencuri dalam Keluaran 20: 15. Kajian ini dilakukan sebagai pengembangan untuk memahami perintah jangan mencuri dalam Keluaran 20: 15. Kajian ini juga bertujuan memberikan penjelasan bagaimana penggenapan yang Yesus lakukan terhadap perintah jangan mencuri dalam Keluaran 20: 15, selain itu kajian ini akan menyoroti realisasi perintah jangan mencuri dalam Keluaran 20: 15 pada masa orang percaya (...) berada dalam langit dan bumi yang baru. Untuk mendapatkan penjelasan tersebut, maka digunakan pendekatan sejarah penebusan. Pendekatan ini akan mendasarkan pada penyelidikan Alkitab sebagai sumber utama didukung dengan artikel dan literatur yang berkaitan dengan topik yang dibahas. Penulis menyakini bahwa Yesus sebagai penggenap seluruh Hukum Taurat pasti juga menggenapi hukum ini dalam kehidupannya. Penulis memiliki hipotesis bahwa perintah jangan mencuri dalam Keluaran 20: 15 tetap relevan sampai kepada kekekalan namun dengan bentuk dan sifat yang baru. Oleh karena itu kiranya melalui tulisan ini menambah pengetahuan bagaimana memahami relevansi sebuah teks Alkitab tidak hanya pada masa lampau dan masa kini, tetapi sampai kepada masa yang akan datang. (shrink)

Compelling voices charge that the theological notion of “sacrifice” valorizes suffering and fosters a culture of violence by the claim that Christ’s death on the Cross paid for human sins. Beneath the ‘sacred’ violence of sacrifice, René Girard discerns a concealed scapegoat-murder driven by a distortion of human desire that itself must lead to human self-annihilation. I here ask: can one speak safely of sacrifice; and can human beings somehow cease to practice the sacrifice that must otherwise destroy them? Drawing (...) on Gregory the Great (ca. 540–604), I propose an understanding of sacrifice that both distinguishes Christian sacrifice from sacred violence and accounts for how to overcome the roots of the sacred violence identified by Girard. I make four claims: First, Girard recognizes two kinds of sacrifice—one, the scapegoat murder, overcomes community rivalries by unanimous imitation of an accuser, shifting blame onto a third party who is collectively murdered; the other sort of sacrifice practices renunciation and forgiveness in imitation of God. These I respectively designate the “Satanic” (Girard’s term) and the “theomimetic” (mine). Second, I analyze the intrinsic instability that keeps the Satanic from sustaining the societal order and unity that it promises. Third, by a constructive reading of Gregory the Great, I posit that satanic sacrifice overlooks and indeed exacerbates the root of human covetousness—a failure to love. Fourth, Gregory’s teaching on the imitation of Christ enables us to expand on Girard’s account of the theo¬mimetic sacrifice of renunciation, to clarify how this latter might not only oppose but also systematically subvert the Satanic by healing the disorder out of which mimetic rivalry and scapegoating first take their rise. (shrink)

To love someone, Eleonore Stump tells us, is to have two desires: a desire her objective good and a desire for union with her. In Atonement, Stump claims that loving someone—understood as having these desires—is necessary and sufficient for morally appropriate forgiveness. I offer several arguments against this claim.

How did Christ's death overcome the estrangement and condemnation of sinners before a holy God, so as to reconcile them to Him? A great variety of theories of the atonement have been offered over the centuries to make sense of the fact that Christ by his death has provided the means of reconciliation with God: ransom theories, satisfaction theories, moral influence theories, penal substitution theories, and so on. Competing theories need to be assessed by their accord with biblical data and (...) their philosophical coherence. (shrink)

According to the Felix Culpa Theodicy, worlds containing atonement and incarnation are of such great value that God is justified in actualizing such a world, despite all of the moral evil that has accompanied it. Focusing upon Alvin Plantinga’s articulation of this theodicy, I argue against FCT on the basis of normative ethical considerations. On the one hand, the deontic status of at least some actions depends upon the consequences of those actions. On the other hand, the existence of atonement (...) depends upon the deontic status of at least one action. Under certain circumstances, this two-way dependence yields a contradiction if atonement has the kind of value conferred upon it by FCT. I conclude by discussing some implications for Molinism and evidential arguments from moral evil. (shrink)

In light of Jewish tradition and the metaphysics of time, we argue that God can and will change the past. The argument makes for a new answer to the problem of evil and a new theory of atonement.

The author contextualizes the Problem of Evil in Open Theism system, listing its main theses, primarily the logicof- love-defense (and free-will-defense) connected to Trinitarian speculation. After evaluating the discussion in Analytic Philosophy of Religion, the focus is on the personal mystery of evil, claiming that, because of mystery and vagueness, the Problem of Evil is undecidable. Recalling other schools of thought (Pareyson: ontology of freedom; Moltmann: Dialectical theology; Kenotic theology; Original Sin hermeneutics), the author tries to grasp their common insights. (...) One of them is the evident explanatory failure of theodicies, expressed in the antinomian statements ‘God is not innocent’. The author follows these insights, developing the concept of Eternal Immolation (Bulgakov), arguing that, without a proper understanding of its mystery (what is, and what is not), theistic theodicy could remain compromised. ‘Eternal Immolation’ is considered consequent – or already present – in recent speculations, it stands or falls when we accept that these reveal some unresolved points in Christian doctrine. Hence, ‘Eternal Immolation’ becomes a coordinating-concept, able to bring together their assumptions: several kinds of kenosis, the ontology of freedom with a logic-of-love defense, strongly linked to a libertarian human freedom, and the acknowledgement of the unresolved mystery of evil. (shrink)

Traditional Christianity holds that Jesus Christ somehow helps to bring about our salvation. A ‘theory of atonement’ is a theory about how he does this. One influential and elegant theory of atonement is Richard Swinburne's reparation theory. In this article, I contend that this theory fails to satisfy an important condition of adequacy on theories of atonement that has been overlooked in the literature. I first argue that in order to be plausible, a theory of atonement must not imply that (...) failure to believe in the correct theory of atonement greatly hinders one from being benefited by Christ's salvific work. I then argue that reparation theory does have this problematic implication. (shrink)

While Biggar in chapter 2 of his In Defence of War cites Augustine in support of an argument for forgiveness and reconciliation, this paper argues through a close look at Augustine’s Letters 95 and 139 and Book I of his On Christian Doctrine that Augustine’s view of how the Donatists should be treated focused on their punishment, not on reconciliation in the sense Biggar describes.

The ‘perfection account’ of atonement is discussed,under which Christ, on the cross,completed the perfection of human nature,establishing the full perfection of loving filial obedience, offering to the Father a perfected humanity, where these features were fundamental to the atonement. A basic perfection account is first set out. Two additional elements of the perfection account are then discussed: first, that Christ established a perfect victory over evil in our humanity; second, that on the cross Christ put to death the pull to (...) the self-life in our humanity. Reparation is then discussed. Finally,some critical questions are addressed. (shrink)

In this essay. I explore questions pertaining to ‘radical’ acts of forgiveness as they relate to considerations of duties and justice. I will survey recent examples and show a possible philosophical basis for understanding them in terms of self-duty. Thus I will try to show that a little noticed basis exists for understanding acts of radical forgiveness as morally required (and not simply admirable or reserved for the saintly). I argue both that considerations of self-duty can provide a secular basis (...) for justifying radical acts of forgiveness and that problems associated with this kind of forgiveness and justice are not as serious as they are often taken to be. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida’s description of forgiveness as a kind of “madness” certainly applies to John L’Heureux’s novel, The Shrine at Altamira. In the novel’s climax, forgiveness is manifested between Russell Whitaker and his son John through an incomprehensible tragedy. But although the novel harmonizes with much of Derrida’s thought, it resists a complete coherence. This article will explore the gaps between the novelistic and philosophic discourses on the subject of forgiveness. I argue that while the story painfully portrays an event of (...) “forgiveness” as a “madness,” it also challenges conceptual articulations of forgiveness and thereby exposes both the necessity and the limits of language. The novel thus compels the reader to make a choice more existential than theoretical: one can either see the act of forgiveness as meaningless, or one can allow the possibility of hope, a hope weak and illogical to be sure, but a hope that refuses to grant tragedy the last word. (shrink)

In this paper I develop and defend a new theory of the Atonement - the Communal Substitution Theory. According to the Communal Substitution Theory, by dying on the cross Jesus either takes on the punishment for, or offers satisfaction for, the sins of the human community. Individual humans have sinned, but human communities have sinned as well. Jesus dies for the communal sins. As a result, human communities are forgiven and reconciled to God, and through the event of communal forgiveness, (...) individual human sins can be forgiven as well. Moving the focal point of atonement to communal sins has various advantages: well-known objections to satisfaction and penal theories are avoided, and many of the advantages of other theories of the atonement are organically integrated into the communal substitution theory. (shrink)

Resumo O plural e conflituoso entendimento da legitimação da pena no Direito, tem origem nas diversas intencionalidades que lhe conferem sentido. Neste artigo são analisadas as intencionalidades mais relevantes, destacando os seus modelos justificativos: retribuição, reparação, prevenção, expiação, reabilitação e restauração . Para melhor análise destes são também consideradas a variável da temporalidade e a variável dos sujeitos, que protagonizam a dinâmica do castigo . Depois, num momento comparativo, destacam-se críticamente as confluências e as oposições. Assim será possível concluir que (...) a intencionalidade restauradora e a sua firme relativização do castigo é aquela que melhor consegue articular as variáveis de sentido – com os seus valores –, a temporalidade e os sujeitos, pelo que se mostra ser a referência mais positiva para a legitimização. Contudo, dada a sua precaridade, devido ao seu surgimento recente, impõe-se reforçá-la reflexivamente e practicamente. Palavras-chave : expiação, pena, prevenção, reabilitação, reparação, restauração, retribuição, vingançaThe plural and conflictual understanding of the legitimacy of penalty in law stems from diverse intentionalities that constitute their respective meanings. This article analyzes the most relevant intentionalities. It seeks to highlight the models that justifies them: retribution, reparation, prevention, atonement, rehabilitation and restoration . To better analyze these models, the variable of temporality and the variable of the subjects are also considered in view of the fact that they operate in the dynamics of punishment . Then, establishing comparisons, the confluences and oppositions are critically highlighted. In order to conclude that the restorative intentionality and its strong relativization of punishment is the one who can best articulate the variables of meaning – with their values, involving temporality and subjects. In the end, it proves to be the most positive reference for legitimization However, given its precariousness, due to its recent emergence, it must be strengthen in both reflection and practice. Keywords : atonement, prevention, punishment, rehabilitation, reparation, restoration, retribution, vengeance. (shrink)

R. G. Collingwood’s philosophical analysis of religious atonement as a dialectical process of mortal repentance and divine forgiveness is explained and criticized. Collingwood’s Christian concept of atonement, in which Christ \ the Atonement the Incarnation), is subject in turn to another kind of dialectic, in which some of Collingwood’s leading ideas are first surveyed, and then tested against objections in a philosophical evaluation of their virtues and defects, strengths and weaknesses. Collingwood’s efforts to synthesize objective and subjective aspects of atonement, (...) and his proposal to solve the soteriological problem as to why God becomes flesh, as a dogma of some Christian belief systems, is finally exposed in adversarial exposition as inadequately supported by one of his main arguments, designated here as Collingwood’s Dilemma. The dilemma is that sin is either forgiven or unforgiven by God. If God forgives sin, then God’s justice is lax, whereas if God does not forgive sin, then, also contrary to divine nature, God lacks perfect loving compassion. The dilemma is supposed to drive philosophy toward a concept of atonement in which the sacrifice of Christ is required in order to absolve God of the lax judgment objection. God forgives sin only when the price of sin is paid, in this case, by the suffering and crucifixion of God’s avatar. The dilemma can be resolved in another way than Collingwood considers, undermining his motivation for synthesizing objective and subjective facets of the concept of atonement for the sake of avoiding inconsistency. Collingwood is philosophically important because he asks all the right questions about religious atonement, and points toward reasonable answers, even if he does not always deliver original philosophically satisfactory solutions. (shrink)

This article highlights some of the difficulties that accompany any attempt to articulate an understanding of forgiveness that is at once coherent, just and desirable. Through a close examination of Charles Griswold’s book Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, I suggest that there are good reasons to think that forgiveness is intrinsically ambiguous, both conceptually and morally. I argue that there is an underlying tension between the concerns that shape the definition, and those that are invoked when affirming the good of forgiveness. (...) Using Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, I then provide some commentary concerning this ambiguity and make some brief suggestions about how this ambiguity might be theologically fruitful. (shrink)

Danaher suggests that doxological justice, grounded in an acute receptivity of the generosity of God, can decenter our current notions of justice. Instead I focus on what might be called doxological forgiveness, that is, grace-responsive forgiveness. The first section argues that a conception of forgiveness which I dub repentance-responsive is compatible with and even requires holding punitive attitudes. The second section sketches the alternative account of grace-responsive forgiveness. Those who embody this virtue have epistemic and theological warrant to entirely disavow (...) punitive emotions. The third section argues that God embodies a grace-responsive forgiveness that undermines retributivism and eclipses repentance-responsive forgiveness. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 2013 Heft: 1 Seiten: 3-24.

I offer a solution to an old puzzle about how God can be both just and merciful at the same time—a feat which seems required of God, but at the same time seems impossible since showing mercy involves being more lenient than justice demands. Inspired by two of Jesus’ parables and work by Feinberg, Johnson and Smart, I suggest that following a “principle of merciful justice”—that persons ought to receive what they deserve or better—delivers mercy and justice simultaneously, certainly in (...) cases of distributions of goods, and even in cases of distribution of harms as well, if we can accept some qualifications. (shrink)

Throughout the bulk of the Reformed Tradition’s history within both Europe and the United States, most scholars have dismissed pastor and theologian Moïse Amyraut as a seventeenth century French heretic whose actions and theology led to the demise of the Huguenots in France. However, upon further introspection into Amyraut’s claims as being closer to Calvin (soteriologically) than his Genevan successors, one finds uncanny parallels in the scriptural commentaries and biblical insight into the expiation of Christ between Calvin and Amyraut. By (...) comparing key scriptural passages concerning the atonement, this article demonstrates that Reformed theologian Moïse Amyraut in fact propagated a universal atonement theory which parallels Calvin’s, both men ascribing to biblical faithfulness, a (humanistic) theological method, and similar hermeneutic. As such, both Calvin and Amyraut scripturally contend that God desires and provided the means for the salvation of the whole world. Further, the article demonstrates that Calvin’s successor, Theodore de Beza, could not in fact make the same claims as Amyraut, this article demonstrating that Beza went beyond Calvin’s scriptural approach to Christ’s expiation. Therefore, this article supports a more centrist approach from within and outside the Reformed tradition by demonstrating that Calvin and Amyraut concentrically held to God’s gracious provision in Christ for the saving of the whole world, for those who would believe in Christ for salvation. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the issue of forgiveness of oneself by looking at the writings of two postwar French philosophers: Georges Gusdorf and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Gusdorf believes that forgiving oneself is necessary for being able to forgive others. On the other hand, Jankélévitch sees no possibility of forgiveness for oneself and for similar reasons is very suspicious of traditional views of the role accorded to repenting and penitence. In short, the main view that separates the thinkers is, quite literally, (...) whether work on oneself—such as repentance and penitence—comes first before forgiveness, or whether repentance and penitence are the result of some prior gracious act, such as forgiveness. Somewhat ironically, their views, when all is said and done, may not really be all that far apart from each other, especially in light of how each views the nature of the self. In the end, the main factor dividing the two thinkers is metaphysical allegiances. Reflecting a tendency that is shown in most—if not all—of his early works, Gusdorf views the self more from the perspective of anthropology. Jankélévitch, like his mentor Henri Bergson, has faith in science and does not have a supernatural view of the human soul. (shrink)

The doctrine of penal substitution claims that it was good (or required) for God to punish in response to human sin, and that Christ received this punishment in our stead. I argue that this doctrine’s central factual claim—that Christ was punished by God—is mistaken. In order to punish someone, one must at least believe the recipient is responsible for an offense. But God surely did not believe the innocent Christ was responsible for an offense, let alone the offense of human (...) sin. So, the central factual claim is mistaken. In the final section, I show that this critique of penal substitution does not apply to the closely-related Anselmian satisfaction theory. (shrink)

The article begins with the gospels’ admonition to take up one's cross and asks how Christians might understand Christ's work on the cross so that we might better imitate or participate in it. Using tools from recent advances in literary analysis and systematic theology, the article attempts to provide some answer to this question. It considers contemporary feminist and liberation theologians’ criticism of the common but problematic interpretation of Christ's cross, what is often called ‘substitutionary penal atonement.’ It compares this (...) with Anselm's atonement theory of satisfaction and Bernard Lonergan's and René Girard's analysis of the cross as a communication of love that invites others into loving relationship. With these interpretations of Christ's work, it concludes with some thoughts on how Christians might take up their own daily crosses. (shrink)

Believers regularly refer to God as “forgiving and merciful” when praying for divine forgiveness. If one is committed to divine immutability and impassability, as Maimonides is, one must deny that God is capable, in principle, of acting in a forgiving manner. If one rejects divine impassability, maintaining that God has a psychology, as Muffs does, one must reckon with biblical depictions of divine vengeance and rage. Such depictions suggest that while being capable, in principle, of acting in a forgiving way, (...) God has a difficulty to manage God’s anger and do so in practice. Employing a Wittgensteinian perspective, I argue that utterances, e.g., “God merciful and gracious, slow to anger. . . forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin”, need not be understood as involving mistaken or confused descriptions of God’s nature and manner of acting. Rather, they can be understood as speech-acts of various types and functions: mystical, theurgic and others, that purport to bring about or transform various states of affairs in this world and/or beyond it. As such, they can function as non-semantic instruments that purport to elevate the believer to the “upper worlds”, or as anger-management devices that purport to help God implement His second order desire to act in a forgiving manner, despite His difficulty to do so. (shrink)

This article engages the conversation between Sarah Coakley, Daphne Hampson, and Aristotle Papanikolaou on the appropriateness of kenosis as a theological trope for women and deeply oppressed and vulnerable others. It affirms Coakley's and Papanikolaou's stance, which maintains that kenosis is a necessary or at least distinctively valuable category in Christian theology for understanding the transformation and redemption of all persons. The paper expands on Papanikolaou's analysis of the kenosis involved in the healing and recovery of personhood, arguing that the (...) “emptying of fear” reaches the fullness of self‐giving love in the scandalous act of forgiveness. (shrink)

In “The Nature of the Atonement”, Eleonore Stump explores the problem of human sin that the atonement is meant to solve, helpfully uncovering important adequacy conditions for theories of atonement. She then uses those conditions to critically evaluate Anselmian and Thomistic theories of atonement, arguing (among many other interesting things) that the Thomist has a leg up on the Anselmian when it comes to the atonement-motivating problem of human sin (pp.11-12 of ms.). I argue for two claims in what follows. (...) First, Stump’s two seemingly independent “further problems” for theorists of atonement (discussed in the penultimate section of her paper) in fact reduce to a single challenge, which suggests a strategy for future theorizing about the atonement. Second, Stump’s case that the Thomist outperforms the Anselmian on the problem of human sin is weaker than it initially appears. As we’ll see, Stump’s own account of shame implies that the Anselmian’s difficulties on this front are less serious than she thinks. (shrink)

This study examines an important part of Richard Swinburne’s case for the plausibility of Christianity, namely his Atonement theory. My examination begins by presenting Swinburne’s theory before alluding to the many criticisms it has attracted. I conclude with some lessons which can be learnt about philosophical theology and its use in interreligious dialogue. My main contention is that if philosophical theology is going to be used for inter-religious dialogue, then it should not be used with the expectation that disagreements will (...) be overcome. (shrink)

The most substantial source for thinking about forgiveness is Christian ethics. Some Christians offer forgiveness even for atrocities in the absence of repentance and reparations. The paper critically examines Christian idealism about forgiveness, while looking beyond Christianity toward a humanistic approach that acknowledges the tragic conflict between forgiveness and justice. Christian forgiveness is part of a radical revaluation of values regarding the goods of this world, personal identity, and temporality. Humanistic approaches, as found in Kant and the Greeks, do not (...) embrace this radical revaluation of values. But it remains useful to consider the benefits of forgiveness, even for those who are not willing to commit to such a radical revaluation. (shrink)

This paper proposes an answer to a puzzle regarding robust notions of forgiveness. Robust forgiveness occurs when victims extend grace to perpetrators in the absence of moral reparation or repentance. If unmerited grace is one of its necessary features, is robust forgiveness a moral and rational response to perpetrators? The paper sketches an empathetic model of forgiveness as a plausible candidate for answering this puzzle. However, this particular model must be refined to handle cases where resentment infiltrates and cements deeply (...) in our motivational structures. Still working broadly within an empathetic framework, the paper proposes a modification aimed to alleviate worries about the dispersing and entrenchment of resentment. (shrink)

In several recent articles and in a forthcoming book, I have tried to articulate what I take the real challenge to virtue ethics to be from social psychology. In this article, I develop that challenge again by looking specifically at the virtue of forgiveness.