summaryMartin and Pfeifer have claimed“that the most typical characterizations of intentionality… all fail to distinguish … mental states from …dispositional physical states.”The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's inexistence of the intentional object, Searle's directedness (...) and Anscombe's indeterminacy, are features which distinguish T‐inten Tional/dispositional The other two are either, as in the case of Chisholm's permissible falsity of a propositional attitude ascription, a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of Frege's indirect reference/Quine's referential opacity, evidence that the S‐intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future. (shrink)

This article analyses Ukraine’s language policies from 2002 to 2022 within a framework of liberalism, while avoiding making normative judgements or recommendations, updating the discussion raised in Kymlicka and Opalski’s Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? The analysis takes into consideration Ukraine’s present and historic position, including the challenge that postcolonial nation building can pose for achieving liberalism and linguistic justice. The paper focuses on three main areas of language policy: education, businesses and media, and assesses if they can be (...) described as liberal orthodox, pluralist or illiberal. The article begins by defining liberalism and illiberalism, discussing the context of Ukraine’s linguistic diversity and postcolonial context, before outlining the language situation until EuroMaidan. Then, the main issue of language policy in the areas of education, business and media is analysed, before considering whether Ukrainian language laws might be considered liberal or illiberal. Finally, potential future trajectories are outlined. (shrink)

Belief in the divine origin of the universe began to wane most markedly in the nineteenth century, when scientific accounts of creation by natural law arose to challenge traditional religious doctrines. Most of the credit - or blame - for the victory of naturalism has generally gone to Charles Darwin and the biologists who formulated theories of organic evolution. Darwinism undoubtedly played the major role, but the supporting parts played by naturalistic cosmogonies should also be acknowledged. Chief among these was (...) the nebular hypothesis proposed by Pierre Simon Laplace in 1796, which explained the origin of the solar system as a natural development over extended periods of time. Ronald Numbers focuses on Laplace's theory as it affected American scientific thought. he first traces the history of Laplace's cosmogony chronologically, from its European inception to its demise about 1900. the last three chapters explore some of the theological and scientific consequences resulting from the acceptance of this cosmogony. Most significant was the change in the status of supernatural doctrine. When the nebular hypothesis lost credence at the end of the nineteenth century, those who had before tried to accommodate natural theory with supernatural doctrine no longer felt compelled to do so when faced with succeeding theories. The nebular hypothesis, it seems, had established natural law in the heavens. (shrink)

The Mesopotamian system of sexagesimal counting numbers was based on the progressive series of units 1, 10, 1·60, 10·60, …. It may have been in use already before the invention of writing, with the mentioned units represented by various kinds of small clay tokens. After the invention of proto-cuneiform writing, c. 3300 BC, it continued to be used, with the successive units of the system represented by distinctive impressed cup- and disk-shaped number signs. Other kinds of “metrological” number systems (...) in the proto-cuneiform script, with similar number signs, were used to denote area numbers, capacity numbers, etc. In a handful of known mathematical cuneiform texts from the latter half of the third millennium BC, the ancient systems of sexagesimal counting numbers and area numbers were still in use, alongside new kinds of systems of capacity numbers and weight numbers. Large area numbers, capacity numbers, and weight numbers were counted sexagesimally, while each metrological number system had its own kind of fractional units. In the system of counting numbers itself, fractions could be expressed as sixtieths, sixtieths of sixtieths, and so on, but also in terms of small units borrowed from the system of weight numbers. Among them were the “basic fractions” which we would understand as 1/3, 1/2, and 2/3. In a very early series of metro-mathematical division exercises and an equally early metro-mathematical table of squares, “quasi-integers” of the form “integer plus basic fraction” play a prominent role. Quasi-integers play an essential role also in a recently found atypical cuneiform table of reciprocals. The invention of sexagesimal numbers in place-value notation, in the Neo-Sumerian period c. 2000 BC, was based on a series of innovations. The range of the system of sexagesimal counting numbers was extended indefinitely both upward and downward, and the use of quasi-integers was abolished. Sexagesimal place-value numbers were used for all kinds of calculations in Old Babylonian mathematical cuneiform texts, c. 1700 BC, while traditional metrological numbers were retained in both questions and answers of the exercises. Examples of impressive computations of reciprocals of many-place regular sexagesimal place-value numbers, with no practical applications whatsoever, are known from the Old Babylonian period. In the Late Babylonian period, such computations were still popular, performed by the same persons who constructed the many-place sexagesimal tables that make up the corpus of Late Babylonian mathematical astronomy. (shrink)

In recent decades, there has been widespread debate in the human and social sciences regarding the compatibility and the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative approaches in research. In psychiatry, depending on disciplines and traditions, objects of study can be represented either in words or using two types of mathematization. In the latter case, the use of mathematics in psychiatry is most often only local, as opposed to global as in the case of classical mechanics. Relationships between these objects of (...) study can in turn be explored in three different ways: 1/ by a hermeneutic process, 2/ using statistics, the most frequent method in psychiatric research today, 3/ using equations, i.e. using mathematical relationships that are formal and deterministic. The 3 ways of representing entities (with language, locally with mathematics or globally with mathematics) and the 3 ways of expressing the relationships between entities (using hermeneutics, statistics or equations) can be combined in a cross-tabulation, and nearly all nine combinations can be described using examples. A typology of this nature may be useful in assessing which epistemological perspectives are currently dominant in a constantly evolving field such as psychiatry, and which other perspectives still need to be developed. It also contributes to undermining the overly simplistic and counterproductive beliefs that accompany the assumption of a Manichean “quantitative/qualitative” dichotomy. Systematic examination of this set of typologies could be useful in indicating new directions for future research beyond the quantitative/qualitative divide. (shrink)

Originally published in 1995, Creation-Evolution Debates is the second volume in the series, Creationism in Twentieth Century America, reissued in 2021. The volume comprises eight debates from the early 1920s and 1930s between prominent evolutionists and creationists of the time. The original sources detail debates that took place either orally or in print, as well as active debates between creationists over the true meaning of Genesis I. The essays in this volume feature prominent discussions between the likes of Edwin (...) Grant Conklin, Henry Fairfield Osbourne and William Jennings Bryan, John Roach Francis and Charles Francis Potter, George McCready Price and Joseph McCabe and William Bell Riley versus Charles Smith, amongst many others. The collection will be of especial interest to natural historians, and theologians as well as academics of philosophy, and history. (shrink)

Ullin Thomas Place died on 2nd January 2000 at the age of seventy-five. I had met him a little over three years earlier, in November 1996, during the annual 'Mind and Brain' symposium organized by Peter Fenwick and held at the Institute of Psychiatry in London. At that meeting Professor Place delivered a slightly shortened version of the paper reproduced here, in which he told his personal story — a pilgrim's progress? — recounting, as he put it, (...) 'the history of a thought process leading from an adolescent interest in mystical experience to an article entitled‘Is consciousness a brain process?’[Place, 1956] in which I argued for an affirmative answer to that question'. (shrink)

For the past three decades linguistic theory has been based on the assumption that sentences are interpreted and constructed by the brain by means of computational processes analogous to those of a serial-digital computer. The recent interest in devices based on the neural network or parallel distributed processor (PDP) principle raises the possibility ("eliminative connectionism") that such devices may ultimately replace the S-D computer as the model for the interpretation and generation of language by the brain. An analysis of (...) the differences between the two models suggests that the effect of such a development would be to steer linguistic theory towards a return to the empiricism and behaviorism which prevailed before it was driven by Chomsky towards nativism and mentalism. Linguists, however, will not be persuaded to return to such a theory unless and until it can deal with the phenomenon of novel sentence construction as effectively as its nativist/mentalist rival. (shrink)

'Why did the window break when it was hit by the stone? Because the window is brittle and the stone is hard; hardness and brittleness are powers, dispositional properties or dispositions.' Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. This book is a record of the debate on the nature of dispositions between three distinguished philosophers - D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place - who have been thinking about dispositions all their working lives. (...) Their distinctive accounts cover many of the issues surrounding dispositions such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation. Dispositions illuminates this central topic in analytic philosophy and at the same time highlights deeper concerns of metaphysics. (shrink)

Historians of modern medicine often divide their subject into two parts, separated by the bacteriological revolution of the late nineteenth century, when medicine supposedly became 'scientific' for the first time. The history of medical geography - to say nothing of other subjects - calls this common view into question. At least in the United States, students of medical geography, arguably the pre-eminent medical science in an age dominated by miasmatic theories of disease, readily adapted to the discovery of germs. And (...) although bacteriology quickly eclipsed medical geography in the world of medicine, place remained an important consideration in treating asthma (and allergies generally) throughout the post-bacteriological period. (shrink)

Research on the cognitive abilities involved in decision making has shown that, under objective risk conditions (i.e., when explicit information about possible outcomes and risks is available), superior decisions are especially predicted by executive functions and exact number processing skills, also referred to as objective numeracy. So far, decision-making research has mainly focused on exact number processing skills, such as performing calculations or transformations of symbolic numbers. There is evidence that such exact numeric skills are based on approximate number (...) processing (ANP) skills, which enable quick and accurate processing of non-symbolic numbers (e.g. Chen and Li, 2014). Very few studies, however, have investigated ANP skills in the context of risky decision making and have analyzed direct associations among the aforementioned sub functions. Possible interactions between the closely related skills have not been considered. The current study (N = 128) examines interactions of ANP skills with executive functions and objective numeracy, in predicting risky choice behavior. ANP skills are represented by the accuracy in a dot-comparison task. Decision making is measured by two versions of the Game of Dice Task (GDT), which place different emphases on the reflection of potential risks. The results show two-way as well as three-way interactions between the measures of ANP skills, executive functions, and objective numeracy in predicting risky decisions in both GDT versions. The riskiest decisions were most frequently made in case of low scores in all of the three competencies, while good performance in any one of them resulted in significant reductions of disadvantageous decisions. The findings indicate that high ANP skills can positively affect choice behavior in individuals who have weaknesses in reflectively attributed skills, namely executive functions and objective numeracy. Potential compensatory effects and mechanisms of ANP in decision making are discussed. (shrink)

This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist (...) epistemology. Greco argues that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception is defended. (shrink)

The law of responsibility (compensation), which was formed around the concept of the ḍamān and was developed by the scholars within the system of furû‘ al-fiqh (substantive law) over time, constitutes one of the important parts of Islamic law. Although compensation law (ḍamān) was not addressed as a private subject in the first period fiqh literature, it is seen that the literature on this specific area started to emerge after the early period. It is the Hanafi jurists who first brought (...) together these issues that are scattered in the classical books of fiqh that are related to the law of responsibility. Compensation law took its classical form in the texts of the early periods and was shaped around the views of the founding imams of the Ḥanafī school (madhab). It has later been expanded with the fatwā and interpretations of the Sheikhs (mesāikh) of Hanafi in the type of waqi'at works. These works were a product of the need for the law to adapt to the new conditions. These issues, which are related to the compensation law in the Hanafi school have been covered as a special section (chapter) in the studies that are classified as waqi'at, such as Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat (Fuṣūl al-Usrūshanī), ʿImād al-Dīn al-Marginānī’s Fuṣūl al-iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿal-Fuṣūlāyn. Later, the topics discussed in these works were developed and continued, and ultimately separate works related to this field have been copyrighted. In this study, the kinds of development and expansion which are in the literature and related subjects will be discussed by examining the above-mentioned works. Therefore; first of all, the first examples of Hanafi jurists related the compensation will be analysed comparatively. Afterwards, the place of ad-Ḍamānāt fī al-furūʻ al-Ḥanafīyyah of Fuḍayl Chalābī (d. 991/1583), one of the Zenbillizade’s, will be addressed.Summary: The core idea of the law of responsibility, which constitutes one of the important parts of Islamic law, was stated in the Qur'an and Hadith, and then have accumulated by the contributions of the jurists (fuqaha), as they developed the idea of the law of responsibility within the furû‘ al-fiqh in relation to the systematic of the legal school (madhab) that they belonged to.These issues, which constitute one of the important parts of the law, were addressed by sprinkling among the topics in almost every part of classical fiqh books. In other words, the subject of ḍamān (responsibility) was not considered as a separate subject in the fiqh works of the first period. In this way, it is seen that the literature on compensation law started to emerge in the following periods, and at first several independent sections on this subject, and then separate works specific to this field, albeit limited in number, were written.It is the Ḥanafī jurists who first brought together these issues that are scattered in the classical fiqh books related to the law of responsibility. Compensation law, which took its classical form in the texts from early periods, shaped around the views of the pioneering imams of the Ḥanafī school, has been expanded with the fatwā and interpretations of the Sheikhs (mesāikh) of Ḥanafī in the waqi'at works, which is a product of the need for the law to adapt to new conditions. Firstly, one of the Ḥanafī jurists, Majd al-Dīn al-Usrūshanī (d. 637/1240) dealt with the responsibilities arising from the contract and unfair acts in the 29th section of his book named al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat under the title “Types of Compensation Required to be Paid and Their Situation”. The method and system that Usrūshanī started in this work, the Ḥanafī jurisits ʿImād al-Dīn al-Marginānī in the Fuṣūl al-iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā in the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn continued to develop the compensation section in their books. Afterwards Fuḍayl Chalābī (d. 991/1583), one of the members of Zenbillizade’s family, enriched these issues and made it an individual work, named ad-Ḍamānāt fī al-furūʻ al-Ḥanafīyyah. Marginānī titled the issues that Usrūshanī had handled in the compensation section and systemised it even more by gathering the fatwās on the related issues under one heading. It is noteworthy to mention that when the compensation sections of both works are compared, the way the subjects handled are exactly the same. But unlike Usrūshanī, Marginānī added the compensation for damages to the fetus in the womb and the responsibility of the person who brought back the fleeing slave at the end of the chapter. On the other hand, unlike them, Shaykh Badr al-Dīn added only the responsibility of the person who found the lost item. Considering that almost all of the topics in the compensation section of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn existed exactly in the compensation section of Marginānī, and that most of them were stated in Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl, it is necessary to say that all of these discussions are based on Usrūshanī as the main backbone of this particular subject and that his work has a unique place in the Islamic legal literature. Chalābī’s ad-Ḍamānāt, is the first work that was written as a separate book in the field of compensation law. Even though in some modern works claim that the work Ghānim al-Baghdādī’s (d. 1030/1620) book named Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt fī madhhab al-Imām al-A'zam Abī Ḥanīfa al-Nu'mān was the first written book in this field; it is known that Chalābī's ad-Ḍamānāt had been written before Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt. As a matter of fact, the work of Chalābī had been completed in 984 Hijra, and the Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt was completed in 1027 Hijra. Although the subject sequence in Baghdādī’s work is different; this work is regarded as a continuation of the same tradition.An examination of the systematic and the content of the work reveals that Chalabi’s ad-Ḍamānāt is the continuation of the type of writing that Usrūshanī started and developed by Marginānī and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn. When compared with the compensation sections of these works before him, Chalābī has added new compensation issues to his book that are not addressed in these three works; such as partnership, mudaraba, suretyship (kafāla) transfer (ḥawāla), peace, legal disability (hajr), freedom of trade (idhn) and testament. Among the works mentioned above, works out of Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn and Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt are available as manuscripts in the libraries. Therefore, these works have not been used much in modern studies on compensation. In addition, the Chalābī's ad-Ḍamānāt is almost unknown. Although there is little information about this work in some bibliographic studies, it is noteworthy to state that this work is not used as a source in contemporary studies written in Arabic on compensation law. The fact that this work is available as manuscripts in Istanbul libraries is probably the reason for this outcome. It is also very difficult to say that this work is known and used sufficiently in studies written in Turkish.Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat and Marginānī’s Fuṣūl al-iḥkām are currently in the form of manuscripts, so there is no comprehensive study on the whole work and the compensation section. It is possible to see the compensation issues discussed in the work, since Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn, which has been published as printed, was translated into Turkish by an editorial group under the presidency of H. Yunus Apaydın. In addition, Kemal Yıldız, who translated the compensation section in this translation, published this section in Jāmiʿal-Fuṣūlāyn as a separate book with the name of “Sources of the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn and Compensation in the Practice of Ḥanafī School”. Yıldız, first introduced the sources of the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn in the first part of this work and then translated the compensation section from beginning to end by adding his own explanations and evaluations around the subject during the second part. Even though some introductory information about the books of Usrūshanī and Marginānī is presented in Yıldız’s study, the absence of information on the contents of the compensation sections of these books does not allow the opportunity for the researchers to evaluate on the subject wholly. (shrink)

Encrypted in Derrida’s contribution to the Capri Seminar on Religion in 1994 are three retrievals: of his discussions of speech and of systems of inscription; of a concealment of splittings in the supposed continuities of traditions; and of a complicity between the operations of religion and those of a dissipation of the unities of science, Enlightenment, and knowledge, into proliferating autotelic tele-technologies. These retrievals take place between the lines of this discussion of faith, knowledge and religion, which arrives (...) in two halves, each in twenty-six sections. The first half arrives in italics, as spoken on the day, and ends by invoking Voltaire on toleration and a contrast between Christianity as Institution and Christianity as the legacy of Jesus and the Apostles. The second half, appended as a written supplement, with footnotes, is signed and dated April 26, 1995. Husserl’s epoche arrives as recurrent performance, challenging the unity of Heidegger’s Ereignis; contrasting modes for the arrival of futurity are invoked in a juxtaposition of the names: Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Bergson, thus providing more than two sources for Derrida’s meditations on religion. (shrink)

If everything exists, then it looks, prima facie, as if talking about nothing is equivalent to not talking about anything. However, we appear as talking or thinking about particular nothings, that is, about particular items that are not among the existents. How to explain this phenomenon? One way is to deny that everything exists, and consequently to be ontologically committed to nonexistent “objects”. Another way is to deny that the process of thinking about such nonexistents is a genuine singular thought. (...) The first strategy we may call “the Meinongian tradition” (championed by authors like Alexius Meinong, Ernst Mally, Terence Parsons, Richard Routley, and Ed Zalta), while the second could be dubbed “the de re tradition” (connected to work by Gareth Evans, John McDowell, and Tyler Burge). Finally, the third way to solve the above puzzle, and probably the majority view in contemporary philosophy, is due to Bertrand Russell and W.V.O. Quine, who deny the particularity of the apparent nonexistent object and the singularity of the corresponding thought via the view that any statement about apparently particular nonexistents can be paraphrased into a quantified expression containing no genuinely referring terms. Jody Azzouni’s book is an attempt to argue for and develop a fourth view, based on the hitherto unrecognised notion of an “empty singular thought”, which Azzouni takes to have a place in logical space. Concomitant to developing the view, Azzouni applies it to three typical cases of talk about nonexistents: numbers, hallucinations, and fictions. As the name suggests, empty singular thought is devised as having three essential characteristics: (1) it is genuine thought, no different from any other, (2) it is singular, that is, its content is partly determined by particular non-conceptualised states of affairs, and (3) nevertheless it is genuinely empty, unlike Meinongian thought, that is, its object “does not exist in any sense”, to use Azzouni’s own formulation. Azzouni undertakes some challenging acrobatics when trying to persuade the reader that his view is substantive and it does not end up being the same as any of the previous three views about apparent talk about nonexistents.. (shrink)

The paper presents a formal model of the system of number representations as a multiplicity of mental number axes with a hierarchical structure. The hierarchy is determined by the mind as it acquires successive types of mental number axes generated by virtue of some algebraic mechanisms. Three types of algebraic structures, responsible for functioning these mechanisms, are distinguished: BASAN-structures, CASAN-structures and CAPPAN-structures. A foundational order holds between these structures. CAPPAN-structures are derivative from CASAN-structures which are extensions of BASAN-structures. The (...) constructed formal model unifies two competitive conceptions of cognitive arithmetic: namely, the conception of the mental number line and the conception of parallel individuation. The paper is the continuation of a paper entitled Representational structures of arithmetical thinking, in which rich empirical evidence supporting the model is presented. The main result achieved in the present paper may be philosophically interpreted as an attempt to formalize the Kantian conception of the pure idea of time, understood as the a priori form of human arithmetical thinking. In this way, our theory may be comprehended as a result of applying the hard method of logical reconstruction of fundamental epistemological categories. (shrink)

Manuscript Add. 3965, section 13, folios 541r–542r and 545r–546r is in the Portsmouth Collection of manuscripts and housed in the University Library, Cambridge. These drafts contain a careful account, in Newton's hand, of his views on place, time, and God. They are part of a large number of drafts relating to the three official editions of the Principia published in Newton's lifetime.

This article offers an encompassing interpretation of Paul Ricœur’s reception of Max Weber’s sociology. Three main domains in which Ricœur redeployed and revised insights from Weber are examined: political responsibility and the definition of the state, significant categories for understanding social interaction and the social ontology implied by this view on action and, finally, the role of explanation in the interpretive social sciences. As a whole, this article argues that Weber was a significant interlocutor of Ricœur on a number (...) of significant themes in the philosopher’s work. In particular, the article profiles the Weberian aspect of Ricœur’s social and political philosophy. (shrink)

SUMMARY1 The rational soul becomes the constant and dimensionless Euclidean point in all experience - defining the situations in which it finds itself, but itself undefined and undefinable in any situation. It is in nature but not of nature. Just as the dimensionless Euclidean point can occupy infinite positions on a line and yet remain unaltered, so the immortal, active intellect remains unaffected by the world in which it finds itself. It is not influenced by age, sense data, sickness or (...) death. It is the knower whose nature is pure knowing or reason. This is in great part the basic assumption that runs through the history of Aristotelean and modern symbolic logics24.The rational soul grasps identity, reasons consistently, and knows objectively for though it is in the world it is not of the world. Thus it is unnecessary and impossible to relate its truth to time or place or condition. As the source of understanding it need not be understood. It understands in that it knows. It is this which places the objective knower and observer outside of all systems of knowledge that it creates in philosophy, science and theology, and frees it from subjective interpretation. It is the absolute observer beyond self-observation.252 Language, values, and meanings reflect the absolute viewpoint of the dimensionless observer beyond the necessity of observation. The task of this observer is to know trie world just as the task of the animal and plant soul is motion and reproduction. The rational soul performs its task beyond nature as surely as animals and plants perform their tasks in nature. This is why it is possible to discuss the necessary evolution of living organisms in nature, but unnecessary to discuss the necessary or unnecessary nature of the evolution of this discussion. This is one of the reasons why determinism or predestination which seem so clearly applicable to nature, need not be applied to theories of determinism and predestination. These are principles grasped in reality beyond nature and totally inapplicable to the non-natural spirit that comprehends their essences. Thus self-reflexive questions about the questioner are as irrelevant as would be questions historically of “in what sense might the definition of dimensionless point itself be dimensioned or dimension-less?”26 Questions, on the other hand, that relate to the observed world are important for they can be truly answered (where questions as to the nature of the questioner cannot). In this view reality is not nature, but rather it is from reality that the objective observer, philosopher, scientist, and theologian understands and controls nature.3 Logic, the science of reason, is the science of all sciences. It reflects the pure and innate rational nature of the knowing intellect or soul. It is pure form beyond nature. Its realm is that of first principles or axioms. These too are in the world but not of it, as with Plato's eidos and Aristotle's universals. They are clear, true and self-evident. This explains the on going use of axiomatized revelations in studies in the natural and social sciences, the arts and the humanities. In symbolic logics, natural languages are in and of the world, but meta-languages are the constructs of pure intellectual activity and thus not natural. The abstract tends to become the more real, the less it can be found in nature. Rational souls, however, share a common reality that is as universal for Frege as it was for Aristotle.274 The occidental object tradition in general breaks out of the nature continuum by withdrawing into reality where the intellect knows and manipulates the world in philosophy, science, and theology from its position in and understanding of reality. Nature is a sub-set of reality and not vice versa. Axioms are the laws and determinants of nature and logic, but they are not nature.28 This means that at the basis of the occidental continuum of nature there is a qualitative and irreducible dichotomy of reality vs. nature. This has been most useful in the history of occidental science, but it produces a world view in which nature may lose the race with reality. SUMMARY IIIn the first portion of my paper, I discussed the implications of the Euclidean egg for philosophy and science as nature is understood and manipulated from reality. I shall now turn to what I see as the implications of the three-legged chicken view that the human intellect is in and of nature and that reality is a perspective in nature and is not simply the other of an irreducible qualitative dichotomy. Although there are an endless number of such implications that I could explore, the following, it seems to me are the most important:1 In the natural continuum there is no “dimensionless real” which can serve either as the locus of an external observer or a fixed position in nature. There is no perspective which is not an aspect of that upon which it is a perspective. The Chinese sage, for example, is one who sees himself/herself as one with or within natural process. This is expressed in a number of ways. Fung Yu-lan speaks of the difference between having no knowledge and having no-knowledge.34 Within such a continuum there can be no abstracting out of the absolute and unchanging. The nameless is the source of the named. First principles are the process itself and these principles are the alternation of opposites:“The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth;The Named is the mother of all things.Therefore let there always be non-being so we may see their subtlety, And let there always be being so we may see their outcome. The two are the same.“352 An empty mind is not a blank mind. Where Aristotle viewed the mind as a blank tablet at birth to be filled by sense experience, Hsun Tzu speaks of its emptiness. It is the emptiness of the Tao itself:“The mind is constantly storing up things, and yet it is said to be empty. The mind is constantly marked by diversity, and yet it is said to be unified. The mind is constantly moving, and yet it is said to be still. Inevitably it will see things for itself. And although the objects it perceives may be many and diverse, if its acuity is of the highest level, it cannot become divided within itself.”36The nature in which and of which the mind is both perspective and aspect remains a totality. Being a totality, it is empty of itself just as any part of a whole, while a part of the whole, is empty of the whole. My ideas of myself are both of myself and empty of myself. This point can be illustrated with the simple example of knowing and speaking about two hands – one of which is mine, and the second of which belongs to someone else. 1 can objectify the second hand and fill my blank mind with information and observations about it, but I continue to remain outside of it –the arbiter in my statements of its nature and reality. However, in knowing my own hand, the hand known is also the knower and what I know represents a perspective upon an aspective of a totality of which “I–my–hand” are aspects. Being an aspect of the whole is being empty of the whole. If mind is in and of nature, any perspective on nature is an aspect of the whole. A blank mind is an unnatural mind outside of nature, filling up with impressions of nature. An empty mind is nature viewing nature as aspect and perspective. The occidental would be ashamed to reach old age and still have a blank mind. The Chinese sage would be ashamed to reach old age and still not recognize that the mind is empty.3 If mind is in nature and like nature, then language too reflects natural flow and change and process. It is one thing for me to talk about myself and another for me to talk about someone else. In the case of the latter, I may insist that objectively this other subject fits into this or that category and even administer tests to determine that it does do indeed so. But when I talk about myself, the speaker and the object of speech are one and the same. The terms I select do represent a dichotomy of sorts, but it is one of aspect and perspective and not subject and object. When I say “this is my hand” for example, the words create distinctions which are aspects of awareness but do not create an / that is or is not my hand. Language does not model or even represent reality as opposed to nature. It makes reality possible as something that nature says or thinks. Reality through language is an aspect of nature and thus a perspective upon itself as aspect. This is an important distinction that translators often miss.4 Logic in this natural continuum is concerned with distinctions in a very different sense. As a consequence of the unity of nature and mind, three kinds of distinction in experience are manifested: (a) Those distinctions which come into being as aspects of the changing world.The 10,000 things are in this sense aspects and not separate “identities” as some philosophers and scientists presuppose.37 (b) Those distinctions which come into being as aspects of the human mind. These are impressions of and thoughts about the infinite distinctions of which the restless mind is capable, (c) Those distinctions which come into being by way of the mind's use of symbols. These are the distinctions which permit us to stabilize and store our experiences, preserve the answers to our questions, and name the world into compartments and relationships.Implicit in these three assumptions which connect the distinguishing mind to the unity of a nature of'10,000‘ aspects, is an inferential process of aspect to perspective to knowledge to understanding to attitude to action/response. The reasoning mind synthesizes some aspect of experience in nature with a perspective upon this aspect. This synthesis, in turn, is an aspect of mind and the reasoning process proceeds from it to a perspective upon it which is knowledge and understanding. Knowledge and understanding in turn are aspects of thinking and the reasoning process proceeds from them to a perspective upon them which is an attitude. Attitude in turn is an aspect of thinking and the reasoning process proceeds from it to a perspective upon it which is reflected in the reasoning individual's actions and responses. This inferential process is a continuum which proceeds from aspects of experience to perspectives in thought to action and response. In this sequence an aspect is always connected by a perspective which becomes an aspect, until action/non-action, response occurs. This is as applicable to the details of life as it is to mastering life as a whole. When this inference process is incomplete many problems may result, ranging from action without understanding to the confusion of aspect and perspective with one another or to “obsession with distinctions.”38In practice this is a logic of paradox. The human being is aware that he or she is a living-dying aspect of nature, but an aspect which is also a perspective upon nature's aspects of living and dying. This paradox is the process around which a profound logic of aspect/perspective is developed by the sage. This view of logic within a continuum does not mean that there is no principle of identity, contradiction or excluded middle present – as some Chinese and European philosophers assume.These principles are also implicit in the knowing of my hand versus the knowing of the hand of another. However, the content, meaning, and application of these principles may vary just as when I say propriety, I mean propriety, and when the Chinese says li he means li but the context, meaning and application of the term may differ in each case.5 Aspect logic as it relates mind to nature in a cosmological totality is a series of syntheses in a cyclic continuum organizing thinking in phases. Each phase is an aspect/perspective synthesis which becomes an aspect of a further aspect/perspective synthesis. This progression might be described thusly: The synthesis of nature/human which is Tao (non-being) translates into the aspects of being (the 10,000 things), and as such is a synthesis of aspect and perspective. This synthesis of aspect and perspective translates into an aspect of ideas and as such is a synthesis of perception and conception. This synthesis of perception and conception translates into an aspect of knowledge, and as such is a synthesis of knowledge and understanding (understanding is a perspective upon knowledge) i.e., no-knowledge. This synthesis of knowledge and understanding translates into an aspect of purpose, and as such is a synthesis of purpose and action. The perspective here on action is aesthetic and/or moral. This synthesis of purpose and actions translates again into an aspect of nature and as such is a synthesis beyond individual aspects and perspective, i.e. Tao. Thus there is a cyclic dynamic in the system which remains open to further development.Tai Chen in his Inquiry Into Goodness connects this cycle of syntheses with wisdom and benevolence:Because there are mind and intelligence, the superior man knows that the perfection of the Way of Man depends completely upon nature. When he looks at the signs of the natural (Cheng), he knows the beginning of things; when he cherishes the virtue of supreme illumination, (Shen-ming), he knows the end of things. Proceeding from mind and intelligence to the attainment of the virtue of supreme intelligence, [the superior man] in his treatment of things in the world will cause the world to return to [the principles of] benevolence; and in his treatment of the capability inherent in things, he will cause the world to follow wisdom (Chih).39. (shrink)

I BEGIN WITH A PUZZLE of sorts. Time is one; space is two—at least two. Time comes always already unified, one time. Thus we say “What time is it now?” and not “Which time is it now?” We do not ask, “What space is it?” Yet we might ask: “Which space are we in?”. Any supposed symmetry of time and space is skewed from the start. If time is self-consolidating—constantly gathering itself together in coherent units such as years or hours (...) or semesters or seasons— space is self-proliferating. Take, for example, the dimensionality of space. One dimension in space is represented by a point or a line, whose radically reduced format mocks the extensiveness of cosmic space. Two dimensions, as in a plane figure, also falls far short of our sense that space spreads out indefinitely far beyond the perceiving subject. Only with three dimensions do we begin to approach an adequation between the structure and the sense of space. For then the subject is surrounded by something sufficiently roomy in which to live and move. Indeed, as Aristotle, Kant, and Merleau-Ponty all remark, the three-dimensionality of space directly reflects our bodily state, that is, the fact that as upright beings three perpendicular planes implicitly meet and intersect in us. Even here, proliferation abounds: our bilateral symmetry means that each dimension is doubled: one vertical plane bifurcates into “up” and “down,” the other vertical plane into “front” and “back,” and the horizontal plane into “right” and “left.” Thus subject-centered space is triple, only to be redoubled. Further, if we think of spatiality not as body-based but as locatory—as determined by landmarks and other locales in the environment—the proliferation is more striking still. There are the four cardinal directions, which themselves split easily into the thirty two points of a compass. Nor need we be so arithmetically well-rounded. Even apart from fancy mathematical models of n –dimensional space, and recent technological instantiations of virtual space, there is no end to the number or ways in which we can be oriented in space—in accordance with what Deleuze and Guattari call “the variability, the polyvocity of directions” by which we can move in any given spatial scene. Beyond direction, however, is place. Heidegger remarks that “space has been split up into places.” The fact is that we continually find ourselves immersed in a multiplex spatial network whose nodal points are supplied by particular places. If space is infinitely large, place is indefinitely many. (shrink)

I BEGIN WITH A PUZZLE of sorts. Time is one; space is two—at least two. Time comes always already unified, one time. Thus we say “What time is it now?” and not “Which time is it now?” We do not ask, “What space is it?” Yet we might ask: “Which space are we in?”. Any supposed symmetry of time and space is skewed from the start. If time is self-consolidating—constantly gathering itself together in coherent units such as years or hours (...) or semesters or seasons— space is self-proliferating. Take, for example, the dimensionality of space. One dimension in space is represented by a point or a line, whose radically reduced format mocks the extensiveness of cosmic space. Two dimensions, as in a plane figure, also falls far short of our sense that space spreads out indefinitely far beyond the perceiving subject. Only with three dimensions do we begin to approach an adequation between the structure and the sense of space. For then the subject is surrounded by something sufficiently roomy in which to live and move. Indeed, as Aristotle, Kant, and Merleau-Ponty all remark, the three-dimensionality of space directly reflects our bodily state, that is, the fact that as upright beings three perpendicular planes implicitly meet and intersect in us. Even here, proliferation abounds: our bilateral symmetry means that each dimension is doubled: one vertical plane bifurcates into “up” and “down,” the other vertical plane into “front” and “back,” and the horizontal plane into “right” and “left.” Thus subject-centered space is triple, only to be redoubled. Further, if we think of spatiality not as body-based but as locatory—as determined by landmarks and other locales in the environment—the proliferation is more striking still. There are the four cardinal directions, which themselves split easily into the thirty two points of a compass. Nor need we be so arithmetically well-rounded. Even apart from fancy mathematical models of n –dimensional space, and recent technological instantiations of virtual space, there is no end to the number or ways in which we can be oriented in space—in accordance with what Deleuze and Guattari call “the variability, the polyvocity of directions” by which we can move in any given spatial scene. Beyond direction, however, is place. Heidegger remarks that “space has been split up into places.” The fact is that we continually find ourselves immersed in a multiplex spatial network whose nodal points are supplied by particular places. If space is infinitely large, place is indefinitely many. (shrink)

The Ottoman legal system is built on religious (sharīʿa) and customary (ʿurfī) laws. The customary law consists of the rules that are not in contrast to the sacred law. Collection of regulations (qānūnnāme) were the most effective way for the execution of the customary laws. The qānūnnāme included the sultan’s orders and edicts (farman). Ottomans regulated and evaluated the taxes through measurements of lands specific times of the year. These measurements would be recorded into the taḥrīr books (written survey of (...) immovable prop-erties). And the administrative qānūnnāme were included in these books. In the qānūnnāmes, we can find information about the taxes, and the unlawful executions of the customary actors (ahl al-ʿurf) as well as the tax regulations. The qānūnnāmes on sanjak are composed accord-ing to the economic, social, and geographical characteristics of the administrative district it is written about, and with this, they provide us information on these issues. In this article, three sanjak qānūnnāmes are taken as the central topic and Kamah, Āmid, Pojega are evaluated in terms of the execution of customary law in these districts. These qānūnnāmes include record-ings of various taxing regulations, altered and cancelled executions, amounts of taxes, and punishments. We can compare the three districts in their economic and social characteristics.Summary: The Ottoman legal system consists of sharia and customary law. Ordinary law is based on some regulations which the sultan deems necessary and is composed of laws. The Ordinary law should not contradict sharia. When the Ottomans conquered a place, they generally protected the current laws (such as Uzun Hasan's laws), except for necessary changes or cancellations. When the Ottomans conquered a place, they used to make census to determine taxes. As a result of this census, Sanjak qānūnnāmes were placed in taḥrīr books. It also involves issues such as public and criminal law, customary tax regulations, and amounts of market taxes, which are approved by the emperor. In this article, the Sanjak qānūnnāmes of different regions belonging to the period of Suleiman the Magnificent, whose dates are close to each other, were selected. The Sanjak qānūnnāmes which are studied on are Kemah sanjak of Erzurum province belonging to (937/1530) and Āmid sanjak of Diyarbekir province belonging to (947/1540) and Pojega sanjak of Budin province belonging to (950/1545). The reason for this is to be able to compare the differences or stableness in tax and practices in the mentioned date range. At the same time, attention has been paid to the effectiveness of customary practices and the parts that are linked to sharīʾa. Some of the laws of Uzun Hasan are in force in Kemah and Amid. In these two sanjaks, some of the bâc taxes and some other taxes were removed. It is seen that the complaints made by the public due to the excess of taxes are taken into consideration. For example, in Kemah, the akche of murahhasiyye paid by the villagers for Armenian priests and bishops is one of them. The taxes that are abolished include kulluk and blend tax and taxes from various business lines. The tax, which was collected by the governors of the sanjak and the castle beys under the name of custom, which was imposed by some local administrators, was cancelled by seeing bidat. When three of the sanjaks are taken together, there are cautions that unfair and unlawful tax collections made by local administrators during tax collection have been abolished and these are accepted as bidat. Kemah sanjak qānūnnāme is 13 pages in total. Kemah, which has a geographical position and military transit route, has commercial relations with cities such as Trabzon and Hasankeyf. In Kemah, there are candle mill (şemhane), creamery (bezirhane) and tavern (meyhane). Kemah is one of the places where the climate has an impact on agriculture. Kemah's economy is based on trade, agriculture, small livestock, beekeeping. In Kemah, where caravan trade is important, trade goods are of value due to its location on the transit road. The Kemah qānūnnāme also contains various taʿzīr for unjust killing, wounding, and adultery. In the city, there are some arcs have ownership in common. The fact that there are mills indicates that the rivers in Kemah are utilized. Âmid Sanjak qānūnnāme consists of two pages. The title that attracts our most attention is that there is vitality and economic activity in the market since Âmid is on the Aleppo-Mosul Silk Road. The high number of weaving looms is due to the production of cotton. Amid has dye house and saphane. Indigo and Amid's red dye sold in the market shows the importance of weaving. Pojega sanjak qānūnnāme is composed of seven pages. Among the qānūnnāmes we have mentioned, this is the most legible one. In addition to the old practices, there are some new regulations in this qānūnnāme. The pig tax is only here because of the non-Muslim population. Transit tax fees indicate trading viability. Based on the studies made on these three sanjaks, it can be said that in the qānūnnāme, the rights of the raia (reaya) were tried to be protected by the rescript of the Sultan himself. Therefore, the most remarkable things in the qānūnnāme are not allowed unfair practices of local administrators and without the need to collect taxes from the public. The dates of the qānūnnāme are close to each other and Despite geographical differences, there is no remarkable change in taxation. Although there are non-Muslim populations in all three sanjaks, it is mostly in the Pojega sanjak. The fact that the pig tax is collected only from this sanjak is evidence of this situation. The presence of meyhane in Kemah, Amid and Pojega sanjaks point to the non-Muslim population. It is also used as a place where the villagers sell their grape juice. The mill tax on Kemah and Pojega show that rivers are used in common. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that the seeing of things together (focal figure and background objects) accounted for the sense that things possess unseen depth: they are three-dimensional entities, not facades. I compare this idea to the law of large numbers. In both cases, single entities take on substance, depth, or meaning when assimilated into a large body of comparable instances. Thinking along these lines, Erwin Schrödinger proposed that living processes achieve order by virtue of the multiplicity of their constituent (...) parts, any of which, when considered individually, militate against perception and understanding. He further suggested that those parts take their place as things to be perceived even as they constitute our perceiving faculties, and this is why uncertainty occasions their reality. Thus he offers an instance of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasmic intertwining, which allows for world-body interchange or reversibility beyond the reach of unequivocal apprehension. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that the seeing of things together (focal figure and background objects) accounted for the sense that things possess unseen depth: they are three-dimensional entities, not facades. I compare this idea to the law of large numbers. In both cases, single entities take on substance, depth, or meaning when assimilated into a large body of comparable instances. Thinking along these lines, Erwin Schrödinger proposed that living processes achieve order by virtue of the multiplicity of their constituent (...) parts, any of which, when considered individually, militate against perception and understanding. He further suggested that those parts take their place as things to be perceived even as they constitute our perceiving faculties, and this is why uncertainty occasions their reality. Thus he offers an instance of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasmic intertwining, which allows for world-body interchange or reversibility beyond the reach of unequivocal apprehension. (shrink)

The English translation of Habermas's The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere converges with the revival of the "political culture concept" in the social sciences. Surprisingly, Habermas's account of the Western bourgeois public sphere has much in common with the original political culture concept associated with Parsonian modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s. In both cases, the concept of political culture is used in a way that is neither political nor cultural. Explaining this peculiarity is the central problem addressed (...) in this article and its companion piece, which appeared in Sociological Theory, volume 3, number 2 (1995). I hypothesize that this is the case because the concept itself is embedded in an historically constituted political culture (here called a conceptual network)-a structured web of conceptual relationships that combine into Anglo-American citizenship theory. The method of an historical sociology of concept formation is used to analyze historically and empirically the internal constraints and dynamics of this conceptual network. The method draws from new work in cultural history and sociology, social studies, and network, narrative, and institutional analysis. This research yields three empirical findings: this conceptual network has a narrative structure, here called the Anglo-American citizenship story; this narrative is grafted onto an epistemology of social naturalism; and these elements combine in a metanarrative that continues to constrain empirical research in political sociology. (shrink)

Fasting during pregnancy is an enigma: why would a woman restrict her food intake during a period of increased nutritional need? Relative to the costs to healthy individuals who are not pregnant, the physiological costs of fasting in pregnancy are amplified, with intrauterine death being one possible outcome. Given these physiological costs, the question arises as to the socioecological factors that give rise to fasting during pregnancy. There has been little formal research regarding the emic perceptions and socioecological factors associated (...) with such fasting. This study therefore took an emic approach and investigated the types of fasts that are common in pregnancy, women’s perceptions of the consequences of fasting, and the socioecological models of pregnancy fasting in three Indian communities. This cross-sectional study took place in Bhubaneshwar, Odisha state, and Mysore, Karnataka state, among two populations of Hindu women and one population of Muslim women (_N_ = 85). In total, 64% of women fasted in prior pregnancies. Findings revealed variation in the number and types of fasts that are common in pregnancy across the three communities. Each community reported differences in positive and negative consequences of fasting, with varied emphasis on reproductive health, religiosity, and general health and well-being. Finally, quantitative analyses indicated that the best-fitting model for fasting during pregnancy was religiosity, and the poorest-fitting models were resource scarcity and general health. This study provides insight into motivations for such fasting and highlights the need to investigate the relationship between supernatural beliefs and maternal–fetal protection further, as well as social functions of pregnancy fasting within the family and community. (shrink)

In 1930 Hunt and Johnson published the remains of P. Oxy. 2064, a roll containing at least some of the poems attributed to Theocritus and dating from the late second century A.d. . The papyrus was important, even though very fragmentary , since at its time of publication it was one of the three earliest witnesses to the text of Theocritus. Fragments of other early papyri of Theocritus have been published since then, but P. Oxy. 2064 has remained the (...) most important known witness prior to the fifth century because of the spread of poems which the extant fragments show it to have contained. No other papyrus allows us to reconstruct the contents of an early Theocritus book to such an extent. In 1983 the editors of Oxyrhynchus Papyri published a further collection of Theocritus fragments from various papyri , among which were more remains from P. Oxy. 2064 edited by P. J. Parsons under the number P. Oxy. 3548. (shrink)

This article explores the Korean application of “mind-transmission” (K. chŏnsim, C. chuanxin) episodes to the intra-Sŏn (C. Chan) polemics. Korean Sŏn masters, unlike Chinese counterparts, sought for the religious meaning of the existence of multiple transmission episodes that circulated in East Asia from the Sŏn polemical perspective. In particular, Kagun and Paekp’a used the term “samch’ŏ chŏnsim” to promote their own visions of Sŏn within the situation in which different visions of Sŏn competed for dominance.

Recent findings indicate that the constituting digits of multi-digit numbers are processed, decomposed into units, tens, and so on, rather than integrated into one entity. This is suggested by interfering effects of unit digit processing on two-digit number comparison. In the present study, we extended the computational model for two-digit number magnitude comparison of Moeller, Huber, Nuerk, and Willmes (2011a) to the case of three-digit number comparison (e.g., 371_826). In a second step, we evaluated how hundred-decade and hundred-unit (...) compatibility effects were moderated by varying the percentage of within-hundred (e.g., 539_582) and within-hundred-and-decade filler items (e.g., 483_489). From the results we predict that numerical distance as well as compatibility effects should indeed be modulated by the relevance of tens and units in three-digit number magnitude comparison: While in particular the hundred distance effect should decrease, we predict hundred-decade and hundred-unit compatibility effects to increase with the relevance of tens and units. (shrink)

This paper engages two debates about trust, deriving from two distinct questions about the nature of trust. The first asks how to define trust. Does trusting B to φ involve anything more than relying on B to φ? The second asks about the normative structure of trust. Does trust most fundamentally embody a two-place or a three-place relation? I’ll defend a new position in the second debate that yields an equally new position in the first. The standard (...) three-place model highlights ‘A trusts B to φ.’ The two-place model prefers ‘A trusts B.’ On my new three-place model, both are less fundamental than ‘A φs through trust in B.’ We do, of course, trust people to do things. But the most fundamental form of trust lies in doing something through trust in a person. I call this the Assurance View of trust because I’ll argue that trusting involves accepting another’s invitation to trust – an assurance, in effect, that the other is relevantly trustworthy. Trust thereby differs from mere reliance by how it makes available a reason to rely on the trusted. In mere reliance, your reason to rely on B is exogenous to the reliance relation, emerging, for example, from B’s track record of relevant reliability. When you trust B, by contrast, you take yourself to have a reason to rely on B that is endogenous to your trust, a reason grounded not merely in B’s reliability, exogenously considered, but in B’s ongoing responsiveness to your relevant needs. The Assurance View’s key insight emerges, I’ll argue, from cases wherein trust is disappointed – the trusted does not do what you trusted her to do – yet not thereby betrayed. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a method to design the pseudorandom number generator using three kinds of four-wing memristive hyperchaotic systems with different dimensions as multientropy sources. The principle of this method is to obtain pseudorandom numbers with good randomness by coupling XOR operation on the three kinds of FWMHSs with different dimensions. In order to prove its potential application in secure communication, the security of PRNG based on this scheme is analyzed from the perspective of cryptography. (...) In addition, PRNG has passed the NIST 800.22 and ENT test, which shows that PRNG has good statistical characteristics. Finally, an image encryption algorithm based on PRNG is adopted. In the encryption algorithm, the optimized Arnold matrix scrambling method and the diffusion processing based on XOR are used to obtain the final encrypted image. Through the evaluation of encryption performance, it is concluded that there is no direct relationship between the pristine image and encrypted image. The results show that the proposed image encryption scheme has good statistical output characteristics and security performance in line with cryptography. (shrink)

The traditional Bayesian qualitative account of evidential support (TB) takes assertions of the form 'E evidentially supports H' to affirm the existence of a two-place relation of evidential support between E and H. The analysans given for this relation is $C(H,E) =_{def} Pr(H\arrowvertE) \models Pr(H)$ . Now it is well known that when a hypothesis H entails evidence E, not only is it the case that C(H,E), but it is also the case that C(H&X,E) for any arbitrary X. There (...) is a widespread feeling that this is a problematic result for TB. Indeed, there are a number of cases in which many feel it is false to assert 'E evidentially supports H&X', despite H entailing E. This is known, by those who share that feeling, as the 'tacking problem' for Bayesian confirmation theory. After outlining a generalization of the problem, I argue that the Bayesian response has so far been unsatisfactory. I then argue the following: (i) There exists, either instead of, or in addition to, a two-place relation of confirmation, a three-place, 'contrastive' relation of confirmation, holding between an item of evidence E and two competing hypotheses H₁ and H₂. (ii) The correct analysans of the relation is a particular probabilistic inequality, abbreviated C(H₁, H₂, E). (iii) Those who take the putative counterexamples to TB discussed to indeed be counterexamples are interpreting the relevant utterances as implicitly contrastive, contrasting the relevant hypothesis H₁ with a particular competitor H₂. (iv) The probabilistic structure of these cases is such that ∼C(H₁, H₂, E). This solves my generalization of the tacking problem. I then conclude with some thoughts about the relationship between the traditional Bayesian account of evidential support and my proposed account of the three-place relation of confirmation. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of philosophers have attempted to fix paradoxes of the counterfactual account of causation by making causation contrastive. In this framework, causation is understood to be not a two-place relationship between a cause and an effect but a three or four-place relationship between a cause, an effect and a contrast on the side of the cause, the effect or both. I argue that contrasting helps resolving certain paradoxes only if an account of admissibility (...) of the chosen set of contrasts is given. I show by means of numerous examples that it is contextual features that determine admissibility. This way, context becomes part of the semantics of causation. I finally argue that once contextualised, explicit contrasting is redundant: causation is therefore a three-place relationship between a cause, an effect and a context. (shrink)

Economic theory teaches that it is in every country’s interest to trade. Trade is a voluntary activity among consenting parties. On this view, considerations of justice have little bearing on trade, and political philosophers concerned with global justice should stay largely silent on trade. According to a very different view that has recently gained prominence, international trade can only occur before the background of an international market reliance practice shaped by states. Trade is a shared activity among states, and all (...) participating states have in principle equal claims to gains from trade. Trade then becomes a central topic for political philosophers. Both views are problematic. A third view about the role of trade in a theory of global justice is then presented, which gives pride of place to a notion of exploitation. The other two views should be abandoned. (shrink)

The first two sections of the paper draw attention to some incompletely interpreted issues within two Romantic dramas: the unclear status of the protagonist in "Dziady, Part IV", and the ambiguous relationship between Goplana and Grabiec in "Balladyna". The third section of notes is an encouragement to discuss two topics: ‘From Zygmunt Krasiński’s Leonard to Jerzy Andrzejewski’s Diego de Manente’; ‘From "Pierścień Wielkiej-Damy, czyli: Ex-machina-Durejko" by Cyprian Norwid to "Tango" by Sławomir Mrożek’.

Abstract:This paper aims to show the connection between space, place and subjectivity. According to how we conceive space, place and their relations, it is possible to affirm a certain understanding of what has been called “the subject” in the framework of Cartesian, Kantian and Husserlian legacies. Quantitative geography takes the transcendental subject—characterized by a methodical detachment from its environment, constituted as an opposite object—for granted. Many and various reactions to this subject-object model can be traced within the social (...) sciences (and within human geography in particular) in the last four decades. In this paper I propose an overview of these reactions and then provide a new conceptual articulation for them, based on the kind of subjectivity they assume. I have identified three overarching patterns, or meta-theories: one ontological, one critical and one phenomenological. (shrink)

The creation of a sense of place has emerged as a goal of many community development initiatives. However, little thought has been given to the role of physical spaces in the shaping of possible senses of place. This article examines three Canadian examples of community sustainable development initiatives to demonstrate that sense of place can be shaped and constrained by the geographical and environmental features of the physical space a community occupies. This finding suggests that a (...) 'one-size-fits-all' approach to community sustainable development is unlikely to be successful; a community's sustainable development ethic will be informed by geography. However, there is some evidence that a strong individual sense of place shaped by local space may act as a barrier to the acceptance of new people and ideas. Conversely, a strong sense of place can result in mobilization for sustainable development initiatives. (shrink)

I argue that intelligible matter, for Aristotle, is what makes mathematical objects quantities and divisible in their characteristic way. On this view, the intelligible matter of a magnitude is a sensible object just insofar as it has dimensional continuity, while that of a number is a plurality just insofar as it consists of indivisibles that measure it. This interpretation takes seriously Aristotle's claim that intelligible matter is the matter of mathematicals generally – not just of geometricals. I also show that (...) intelligible matter has the same meaning in all three places where it is explicitly invoked: Z.10, Z.11, and H.6. Since the H.6 passage involves a mathematical definition, this requires determining what the mathematician defines and how she defines it. I show that, as with natural scientific definitions, there must be a matterlike element in mathematical definitions. This element is not identical with, but rather refers to, intelligible matter. (shrink)

Three-legged animals do not exist today and such an animal is not found in the fossil record. Which constraints operate to result in the lack of a triped phenotype? Consideration of animal locomotion and robotic studies suggests that physical constraints would not prevent a triped from being functional or advantageous. As is reviewed here, the strongest constraint on the evolution of a triped is phylogenetic: namely, the early genetic adoption of a bilaterally symmetrical body plan occurring before the advent (...) of limbs. Presumably, this would greatly constrain any three-legged animal from ever evolving. Tripedalism is employed only by a few animals, but many use a tripod stance while engaged in a variety of activities. Because terms are often used interchangeably in the literature, a standardization of locomotion terminology is proposed. Understanding the constraints behind “forbidden” phenotypes forces us to confront gaps in our evolutionary understanding of which we may be unaware. (shrink)