24 found
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Edward Hinchman [16]Edward S. Hinchman [8]
  1. Telling as inviting to trust.Edward S. Hinchman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587.
    How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling (...)
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  2. Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):613-646.
    The oddities in lottery cases and Moore’s paradox appear to support the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one should assert only what one knows. This paper preserves an emphasis on epistemic norms but presents grounds for an alternative explanation. The alternative divides the explanandum, explaining the error in lottery and Moorean assertions with one move and their deeper incoherence with another. The error derives from a respect in which the assertions are uninformative: the speaker is not being appropriately (...)
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  3. Assurance and warrant.Edward Hinchman - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-58.
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
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  4. Assertion and Testimony.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    [The version of this paper published by Oxford online in 2019 was not copy-edited and has some sense-obscuring typos. I have posted a corrected (but not the final published) version on this site. The version published in print in 2020 has these corrections.] Which is more fundamental, assertion or testimony? Should we understand assertion as basic, treating testimony as what you get when you add an interpersonal addressee? Or should we understand testimony as basic, treating mere assertion -- assertion without (...)
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  5. On the Risks of Resting Assured: An Assurance Theory of Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2017 - In Tom Simpson Paul Faulkner (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Trust. Oxford University Press.
    An assurance theory of trust begins from the act of assurance – whether testimonial, advisorial or promissory – and explains trust as a cognate stance of resting assured. My version emphasizes the risks and rewards of trust. On trust’s rewards, I show how an assurance can give a reason to the addressee through a twofold exercise of ‘normative powers’: (i) the speaker thereby incurs an obligation to be sincere; (ii) if the speaker is trustworthy, she thereby gives her addressee the (...)
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  6. Trust and diachronic agency.Edward S. Hinchman - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):25–51.
    Some philosophers worry that it can never be reasonable to act simply on the basis of trust, yet you act on the basis of self-trust whenever you merely follow through on one of your own intentions. It is no more reasonable to follow through on an intention formed by an untrustworthy earlier self of yours than it is to act on the advice of an untrustworthy interlocutor. But reasonable mistrust equally presupposes untrustworthiness in the mistrusted, or evidence thereof. The concept (...)
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  7. Narrative and the Stability of Intention.Edward S. Hinchman - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):111-140.
    This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this (...)
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  8. Advising as inviting to trust.Edward S. Hinchman - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):355-386.
    How can you give your interlocutor a reason to act? One way is by manipulating his deliberative context through threats, flattery, or other incentives. Another is by addressing him in the way distinctive of reasoning with him. I aim to account for the possibility of this non-manipulative form of address by showing how it is realized through the performance of a specific illocutionary act, that of advising as inviting to trust. I argue that exercise of a capacity for reasonable trust (...)
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  9. Trust, Mistrust, and Autonomy.Edward Hinchman & Andrea Westlund - 2023 - In David Collins, Iris Vidmar Jovanović, Mark Alfano & Hale Demir-Doğuoğlu (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Trust. Lexington Books. pp. 105-121.
    Is autonomy – governing yourself – compatible with letting yourself be governed by trust? This paper argues that autonomy is not only compatible with appropriate trust but actually requires it. Autonomy requires appropriate trust because it is undermined by inappropriate mistrust. An autonomous agent treats herself as answerable for her action-guiding commitments, where answerability requires openness to the rational influence of external, critical perspectives on those commitments. This openness to correction makes one vulnerable to manipulation and can be exploited in (...)
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  10. Can Trust Itself Ground a Reason to Believe the Trusted?Edward Hinchman - 2012 - Abstracta 6 (S6):47-83.
    Can a reason to believe testimony derive from the addressee’s trust itself or only from reliability in the speaker that the trust perhaps causes? I aim to cast suspicion on the former view, defended by Faulkner, in favor of the latter – despite agreeing with Faulkner’s emphasis on the second-personal normativity of testimonial assurance. Beyond my narrow disagreement with Faulkner lie two broader issues. I argue that Faulkner misappropriates Bernard Williams’s genealogy of testimony when he makes use of Williams’s genealogical (...)
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  11. Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
    On one conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of avoiding incoherent combinations of attitudes. This conception construes the norms of rationality as codified by rational requirements, and one plausible rational requirement is that you not be akratic: that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ. On another conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of thinking or acting in a (...)
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  12.  38
    Life and meaning.Edward Hinchman - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (3):333-350.
    What sense could it make to describe your life as ‘unlivable’? What is it not only to be alive but to have a life that you live or lead? I answer by developing a social understanding of the pursuit of meaning in life. True to other uses of ‘meaning,’ I propose, meaning in a life is communicative. If you experience your life as ‘unlivable,’ recovery can lie in this communicative dynamic: you regain the experience of leading your life by letting (...)
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  13. ‘What on Earth Was I Thinking?’ How Anticipating Plan’s End Places an Intention in Time.Edward Hinchman - 2015 - In Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 87-107.
    How must you think about time when you form an intention? Obviously, you must think about the time of action. Must you frame the action in any broader prospect or retrospect? In this essay I argue that you must: you thereby commit yourself to a specific prospect of a future retrospect – a retrospect, indeed, on that very prospect. In forming an intention you project a future from which you will not ask regretfully, referring back to your follow-through on that (...)
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  14. Conspiracy, Commitment, and the Self.Edward Hinchman - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):526-556.
    Practical commitment is Janus-faced, looking outward toward the expectations it creates and inward toward their basis in the agent’s will. This paper criticizes Kantian attempts to link these facets and proposes an alternative. Contra David Velleman, the availability of a conspiratorial perspective (not yours, not your interlocutor’s) is what allows you to understand yourself as making a lying promise – as committing yourself ‘outwardly’ with the deceptive reasoning that Velleman argues cannot provide a basis for self-understanding. Moreover, the intrapersonal availability (...)
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  15. Trust and Will.Edward Hinchman - 2019 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy. Routledge.
    This paper treats two questions about the relation between trust and the will. One question, about trust, is whether you can trust ‘at will.’ Can you trust despite acknowledging that you lack evidence of the trustee’s worthiness of your trust? Another question, about the will, is whether you can exercise your will at all without trust – at least, in yourself. I treat the second question as a guide to the first, arguing that the role of trust in the will (...)
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  16. Reflection, Disagreement, and Context.Edward Hinchman - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):95.
    How far, if at all, do our intrapersonal and our interpersonal epistemic obligations run in parallel? This paper treats the question as addressing the stability of doxastic commitment in the two dimensions. In the background lies an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. We’ll pursue the question of doxastic stability by coining a doxastic analogue of Gregory Kavka’s much-discussed toxin case. In this new case, you foresee that you will rationally abandon a doxastic commitment by undergoing a shift in the (...)
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  17. Receptivity and the will.Edward S. Hinchman - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):395-427.
    This paper defends an internalist view of agency. The challenge for an internalist view of agency is to explain how an agent’s all-things-considered judgment has necessary implications for action, a challenge that lies specifically in the possibility of two species of akratic break: between judgment and intention, and between intention and action. I argue that the two breaks are not importantly different: in each case akrasia manifests a single species of irrational self-mistrust. I aim to vindicate internalism by showing how (...)
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  18. Disappointed Yet Unbetrayed: A New Three-Place Analysis of Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2021 - In Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Social Trust: Foundational and Philosophical Issues. Routledge. pp. 73-101.
    This paper engages two debates about trust, deriving from two distinct questions about the nature of trust. The first asks how to define trust. Does trusting B to φ involve anything more than relying on B to φ? The second asks about the normative structure of trust. Does trust most fundamentally embody a two-place or a three-place relation? I’ll defend a new position in the second debate that yields an equally new position in the first. The standard three-place model highlights (...)
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  19. The Role of Assurance in Judgment and Memory.Edward Hinchman - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg & Stephen Wright (eds.), Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology.
    It’s a popular idea that memory resembles testimony insofar as each can ‘preserve’ epistemic warrant. But how does such ‘preservation’ do its epistemic work? I have elsewhere developed an assurance theory of testimonial warrant. Here, I develop an assurance theory of preservative memory. How could the ‘preservation’ of warrant through memory work through an assurance? What would even count as an intrapersonal assurance? I explain each form of preservation by contrasting the relation that preserves warrant with a pathological alternative. My (...)
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  20. Judging as Inviting Self-Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2007 - Center for 21st Century Studies Working Papers.
    [This draft is dated November 2007. I wrote it while I was a fellow at the Center for 21st Century Studies at UW-Milwaukee, in 2005-06, and published it only on the Center's website as a working paper. Many of the core ideas in this paper wound up in "Receptivity and the Will," Nous 2009, "Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge," Nous 2013, and "Assurance and Warrant," Philosophers' Imprint 2014 -- though formulated rather differently. What follows is the original abstract.] This working paper (...)
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  21. Trust and Reason.Edward Hinchman - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Entering into a trust relation enables you to do things you couldn't otherwise do. As trusted, you can help others do or believe what they have reason to do or believe. As trusting, you can get such help when more private resources run out. I begin by contrasting the way you address someone when you intend him to trust your testimony or advice with the way you might address him if you wanted merely to give him evidence that what you (...)
     
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  22. Review of David C. Rose, The Moral Foundations of Economic Behavior. [REVIEW]Edward S. Hinchman - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (5):607-610.
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  23.  20
    Review of Benjamin McMyler, Testimony, Trust, and Authority. [REVIEW]Edward Hinchman - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3 (10).
  24.  34
    Review of Patrick J. Reider, Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency. [REVIEW]Edward Hinchman - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7 (02).
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