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  1. Eliminativism and Reading One's Own Mind.T. Parent - manuscript
    Some contemporary philosophers suggest that we know just by introspection that folk psychological states exist. However, such an "armchair refutation" of eliminativism seems too easy. I first attack two strategems, inspired by Descartes, on how such a refutation might proceed. However, I concede that the Cartesian intuition that we have direct knowledge of representational states is very powerful. The rest of this paper then offers an error theory of how that intuition might really be mistaken. The idea is that introspection (...)
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  2. Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Present State of Connectionism.Vanja Subotić - 2021 - Theoria: Beograd 1 (64):173-196.
    Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul (...)
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  3. Asking What’s Inside the Head: Neurophilosophy Meets the Extended Mind. [REVIEW]Anthony Chemero - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (3):345-351.
    In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing (...)
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  4. Mind As a Scientific Object.Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
  5. Connectionism and the propositional attitudes.Barbara Von Eckhardt - 2004 - In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
  6. Folk psychology and cognitive architecture.Frances Egan - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
    It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
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  7. Connectionism and the commitments of folk psychology.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.
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  8. Connectionism and Eliminativism.Cynthia Macdonald - 1995 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  9. On the projectable predicates of connectionist psychology: A case for belief.Paul Smolensky - 1995 - In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
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  10. Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do connectionist minds have beliefs?Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield - 1995 - In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
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  11. Beliefs, functionally discrete states, and connectionist networks.George Botterill - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):899-906.
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  12. Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology: A reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon.Malcolm Forster & Eric Saidel - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437 – 452.
    Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best understood as complementary (...)
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  13. On the threat of eliminativism.John O’Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (3):325-46.
  14. Distributed representation and causal modularity: A rejoinder to Forster and Saidel.William Ramsey - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):453-61.
    In “Connectionism and the fats of folk psychology”, Forster and Saidel argue that the central claim of Ramsey, Stich and Garon (1991)—that distributed connectionist models are incompatible with the causal discreteness of folk psychology—is mistaken. To establish their claim, they offer an intriguing model which allegedly shows how distributed representations can function in a causally discrete manner. They also challenge our position regarding projectibility of folk psychology. In this essay, I offer a response to their account and show how their (...)
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  15. Connectionism, eliminativism, and the semantic view of theories.John Bickle - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (3):359-382.
    Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not principled. Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in this (...)
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  16. Eliminative connectionism: Its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics.Ullin T. Place - 1992 - Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):21-35.
    For the past three decades linguistic theory has been based on the assumption that sentences are interpreted and constructed by the brain by means of computational processes analogous to those of a serial-digital computer. The recent interest in devices based on the neural network or parallel distributed processor (PDP) principle raises the possibility ("eliminative connectionism") that such devices may ultimately replace the S-D computer as the model for the interpretation and generation of language by the brain. An analysis of the (...)
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  17. Connectionism isn't magic.Hugh Clapin - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (2):167-84.
    Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols (...)
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  18. Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought.Martin Davies - 1991 - In W Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 485-503.
    The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the (...)
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  19. Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation.Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.) - 1991 - Blackwell.
    This volume provides an introduction to and review of key contemporary debates concerning connectionism, and the nature of explanation and methodology in cognitive psychology. The first debate centers on the question of whether human cognition is best modeled by classical or by connectionist architectures. The second centres on the question of the compatibility between folk, or commonsense, psychological explanation and explanations based on connectionist models of cognition. Each of the two sections includes a classic reading along with important responses, and (...)
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  20. Is connectionism commonsense?Gerard J. O'Brien - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):165-78.
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  21. Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 499-533.
  22. Philosophy and Connectionist Theory.William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.) - 1991 - Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
    The philosophy of cognitive science has recently become one of the most exciting and fastest growing domains of philosophical inquiry and analysis. Until the early 1980s, nearly all of the models developed treated cognitive processes -- like problem solving, language comprehension, memory, and higher visual processing -- as rule-governed symbol manipulation. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the last half dozen years. In that period there has been an enormous shift of attention toward connectionist models of cognition that are (...)
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  23. Connectionist minds.Andy Clark - 1990 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:83-102.
    Andy Clark; VI*—Connectionist Minds, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 90, Issue 1, 1 June 1990, Pages 83–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.
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  24. Beyond eliminativism.Andy Clark - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (4):251-79.
    There is a school of thought which links connectionist models of cognition to eliminativism-the thesis that the constructs of commonsense psychology do not exist. This way of construing the impact of connectionist modelling is, I argue, deeply mistaken and depends crucially on a shallow analysis of the notion of explanation. I argue that good, higher level descriptions may group together physically heterogenous mechanisms, and that the constructs of folk psychology may fulfil such a grouping function even if they fail to (...)
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  25. Belief in networks.Paul G. Skokowski - manuscript
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