This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the term “personal identity” refers to the numerical identity of persons and its analysis provides (...) the persistence conditions for persons. I argue that if the subjective theories purport to provide a criterion of numerical personal identity, they fail. A different interpretation may suggest that they purport to provide a non-numerical type of identity for the purpose of providing plausible analyses of certain identity-related practical concerns. I argue that the criteria the subjective theories provide fail to capture several of the identity-related concerns. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected as well. (shrink)

‘Hybrid’ theories of personal good, defended by e.g. Parfit, Wolf, and Kagan, equate it, not with a subjective state such as pleasure on its own, nor with an objective state such as knowledge on its own, but with a whole that supposedly combines the two. These theories apply Moore's principle of organic unities, which says the value of a whole needn't equal the sum of the values its parts would have by themselves. This allows them, defenders say, to combine the (...) attractions of purely subjective and purely objective views. This common understanding of the theories is, however, mistaken. At the most fundamental level they don't combine a subjective and an objective element but two objective ones. Once this is understood, their attraction as hybrid theories diminishes: the value in their wholes may be just the sum of the values in their parts. (shrink)

In this book, Vasubandhu's classic work Refutation of the Theory of a Self is translated and provided with an introduction and commentary. The translation, the first into a modern Western language from the Sanskrit text, is intended for use by those who wish to begin a careful philosophical study of Indian Buddhist theories of persons. Special features of the introduction and commentary are their extensive explanations of the arguments for the theories of persons of Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavâdines, the (...) Buddhist philosophers whose theory is the central target of Vasubandhu's refutation of the theory of a self. (shrink)

In this article, we consider three metaphysical theories of personal identity: the soul theory, the body theory, and the psychological theory. Clinical cases are discussed as they present conceptual problems for each of these theories. For the soul theory, the case of Phineas Gage, and cases of pedophilic behavior due to a brain tumor are discussed. For the body theory, hypothetical cases of cephalosomatic anastomosis and actual cases of dicephalic parapagus and craniopagus parasiticus are discussed. (...) For the psychological theory, cases of delusions and memory impairments are discussed. After a discussion of all these cases, we conclude that it is very difficult to unequivocally favor one of these theories, yet we argue that this discussion must be based not on abstract armchair speculation, but rather, consideration of real clinical cases. (shrink)

According to David Hume, there is nothing to the mind other than the various fleeting events that it hosts. According to commonsense, this is false. But the commonsense view has never been meaningfully elaborated. This short work states an analysis of personal identity that combines Hume's position with the position, so far as there is one, of commonsense, thereby giving much needed substance to the latter.

We statisticians, with our specific concern for uncertainty, are even more liable than other practical men to encounter philosophy, whether we like it or not. For my part, I like it comparatively well. That is why the honor of opening this session of discussion has come to me, though my background makes my knowledge and idiom somewhat different from your own.

이 글의 목적은 최근 인도 심리학계에서 활발하게 연구되고 있는 삼질 성격이론에 대하여 심도 있는 소개를 하는 것이다. 삼질 성격이론이란 인도 성전과 상키야 철학에서 보여주는 삼질에 대한 철학적 이론을 현대의 심리학적 분석과 방법론을 통하여 성격 심리학으로 재탄생시킨 것이다. 인도 심리학자들은 삼질 성격이론의 연구에서 인간의 마음을 이루고 있는 구성 요소인 삼질은 한 개인의 성격 형성에서 중추적인 역할을 한다는 것을 핵심적 주장으로 삼고, 삼질에 대한 많은 문헌적 근거를 들어 삼질의 개념을 심리학적으로 재구성하였다. 이 글은 삼질 성격이론의 소개와 함께 인도 심리학자들에 의하여 만들어진 삼질에 (...) 대한 구성개념이 과연 철학적인 원의를 손상시키지 않고 심리학이 추구하는 바를 잘 달성하고 있는가하는 문제에 중점을 두었다. 삼질 성격이론은 개인적 문제의 해결에 중점을 둔 서구의 성격이론들과는 달리 영적 성장에 방향을 맞추고 해탈의 상태를 최상의 성격 유형으로 보기 때문에 인도 전통문화와 조화롭게 어울릴 뿐만 아니라 현대인의 영적 추구에 대한 관심을 충족시키는 성격이론이라고 할 수 있다. 이 연구를 통하여 삼질의 심리학적 구성개념이 원래의 철학적 원의를 모두 반영하지 못한다는 것을 확인했고, 과학적 연구의 역사가 일천한 삼질 성격이론이 더욱 발전된 경험적 연구를 위해서 선행적으로 풀어야 할 문제들을 볼 수 있었다. 그 중에 가장 먼저 해결해야 할 것이 개선된 삼질 척도를 만들기 위하여 삼질의 심리적인 속성에 대한 합의된 개념을 도출하는 것이라고 본다. 이 글은 끝으로 삼질 성격이론이 경험적 연구에서 더욱 발전하여 심리학계에서 정립된 이론으로 인정받기 위해서 몇 가지 선행되어야 할 점들을 제안하였다. (shrink)

Perhaps the best way to understand the novelty of Berofsky’s approach is to discuss two prevailing views about autonomy he rejects. On one of these views, we have the following picture: Autonomous agents develop powers to critically reflect upon and evaluate their past and present motivations. Such reflection inevitably leads to conflicts between reflective evaluation and existing motivation. The workaholic judges that he should spend more time with his family; the smoker does not want to have the craving for cigarettes (...) she does have. When such conflicts arise, one exercises autonomy by choosing in favor of the evaluations or higher-order desires over one’s first-order desires. Reason wins out over desire, or the higher self—the “true” or “real” self—wins out over the lower self. (shrink)

The fundamental question I consider is the following: What is it that makes one thing a person and another thing not? I do not provide a complete answer; rather I begin to develop a framework for answering the question. In this essay I do the following: (1) distinguish between the powers possessed by persons and the constitutions of persons, and propose some metaphysical conjectures concerning the relationship between persons' powers and their constitutions; (2) propose for Christians, as well as for (...) others, an hylomorphic soul-body alternative to Cartesianism; (3) highlight some prominent differences between the nature of human persons and the natures of brute animals; and (4) apply this framework for understanding human persons to problems in biomedical ethics concerning the ontological and moral status of human embryos and of the comatose. (shrink)

This is a detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A sustained critique of (...) concepts such as moral autonomy, self-realisation, ideal autonomy, and identification is offered. The author replaces these with an alternative model that reveals how spontaneity, vitality and competence enable human beings to act in the real world. (shrink)

I argue that Sellars’s naturalization of Kant should be understood in terms of how he used behavioristic psychology and cybernetics. I first explore how Sellars used Edward Tolman’s cognitive-behavioristic psychology to naturalize Kant in the early essay “Language, Rules, and Behavior”. I then turn to Norbert Wiener’s understanding of feedback loops and circular causality. On this basis I argue that Sellars’s distinction between signifying and picturing, which he introduces in “Being and Being Known,” can be understood in terms of what (...) I call cybernetic behaviorism. I interpret picturing in terms of cycles of cybernetic behavior and signifying in terms of coordination between cybernetic behavior systems, or what I call triangulated cybernetic behavior. This leads to a formal, naturalistic understanding of personhood as the capacity to engage in triangulated cybernetic behavior. I conclude by showing that Sellars’s thought has the resources, which he did not exploit, for introducing the concept of second-order cybernetics. This suggests that Sellars’s philosophy of mind could be developed in the direction of autopoiesis and enactivism. (shrink)

It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is (...) itself dependent upon considerations of bodily continuity. Alternatively it has been suggested that Locke's theory could be modified by allowing that for the purposes of personal identity ‘remember’ should be regarded as a transitive relation. So if A remembers the experiences of B but not those of C, and B remembers the experiences of C, then A, B and C can be regarded as belonging to the same unit of consciousness. (shrink)

Here it is argued, with the help of Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Candrakīrti's theory of persons, and on the basis of the character of Vasubandhu's encounter with the Pudgalavādins in the "Refutation of the Theory of Self," that in his Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya . Candrakīrti most likely identifies the theory of persons he attributes to the Sāṃmitīyas with the theory of persons Vasubandhu presents in the "Refutation," and the theory of persons he attributes to the Āryasāṃmitīyas with the (...) Pudgalavādins' theory of persons, to which Vasubandhu objects in that same work. He interprets Vasubandhu's thesis, that persons exist as their aggregates, as the thesis of the Sāṃmitīyas, that persons possess the essence of the aggregates, and interprets the Pudgalavādins' thesis, that persons exist apart from their aggregates as their identity-free substratum, as the thesis of the Āryasāṃmitīyas, that persons possess an essence of something that is neither other than nor the same as the aggregates. It is explained that Candrakīrti's interpretations both rest on the assumption that existence is the possession of an essence and mirror the assumptions upon which Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavādins object to one another's thesis. (shrink)

Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity resulted not only from his agnosticism on substance, but also from his biblical theology. This theory was intended to complement and sustain Locke’s moral and theological commitments to a system of otherworldly rewards and sanctions as revealed in Scripture. Moreover, he inferred mortalist ideas from the Bible, rejecting the resurrection of the same body and maintaining that the soul dies at physical death and will be resurrected by divine miracle. Accordingly, personal identity (...) is neither in the soul, nor in the body, nor in a union of soul and body. To Locke, personal identity is in consciousness, which, extending “backwards to any past Action or Thought,” enables the self, both in this life and upon resurrection for the Last Judgment, to recognize that “it is the same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Essay II.xxvii.9). (shrink)

Since his contribution to the field of personal identity in 1738 Hume’s theory has been debated thoroughly. Throughout the years there have been multiple critiques of Hume’s theory, but despite the fact that all of these generally appear unsatisfactory, Hume’s theory of personal identity is far from being a popular one in the field. I believe the blame partly falls on Hume himself. Hume’s appendix to Treaties is most often read as expressing a deep concern regarding his (...) own theory, and this concern, I believe, is to blame for his theory never gaining the respect it deserves. After all, why should we listen to Hume if he himself found his theory lacking? It is, however, a mistake to judge Hume’s theory of personal identity, based on the appendix to Treaties. The appendix is far too ambiguity for any real conclusion and it offers nothing that cannot be found in the original chapter on personal identity from Treaties. (shrink)

1. Introduction; 2. Indexical self-awareness; 3. Detached self-awareness; 4. Social self-awareness; 5. Basic social self-awareness; 6. Developed social self-awareness; 7. Person-consciousness.

The major concern of the problem of personal identity gravitates around the question of whether a person’s identity is located in the mind or in the body. Scholars have developed different theories such as survivalist and physicalist criteria among others in response to this question. In this paper, I engage with the theory of sense-phenomenalism as an aspect of the physicalist criterion of personal identity to show how it might legitimize racism and colour-branding. Sense-phenomenalism is a body-only model of (...) personal identity that holds that an individual’s identity is determined by the physical features sensually perceptible by other humans in the society. I argue that sense-phenomenalism by reposing a person’s identity on his/her bodily traits might foster social discrimination, deepen the dichotomy between the self and the other and enhance the fabrication of justifications for the denial of individual’s rights. (shrink)

A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to (...) explain the conditions of personal identity after all. My suggestion, instead, will be that the concept of a person’s continued existence is better taken as philosophically unanalyzable. (shrink)

Theories of personality and personality disorders need, from time to time, to be revised and updated according to new empirical and conceptual developments. Such development has taken place in the realms of affective neuroscience, evolution and social cognition. In this article we outline a new personality theory which claims that phenomena we usually ascribe to the concept personality are best understood by postulating a web consisting of three major constituents: Temperament (mainly primary emotions), attachment and (...) self-consciousness (mentalizing). We describe these constituents, their neurobiological underpinnings, the subjective experiences they evoke and their behavioral implications. We discuss the relevance of the espoused theory for the field of personality disorders with references to borderline, narcissistic and avoidant personality disorders as well as the DSM-5 Alternative Model. Implications for social psychology, psychotherapy and common-sense self-understanding are outlined. The theory aims to bridge previous contradictions between natural sciences and hermeneutics by its propositions of the evolution of self-consciousness. (shrink)

David lewis has argued that--Despite the 'fission' cases--One may consistently hold both that what matters in survival is "mental continuity and connectedness" and that what matters in survival is identity. To prove his point, He produces a certain theory of persons. Derek parfit and penelope maddy have objected that the theory lewis produces does not actually have the advantages he claims for it. In this paper, The author questions their objections, And then argues that, Even though lewis's (...) class='Hi'>theory has many virtues, No sufficiently knowledgeable person can be justified in accepting it (here and now) as an adequate theory of persons. (shrink)

A book review of Bernard Berofksy's Liberation from Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy.

Il est une opinion fort répandue que la théorie leibnizienne de l'identité personnele dans les Nouveaux Essais est contradictoire car elle renferme deux thèses incompatibles, à savoir, que 1) comme persone, je suis mon esprit, et que 2) je pourrais continuer, sans mon esprit. Dans cette étude, par une interprétation nouvelle de la pensée leibnizienne sur l'identité personnelle dans les Nouveaux Essais, je soutiens que pour Leibniz est vrai mais est faux, et que par conséquence sa théorie est consistante.

"In this paper, I shall consider the several ways in which interpreters, since 1976, have attempted to challenge the premises of Wilson's argument, and so have tried to rescue Leibniz's theory from Wilson's charge of incoherence. I shall argue that only one of these ways stands any chance of being successful." (S. 117/118)\nDiskussion zu Margaret Wilson: Leibniz : self-consciousness and immortality in the Paris notes and after. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 58 (1976), S. 335 - 352 (vgl. M (...) 2, Nr. 3171). (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the view that the identity of indiscernibles could serve as an adequate basis for a general theory of identity. I then show how a theory of essentialism forces one to modify that general theory. In light of both the original and modified theory, I offer a new resolution of some of the classical and contemporary problems of personal identity.

Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal identity. (...) But the former stumble on circularity and the latter is insufficient for Locke’s moral theory insofar as he is committed to a theory of divine rectification. The common problem is that Locke’s theory seems to demand an objective, or metaphysical, fact of a continuing consciousness that does not appeal to a traditional notion of substance for the continuity. I’m suggesting something new. In II.xxvii of the Essay, we see an ambiguity in Locke’s use of the term ‘consciousness’. Locke seems to see consciousness as both a mental state by means of which we are aware of ourselves as perceiving and as the ongoing self we are aware of in these conscious states. First, I make the textual argument why we should read Locke as having a conception of a metaphysical fact of a continuing consciousness that does not appeal to thinking or bodily substance to establish its continuity. I then argue that the metaphysical fact of an enduring consciousness is revealed to us as a phenomenological fact of experience. Due to the nature of certain kinds of perceptual situations we have an experience of ourselves as temporally extended. Although the text bears out that Locke seemed to think there is a fact of an ongoing consciousness, I argue that it is consistent with his reluctance elsewhere that he makes no further epistemological or ontological claims about it. Finally, I provide an account of Locke’s understanding of memory and its relation to consciousness that supports the claim that consciousness is something ontologically distinct from either thinking or bodily substance. (shrink)

This paper sketches an alternative answer to James Jones's recent attempt to explore the implications of cognitive social learning theories of personality for issues in epistemology, philosophy of science, and religious studies. Since the 1960s, two cognitive revolutions have taken place in scientific psychology: the first made cognition central to theories of perception, memory, problem solving, and so on; the second made cognition central to theories of learning and behavior, among others. Cognitive social learning theories find their place in (...) the latter revolution. Because of an ongoing naturalistic revolution in philosophy, these cognitive revolutions in psychology are having a profound effect on both descriptive and normative issues in epistemology and philosophy of science. From the naturalistic perspective, philosophy cannot adequately pursue its goals without the contributions of the empirical sciences, including psychology. The author concludes that the cognitive revolutions in psychology and the naturalistic revolution in philosophy have similar descriptive and normative import for the study of religion. (shrink)

This dissertation develops a theory of personal well-being---i.e., a theory of what is it for a person's life to go well for them. The proposed theory is called "the successful activity view of well-being." It is an end-neutral account of individual welfare that primarily values the pursuit, achievement, and enjoyment of ends that are important to a person. The parts of this process---e.g., the pursuit of ends, the achievement of ends, the enjoyment of activities and situations, and (...) even the satisfaction of desires for situations---are also of some significance for a person's level of well-being when actualized separately. I argue that previous end-neutral accounts of well-being, such as hedonism and desire-satisfactionism, are open to damaging objections because pleasures and desires can fail to coincide with a person's values. I also argue that the successful activity view has greater unity, explanatory power, and ontological economy than any form of perfectionism or any hybridized theory of wellbeing currently on offer.^. (shrink)

The article sets out aspects of locke's theory of personal identity which were seen by contemporaries to be not only fallacious but also to conflict with christian doctrine regarding the soul. A modified theory is then educed, From berkeley, Butler, William law and other divines, Which avoids these fallacies, Is epistemologically more rigorous and arguably expressed christian doctrine more accurately. This is seen as a forerunner of some central concerns of romantic theology.