Peter Berger established himself in the sociological profession in large part through his functional interpretations of religion and its ostensible demise in relation to the empirical bent of modern intellectual thought. Yet, in his ef–fort to expand the scope of empiricism such that it might address nontrivial concerns, Berger found himself attempting to understand the “substance” of religiori—that is, the conviction that there exists an “other” which confronts us unconditionally and consequently forms the basis of all issues concerning value (...) and meaning. Berger's writings deserve critical attention in that they disclose both the problems and the promises of utilizing empirical methods for the task of rehabilitating, rather than debunking, humanity's religious propensities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eclecticism and the Technologies of Discernment in Pietist PedagogyKelly J. WhitmerWhile the Franckesche Stiftungen (the Francke Foundations) of Halle/Saale are perhaps best known today as the institutional centre of German Pietism, throughout much of the eighteenth century they were widely regarded as a pedagogically innovative Schulstadt (or city of schools). The founder of this Schulstadt, August Hermann Francke (1663–1727), was many things to many people: Pietist, radical Lutheran, (...) theologian, pedagogue, professor of Greek and Oriental languages, preacher, member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and proponent of a Protestant mission. Like most participants in what was initially a grassroots movement oriented around the personality of Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705), a minister active in Frankfurt am Main around 1670 who sought to breathe new life into the Lutheran church,2 Francke rarely referred to himself as a Pietist. From his post at the University of Halle (founded in 1694), this Spenerian prote´gé set out to create a new "universal seminar" that would make the assimilation of many diverse points of view, identities, and competing strands of knowledge its [End Page 545] defining mandate. "My purpose," Francke wrote in a letter to a Pastor Ring from Grünebartau (October 29, 1712), "is to develop a universal institution, useful for bringing into a good and holy order all that is important for the Christianity of all orders of society and relates, in some way, to the healing power of the soul."3 His Schulstadt would "bring into order" a myriad of relationships around a single point and relied, quite deliberately I propose, on an eclectic methodology to do this.In recent years, the relationship of Francke's Schulstadt to the implementation of Brandenburg-Prussia's first compulsory schooling system and teacher training institutes has been better documented than in the past.4 Scholars of education have paid closer attention to the methodological innovations of Pietist pedagogy, and its points of convergence with the ideas of John Locke (1632–1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827) have become subjects of mounting interest.5 Francke's significance for the history of education has been assessed mainly in terms of his ability to realize the pedagogically inclined reform projects of seventeenth-century figures, such as Johann Amos Comenius (1592–1670).6 We know that the thousands of children who participated in the life of the Schulstadt very often left Halle to become actively involved as teachers and ministers throughout the German states. Several played pivotal roles in the development of the late eighteenth-century educational reform movement known as Philanthropismus and its associated practices and institutions.7 [End Page 546]Perhaps the most striking feature of Francke's Schulstadt was its curriculum, which featured innovative training regimens in applied mathematics for children from diverse social backgrounds.8 The scale and rigor of these programs were to be found nowhere else at the time and can be linked to the overtly pedagogical mandate of the Berlin Academy of Sciences (f. 1701). These regimens deliberately juxtaposed artisanal and learned knowledge and stressed the importance of the eye as a conciliatory medium.9 Despite having acquired largely anti-empiricist reputations over the years due to their lingering interest in alchemy and their roles in securing the banishment of the "rationalist" mathematician and philosopher, Christian Wolff (1679–1754), from their community in 1723, careful consideration of what Halle Pietists were teaching in their schools suggests a different view. These historical actors reconciled categories of knowledge production and transmission often framed as oppositional—despite what several scholars have recently shown to be their clear interconnectedness.10I argue here for the predominance of eclecticism in the Schulstadt, including a pronounced emphasis on the "middling" mathematical and mechanical sciences as tools of conciliation and self-improvement. I seek to illustrate how eclecticism was much more than a Philosophiebegriff that was well received by some Pietists, as Walter Sparn has argued, but that it is better understood as a set of conciliatory practices, traces of which resonate in Pietist lesson plans.11 Teachers in Francke's schools integrated experimental philosophy into an educational program that was introducing children to the exercises of... (shrink)

Noted psychologist and philosopher develops his own brand of pragmatism, based on theories of C. S. Peirce. Emphasis on "radical empiricism," versus the transcendental and rationalist tradition. One of the most important books in American philosophy. Note.

Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism. I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not (...) just whether we have achieved said equality in our society, but whether we are, in fact, all equal. I will raise the concern that the way in which they model the role of values in epistemology may be a problematic idealization of the open-mindedness of human agents. In some cases, resistance to value-change cannot be diagnosed as a failure to respond adequately to evidence. If so, the strategy of empirically testing our values that some feminist radical empiricists suggest may not be as useful a tool for social change as they think. (shrink)

Author of "Truth of analytic statements in a radically empiricist theory of meaning" answers to a critical essay written by Maciej Witek. He clarifies the metaphysical assumptions and implications of proposed conception, dealing with such issues as: sense/reference distinction; methodological versus realistic approach to theory of meaning; inferential/causal relations among meaningful items; mental aspect of meanings. Next, he makes explicit a view on the concept of truth to which this theory is committed. In addition, he formulates ways of sociolinguistic (...) operationalization of concepts of 'platitude' and 'meaning'. (shrink)

Neutral monism is the view that both ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are grounded in a more fundamental form of reality that is intrinsically neither mental nor material. It has often been treated as an odd fringe theory deserving of at most a footnote in the broader philosophical debates. Yet such attitudes do a grave disservice to its sophistications and significance for late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophy of mind and psychology. This paper sheds light on this neglected view by situating it (...) within broader historical monist debates about the mind and bringing attention to one of its central internal disputes regarding ‘mental chemistry’. By taking a closer look at how Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell address the question of whether and how our mental episodes are composed of more basic elements, it highlights deep differences among their conceptions of the fundamental ‘neutral stuff’ and its relations to ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. (shrink)

The radical empiricist theory of the Quartz & Sejnowski target article would result in a brain that could not act. The attempt to bolster this position with computational arguments is misleading and often just wrong. Fortunately, other efforts are making progress in linking neural and cognitive development.

This paper explores connections between Radical Empiricism (RE), a philosophic attitude developed by William James at the beginning of the 20th century, and Empirical Modelling (EM), an approach to computer-based modelling that has been developed by the author and his collaborators over a number of years. It focuses in particular on how both RE and EM promote a perspective on the nature of knowing that is radically different from that typically invoked in contemporary approaches to knowledge representation in (...) computing. This is illustrated in detail with reference to the modelling of several scenarios of lift use. Some potential implications for knowledge management are briefly reviewed. (shrink)

By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.

This paper explores connections between Radical Empiricism, a philosophic attitude developed by William James at the beginning of the 20th century, and Empirical Modelling, an approach to computer-based modelling that has been developed by the author and his collaborators over a number of years. It focuses in particular on how both RE and EM promote a perspective on the nature of knowing that is radically different from that typically invoked in contemporary approaches to knowledge representation in computing. This (...) is illustrated in detail with reference to the modelling of several scenarios of lift use. Some potential implications for knowledge management are briefly reviewed. (shrink)

John E. Smith; XI—Radical Empiricism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 65, Issue 1, 1 June 1965, Pages 205–218, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

John E. Smith; XI—Radical Empiricism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 65, Issue 1, 1 June 1965, Pages 205–218, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

Radical empiricists at the turn of the twentieth century described organisms as experiencing the relations they maintain with their surroundings prior to any analytic separation from their environment. They notably avoided separating perception of the material environment from social life. This perspective on perceptual experience was to prove the inspiration for Gibson’s ecological approach to perceptual psychology. Gibson provided a theory of how the direct perception of the organism-environment relation is possible. Central to his account was the notion of (...) a medium for direct perception. However Gibson provided two mutually inconsistent accounts of the medium leading to problems for his radical empiricism. We develop an account of the medium that does justice to ecological psychology’s radical empiricist roots. To complement this account of the medium we detail a usage-based account of information. Together they allow us to propose a novel radical empiricist view of direct perception. We then return to the notion of medium and expand it to include sociomaterial practices. We show how direct perception happens in the midst of social life, and is made possible by an active achieving and maintaining of a pragmatic relation with the environment. (shrink)

Roderick Firth's writings on epistemology amount to an exceptionally careful and cogent defense of an account of perceptual knowledge in the tradition Firth called 'radical empiricism.' This important book collects all of Firth's major works on epistemology; it also contains his only publication in ethics, the extremely influential essay on 'Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.' In addition, the book includes a number of important previously unpublished essays. Together, these writings constitute the most finished and compelling version of (...) traditional empiricist epistemology. This book will be of value to students and scholars of epistemology, phenomenalism, and ethics. (shrink)

This paper suggests that one single thread characterizes the developments of French phenomenology that occurred after 1990 in the wake of Merleau-Ponty's and Levinas's major contributions. Janicaud in 1991 had already identified one global trend in French phenomenology and believed it was possible to unite the thoughts of Levinas, Henry, Marion and Chrétien under the common banner of “theological phenomenology.” However, his analysis seems to fail to account for deeper-seated affinities that exist between French phenomenologists such as Marion, Lacoste, Chrétien, (...) Richir, Depraz, Romano – and Benoist for part of his work. This is the reason why, although the present paper does agree with Janicaud's idea that the French authors who define themselves as phenomenologists share some common ground, it defines this common trend quite differently, i.e., as a form of epistemological realism that ultimately manifests itself as a radical empiricism. Consequently, the present study will state and defend three hypotheses: contemporary French phenomenology professes a form of realism of experience, which is the true rallying point of otherwise differing elaborations; this type of epistemological empiricism, by virtue of its radicality, implies a problem that threatens to drive phenomenology towards its own dissolution, because as it precipitates in fine the dilution of philosophical discourse into a multitude of other discourses; this variant of empiricism shows that, within its strictly defined viewpoint, there is scarcely any difference between French phenomenology and a certain part of French analytical philosophy. All three hypotheses lead to the same conclusion: the determination of the defining aspect of contemporary French phenomenology entails, beyond the apparent, misleading, and futile quarrel of paradigms, to bring to light a common space for contemporary French philosophy, which, from both perspectives, can be conveyed by the single term “to show.” It is, in fact, the elevation of “to show” to the detriment of “to demonstrate” that seems to ensnare thinkers within an impasse. (shrink)

Rarely in modern times has religion been associated with empiricism except to its own peril. This book represents a comprehensive and systematic effort to retrieve and develop the tradition of American religious empiricism for religious inquiry. Religion and Radical Empiricism offers a challenging account of how and why reflection on religious truth-claims must seek justification of those claims finally in terms of empirical criteria. Ranging through many of the major questions in philosophy of religion, the author (...) weaves together a study of the varieties of empiricism in all its historical forms from Hume to Quine. She finds in James and Dewey; in Wieman, Meland, and Loomer of the Chicago School; in Whitehead; and in Abhidharma Buddhism constructive elements of a radically empirical approach to the controversial topic of religious experience. This work provides a strong counter-argument to critics of "revisionary theism," to caricatures of philosophy as "conversation," and to any collapse of the category of experience into its linguistic forms. (shrink)

Essays in radical empiricism: Does "consciousness" exist? A world of pure experience. The thing and its relations. How two minds can know one thing. The place of affectional facts in a world of pure experience. The experience of activity. The essence of humanism. La notion de conscience.--A pluralistic universe: The types of philosophic thinking. Monistic idealism. Hegel and his method. Concerning Fechner. The compounding of consciousness. Bergson and the critique of intellectualism. The continuity of experience. Conclusions. Notes. Appendix: (...) On the notion of reality as changing. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, the author wishes to defend a naturalistic version of phenomenology rooted in and expropriated from William James’s radical empiricism against Max Scheler’s non-naturalistic phenomenology. By drawing from Jack Reynolds’s arguments for a minimal phenomenology, the author posits that radical empiricism is a middle way between the misguided self-sufficiency of transcendental phenomenology and the misguided self-sufficiency of ontological naturalism. The orthodox reading of Scheler as a dualist is found problematic, and in outlining four (...) propositions characteristic of Scheler’s positions, the author motivates resources from Jamesian thought to argue for the superiority of a naturalistic phenomenology. (shrink)

I argue that Nelson's feminist transformation of empiricism provides the basis of a dialogue across three currently competing feminist epistemologies: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theories, and postmodern feminism, a dialogue that will result in a dissolution of the apparent tensions between these epistemologies and provide an epistemology with the openness and fluidity needed to embrace the concerns of feminists.

: The relationship between individuals and communities in knowing is a central topic of discussion in current feminist epistemology. Lynn Hankinson Nelson 's work is unusual in grounding knowledge primarily in the community rather than the individual. In this essay I argue that responses to Nelson 's work are based on a misinterpretation of her holistic approach. However, Nelson 's holism is incomplete and hence inconsistent. I defend a more radically holistic feminist empiricism with a multiaspect view of the (...) knower, which is more consistent with a feminist empiricist approach to evidence. (shrink)

The relationship between individuals and communities in knowing is a central topic of discussion in current feminist epistemology. Lynn Hankinson Nelson's work is unusual in grounding knowledge primarily in the community rather than the individual. In this essay I argue that responses to Nelson's work are based on a misinterpretation of her holistic approach. However, Nelson's holism is incomplete and hence inconsistent. I defend a more radically holistic feminist empiricism with a multiaspect view of the knower, which is more (...) consistent with a feminist empiricist approach to evidence. (shrink)

Both William James and Gilles Deleuze labeled their philosophies "radical empiricism." In this context, this essay explores the similarities and differences between James's radical empiricism and Deleuze's "transcendental empiricism". These accounts then inform a view of philosophy understood as a creative art. This art demands flexible habits--what James termed "genius"--in a changing world. Accordingly, radically empirical accounts of creativity and genius are sketched.

This paper aims to defend scientific realism against two versions of agnostic empiricism: a naive agnostic position, which suggests that the only rational option is to remain agnostic as to the truth of theoretical assertions, and van Fraassen's more sophisticated agnostic empiricism - which may be called "Hypercritical Empiricism". It first argues that given semantic realism, naive agnostic empiricism cannot be maintained: there is no relevant epistemic difference between theoretical assertions and observational ones. It then focuses (...) on van Fraassen's more sophisticated alternative to scientific realism and suggests that an attitude towards science which involves less than aiming at theoretical truth and believing in theories would be, in some concrete respect that empiricists should recognize, worse off than the recommended realist attitude. To this end, the paper develops the so-called conjunction argument into a diachronic argument for scientific realism. (shrink)

This essay examines the concept of "truth" from empiricist and pragmatist perspectives. This not without reference to other theories. The concern is to see how the ascendancy of pragmatism has affected humanity and may continue to affect humanity, the so-called objectivity in the practice of science and philosophy and the relationships between the diverse peoples of the world. An analysis of the pragmatist's preference for usefulness, rather than truth, it is argued, accounts for the deleterious consequences of pragmatism for humankind (...) in its almost irrational substitution of usefulness for truth. (shrink)

According to H.O. Mounce, James's pragmatism is a failure simply for being inconsistent with that of C.S. Peirce. Mounce also dismisses James's radical empiricism as involving phenomenalism. There are significant inaccuracies with such a view of James, and, accordingly, this paper is a response to Mounce. The two themes of radical empiricism and pragmatism constitute the heart of William James's philosophical project, and at least for this reason alone I think it important to correct Mounce. In (...) short, his indictment of James for having paved the way for the Richard Rortys of our community both fails to sufficiently engage James on his own terms and fails to present pragmatism in a sufficiently pragmatic manner. (shrink)

The philosophy of Gabriel Marcel is informed by the classical tradition of American philosophy – most notably William James, William Ernest Hocking and Josiah Royce. At a time when Marcel scholarship is at risk of being eclipsed by abstract modes of philosophical discourse, a return to the classical American sources of Marcel's thought is vital. This article investigates Marcel's thought from the standpoint of James’ conception of radical empiricism, the primacy of intersubjective experience in Hocking’s philosophy, and the (...) importance of praxis in the later Royce. Marcel’s openness to the classical American tradition in philosophy is a function of the Catholic character of Marcel’s thought. (shrink)

In a recent book on the historical development of Buddhist thought, the author, David J. Kalupahana, has presented the thesis that early Buddhist philosophy, as found in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, is radically different from that of later Buddhism, and supports his claim by tracing the historical divergence of the later schools from original Buddhism as he reconstructs it. He then goes on to assert that not only does early Buddhism differ philosophically from the later schools, but also (...) that even the spiritual goal of nirvāna was fundamentally different, i.e., that the experience or condition denoted by the term ‘ nirvāna ’ in early Buddhism is quite different from that state which the same term came to denote later – a theory which is perhaps the most controversial feature ofhis overall interpretation of Buddhism. (shrink)

I contrast the “data fitting” vs “data interpreting” approaches to data science along three dimensions: Expediency, Transparency, and Explainability. “Data fitting” is driven by the faith that the secret to rational decisions lies in the data itself. In contrast, the data-interpreting school views data, not as a sole source of knowledge but as an auxiliary means for interpreting reality, and “reality” stands for the processes that generate the data. I argue for restoring balance to data science through a task-dependent symbiosis (...) of fitting and interpreting, guided by the Logic of Causation. (shrink)

In A Pluralistic Universe, James argues that the world we experience is more than we can describe. Our theories are incomplete, open, and imperfect. Concepts function to try to shape, organize, and describe this open, flowing universe, while the universe continually escapes beyond our artificial boundaries. For James and myself, the universe is unfinished, a “primal stuff” or “pure experience.” However, James starts with parts and moves to wholes, and I want to start from wholes and move to parts and (...) back to wholes again. This is an issue between us I further consider, for while he describes himself as a radical empiricist, emphasizing the parts, my descriptions are in terms of w/holism. I use this opportunity to explore James’s contributions to my metaphor of “pure experience” as being like an infinite Ocean and the fishing nets we create represent our ontologies and epistemologies that help us catch up our experiences and give them meaning. I also make the case for why a better understanding of ontology matters for us as educators, using Maria Montessori’s curriculum and instruction design, Dinè Primary School, and Cajete’s theology of place and culturally based science as examples of relational fishing nets we could be using to teach our children. (shrink)

As British and American idealism waned, new realisms displaced them. The common background of these new realisms emphasized the problem of the external world and the mind-body problem, as bequeathed by Reid, Hamilton, and Mill. During this same period, academics on both sides of the Atlantic recognized that the natural sciences were making great strides. Responses varied. In the United States, philosophical response focused particularly on functional psychology and Darwinian adaptedness. This article examines differing versions of that response in William (...) James and Roy Wood Sellars. James viewed the mind as a “fighter for ends.” His neutral monism, by taming the mind-body problem and the problem of the external world, provided a secure metaphysics of mind as functional activity. In contrast, Sellars ’s scientific realism endorsed physical reality but was not mechanistic or reductionist. His critical realism and evolutionary naturalism offered novel metaphysical and epistemological positions in comparison with other American and British realisms. James and Sellars are distinguished from British philosophy in 1890–1918 in the types of realism they endorsed and in their success at introducing Darwinian evolutionary considerations and functional psychology into mainstream philosophy. (shrink)