Noted scholar and humanist argues that we can find answers to important human questions without recourse to faith in a supernatural deity. What gives purpose to our existence? What happens to our mind and body when we die? What invests our lives with meaning and propels us to go on from day to day? These are some of the questions that have occupied humankind for centuries. Do solutions to these problems of life and death depend, as many believe, (...) on the existence and intervention of a supernatural creator god? In this contribution to the Prometheus Lecture Series, noted scholar and humanist Kurt Baier, one of the leading ethical theorists of the 20th century, contends that rational humanism is the best alternative to theism. In Problems of Life & Death: A Humanist Perspective, he offers a lively discussion of humanism and supernaturalism; problems of practical wisdom featuring death and the good; and traditional moral problems. Part one traces contemporary rational humanism to its roots in ancient Greece; its revival in the Christian renaissance; its development during the scientific revolution, the 18th century Enlightenment, the Darwinian theory of evolution, and its contemporary developments. Part two answers broad questions of practical wisdom from the rationalist point of view. The third part offers a rationalist conception of morality to replace "the will of God" as the impetus for human action. Baier then applies this moral stance to a number of contemporary moral problems including how to lead a rewarding life, homosexual behavior, birth control, and suicide. With fresh ideas, a carefully argued thesis, and convincing conclusions, Baier shows how the rational humanist can come to grips with some of the deepest problems of human existence, without assumptions based on religious faith. (shrink)

This chapter examines Wittgenstein’s battles with the profound anxiety that can arise in response to a sense of the radical contingency of everything one is and everything one cares about. By giving particular attention to entries in Wittgenstein’s ‘Koder Diaries’ from the 1930s, the chapter analyses the nature of ‘the problem of life’ both as it manifested in Wittgenstein’s own life and as a universally relevant problem. It then defends the seriousness of the problem by reconstructing ways in (...) which Wittgenstein might have responded to questions about whether life really is as problematically precarious as his most angst-ridden diary entries seem to presume. (Abstract adapted from Mikel Burley’s ‘Introduction: Wittgenstein, Religion and Ethics: Seeing the Connections’, p. 7). (shrink)

Professor Wilhelm Blasius, physiologist at Giessen in West Germany, has written a book "Probleme der Lebensforschung" (Verlag Rombach, Freiburg 1973) which - I understand - is to be published in an English version. To me it has been of interest as an orientation in a world of traditional German thinking, best known from Goethe's natural philosophy of perceptible "Ur­ bilder", which perhaps in English could be rendered descriptively by calling it an inner vision of further irre­ ducible totalities. It is (...) in contemporary language a kind of intuitive 'holistic' insight which represents understanding different from that of natural science. The latter is devoted to the study of causal chains, is largely experimental and in its aim ultimately 'reduc­ tionist' -to use another modern term. Goethe's approach is reincarnated in the "Wesenslehre" of the late Ludwig Klages (1872-1956) and in the thinking of Carl Gustav Caruso To Klages the perceived image alone is the meaning of everything in this world and in this sense he is the advocate of a psychological phenom­ enology that is an end in itself. Originally trained as a chemist Klages soon turned to philosophy and de­ veloped a system of concepts supposed to give a deeper insight into the essence of life than did the endless causal chains of natural science. Blasius makes much use of the concepts of this philosopher, in particular his ideas on 'polarities'. (shrink)

May I first say, Mr Chairman, that I regard it as a great honour to have been invited to take part in this Conference? I speak to you as a philosopher who happens to be interested both in religion and in psychical research. But I am afraid I am going to discuss some questions which it is ‘not done’ to talk about.

Excerpt from The Problem of Life I must here relate that I had many obstacles to contend with in publishing this book. I lost one entire Chapter of the Manuscript, The Social Economy, it accidentally being burned, and not feeling well and energetic at the time I had to finish up the book without this last Chapter, but the Pamphlet accompanying each Problem of Life book, practically contains the same theories and principles that the Social Economy held. A (...) few years ago I Visited Florida, and in my wanderings in that romantic Country I met with a Farmer, who wasalso a printer in a small way, who undertook to print my book on his small hand press, one page at a'time, when not occupied with his duties on the farm. So you see it was a big undertaking, and not a very easy job to print 500 Copies, - but he did gt Thus the publishing of this little book was quite a problem in itself. But my publisher has solved his part of the work well. Thus, although this book was written in a great Northern City, midst its noises and bustle of commerce and industry, and midst a sea. Of humanity in all its phases of human nature it was print ed far away in the South, in a beautiful Ideal hammock home, midst Magnolias and Palms swaying and murmur ing love to breezes scented with Jessamine. Where the song of the Mocking Bird, the cricket, and the whip-poor-will soothe the Soul. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In this paper, I state the what I call the “problem of life after death,” survey some responses to it, and highlight a way in which the field might progress. Put simply, the problem of life after death is the problem of reconciling the fact that when we die, we will be totally destroyed with the belief that we will exist again at some time after our deaths. Contemporary solutions to the problem have focussed on the “logical” version (...) of this problem. I highlight that the problem would be better thought of as an evidential problem. (shrink)

"Presents an account of the ways scientists and others have perceived life and living processes from the times of the early Greek philosophers to the twentieth century ... The book follows out several major themes in the history of biological thought. How is it possible to harmonise atomism and organism? What has happened to the concept of the soul which played so important a part in early biologies? To what extent does our technology influence our understanding of the living (...) process? These and other questions are seen as instances of a major movement in the history of biological thought: a movement from an Aristotelian to a Cartesian vision of the nature of life"--From publisher description. (shrink)

In this volume, originally published in 1928, Mackenzie explores the meaning of Value and its place and relation in human thought and life. Divided into two parts, the first concerns itself with more general problems concerning Value while the latter part details the bearing Value has upon social problems. Mackenzie integrates the major branches of philosophy to analyse and evaluate the fundamental problems of citizenship making this title ideal for students of Philosophy and Politics.

In this volume, originally published in 1928, Mackenzie explores the meaning of Value and its place and relation in human thought and life. Divided into two parts, the first concerns itself with more general problems concerning Value while the latter part details the bearing Value has upon social problems. Mackenzie integrates the major branches of philosophy to analyse and evaluate the fundamental problems of citizenship making this title ideal for students of Philosophy and Politics.

The study of the origin and nature of life can be a problem, especially for a scientist whose method precludes any conclusion that would transcend the realm of empirical evidence. A scientist, and more specifically a biologist, can ascertain the characteristics that distinguish a living from a non-living being, but he is unable to attain to the source of those characteristics or life itself, which defies all empirical analysis. Here science must surrender to philosophy and let reason draw (...) conclusions that go beyond the data of experience and reach out into an area that many philosophers consider as their exclusive domain. (shrink)

The paper gives an analysis of the theoretical-methodological principles of the philosophy of J. Pato?ka not only as a historian of philosophy, but also as a historian of science, especially of its revolutionary periods. The aim of the paper is to show that following the general context of his works here also Pato?ka consistently deals with the central issue of his philosophy, namely the life-world . In Pato?ka's view it was already the rise of ancient philosophy, and especially of (...) the mathematical natural science that destroyed the original uniform picture of the universe, splitting man's world into the natural world on one hand and the world construed by the mathematical natural science on the other hand. Further, the paper shows Pato?ka's view of phenomenology, which he has seen as a means, with the help of which this dichotomy could be resolved, as well as Pato?ka's criticism of the original Husserlian concept of phenomenology, which failed to avoid its subjectivist and solipsist tendencies. The problem of lifeworld led Pato?ka not only to the principles of non-subjective phenomenolog, but it also became the basis of his philosophy of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to show to what extent Wittgenstein’s thinking about the problem of the meaning of life was influenced by Tolstoy. I begin with the problem of what Tolstoy’s writings, especially philosophical, Wittgenstein knew. Then I proceed to three areas of impact: (1) treating the question of the meaning of life as the central problem for philosophy, (2) defining Ethics in terms of the meaning of life, and (3) the idea that the solution of (...) the problem of the meaning of life lies in a practical change, not in giving a theoretical answer, which in turn is broken down into three more specific ideas, namely that (3a) the question concerning the meaning of life is a pseudo-question, that (3b) this vanishing of the question is not yet the solution, and that (3c) the solution of the problem of life consists in taking a religious attitude towards the world. I try to show that in point 1 Wittgenstein accepted Tolstoy’s general idea, but gave it his own version, which in turn makes the definition of Ethics in terms of the meaning of life in point 2 understandable; whereas in point 3 Wittgenstein accepts Tolstoy’s ideas and tries to formulate them in his own way. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a Kantian reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's early notions of immortality and the problem of life. I argue that, in spite of his rejection of the assumption of temporal immortality as a solution to the problem of life, Wittgenstein's understanding of the problem itself reflects the Kantian setting of his early system. Moreover, while there is no room for any postulates of practical reason in Wittgensein's early thought, God and immortality are still notions that (...) figure in his preferred solution to the problem of life. (shrink)

Based on the urgent need to promote the process of revival of the spirituality of the Ukrainian people, our ancient cultural strata should be analyzed. Particularly interesting here is the consideration of the origin and development of their own philosophical tradition. Undoubtedly, such a tradition stands out for certain issues that were relevant at the time. From a large array of problems of philosophical direction should be distinguished those closely related to human life. Exactly such problems belong (...) to the category of "eternal". (shrink)

In this book, John Kekes discusses the hard questions we all must face in the course of our lives. How should we respond to evil? Do we owe what our country asks of us? Does it make us better to be ashamed of what we have done? Is it always good to be true to who we are? Do good intentions justify bad actions? John Kekes argues that such questions are hard because reasonable answers to them often conflict. He shows (...) how their conflicts can be resolved and how we can best cope with these problems. (shrink)

A substantial proportion of human embryos spontaneously abort soon after conception, and ethicists have argued this is problematic for the pro-life view that a human embryo has the same moral status as an adult from conception. Firstly, if human embryos are our moral equals, this entails spontaneous abortion is one of humanity’s most important problems, and it is claimed this is absurd, and a reductio of the moral status claim. Secondly, it is claimed that pro-life advocates do (...) not act as if spontaneous abortion is important, implying they are failing to fulfill their moral obligations. We report that the primary cause of spontaneous abortion is chromosomal defects, which are currently unpreventable, and show that as the other major cause of prenatal death is induced abortion, pro-life advocates can legitimately continue efforts to oppose it. We also defend the relevance of the killing and letting die distinction, which provides further justification for pro-life priorities. (shrink)

This article argues, contra-Derrida, that Foucault does not essentialize or precomprehend the meaning of life or bio- in his writings on biopolitics. Instead, Foucault problematizes life and provokes genealogical questions about the meaning of modernity more broadly. In The Order of Things, the 1974-75 lecture course at the Collège de France, and Herculine Barbin, the monster is an important figure of the uncertain shape of modernity and its entangled problems (life, sex, madness, criminality, etc). Engaging Foucault’s (...) monsters, I show that the problematization of life is far from a “desire for a threshold,” à la Derrida. It is a spur to interrogating and critiquing thresholds, a fraught question mark where we have “something to do.” As Foucault puts it in “The Lives of Infamous Men,” it an ambiguous frontier where beings lived and died and they appear to us “because of an encounter with power which, in striking down a life and turning it to ashes, makes it emerge, like a flash [...]. (shrink)

This article argues, contra-Derrida, that Foucault does not essentialize or pre-comprehend the meaning of life or bio- in his writings on biopolitics. Instead, Foucault problematizes life and provokes genealogical questions about the meaning of modernity more broadly. In The Order of Things, the 1974-75 lecture course at the Collège de France, and Herculine Barbin, the monster is an important figure of the uncertain shape of modernity and its entangled problems. Engaging Foucault’s monsters, I show that the problematization (...) of life is far from a “desire for a threshold,” à la Derrida. It is a spur to interrogating and critiquing thresholds, a fraught question mark where we have “something to do.” As Foucault puts it in “The Lives of Infamous Men,” it an ambiguous frontier where beings lived and died and they appear to us “because of an encounter with power which, in striking down a life and turning it to ashes, makes it emerge, like a flash [...].”. (shrink)

Substitute decision-makers for severely disabled neonates who can be kept alive but who will require constant medical interventions and will die at the latest in their teens are faced with a difficult decision when trying to decide whether to keep the infant alive. By and large, the primary focus of their decision-making centers on what is in the best interests of the newborn. The best-interests criterion, in turn, is importantly conditioned by quality-of-life considerations. However, the concept of quality of (...) life is logically and ethically different for patients with a developing as opposed to a developed awareness. Unfortunately, this difference is ignored by current quality-of-life considerations, there are no quality-of-life measures that take this difference into account, and decision-making proceeds entirely without acknowledging this fact. This note outlines why this is a problem and why there is a need for a new set of tools that incorporates this distinction if the substitute decision-makers are to apply the best-interest criterion in a meaningful way. (shrink)

Modern medicine provides unprecedented opportunities in diagnostics and treatment. However, in some situations at the end of a patient’s life, many physicians refrain from using all possible measures to prolong life. We studied the incidence of different types of treatment withheld or withdrawn in 6 European countries and analyzed the main background characteristics.

The article argues for the relevance of Simmel's life‐philosophy for the contemporary thought about life and death. By considering life, paradoxically, at once as a pre‐individual flux of becoming and individuated, Simmel manages to avoid both reductionism and mysticism. In addition, unlike Deleuze, for example, Simmel thinks that we can experience and know life only in some individual, actual form, never in its pure virtuality, as an absolute flow. During the course of examination, Simmel's insights will (...) also be discussed in connection with Heidegger. The article maintains that what remains on the Simmelian side beyond the striking affinities between the two thinkers is a kind of animal vitality. Though Simmel's life‐philosophy is mainly concerned with the world‐relation of humans, when it comes to death, it places humans on a par with all living organisms. A death that is immanent in life is appropriate to anything that is living. Thus the human individual, too, is dying precisely as a living organism, as some‐body that is alive. (shrink)

End-of-life care became an important issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was in great part driven by complaints about the care of the dying: lack of patient autonomy, indifferent or insensitive physicians, and inadequate pain control. The main task of those who worked to improve the situation centered on changing each of those variables, assuming that would do the job. But it has worked to a moderate extent only and the problem is not fully solved. The (...) main omission has been a failure to confront the medical enterprise itself, which believes in endless progress and conducts a war against death. Only a change in those underlying values can bring about further significant change. (shrink)

That the problem of the way of life has become a current issue should be linked primarily to two circumstances: the fact that socialist society has attained maturity, and the development of the modern revolution in science and technology. Viewing the category of people's way of life as an objective system of their human daily life activity makes it possible, in the first place, by pursuing the objective logic of the functioning of the entity, to picture the (...) individual and the social group in all the diversity of their life manifestations, i.e., in truly rounded form. Secondly, it makes it possible to significantly enrich theoretical judgments by means of concrete analysis of the actual conditions and forms of people's social conduct. A person's way of life may be defined most succinctly as the system of concrete conditions and forms of his ties to society. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some main philosophical positions taken in the admittedly multifarious discussion concerning the possibility of rational evaluation in comparing different forms of life. Most importantly, I will outline a view of rational evaluation that would be as sensitive as possible to the diversity and offerings of various cultural viewpoints.

The rise of modern science created a crisis for Western moral and political philosophy, which had theretofore relied either on Christian theology or Aristotelian natural teleology as guarantors of an objective standard for "the good life." This book examines Rousseau's effort to show how and why, despite this challenge from science, nature can remain a standard for human behavior. While recognizing an original goodness in human being in the state of nature, Rousseau knew this to be too low a (...) standard and promoted the idea of "the natural man living in the state of society," notably in _Emile_. Laurence Cooper shows how, for Rousseau, conscience—understood as the "love of order"—functions as the agent whereby simple savage sentiment is sublimated into a more refined "civilized naturalness" to which all people can aspire. (shrink)