Drucilla Cornell’s singular approach to feminist jurisprudence braided together psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and liberal legalism to formulate a simultaneously radical and practical remedy for women’s sexual subjection. Crossing epistemological and methodological divides in a disciplined and creative way, her brilliant work charted a path through the Scylla and Charybdis of over-regulation sacrificing freedom and libertarianism sacrificing equality.

Pragmatic encroachers argue that whether you know that p depends on a combination of pragmatic and epistemic factors. Most defenses of pragmatic encroachment focus on a particular pragmatic factor: how much is at stake for an individual. This raises a question: are there reasons for thinking that knowledge depends on other pragmatic factors that parallel the reasons for thinking that knowledge depends on the stakes? In this paper I argue that there are parallel reasons for (...) thinking that knowledge depends on social factors such as one’s social role or identity. I call this social encroachment. After defending social encroachment, I compare and contrast social encroachment with some key ideas in feminist epistemology. I argue that, while there are some important similarities, there are also some important differences. I finish by commenting on what I take the upshots of these differences to be. (shrink)

I have been acutely aware, too much so, doubtless, of a tendency of other thinkers and writers to achieve a specious lucidity and simplicity by the mere process of ignoring considerations which a greater respect for the concrete materials of experience would have forced upon them. In her chapter of Disability, Difference, and Discrimination titled “A Feminist Standpoint,” Mary Mahowald looks to feminist standpoint epistemology as a method for identifying, voicing, and mitigating the ways in which people with disabilities are (...) dominated and oppressed by social structures.1 While I will remain uncommitted, for the purposes of this essay at least, to Mahowald’s or any of the other philosophic conceptions of .. (shrink)

While disability theory and feminist theory share a great deal in their methodology and could potentially share quite a bit in their political commitments, there is a tension or conflict between these two approaches as they evaluate prenatal diagnosis. For the feminist disability advocate, this can be thought of as a type of ideological double bind. This paper will dissolve this tension by way of John Dewey’s version of American pragmatism. First, I will map out the landscape of the prenatal (...) diagnosis double bind by describing the skeptical disability arguments and supportive feminist arguments. Then, I will describe how Dewian pragmatism can dissolve the tension between disability advocacy and feminism by giving lived experience priority over absolutist ethical theories and recommending that we deliberately evolve our social institutions to work better in our social environment. Finally, I will suggest some reforms of the social institutions surrounding prenatal diagnosis, taking into account the interests of people with disabilities, caregivers who tend to be female, and pregnant women. (shrink)

Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism is more similar to the self-described pragmatisms of his contemporaries Jürgen Habermas and Hilary Putnam than it is dissimilar from them. Indeed, the only significant difference between Rorty’s views and those of his interlocutors, and what forms the basis of their many public exchanges, is their respective stances toward the status of epistemic norms. Rorty’s arguments against Habermas’s endorsement of transcendental conditions that ground successful communication, and against Putnam’s contention that there exists a limit conception of truth (...) upon which the possibility for critique depends speak to the very heart of his philosophical differences from the Kantian pragmatisms of Habermas and Putnam. -/- This paper engages in a detailed exploration of the debates between Rorty and Habermas and between Rorty and Putnam over these matters. These debates provide us with a direct route to understanding Rorty’s own views on epistemic norms. That is, the comparison between his own position and those of his fellow neopragmatists throws into sharp relief Rorty’s belief in the radical contingency of epistemic norms. -/- This exploration profits from engaging a feminist lens because feminist critiques, specifically of Habermas’s work, draw attention to the inadequacies of his views that Rorty seeks to correct, inadequacies that can be easily translated to Putnam’s case as well. By approaching this issue from a feminist angle, the paper highlights the dissimilarities in the theoretical positions between Rorty and his contemporaries, and shows why this difference is more significant than it might seem at first blush. The paper concludes with the suggestion that Rorty’s emphasis on the radical contingency of epistemic norms can provide a basis for the kind of revolutionary social, political, and cultural change that is central to much recent feminist theory. (shrink)

Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned (...) social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems. (shrink)

Before the early 1990s, accounts of classical American philosophy paid relatively little attention to the work and intellectual contributions of women philosophers. However, as early as 1991, a number of contemporary feminist philosophers and historians began to devote more focused attention to women philosophers whose intellectual achievements had been marginalized or forgotten. One woman philosopher whose contributions have still gone unnoticed is that of American logician, mathematician, and color theorist Christine Ladd-Franklin. This paper argues that Ladd-Franklin's feminist efforts to increase (...) the opportunities for women in professional academia were influenced not only by her work as a woman scientist and her reading of feminist literature but also by her understanding of pragmatism and her interaction with Charles Peirce. Specifically, Ladd-Franklin's arguments to increase academic research positions for women and her criticisms of male-only scientific societies point out how discrimination on the basis of gender violates Peirce's first rule of reason that one ought not block the road to inquiry and expose the unscientific nature of gender discrimination by contrasting the pragmatic meaning of acquiring a doctorate with the institutional practice of barring women from making intellectual contributions by denying them professorial positions. (shrink)

Contemporary feminist interest in the persistent underrepresentation of women in top professions suggests an implicit approval of the competition required to achieve these posts. Competition, however, seems to be in tension with feminist opposition to domination and oppression. This paper outlines the dimensions of this tension and examines three attempts to resolve the incompatibility. The first two try to separate the undesirable elements of competition from the positive by way of the competitiveness/competition and the challenge/scarcity distinctions. I argue that these (...) distinctions fail to alleviate worries about competition, particularly in the context of the professions. Meanwhile, the third reconciliatory attempt offers a pragmatic argument for compatibilism based on the value of women's participation in the professions. Although this pragmatic argument has some merit, I argue that it significantly overestimates the amount of competition acceptable for feminist participation. The end result is that, within the context of the professions, competition remains fundamentally in tension with feminism. (shrink)

This article reflects upon what can go wrong when feminist philosophers begin with a universal identity, rather than with the needs of particular individuals, and argues that we can group individuals together without such a universal identity if we develop a practice of social generalization that places shared needs, rather than identities, at the center of attention.

Posthumanist feminist theory has been instrumental in demonstrating the salience of gender and sexism in structuring human–animal relationships and in revealing the connections between the oppression of women and of nonhuman animals. Despite the richness of feminist posthumanist theorizations it has been suggested that their influence in contemporary animal ethics has been muted. This marginalization of feminist work—here, in its posthumanist version—is a systemic issue within theory and needs to be remedied. At the same time, the limits of posthumanist feminist (...) theory must also be addressed. Although posthumanist feminist theory has generated a sophisticated body of work analyzing how gendered and sexist discourses and practices subordinate women and animals alike, its imprint in producing intersectional analyses of animal issues is considerably weaker. This leaves theorists vulnerable to charges of essentialism, ethnocentrism, and elitism despite best intentions to avoid such effects and despite commitments to uproot all forms of oppression. Gender-focused accounts also preclude understanding of the importance of race and culture in structuring species-based oppression. To counter these undesirable pragmatic and conceptual developments, posthumanist feminist theory needs to engender feminist accounts that centralize the structural axes of race and culture. (shrink)

In this brilliant assessment of the relation between poststructuralism and feminism to current religious thought, philosopher of religion Carol Wayne White convincingly demonstrates that postmodernist continental and feminist philosophies—far from being antithetical to religious concerns—in fact enrich our understanding of religion and its relevance to debates about contemporary culture. By triangulating these three unique perspectives on culture she expands prevailing views of cultural criticism and opens up the discussion to new creative solutions that arise from the intersecting interests of (...) poststructuralist, feminist, and religious studies. Dividing her work into three major sections, White first summarizes the major developments in postmodern and feminist thought in a lucid and refreshingly jargon-free exposition. Next she focuses on two major thinkers in poststructuralist religious scholarship—Sharon Welch and Mark C. Taylor—showing how their work incorporates, on the one hand, Foucault's political critique of power and, on the other, Derrida's textual deconstruction. Finally, she looks at feminist critiques of culture with special emphasis on feminists' contributions to the study of religion. She concludes by highlighting the important role of religious valuing in providing an impetus to action and pragmatic social change. Religion can and should move us beyond the stalemate of postmodern critiques with their often-nihilistic undertones and fruitless academic posturing. Poststructuralism, Feminism, and Religion succeeds in elucidating what it means to think and act religiously in the postmodern era. (shrink)

This essay argues that feminist legal theory offers an important, and underutilized, perspective to examine health law and policy. We use several theoretical frameworks developed by feminist legal theorists including relational autonomy, intersectionality, vulnerability theory, and the feminist critique of the public-private divide to demonstrate the utility of these theories to health law analysis. These frameworks provide insights relevant not only to issues that obviously relate to gender, but also to matters of choice, quality, and access that are less obviously (...) gender-related. We map three key areas of existing scholarship and future inquiry at the intersection of health law and feminist legal theory: patient choice and relational autonomy, patriarchy, power and patient safety, and access to health care and healthy living conditions at the public-private divide. Uniting these areas of inquiry is a nagging question central to the relationship between critical legal scholarship and pragmatic action to combat injustice: Can we use legal rights to achieve our aims even as we recognize them as tainted tools that have propped up oppressive social structures? A feminist agenda for health law and policy must grapple with this dilemma. (shrink)

This article addresses the need for adaptive ethical analysis within machine learning that accounts for emerging problems concerning social bias and generative adversarial networks. I use John Dewey’s criticisms of the reflex arc concept in psychology as a basis for understanding how these problems stem from human-gan interaction. By combining Dewey’s criticisms with Donna Haraway’s idea of cyborgs, Luciano Floridi’s concept of distributed morality, and Shaowen Bardzell’s recommendations for a feminist approach to human-computer interaction, I suggest a dynamic perspective from (...) which to begin analyzing and solving issues of injustice evident in this particular domain of machine learning. (shrink)

Clough shows how inadequate empirical philosophy is in creating real change in the sciences. Instead, she supports a more pragmatic approach based on the work of Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson. This work encourages Clough's fellow feminists to refocus their critiques and discard their philosophical debates about epistemology.

ABSTRACT Khader’s Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic brings to our attention in a forceful way that feminist modernity is complicit with imperialist ideals and attitudes. She offers an extensive set of examples, analyses and arguments to recommend a nonideal universalism while embracing maternal ‘feminized power’ from non-Western cultures. I comprehend her arguments to understand salient features of imperialist feminism and then contextualize her critique in the South Asian context of feminist discourse. Expanding on her main critique of Western (...) imperialist hegemony, I propose pluriversal philosophies as a positive approach towards a more just world. I take inspiration from Mignolo, Phule, Ambedkar, Buddha, Anzaldúa and Freire as philosophers of praxis and engage with important anti-hegemonic scholars and organizations to offer a pragmatic translation of powerful ideas. (shrink)

Sometimes, we operate as though we live in the center of our brains at the top of the tower that is our bodies. We are aware of our bodies as instrumental to accomplishing various pragmatic tasks, but we are unaware or forgetful about how the body constitutes our conscious experience of self and world. The deeper nature and significance of our lived bodily experience is hidden, and it is challenging to discover and describe adequately. Nonetheless, during periods of sickness (...) and injury, we are forced into dramatic confrontations with our bodies and must address our lived bodily experience in often vivid and visceral detail. Fortunately, we are not without resources in the effort to... (shrink)

Most feminist theorists over the last forty years have held that a basic tenet of feminism is that women as a group are oppressed. The concept of oppression has never had a very broad meaning in liberal discourse, however, and with the rise of neo-liberalism since 1980 it has even less currency in public debate. This article argues that, while we may still believe women are oppressed, for pragmatic purposes Michel Foucault’s concept of practices of freedom is a (...) more effective way to characterize feminist theory and politics. (shrink)

RACINE L and PETRUCKA P. Nursing Inquiry 2011; 18: 12–20 Enhancing decolonization and knowledge transfer in nursing research with non-western populations: examining the congruence between primary healthcare and postcolonial feminist approachesThis article is a call for reflection from two distinct programs of research which converge on common interests pertaining to issues of health, social justice, and globalization. One of the authors has developed a research program related to the health and well-being of non-western populations, while the other author has expanded (...) the field of Aboriginal and international research in Canada and abroad. Based on examples drawn from our respective programs of research, we suggest conciliating the philosophy of primary healthcare to postcolonial feminism for decolonizing research and enhancing knowledge transfer with non-western populations. We contend that applying the theoretical and methodological strengths of these two approaches is a means to decolonize nursing research and to avoid western neocolonization. In conciliating primary health care and postcolonial feminism, the goal is to enhance the pragmatic relevance of postcolonial feminism to generate resistance through transformative research for achieving social justice. In tapping into the synergistic and complementary epistemological assumptions of the philosophy of primary health care and postcolonial ‘feminisms’, nurse researchers reinforce the anti-oppresive goals of postcolonial feminist research. Consequently, this approach may enhance both decolonization and knowledge transfer through strategies like photovoice. (shrink)

Rae Langton and Caroline West famously argued that pornography operates like a language game, in that it introduces certain views about women into the common ground via presupposition accommodation. While this pragmatic model explains how pornography has the potential to change its viewers’ beliefs, it leaves open how pornography changes people’s desires. Our aim in this paper is to show how Langton and West’s discourse theoretic account of pornography can be refined to close this lacuna. Using tools from recent (...) developments in discourse theory, we propose that pornography issues implicit directives, and thereby introduces bouletic components into the discourse. (shrink)

The feminist subject, which refers to the category "woman" as a shared identity for all women, has excluded women who do not fit neatly into its boundaries. In response, Judith Butler suggested that feminists must give up theorizing the feminist subject or invoke it as a pragmatic strategy only. Since Butler's solution is a dead-end for feminist politics, I propose the idea of a feminist subject-in-outline for emancipatory feminist politics. The feminist subject-in-outline emerges in what Jacques Lacan has termed (...) the moment of the real, which refers to the gap in the signifier "woman." In this gap, all those women who have been rendered invisible and without a proper place in the feminist community can become subjects and transform its boundaries. (shrink)

This paper explains the discipline of somaesthetics, which emerges from pragmatism's concern with enhancing embodied experience and reconstructing the aesthetic in ways that make it more central to key philosophical concerns of knowledge, ethics, and politics. I then examine Beauvoir's complex treatment of the body in The Second Sex, assessing both her arguments that could support the pragmatic approach of somaesthetics but also those that challenge its bodily focus as a danger for feminism.

This article returns to Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophical oeuvre in order to offer a way of thinking beyond contemporary feminist divisions created by ‘gender critical’ or trans-exclusionary feminists. The ‘gender critical’ feminist position returns to sex essentialism to argue for ‘abolishing’ gender, while opponents often appeal to proliferated gender self-identities. I argue that neither goes far enough and that they both circumscribe utopian visions for a world beyond both sex and gender. I chart how Beauvoir’s ontological, ethical and political positions (...) can be used to overcome the material/cultural, sex/gender bind that the contemporary divide perpetuates. I outline Beauvoir’s ‘ambiguous’ non-foundational ontology that attends to both the cultural origins, and material effects, of both sex and gender, and to the extent that humyns are fundamentally social. After outlining Beauvoir’s definition of freedom as purposive action, I then outline how the existence of the humyn-made and intersubjectively-upheld ‘situations’ of both sex and gender delimit this, urging feminists to return to the lost question of eradicating both. I use the utopian impulse in Beauvoir to argue that an ethics of reciprocity is an alternative mode of understanding the self and others. Beauvoir also calls for a political strategy that I call a ‘utopian realism’ that I apply to the contemporary divide. A way forward that is attentive to the concerns of both positions is the pragmatic use of identity politics that is nonetheless mindful of identity’s limits, alongside Beauvoir’s proto-intersectional vision of solidarity politics based not on identity but on a position of alterity and shared political strategy. Ultimately, I use this to argue that feminism would do better to unite around a shared commitment to challenging alterity, rather than further contributing to it. (shrink)

The thought and actions of Giselle Donnard opened singular spaces of analysis, anchored in the apprehension of manifold international realities. Giselle was a ’go-between’ of the sort that rejects binary choices and performs improbables hybridizations. She sought to make the complexity and diversity of social evolutions heard, by being at the same time radical and pragmatic, bringing together singularities and multitudes.

I cite areas of pragmatism and feminism that have an intersection with or an appeal to the other, including the notions of the universal and/or normative, and foundationalist lines in general. I deal with three areas from each perspective and develop the notion of their intersection. Finally, the paper discusses the importance of a pragmatic view for women's lives and the importance of psychoanalytic theory for finding another area where pragmatism and feminism mesh.

To attain individual morality in an age demanding social morality, to pride oneself on the results of personal effort when the time demands social adjustment, is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation.melioration of most social problems today—problems like health care and environmental justice—requires a feminist pragmatist methodology1 because many of these problems are not only dynamically complex, but inherently wicked. That is, many of our social problems today are characterized by intense disagreement between fragmented stakeholders, multiple and often conflicting (...) objectives, as well as high levels of uncertainty, variability, and risk. While the burgeoning field of wicked problems implicitly relies on a .. (shrink)

This Hypatia cluster aims to create space for sharing stories and tools designed to support situated, embodied, and dialogical philosophical activism. It emerges from a new generation of pragmatist feminists, illustrating how the field has evolved. These pieces locate pragmatist feminism in place- and issue-based philosophical activism. As an activist and pragmatically grounded philosophy, this approach values the embodied and relational nature of social change as well as the need to create multiple pathways of engagement situated in and across (...) communities. (shrink)

This paper explains the discipline of somaesthetics, which emerges from pragmatism's concern with enhancing embodied experience and reconstructing the aesthetic in ways that make it more central to key philosophical concerns of knowledge, ethics, and politics. I then examine Beauvoir's complex treatment of the body in The Second Sex, assessing both her arguments that could support the pragmatic approach of somaes-thetics but also those that challenge its bodily focus as a danger for feminism.

A woman’s perspective, or the so called feminist standpoint, needs to be incorporated into a theory of cognition to highlight its particular stance, to counter the present tendency to expect special advantages in cognition connected with gender specific (feminine) experience, which though not yet sufficiently recognized, is often neglected or denied to women.The most clarified stances, however, are not claiming the right to universality, considering the rather important anthropological/contextual differences between the subject/s of knowledge concerning race, ethnicity and sexual orientation. (...) If ever to look for pragmatic justifications feminist epistemology needs to be a philosophical discipline, in order to indicate new ways/directions through a detailed critique of traditional knowledge and science, as well as present new goals and methods, especially for particular disciplines with anthropological problems.The humanitarian mission in the project of “imprinting women into the process and result of cognition” one can consider as simply an additional factor justifying the development of philosophical particularism in gynocentric studies following the democratization of recent formulations and institutions regarding knowledge/cognition. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the Cultural Left and what we call cultural post-feminism has done little to alleviate conditions of subjugation and oppression of girlsand women outside of academia and has in fact been complacent with patriarchal social structures. Cultural post-feminism, with its focus on difference and identity and its fear of speaking on behalf of the down-trodden for fear of "colonizing" them with Western ideologies, has made few serious attempts to evoke a real alternative to (...) super-tolerant liberal pluralism. Further, we argue that academic feminism's traditional involvement with textual analysis rather than pragmatic social and political action has cooperated with the conservative academic climate in colleges and universities, giving students an overly abstract and elitist view of the feminist project. We call for a more active and progressive form of academic feminist thought, one that focuses less on difference, identity, and textuality, and more on social and political equality and justice. (shrink)

First published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

I explore both the potential and the perils of Twitter as a space for constituting a Deweyan public aimed at transforming how "we" (here, I mean not only citizens of the United States but global citizens) affectively receive and thereby respond to and resist sexual violation. In the course of this brief exploration, I operate with a pragmatic notion of "truth," namely, as democratically formulating a hypothesis concerning the nature of a social problem that enables fruitful amelioration of the (...) problem. I specifically focus on the viral #WhyIDidntReport Twitter campaign provoked by Brett Kavanaugh's Supreme Court hearing. (shrink)