This article contends that environmental organisations vary in type, scale and purpose in ways that help stewards self-sort into the opportunities that align with their individual motivations and e...

This paper explores a new non-deflationary approach to the puzzle of nonexistence and its cousins. On this approach, we can, under a plausible assumption, express true de re propositions about certain objects that don’t exist, exist indeterminately or exist merely possibly. The defense involves two steps: First, to argue that if we can actually designate what individuates a nonexistent target object with respect to possible worlds in which that object does exist, then we can express a de re proposition about (...) “it”. Second, to adapt the concept of outer truth with respect to a possible world – a concept familiar from actualist modal semantics – for use in representing the actual world. (shrink)

The author argues that being-thought, in keeping with the ‘intellectualist choice’ of the Greeks, has narrowed the thinkable to the question of whether something is or is not. The discourse-reason (logos) of the Greeks necessarily lends itself to construction and to its result, which is knowledge. Knowledge in turn trades the singular for generality, e.g. beautiful things for beauty. Because what it seeks is nowhere to be found in the world, such philosophy has located pure in-itself-ness in the beyond of (...) metaphysics, reducing life to metabolism, a shuttling between the extrema of lack and satiety. The Chinese language, because it lacks morphological markers, an imperative mood, and a verb ‘to be’, sidesteps ontology (being-thought) and thus hints at a more fruitful perspective on living, elucidating the notion of ex-istence as a way to provide an exteriority from which to examine living, in all its immediacy, without recourse to any metaphysical beyond. (shrink)

In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will not actually, exist? Recently, unusual positions have been taken regarding merely possible people and the non-identity problem. David Velleman argues that what might have happened to you – an existent person – (...) often doesn't merit moral consideration since the alternative person one would have been had what might have happened actually happened is a merely possible person about whom one has no reason to care. He argues that his way of thinking can eliminate the non-identity problem. Caspar Hare argues that merely possible people have interests and are morally relevant. He argues that we can solve the non-identity problem by rejecting the view that merely possible people are morally irrelevant. Both Hare and Velleman argue that focusing on one's de dicto rather than on one's de re children can help us avoid the non-identity problem. I analyze the role that merely possible, nonexistent hypothetical entities ought to play in our moral reasoning, especially with regard to procreation. I refute both Velleman's and Hare's views and demonstrate the difficulties we encounter when we try to apply their views to common non-identity cases. I conclude with the common-sense view regarding who matters, morally: only those who do, did, or will exist. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger devotes extensive discussion to medieval philosophers, particularly to their treatment of Truth and Being. On both these topics, Heidegger accuses them of forgetting the question of Being and of being responsible for subjugating truth to the modern crusade for certainty: ‘truth is denied its own mode of being’ and is subordinated ‘to an intellect that judges correctly’. Though there are some studies that discuss Heidegger’s debt to and criticism of medieval thought, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas, there is (...) no constructive reply to his assertions. As a result, Heidegger’s critique had an unprecedented effect on the credibility of medieval philosophy, whereby great portions of the philosophical community dismiss it altogether as an illegitimate Onto‐Theology. It is the aim of this study to offer a constructive reply that will fundamentally grapple with these allegations. By constructive reply we mean not only a reply that avoids the problems Heidegger raises regarding existence, essence and truth, but more importantly, one that uses Heidegger’s criticism in order to present a more insightful account of these notions. The present study is composed of two parts where the second serves as a sort of addendum. The first part, the core of this study, is an attempt to develop an understanding of the distinction between essence and existence that, on the one hand, accords with Heidegger’s criticism while on the other hand advances our understanding of how we think and understand reality. After presenting Heidegger’s depiction of Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence (esse) as a real distinction, the study will present several views propounded by scholars of Aquinas regarding the status of this distinction. It will be argued that it is not clear whether the distinction is real, formal or conceptual, and that different types of distinction are applied in different places, particularly in regard to the phantasm that Aquinas considers essential to the human act of thinking. The second part diverges from the first part and focuses on Heidegger’s criticism of Aquinas’s conception of truth as adequation, i.e., what it is that grounds the possibility of truth as adequation. This divergence is necessary in order to present a full metaphysical response to Heidegger’s criticism. Since the aim of the present study is to argue that Aquinas’s philosophical system can contend with Heidegger’s criticism, a partial reply would greatly diminish its effectiveness. (shrink)

The mere fact that ontological debates are possible requires us to address the question, what is it to claim that a certain entity or kind of entity exists—in other words, what do we do when we make an existence-claim? I develop and defend one candidate answer to this question, namely that to make an existence-claim with regard to Fs is to claim that we can refer to Fs. I show how this theory can fulfil the most important explanatory (...) desiderata for a theory of existence; I also defend it against the charges of illegitimate ‘semantic ascent’ and of making existence counterfactually dependent on human linguistic ability. (shrink)

One of the fundamental debates that theologians have held to discuss the possibility of and to facilitate understanding of the bodily resurrection is iʿādat al-maʿdūm; that is, the restoration of the non-existent. Despite some differences in their perspectives, theologians, including the Muʿtazilites, have considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm possible. Avicenna, who opposed the classical views of theologians by rejecting iʿādat al-maʿdūm, provoked a new discussion and fuelled controversy about this issue. Later Islamic philosophers and theologians who were influenced by him took (...) his path and reformulated his arguments about the impossibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm. Likewise, the theologians of the mutaʾakhkhirūn period, who defended the possibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm, in support of the classical view, voiced new criticisms against these recontructed arguments. Thus, the debate turned into a highly controversial issue between Islamic philosophers and theologians. In fact, unlike the theologians who included the issue of iʿādat al-maʿdūm in the subsections of the samʿiyyāt chapters as an extension of the resurrection debates, Islamic philosophers did not consider it possible and preferred to address it under the subheadings of the umūr al-āmma chapters on existence and non-existence, in which metaphysical issues were discussed. This is because Avicenna considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm a metaphysical issue related to non-existence. On the one hand, some philosophers, who considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm impossible, deployed the new argument that things that existed and then disappeared could not be recreated in the same way. On the other hand, others expressed their criticisms against these arguments in the disputatious style (jadali) and tried to defend the restoration of the non-existent in the same way. Therefore, the theologians who addressed these issues in their works helped answer the question of whether it is possible to recreate the non-existent. This is because the texts provided detailed and important information about the course of the debate, such as who rejects and accepts iʿādat al-maʿdūm, the background and context of the debate between philosophers and theologians, the proofs put forward for the rejection of recreation, the criticisms in response to these proofs, and the evidence put forward for recreation. Therefore, the present study aims to discuss the arguments for iʿādat al-maʿdūm; that is, whether maʿdūm can be recreated in the same way, and the criticisms against these arguments, which have become a subject of debate between theologians and philosophers. Avicenna’s ideas are also highlighted in the study as he is the source of the arguments for the impossibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm. In terms of its scope, the present study is based on the major works of the prominent theologians of the mutaʾakhkhirūn period and the main commentaries written on these works. (shrink)

Eternal Possibilities: A Neutral Ground for Meaning and Existence builds on David Weissman's earlier Dispositional Properties and makes a signal contribution to the study of metaphysics.

_Eternal Possibilities: A Neutral Ground for Meaning and Existence_ builds on David Weissman's earlier_ Dispositional Properties_ and makes a signal contribution to the study of metaphysics. Here, broadening and enriching the point of view adopted in his earlier work, Weissman cites and criticizes a large number of theories proposed by authors from Plato to Wittgenstein and others exploring language theory and metaphysics. __ Students of Wittgenstein will be especially interested in Mr. Weissman's critical examination of Wittgenstein's claim in the_ Tractatus_ (...) that possibilities are the facts for logic. Weissman proposes a modal theory of properties: they exist in the first instance as possibilities. He argues that a sentence is meaningful if it signifies a property or complex of properties existing as a possible, and true if that possible is instantiated. The status of possibilities and their relation to actual states of affairs are considered in detail. (shrink)

In this systematic historical analysis, Nino Langiulli focuses on a key philosophical issue, possibility, as it is refracted through the thought of the Italian ...

According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the actual world. In this paper, I discuss some problems faced by HA when it comes to accounting for certain alleged possibilities of non‐existence. I focus particular attention on Leech (2017)'s dilemma for HA, according to which HA must either sacrifice extensional correctness or admit mere possibilia. I propose a solution to Leech's dilemma, which relies on a distinction between weak and strong possibility. (...) It remains the case, however, that HA cannot capture certain iterated de re possibilities of non‐existence and that it is committed to a stock of necessary existents. But I still think that the virtues of the view outweigh these costs. (shrink)

Feminist relational theory can provide a theoretical framework for understanding and affirming the agency of women Cambodian religious leaders; an agency that can be overlooked if one assumes it co...

This essay considers Kant’s theory of modality in light of a debate in contemporary modal metaphysics and modal logic concerning the Barcan formulas. The comparison provides a new and fruitful perspective on Kant’s complex and sometimes confusing claims about possibility and necessity. Two central Kantian principles provide the starting point for the comparison: that the possible must be grounded in the actual and that existence is not a real predicate. Both are shown to be intimately connected to the (...) Barcan formulas, and Kant’s views on what he distinguishes as three different kinds of modality are then considered in light of this connection. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that the primary necessary ontological conditions for any existents and for their knowledge are individual pure possibilities. As being such conditions, pure possibilities exist absolutely independently of actualities, possible worlds, or minds. Pure possibilities are exempt from spatiotemporal and causal restrictions or conditions, whereas any actuality is inescapably subject to them. Each actuality is an actualization of an individual pure possibility, which also serves as its identity. The existence of individual pure possibilities is (...) necessary because it is ontologically indispensable for the existence of anything, possible or actual, and because there are some existents instead of nothing. Ignoring or not acknowledging relevant pure possibilities may result in overlooking their actualities without recognizing or identifying them and, thus, this has hindered the progress of science and knowledge. Hence, the knowledge of actual possibilities, too, depends on their pure possibilities. (shrink)

In this commentary, I scrutinize Coeckelbergh’s criticism of postphenomenology, and question whether postphenomenology indeed tends to neglect the social dimension of technology use (ontic), and must necessarily be conceived as being in opposition to transcendental philosophy (ontological). Second, I suggest that the Wittgensteinian concepts that Coeckelbergh introduces are interesting additions to the concepts used in postphenomenology, but that his use of the term “transcendental” seems up to now primarily to be a rhetorical means enabling him to distance himself from postphenomenology.

This paper examines the Leibnizian background to Kant's critique of the ontological argument. I present Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate, already formulated in his pre-critical essay of 1673, as a generalization of Leibniz's reasoning regarding the existence of created things. The first section studies Leibniz's equivocations on the notion of existence and shows that he employs two distinct notions of existence ? one for God and another for created substances. The second section (...) examines Kant's position in his early paper of 1763. My claim is that Kant's view of existence in 1763, namely that it is not a predicate, is strongly related to the logical notion of possibility, formulated by Leibniz and accepted by Kant. (shrink)

The search for God is dictated not from without but from a profound sense of one's own moral being and worthiness to be happy. The core of Immanuel Kant's argument remains relevant to the experience of ordinary men and women. He wished to strengthen, not undermine, belief in God and in the spiritual nature of humankind. This 1763 essay is imporrtant in understanding the development of Kant's thought. It exposed the flaw in the Cartesian argument that the existence of (...) a perfect being could be deduced from an idea or concept of such. Similarly, Kant saw the problem inherent in the Leibnizian view of a philosophical system modeled on mathematics: a philosopher who, like a mathematician, began with an arbitrary definition remained trapped in a circle of words. In The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God , Kant diverged from the familiar forms of ontological argument. The result was a brilliant approach to divine being that anticipated his mature Critique of Pure Reason. With this Bison Book edition, The One Possible Basis appears in paperback for the first time. Gordon Treash's English translation, the only modern one, faces pages containing the original German. Treash, who is a professor of philosophy at Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, edited, with Paul A. Bogaard, Metaphysics as Foundation: Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc . Also available as a Bison Book is Kant's last major essay, The Conflict of the Faculties (1992). (shrink)

In the 1750s Optimism, the Leibnizian doctrine that the actual world is the best possible world, popularised by Pope in 1733 in his Essay on Man, was a hot topic. In 1759 Kant wrote and published a brief essay defending Optimism, Attempt at some Reflections on Optimism. Kant’s aim in this essay is to establish that there is one and only one best possible world. In particular, he argues against the claim that, for every possible world, there is a possible (...) world better than it and against the claim that there are two or more equally good possible worlds that are better than all the rest. Although it is not clear why, Kant was later dissatisfied with his essay. In this article I shall reconstruct, discuss, and evaluate Kant’s arguments. My evaluation will be negative, and so I think Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with his essay. (shrink)

The thesis that entities exist in, at, or in relation to logically possible worlds is criticized. The suggestion that actually nonexistent fictional characters might nevertheless exist in nonactual merely logically possible worlds runs afoul of the most general transworld identity requirements. An influential philosophical argument for the concept of world-relativized existence is examined in Alvin Plantinga’s formal development and explanation of modal semantic relations. Despite proposing an attractive unified semantics of alethic modality, Plantinga’s argument is rejected on formal grounds (...) as supporting materially false actual existence assertions in the case of actually nonexistent objects in the framework of Plantinga’s own underlying classical predicate-quantificational logic. (shrink)

Michael Smithurst; II*—Hume on Existence and Possibility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 17–38, https://doi.org.

In the 1750s Optimism, the Leibnizian doctrine that the actual world is the best possible world, popularized by Pope in 1733 in his Essay on Man, was a hot topic. In 1759 Kant wrote and published a brief essay defending Optimism, Attempt at some Reflections on Optimism. Kant’s aim in this essay is to establish that there is one and only one best possible world. In particular, he argues against the claim that, for every possible world, there is a possible (...) world better than it and against the claim that there are two or more equally good possible worlds that are better than all the rest. Although it is not clear why, Kant was later dissatisfied with his essay. In this article I shall reconstruct, discuss, and evaluate Kant’s arguments. My evaluation will be negative, and so I think Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with his essay. (shrink)

In classical quantificational logic, every individual constant is assigned a value from the domain of discourse, thus ensuring that every instance of \\) is valid and so a theorem of a complete logic. Standard tense and modal logics validate a rule of necessitation, according to which, crudely, every theorem is always and necessarily true. Combining these two generates the result that everything always and necessarily exists. In a number of works from the late 1950s through to his death in 1969, (...) Prior worked to develop tense and modal logics that avoided these results. Prior’s key idea was to reject the rule of necessitation. In this essay, I present and criticize Prior’s account of the contingency of existence and offer a more satisfying account that shares many of the virtues of Prior’s account. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: To Prove a Possibility Mackie's Response Proving a Possibility The Logical Argument from Evil Suggested Reading.

Michael Smithurst; II*—Hume on Existence and Possibility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 17–38, https://doi.org.

In this paper, an argument of Alvin Plantinga's for the existence of abstract possible worlds is shown to be unsound. The argument is based on a principle Plantinga calls "Quasicompactness", due to its structural similarity to the notion of compactness in first-order logic. The principle is shown to be false.

A dialectical, double-aspect model of general interaction is proposed as a means of visualizing existence. It is constructed from observation of the transformational properties of the Moebius surface, with hyperdimensional extrapolation to the Klein bottle. The interaction of systems is viewed as a process of circumversion (i.e. turning inside-out) whereby systems exchange relations, become mutually negated, then exchange identities. Interaction is discussed in the context of the PCT problem, symmetry, creation-annihilation, and uncertainty.

This paper attempts to demonstrate, at least for the passions, that while emotions are important elements of common sense psychological thought, they are not psychological, neural, or mental entities. People talk of emotions, we claim, in two sorts of cases: Firstly, when it is believed that someone has done something that she shouldn't because she has been overwhelmed by desire and secondly, when someone is found to be compelled to devote cognitive resources to an act she knows she will never (...) carry out. In this case motivational states command attention and cognitive and physiological resources, distract us, even though they will not issue in action. In either case pointing to an emotion is pointing to a partial, aborted, or misdirected desire. We discuss why emotions are considered important in common sense and professional psychology though they do not exist. (shrink)