El artículo presenta las elaboraciones conceptuales de Deleuze y Guattari en torno a la perversión, especialmente según las propuestas que los autores desarrollan en El anti-Edipo. Capitalismo y Esquizofrenia. Se trabajará la idea de que la perversión, así como otras formas de lo psíquico, están entramadas al interior del campo social, en una relación de continuidad y siguiendo un proceso de producción de lo real, que es lo que Deleuze y Guattari entienden por deseo. El carácter histórico del delirio y (...) el carácter grupal del fantasma muestran esa continuidad entre lo psíquico y lo social como expresión de modos no-normados de la subjetividad en tanto que reivindicaciones políticas del deseo. (shrink)

Words change meaning, usually in unpredictable ways. But some words’ meanings are revised intentionally. Revisionary projects are normally put forward in the service of some purpose – some serve specific goals of inquiry, and others serve ethical, political or social aims. Revisionist projects can ameliorate meanings, but they can also pervert. In this paper, I want to draw attention to the dangers of meaning perversions, and argue that the self-declared goodness of a revisionist project doesn’t suffice to avoid meaning perversions. (...) The road to Hell, or to horrors on Earth, is paved with good intentions. Finally and more importantly, I want to demarcate what meaning perversions are. This, I hope, can help us assess the moral and political legitimacy of revisionary projects. (shrink)

Résumé L’évaluation est de toutes les sociétés et de tous les temps. Pourtant, ce terme usuel hante le monde contemporain, il suscite les plus vives réactions. Évaluation et notation sont liées, et les agences de notation pèsent sur la politique des États, non pas seulement sur les firmes cotées en Bourse. L’évaluation est-elle nécessaire? De fait, elle situe les sociétés contemporaines entre perversion et sublimation.

This article examines the concerns and debates that have arisen in African philosophy over the last few decades, and asks whether it continues to be necessary for African philosophy to take on what the author calls “perverse questions” or “perverse preoccupations” with the West. The author argues that to engage and respond to questions about the intellectual capabilities of African thinkers or the possible existence of philosophical resources in African cultures is to respond to perverse questions. To engage in academic (...) dialogues implicitly or explicitly guided by a request or a felt need to justify and defend the very possibility of African philosophy or African rationality is to engage in perverse and unnecessary dialogues. Because these perverse debates often precede, prevent, or condition the formulation of what count as necessary debates, it is important that they be identified and critically assessed, and when possible, dispensed with. Only then can African philosophy pursue necessary and fruitful debates. (shrink)

The classic formula of disavowal given by Octave Mannoni, “I know well, but all the same,” undergoes interesting and far-reaching permutations in today’s social context. When it comes to dealing with and (not) responding to various crises, we usually point the finger at deniers and their “irrational” attitudes. However, far more common and socially problematic is the attitude that combines full recognition and denial in the same movement. Moreover, knowledge of a problem not only goes seamlessly with ignoring it but (...) seems to make ignoring it possible in the first place. Saying that “we know well” often enables us to ignore the real of that knowledge. Disavowal thus takes a doubly perverse turn, which is the focus of the analysis in this article. (shrink)

We draw on ancient Greek philosophy and contemporary psychosocial theorists to analyse the ethical implications of social policies implemented through the welfare state with the espoused objective of achieving social inclusion. We argue that many such policies establish a boundary between domains of inclusion and exclusion that perversely maintains the very problem such policies are designed to solve. They then also provide ?rationalisations? for social exclusion which imply that such states can be explained?that they are ethical, and so legitimate. We (...) illustrate our argument with reference to a specific area of social policy?Improving Access to Psychological Therapies?and discuss how it impacts on our own area of practice as state employed psychotherapists. We analyse how this policy frames aspects of social exclusion (un(der)employment?) as a ?psychological? problem: a move that grants the excluded a specific kind of identity and then locates the problem of exclusion in this identity. We invoke Plato's Republic to show how this offer of psychological ?help? subliminally suggests that these mental disorders result from individuals' failures to ?know their place? and to ?mind their own business?, rather than as a consequence of complex networks of social (dis)orders, exclusions and injustices within which we are all embedded. (shrink)

For an agent to be motivated by a normatively perverse reason is to be motivated by a normative or evaluative thought as such which, if true, would count as such against the action that it motivates the agent to perform, or against the attitude that it motivates the agent to take. For example, that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad counts, as such, against performing the action. When the thought that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad (...) motivates me as such to perform the action, my motivating reason is normatively perverse. If being motivated by normatively perverse reasons is possible, then what, if anything, is wrong about it? I present and reject some accounts of what may be wrong about normative perversity. In the course of this discussion some desiderata emerge. Then I defend the suggestion that normative perversion is socially undesirable, in that it undermines certain valuable interpersonal and intrapersonal relations. Entering and maintaining these relations is constitutive of valuing people as beings to whom reasonable justification is owed. I show how this account satisfies the desiderata. (shrink)

The central argument of this article lies in the intent to think, from a reading of The Invention of Morel, about the subversion possibilities, simultaneously discursive and operational, of certain structures of capitalism, carried out by discrete elements of society, regardless of their social standing. Discussing Morel himself and his invention, I postulate the hypothesis that Morel is subversive because he is perverse. As a preamble to this discussion, and in an attempt to turn it into a critique of current (...) times, a reading of Slavoj Žižek’s 2009 article entitled “Censorship Today: Violence, or Ecology as a New Opium for the Masses” will be undertaken. Through a comparative analysis of the rational underlying the four antagonisms which, in Žižek’s opinion, will prevent the indefinite reproduction of the current “naturalization” of capitalism in the global world, and Morel and his invention, one concludes the latter’s obscene perversity causes, through exaggeration, potentially destructive effects of the very mechanisms and capitalist subsystems which generated them, thus deconstructing their significant codes. (shrink)

Marking a ground-breaking moment in the debate surrounding bodies and "body politics," Elizabeth Grosz's Space, Time and Perversion contends that only by resituating and rethinking the body will feminism and cultural analysis effect and unsettle the knowledges, disciplines and institutions which have controlled, regulated and managed the body both ideologically and materially. Exploring the fields of architecture, philosophy, and--in a controversial way--queer theory, Grosz shows how these fields have conceptually stripped bodies of their specificity, their corporeality, and the vestigal (...) traces of their production as bodies. Her tour de corpe investigates the work of Michel Foucault, Teresa de Lauretis, Gilles Deleuze, Judith Butler and Alphonso Lingis. Grosz considers their work by examining the ways in which the functioning of bodies transforms understandings of space and time, knowledge and desire. Begining with an exposition of the epistemological implications of bodily and sexual difference, Grosz examines the effects such knowledge have on the reception of meaning. She looks at the relationship between the knowledge of difference and the way that knowledge validates, affirms, avows and valorizes subjects. Grosz then extends this analysis to an investigation of the relationship between space, time, bodies and the spatial "arts" such as architecuture, urban planning and geography. In the last section, Grosz moves toward a radical consideration of bodies and their relationship to transgression and perversity. Controversially showing the ways in which "queer" theory fails to offer a truly transformative conception of bodies and their politics, Grosz finds "queer" a reactive category "which sees itself in opposition to a straight norm and thus defines itself in terms of this norm." Consequentially, "queer" theory inherits the acceptance of an entire range of sexual practices, without "asking what they share and without taking into account the profound tension that may exist among these practices." Grosz's Space, Time and Perversity is a diverse and incisive collection of essays from a renowned feminist philosopher. (shrink)

Weighted voting involves weighting representatives’ votes by the populations that they represent. Such systems have been adopted in some legislative bodies as a remedy for malapportionment, and are sometimes used to elect candidates for the executive branch of government. But they receive little attention. This note observes the neglected vices of weighted voting systems: they violate intuitive conditions of monotonicity and participation. These vices count significantly against the use of weighted voting, and reflecting on why they arise improves our understanding (...) of axioms in social choice theory. (shrink)

The popular fascination with forensic science, DNA bio?banks and TV shows such as CSI have created a belief that the law can track down any criminal and that only a small sample from his or her body is needed to prove whether he or she is guilty or innocent. In recent years, however, there were a number of cases of forensic scientists tampering with DNA evidence. Psychoanalysis raises the question of whether such cases present us with individuals who derive a (...) perverse pleasure from making "mistakes" in their testimonies. For a pervert is not only someone who seeks a particular sexual pleasure , a pervert might very well be someone who enjoys the empowerment of speaking from a position of self-righteousness. When a forensic scientist goes to the extreme of making false claims about DNA evidence, we have the right to ask just why he or she relishes being an authority who can manipulate other people's lives. The question also exists as to why the legal profession has such a hard time questioning expert testimonies and why the public places such faith in the power of DNA. (shrink)

This paper discusses the ethical implications of perverse incentives with regard to autonomous driving. We define perverse incentives as a feature of an action, technology, or social policy that invites behavior which negates the primary goal of the actors initiating the action, introducing a certain technology, or implementing a social policy. As a special form of means-end-irrationality, perverse incentives are to be avoided from a prudential standpoint, as they prove to be directly self-defeating: They are not just a form of (...) unintended side effect that must be balanced against the main goal or value to be realized by an action, technology, or policy. Instead, they directly cause the primary goals of the actors—i.e., the goals that they ultimately pursue with the action, technology, or policy—to be “worse achieved”. In this paper, we elaborate on this definition and distinguish three ideal-typical phases of adverse incentives, where only in the last one the threshold for a perverse incentive is crossed. In addition, we discuss different possible relevant actors and their goals in implementing autonomous vehicles. We conclude that even if some actors do not pursue traffic safety as their primary goal, as part of a responsibility network they incur the responsibility to act on the common primary goal of the network, which we argue to be traffic safety. (shrink)

This paper discusses the ethical implications of perverse incentives with regard to autonomous driving. We define perverse incentives as a feature of an action, technology, or social policy that invites behavior which negates the primary goal of the actors initiating the action, introducing a certain technology, or implementing a social policy. As a special form of means-end-irrationality, perverse incentives are to be avoided from a prudential standpoint, as they prove to be directly self-defeating: They are not just a form of (...) unintended side effect that must be balanced against the main goal or value to be realized by an action, technology, or policy. Instead, they directly cause the primary goals of the actors—i.e., the goals that they ultimately pursue with the action, technology, or policy—to be “worse achieved”. In this paper, we elaborate on this definition and distinguish three ideal-typical phases of adverse incentives, where only in the last one the threshold for a perverse incentive is crossed. In addition, we discuss different possible relevant actors and their goals in implementing autonomous vehicles. We conclude that even if some actors do not pursue traffic safety as their primary goal, as part of a responsibility network they incur the responsibility to act on the common primary goal of the network, which we argue to be traffic safety. (shrink)

Ivan is a gifted pianist, but spends most of his time at the keyboard playing simple blues progressions over and over. Sarah is fluent in French, but avoids every opportunity to converse in that language. Greg lives in a household whose kitchen offers an assortment of tantalizing foods, yet he never eats anything except bagels and cream cheese. Melinda has many friends, with whom she would enjoy socializing, but she forgoes their company to devote all her free time to video (...) games. Clive is a champion mountain climber, but has lately taken to never venturing out of the house. Esther has a masters degree in comparative literature, but now reads nothing but Harlequin romances. And Phil is partial to the Allegros in Bach’s Brandenburg Concerti, but only as background music for dancing, not as something to listen to with attention. (shrink)

This paper explores recent vigilance attending pedophilia in the UK context. It examines governmental and popular responses to the perceived threat posed by child sex offenders, exhibited respectively in provisions for sex offender orders within the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and in press and public campaigns for the “naming and shaming” of paedophiles. These two responses cohabit in current contexts of concern about childhood as innocence and vulnerability, and are worked out against the figure of the paedophile as a (...) “dangerous individual”; nevertheless, they invoke different visions of political community. Developing Foucault's observation that contemporary political rationalities combine two distinct models of political community, that of the juridically constituted polity and that of the society rendered calculable and organized through normalizing models of risk, the paper argues that both of these models are evident in governmental and popular responses to paedophilia. However, where the former, a technical and administrative response to a problem of social order, aims to achieve public safety through the professional prediction and management of risk, the latter is premised on the elimination of danger,demanding the public outing of paedophiles and their exorcism from the community. While these responses contest whether danger can be turned into risk through professional management, they are mutually enhancing in fostering governmental and popular concern with public and community safety. (shrink)

Gaylin and Jennings tell us that we must change the everyday behavior shaping the landscape of modern American society. Our current culture of autonomy is predicated on rationality as the basis of human conduct. But, we are reminded here, man is not inherently rational; appeals to emotion are far more effective than logical argument in changing our conduct.

This paper aims to discuss human experience in the Anthropocene geological era based on contemporary social theorists as Žižek and Badiou. I propose that, in face of the environmental crisis, techno-ecological corporative style sustainability is a perverse response; and this circuit can only be broken by a radical version of environmentalism that antagonizes the hegemonic discourse of our production-and-consumption system – emphasizing politics. The paper is divided into four parts where: a) the term Anthropocene, created by Paul Crutzen among others, (...) is described as the configuration of an era when biosphere disappears as an externality and becomes subordinated to the ensemble of knowledge and powers of liberal-capitalism; b) based on Alain Badiou, I describe the subject as resulting from an event’s truth progressing as fidelity; and the fact that not even the vision of environmental death have had the power to create new environmentalist subjects in place of consumer subjects; c) I analyze the perverse structure of denial that shows the reverse of the hole made positive - namely the appearing of techno-ecological products inviting us to enjoy a qualified consumption as the positived reverse of the environmental crisis; d) finally, after a brief comment about the currents which fight for hegemony in the discursive field of environmentalism, I discuss how the radical ecologism proposes to break the perverse circuit of techno-efficient sustainability by means of the political antagonism. (shrink)

Les discours psychanalytiques sur les normes en matière de sexualité ont souvent conduit à une double opposition : une opposition entre l’approche psychanalytique de la sexualité et d’autres discours : moral, religieux, politique, social et culturel ; une opposition au sein même du champ psychanalytique entre différents courants. Cet article propose l’étude de cette deuxième controverse à partir de trois versions socio-historiques de cette question : la transgression, la perversion et la subversion. L’apparition de chacune d’entre elles fait apparaître (...) des oppositions théoriques dans le champ de la psychanalyse qui conduisent parfois jusqu’à des scissions. Ces oppositions ne seraient-elles pas parfois le reflet de positions idéologiques et/ou traduiraient-elles la difficulté de composer avec d’autres approches? (shrink)

Les discours psychanalytiques sur les normes en matière de sexualité ont souvent conduit à une double opposition : une opposition entre l’approche psychanalytique de la sexualité et d’autres discours : moral, religieux, politique, social et culturel ; une opposition au sein même du champ psychanalytique entre différents courants. Cet article propose l’étude de cette deuxième controverse à partir de trois versions socio-historiques de cette question : la transgression, la perversion et la subversion. L’apparition de chacune d’entre elles fait apparaître (...) des oppositions théoriques dans le champ de la psychanalyse qui conduisent parfois jusqu’à des scissions. Ces oppositions ne seraient-elles pas parfois le reflet de positions idéologiques et/ou traduiraient-elles la difficulté de composer avec d’autres approches? (shrink)

Why has little progress been made in resolving the debate about the concept of sexual perversion? I suggest that the stalemate is due to misunderstandings and poor methodology. I develop a new methodology for resolving disputes about the correct analysis of the contents of concepts where the disputes have social and political ramifications. When deciding between competing analyses of a concept, we should not just consider facts about our inferential and judgemental dispositions with respect to that concept; we should (...) also incorporate facts about its desired social function. This provides additional resources for making decisions about which analysis to choose, when information about our dispositions alone cannot determine an answer. (shrink)

This paper explores the perversion of reality in the context of advanced technologies, such as AI, VR, and AR, through the lens of Jean Baudrillard’s theory of hyperreality and the precession of simulacra. By examining the transformative effects of these technologies on our perception of reality, with a particular focus on the usage of digital avatars, the paper highlights the blurred distinction between the real and the simulated, where the copy becomes more ‘real’ than the original. Drawing on Baudrillard’s (...) concept of hyperreality, the paper delves into the perversion of reality as individuals seek refuge in virtual pleasure paradises and embrace artificial pleasures through their digital avatars, disconnecting from genuine human experiences. The convergence of AI, VR, and AR technologies amplifies this hyperreal condition, where digital avatars mimic or surpass the depth of human relationships, challenging our understanding of what is real. In line with Baudrillard’s theory, the paper explores the objectification and commodification of reality within digital spaces, specifically examining the digital avatars’ role in the erosion of genuine human connections. It explores the implications of these avatars in terms of consent, exploitation, and loss of authenticity, echoing Baudrillard’s concerns about the distortion of reality in contemporary society. Recognizing the implications of these technologies, the paper calls for a critical reflection on their transformative power. It emphasizes the need for a nuanced understanding of the hyperreal condition and ethical responsibility in engaging with AI, VR, and AR, particularly in relation to the usage of digital avatars. By resisting the seductive allure of digital escapism and preserving genuine human connections, we can navigate the perversion of reality and cultivate empathy, compassion, and meaningful interactions that transcend the simulated experiences offered by technology. (shrink)

One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like “race” and “sex” and “homosexuality” and “perversion” actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from clear that (...) these two commitments are consistent. The sort of mismatch between belief and underlying nature constructionists’ suppose is often taken to indicate a failure of reference. Reliance on a causal-historical account of reference allows the preservation of reference, but unfortunately, constructionists' appropriation of causal historical accounts of reference is beset by difficulties that do not attend natural kind theorists’ appeals to such accounts. Here, I set out these difficulties, but argue that they can be answered, allowing terms for apparently natural human kinds refer to some sort of social construction about which there is massive error. (shrink)

By conceiving interpellation as a general mechanism for the social constitution of human subjects, authors such as Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek have emancipated interpellation from its conservative roots as an ideological dispositif. I examine this conceptual shift through the work of Ernesto Laclau, who, using interpellation as a model for the Gramscian process of articulation, shifts it from the conservative to the radical side of the political ledger. But, we will see, Laclau’s theory runs into various difficulties. (...) I get around these by suggesting a generalization of the concept of interpellation that realizes Althusser’s seminal project of combining his own anti-humanist reading of Marx with Lacan’s “return to Freud.”. (shrink)

Observers, including the Catholic Church, have consistently demonstrated a keen ability to identify instances of rhetoric, such as advertising, that are distasteful or offensive. Although they have not necessarily characterized such endeavors as immoral, I submit that a developing notion of “natural rhetoric” may permit such criticism by contextualizing rhetoric as natural, unnatural or even perverse. Following this approach I assert that natural rhetoric, in service to reason, makes possible the apprehension of the basic good of societas. Consequently, rhetoric of (...) the unnatural variety undermines this teleological purpose; when conceived as a perversion it might not only undermine the mission of natural rhetoric, but it might do so in such a way that it harms one or more individuals. After articulating and testing this exploratory thesis with two exemplars, I offer implications for Thomistic natural law and for those who formulate the Catholic Church’s positions on social communications. (shrink)

The sublime and the abject -- Sade pro and contra Sade -- Dark enlightenment or barbaric science -- The Auschwitz confessions -- The perverse society.

In this essay, I interpret the wildly successful book series Freakonomics as a discourse of perversion. Drawing upon Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and Žižekian cultural criticism, I first explore how the books function as neoclassical economic theory in practice, then I explain how the series enjoins us to adopt reading strategies that turn us into perverts. Perversion, rather than a moral judgment, is best considered a structural inversion of the position of enjoyment, schematized as a ◊$. Freakonomics seeks to (...) explain all human behavior as the result of a “hidden force” that organizes social reality—this force is, in every case, an ontological market structure that we all unconsciously obey. The result is that we end up identifying with the mechanisms of the capitalist free market rather than our own idiosyncratic, idiotic desires, and see our desires retroactively narrated as the result of these market mechanisms. If perversion is, following Lacan, about propping up the law, I argue that Freakonomics not only props up, but instantiates, the big Other of the market by disavowing a noneconomic space and registering all of social reality under a single market structure. Freakonomics gives readers, as Lacan puts it, the “ père-version ” of events. (shrink)

Two recent discussions concerning punishment of the socially deprived reach conflicting conclusions. Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth argue that we should sympathize with the predicament of the poor and therefore mitigate their sentences. Peter Chau disputes von Hirsch and Ashworth’s conclusion, contending that having to face strong temptations is not an appropriate ground for reducing anyone’s punishment for their crimes. I argue that neither von Hirsch and Ashworth’s account nor Chau’s critique of it is persuasive. I then take up (...) the challenge of showing why social deprivation renders punishment problematic. I contend that it establishes a perverse incentive structure that is persistent and powerful, requiring the disadvantaged to exercise self-control on an ongoing basis. Repeated acts of self-control are difficult, especially for youths whose skills at it are not yet fully developed. Also, in a variety of more and less subtle ways, social deprivation reduces the incentives for self-control and may work to stunt its development. In closing, I briefly consider the options for responding to the crimes of the chronically disadvantaged. (shrink)

Why does the law spurn win-win transactions? -- Things we can't consent to, though no one knows why -- A parable -- Lessons -- The social choice connection -- Why is the law so full of loopholes? -- The irresistible wrong answer -- What is wrong with the irresistible answer? -- The voting analogy -- Turning the analogy into an identity -- Intentional fouls -- Why is the law so either/or? -- The proverbial rigidity of the law -- Line drawing (...) as a matter of life and death -- Why don't we punish all we condemn? -- The undercriminalization problem -- Multicriterial ranking and the undercriminalization problem -- Final thoughts. (shrink)

This paper examines recent developments in U.K. utility regulation from a business ethics perspective. The regulatory framework that facilitated privatisation of the utility companies has foundations based upon free market principles involving a transfer from regulation to competitive markets wherever possible. Where competition is not feasible, continuing economic regulation is relied upon, designed to mirror the competitive market to induce, through comparative competition and the price capping mechanism, incentives for greater efficiency. The New Labour Government, having fundamentally reviewed this framework (...) when it came to office, has surprisingly endorsed its basic tenets. However, it wishes to superimpose social responsibility regulations designed to achieve social policy rather than economic objectives. This interventionist approach is in itself in conflict with the free market inspired regulatory framework but additionally, the imposition of social policy objectives creates fundamental ambiguities within the framework for the key stakeholders. The paper concludes that the Government''s policy, by eliciting stakeholder confusion and perverse behaviour, could be counter-productive but that ethical theories and frameworks can contribute to thinking in this vital area of the economy. (shrink)

Nos encontramos en una época complicada que ha acelerado el éxito del denominado capitalismo de la vigilancia. La pandemia ha confirmado laimplantación de un nuevo sistema de poder favorecido por la sociedad digital, aunque no identificado con la misma, que combina de forma muy criticable clásicos binomios como libertad-seguridad o individuo-colectividad. Es un sistema que supuestamente ofrece más libertad a los individuos, si bien a a vez utiliza los resultados del ejercicio de esa libertad para guiar las conductas de todos (...) y ofrecer mayor certeza, seguridad y eficacia social. (shrink)

Commenting on the role of psychoanalysis at the time of the posthuman, Véronique Voruz notes dryly that “posthumanismposthumanism is a discourse that brings people together in a conversation where nobody knows what the other is saying, but everyone believes they understand each other to a sufficient degree for a conversation to take place”. “Posthumanismposthumanism” is both symptom and signifiersignifier and thus organizes a social bondsocial bond, at least between academics where the jouissancejouissance or pleasure of discourse compensates for the lacklack (...) of meaning. This is both fortunate and ironic because one of the features of posthumanismposthumanism is precisely the decline and even absence of traditional forms of social bondsocial bond, that is to say those organized by signifiers. In this era of planetary-scale technology, the social bondsocial bond is pre-eminently mediated by objects organized in informationinformation networks. The posthuman “internet of things” provides the paradigm of communicationcommunication in which everything is “chipped” and rendered equivalent: humans, animalsanimal and machines. All are objects that relay readable datadata leaving open the question of whether there is another face to these objects that is unreadable, and whose register therefore in psychoanalytic terms would not be meaning but jouissancejouissance. (shrink)

It is this very contention that sits at the heart of Matthew Flisfeder’s, Algorithmic Desire: Towards a New Structuralist Theory of Social Media (2021). In spite of the accusation that, today, our social media is in fact hampering democracy and subjecting us to increasing forms of online and offline surveillance, for Flisfeder (2021: 3), ‘[s]ocial media remains the correct concept for reconciling ourselves with the structural contradictions of our media, our culture, and our society’. With almost every aspect of our (...) contemporary lives now mediated through the digital, the significance of the algorithm maintains a pertinent importance in making sense of the social and psychic investments that our interactions on social media, as well as other forms of digital media, rely upon and encourage. The socio-political tensions and contradictions that such interaction prescribes remains a reoccurring theme throughout Algorithmic Desire, with Flisfeder masterfully navigating the problems and pitfalls of a burgeoning digital infrastructure that is redefining our lives as social beings. What becomes apparent from Flisfeder’s account is how debates and discussions regarding the algorithm can be couched in a number of pressing concerns, including the proliferation of online misinformation and the contradictions inherent to our freedom and security. While these debates are drawn together through the prism of the algorithm, it is mostly with regards to the medium of social media that Flisfeder examines how our desire and enjoyment are algorithmically organized. This focus is expertly followed throughout the book’s eight chapters, producing a critically engaging inquiry that continually considers the socio-political tensions and ambiguities that frame and sustain our digital media interactions. Ultimately, it is this contention that lends further support to Flisfeder’s assertion that algorithms play a key role in reading our desire. In the discussion that follows, this reading will be critically considered by tracing and outlining a number of key significances underpinning Flisfeder’s approach. Most notably, this will require a discussion of the Lacanian conception of desire; the effects of disavowal and cynical perversion; the importance of ‘maintaining appearances’; and, finally, the significance of the social media metaphor. (shrink)

Rankings of countries by perceived corruption have emerged over the past decade as leading indicators of governance and development. Designed to highlight countries that are known to be corrupt, their objective is to encourage transparency and good governance. High rankings on corruption, it is argued, will serve as a strong incentive for reform. The practice of ranking and labeling countries "corrupt," however, may have a perverse effect. Consistent with Social Labeling Theory, we argue that perceptual indices can encourage the loss (...) of needed investment and, thus, contribute to higher rates of corruption within unfavorably ranked countries. In effect, corruption indices may inhibit foreign direct investment, the effect of which is to encourage the status quo in terms of corruption ranking. Using an experimental study design, we test the effects of country corruption rankings on the assessment of country investment desirability and find ranking exposure causes shifts in country investment desirability for 10 of 12 countries studied. These findings suggest that corruption rankings, which are based on perceptions of corruption, may cause country isolation and a reduction in legitimate means of investment. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the same logic that imbues the state with the legitimate authority to punish also imposes restraints on that authority. It suggests that scholarship on punishment puts more emphasis on the political legitimacy of state punishment rather than on the moral question of what is deserved by criminals. It turns to Rousseau's social contract based justification for punishment as a crucial resource in that effort. It begins by closely examining Rousseau's claim that the criminal consents to punishment, (...) and by suggesting that his seemingly absurd and perverse claims are actually defensible. It goes on to clarify two senses in which Rousseau's understanding of consent serves to ground the rights of the guilty. First, it argues that the idea of consent itself legitimizes some punishment but also sets strict limits on when and how the state can punish. Second, it argues that Rousseau's account of welfare rights also sets a limit on when the state may rightfully punish. The final two sections of the chapter consider the role of punishment outside the social contract in Rousseau's theory and suggest an important contrast between Rousseau's and Hobbes's conceptions of punishment. (shrink)

It is easy to dispose of the historical aspect of this question. When Aristotle affirmed that the family is more natural than the State, in the sense of original rather than final or necessary, and taught his contemporaries to regard the State as the result of a gradual development through the family and the tribe, he adopted a viewpoint which would probably find universal endorsement to-day. Only a particularly perverse writer would endeavour to revive the controversy as to whether or (...) not the institution of the State began with explicit resolutions concluded at a specific date. No doubt there are plentiful instances of the establishment of particular States through some agreement or contract on the part of its members. The case of the Pilgrim Fathers is often cited as a classical example. But this does not give us an original contract. We should seek one in vain. (shrink)

It is easy to dispose of the historical aspect of this question. When Aristotle affirmed that the family is more natural than the State, in the sense of original rather than final or necessary, and taught his contemporaries to regard the State as the result of a gradual development through the family and the tribe, he adopted a viewpoint which would probably find universal endorsement to-day. Only a particularly perverse writer would endeavour to revive the controversy as to whether or (...) not the institution of the State began with explicit resolutions concluded at a specific date. No doubt there are plentiful instances of the establishment of particular States through some agreement or contract on the part of its members. The case of the Pilgrim Fathers is often cited as a classical example. But this does not give us an original contract. We should seek one in vain. (shrink)

Ethical conduct is a maxim in scholarly research as well as scholarly endeavour generally. In the case of research involving humans, few if any question the necessity for ethics approval of procedures by ethics boards or committees. However, concerns have been raised about the appropriateness of ethics approval processes for social science research arguing that the orientation of ethics boards and committees to biomedical and experimental scientific research, institutional risk aversion, and other factors lead to over-protection of research participants and (...) overly restrictive processes that delay and sometimes prevent important social science research. This is particularly significant when social science research is required to respond to social, environmental, or health emergencies and in contract research projects for the reasons explained. This analysis of an ethics approval case study adds to increasing concerns that ethics approval processes can have perverse effects in the social sciences. While a single case study does not provide generalizable findings, in-depth analysis of a significant case can identify issues that need to be further explored. Recommendations offer pathways for facilitating social science research including in emergency situations in which timeliness is important and in collaborative approaches such as participatory action research, while maintaining high ethical standards. (shrink)

This article starts with a historical questioning of postmodernity religious phenomenon, revisiting the "Masters of Suspicion", trying to detect the "perversions" of religion. The article presents the spirituality as something different from religion. Spirituality as the expression of the ancient spiritual traditions and religion as their historical formulations. It is argued that a Holistic Spirituality would seek convergences between all spiritual traditions. From that point we examine some of the major contemporary challenges, namely neoliberalism, postmodernity, as well as matters relating (...) to Justice, Peace and Ecology. The holism is indicated as output to a new paradigm. Finally, we intend to combine the holistic paradigm to the paradigm of liberation theology. Thus, the article concludes with practical issues: the problem of mediations of God's Kingdom, for example: a) the Christian churches today would be mediating the Kingdom? What about the religious life); b) some urgent issues of justice, peace, ecological respect, option for the poor and oppressed, looking for a non-capitalist economic model and more direct democracy, the need for active non-violence, the presence of grace in the midst of strategic and tactics mediations, as well as practice Spirituality following the Master of Galilee. (shrink)

The Milgram obedience experiments called into question the limits of obedience to authority figures. The perverse consequences of concerns over the Milgram experiments are that researchers must now submit to the authority of ethics review boards and that researchers are considered prima facie to be threats to participants. These assumptions are questioned widely by social science researchers, but this article argues that these assumptions seem to have blinded analysts to the possibility that there may be a group of participants that (...) might also be threatened by the power of authority figures in a research situation—researchers. Regarding the second point, social science researchers “interviewing up” may themselves be threatened, whether overtly or covertly, by their participants’ relative authority and power. In cases where researchers work with extraordinarily powerful respondents, what might IRBS and the researchers they work for learn from the Milgram experiments? (shrink)

Professor Hartshorne, together with many other recent thinkers, has rightly rebelled against these distortions and perversions of theological doctrine. He cannot accept the view that "the most wicked acts are caused by God, made inevitable even though 'not necessary') by his decision". He is repelled by the "otherworldliness" of traditional religion, so often embraced as "the flight from the one task we surely face, that of human welfare on earth, to a questionable one, the winning of a heavenly passport". He (...) objects to religious irrationalism and "obscurantism--the theory that we can best praise God by indulging in contradiction and semantical nonsense". (shrink)